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PURUṢOTTAMAJĪ
A STUDY



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-C O N T E N T S-

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-P R E F A C E-

Whatever I have to say regarding the thesis, is stated in the statement. I have therefore nothing to add to it except performing the pleasant duty of acknowledging my deep debt of gratitude to those who have helped me.

I am unable to express adequately my deep debt of gratitude to my guiding teacher Prof. G. H. Bhatt. He took a personal interest in my work and constantly encouraged and guided me through out my study. Without his guidance, I doubt whether I would have been able to finish my study.

I am highly obliged by His Holiness Shri. Vrajratnalalji Maharaj of Bada Mandir, Surat. He showed keen interest in my work and helped me whenever I approached him.

I am also thankful to Shri. C. H. Shastri of Surat. He supplied me with many of the works of Puruṣottamajī and of others from his personal Library. Without his help it would have been very difficult for me to secure most of the works.

I express here my thanks to all the institutions and individuals, who have helped me in various ways.

S. D. Bhatt

" S T A T E M E N T "

The popularity, enjoyed by the Puṣṭimārgīya Vaiṣṇavism in Gujarat and other parts of Western India, naturally attracts the attention of a student to attempt a complete study of the doctrines of this particular school of the Vedānta. Vallabha is however very brief in his writing, to the extent that it is difficult to understand his works without the help of a commentary. His son Viṭṭhalanātha, though a man of genius and ability, appears to have been concerned with the propagation of the Sampradāya more than a thorough explanation of the theories propounded by his father. Looking to the long line of the Gosvāmīs who followed them, one can see that Puruṣottama was the most prolific writer in the school. He gave us voluminous works in a fairly large number and essayed to explain the fundamentals of the philosophy of his school. After Puruṣottama many works, critical and explanatory, were written by the followers of the school, but before him, the Ācāryas of the Sampradāya like Gokulanātha and Harirāya were more or less concerned with the teaching and propagation of the path of devotion to the masses. Thus Puruṣottama occupies a unique place in the history of the Sampradāya. If one studies the works of Puruṣottama, then alone one can fully understand the

Suddhādvaita. If again some light is thrown on the life and times of Puruṣottama, it will be very helpful from the point of view of the history of the Sampradāya as a whole. Hence the thesis, "Puruṣottamjī- A Study."

To a student of history, mediaeval India presents a very hazy picture full of thousand figures. There was a large number of saints and teachers and paṇḍitās belonging to various schools of thought, some established their own schools also. There were also many Princes and Kings. A halo of myths and legends was woven round the names of great teachers and scholars. This being the position, it is very difficult to give an exact account of the life of any teacher. Puruṣottama is no exception to this. Puruṣottama's life is described by Shri. M.T. Telivale in an article in the Puṣṭibhaktisudhā. Vol.V.No.3 and by Shri. H.O. Shastri in his Hindi Introduction to the Avatāravādāvalī and in a Gujarati work, 'Puruṣottamjī Mahārājanun caritra'. I examined these sources in the light of whatever other information I could gather from various other sources and I have tried to give as much information as possible, with a view to be as near to the truth as I could. I have also recorded as many traditions as I came to know.

Another difficulty was in securing his works. Thanks

however, to the help and guidance of my teacher Prof. G.H. Bhatt and the co-operation of His Holiness Shri.Vrajratnalalji maharaj and Shri. C.H.Shastrī of Surat, that I could secure most of his works. Puruṣottama is said to have written so much that one can never be definite as to the exact number of works, written by him. The lists given by Shri.Telivale and Shri. H.O.Shastrī may or may not be conclusive. Some of the works, listed there, could not be found by me. Some works are again said to have been fathered upon others by himself. I had therefore to satisfy myself with as many as works as I could get. Some of them had to be examined from the point of view of authorship also. I had also to bear in mind the traditional view-point regarding some of them. I should also make it clear that I did not examine the works from the textual point of view. As Puruṣottama is a recent author, the question of inter^lpolations and all that does not arise to a very great extent.

I studied the works of Puruṣottama from three points of view as follows:-

As I found Puruṣottama to be a very good argumentator in the Sampradāya, I tried to study his Vādepāddhati. His method

of carefully analysing the theories of his own school, comparing them with those of other schools and criticising the latter, is worthy of a critical study.

Secondly Puruṣottama is mainly an interpreter. It is therefore necessary to see how he interpreted the works, he has commented upon. The Ācāryas of various schools of the Vedānta raised their systems of thought on the basis of the Prasthānas viz. the Śrutis, the Gītā, the Brahmasūtras and the Bhāgavata Purāṇas, the last being included in the list by Vallabha. It is thus a topic of study as to how the Ācāryas have interpreted the Prasthānas. In the Thesis I have tried to examine some of the interpretation of Vallabha in the light of what Puruṣottama has said with regard to them. Here ofcourse I have mainly discussed the interpretations of the Śrutis and the Sūtras.

Thirdly Puruṣottama is a very capable exponent of the Śuddhādvaita system of philosophy. Vallabha's theories have been explained in various works. Thus for instance Prin. S. N. Dasgupta has devoted one chapter to it in his 'History of Indian Philosophy' Vol. IV. In Gujarati, perhaps the best explanation of the Śuddhādvaita theories is given by Prof. M. G. Shastri in his 'Śuddhādvaita-Siddhānta-Pradīpa'. I have however followed

Puruṣottama's exposition of the 'Suddhādvaita and have tried to show where his analysis leads us, after comparing the doctrines of this school with those of Śaṅkara and Rāmānuja and others also whenever necessary.

At the end I have tried to give an evaluation of Puruṣottama, especially his place in the Sampradāya and in the history of Indian thought. What did Puruṣottama think of the conditions prevailing in the Sampradāya at that time? What did he do for it? How was he understood and appreciated by others? How could he influence the Sampradāya? All these questions, I have tried to answer on the basis of his works and the hearsays about him.

The life and works of Puruṣottama have not been studied so far, and thus the Thesis contains my humble contribution to the knowledge of Sanskrit Literature and Philosophy.

"SYNOPSIS"

Chapter. I.

Vallabha-Sampradāya-its growth and development.

- (I) Introductory-Medieval period in Indian thought-Śaṅkara and his teaching-Vaiṣṇavism and Śaivism, popularised in South by Tamil saints-muslim invasions, their influence on Indian life and thought, Hinduism turned more and more inwards-attempts were made to explain Vaiṣṇavism as evolved from the Vedic literature.
- (II) Ācāryas-Śaṅkara's commentary, the earliest commentary extant-Bhāskara-Rāmānuja-Nimbārka-Madhva-Visṇusvāmin, his connection with Vallabha-Śrīkantha and other Ācāryas.
- (III) Popular movements-Devotion to God and not dialectics-Rāmāṇḍa, Nanak, Kabir, and other-Saints did not care for political changes-Caitanya-Hitaḥarivaṇśa.
- (IV) Vallabhācārya-life and works.
- (V) Viṭṭhalanātha and his descendants-Gopīnātha-Viṭṭhaleśa's life and works-Cokulanātha-Kalyāṇarāya-Harirāya.
- (VI) Spread of Vallabha-Sampradāya in Gujarat-existence of Vaiṣṇavism in Gujarat from very early times-influence of other Sampradāyas-Jainism-how it gave way to Puṣṭimārgīya Vaiṣṇavism-Political upheavals in Gujarat-Visits of Vallabha and Viṭṭhaleśa to Gujarat.Viṭṭhaleśa's disciples in Gujarat-General conditions-Surat, centre of business, and wealthy-its description in the Indudūta.

Chapter. II.

Purusottama's life.

- (I) Genealogy-Vallabha was a householder, hence a line of direct descendants-three orders of scholars, Vaisnavas, Bhattas, and Gosvāmis-Vallabha and Viṭṭhaleśa call themselves Dīksita-Title Goswāmi, perhaps after receiving Imperial Firmans-Purusottama, seventh in descent from Vallabha.
- (II) Date and place of birth-Generally accepted year of Purusottama's birth, V.S. 1724-horoscope of Purusottama-year of birth, V.S. 1714-Gokula, his probable birth place.
- (III) The temple at Surat, Image of Bālekṛṣṇa, history, how it came to Vrajarāya and Purusottama-after Purusottama.
- (IV) Study and scholarship-Kṛṣṇacandra, his Guru-Traditional account regarding Purusottama's scholarship-Purusottama, a great scholar, referring to many works and authors-Traditional verse regarding his scholarship-Great scholars, kept by him.
- (V) Travels and Digvijaya-said to have travelled all over India, and defeated many scholars in Śāstrārtha-visits to Dumas-very probable.
- (VI) Private life-Three wives, two sons, one daughter-passed most of his time in writing-kept about nine scribes-three copies of all his works-Purusottama, as a scribe-Surat, wealthy and prosperous, but Purusottama led a simple life-Purusottama, an artist, one picture and five paper-cuts, in Badamandir, Surat.

(3)-

(VII) Contemporaries -Herirāya-his connection with Puruṣottama-
two stories about it-Vitṭhalarāya of Capaseni-Śrī-
Vallabha-list of contemporary Gosvāmis-other
contemporaries-an age of commentaries and compilations-
according to tradition, Appayya Dīkṣita and Puruṣottama
had a Śāstrārtha and the former was defeated-the account
does not seem to be correct-similar tradition regarding
Bhāskararāya-contact between Puruṣottama and Bhāskara-
-rāya, very probable.

(VIII) Disciples of Puruṣottama-Bhaṭṭa Tuljārāma-Venīdatta
Vyāsa-Gopālajī Sācorā.

(IX) Ending years/we do not know when Puruṣottama died--
Puruṣottama's gift of everything to another Puruṣottama
in V.S. 1781-Telivāla saw one manuscript dated V.S. 1810,
belonging to Puruṣottama-Puruṣottama lived a very long
life.

Chapter. III.

Puruṣottama's works.

(I) Introductory-Puruṣottama, the greatest writer in the
Sāmpredāya-list of his works as given by H.O. Shastri
and Telivāla-division into independent works and
commentaries-further division into Avatāravadāvalī,
other independent works, commentaries on the works of
Vallabha and Viṭṭhaleśa and commentaries on other works.

list of works, described in the chapter.

(II) Avatāravādāvelī-24 or 52 Vādagranthas-Purusottama's remarks about his own Vādagranthas-(1)&(2) Prāhastavāda and its commentary-three sub-Vādas-Commentary on the Vāda-Did he comment upon all the Vādas or only Prāhastā? Structure of Prāhastā-(3) Paṇḍitakarabhindipālavāda-(4) Bheda-bheda-svarūpa-nirṇaya-(5) Pratīkṛtipūjanavāda-(6) Sṛṣṭibhedavāda-(7) Khyāti-vāda-(8) Andhakāravāda-(9) Brāhmaṇatvādidēvatēvāda-(10) Jīva-pratibimbavakhaṇḍanavāda-(11) Āvirbhāvatīrobhāvavāda-(12) Pratibimbavāda-(13) Bhaktyutkarsavāda-(14) Khalālapana-vidh-vamsavāda-(15) Bāṃsavāda-(16) Mūrtipūjanavāda-(17) Ūrdhavapundra-dhāraṇavāda-(18) Śaṅkha-cakra-dhāraṇavāda-(19) Tulasīmālā-dhāraṇavāda-(20) Upadeśa-viśayaśaṅkānirāśavāda-(21) Bhāgavata-svarūpaviśayaśaṅkānirāśavāda-(22) Svavṛttivāda-(23-26) Jīvavyēpakatvakhaṇḍanavāda, Vastrosevavāda, Abhāvavāda, & Ātmavāda-(27) Bhaktirasatvavāda-ascribed to Pītāmbara-an analysis of the Vāda.

(III) Other independent works-(28) Prasthānaratnākara-not complete-contents of the extent portion-plan of the work (29) Samprapā^{ka}śrṇaya-(30) Mukti^{ka}intāmaṇi-(31) Dravyasuddhi-its purpose-contents-(32) Utsavapratāna-discussion of festivals-a kālanirṇayagrantha-work, held in high esteem-(33) Utsavabhāvanukrama.

(IV) Commentaries on the works of Vallabha and Viṭṭhaleśa-

(34) Anubhāsyaprakāśa-dual authorship of Anubhāsyamany commentaries on Anubhāsyaprakāśa of Puruṣottama-two versions of Anubhāsyā-Arguments for and against the alleged Śrīmadbhāṣya-Publication of some parts of the said Bhāṣya-Telivala's view about it-no reference to the said Bhāṣya in Puruṣottama's works-Bhāvaprakāśikā -a study of the Vṛtti-only first Adhyāya revised by Puruṣottama-Puruṣottama not its author-Guṇopasamhāra-pādevivarana-difference between the Prakāśa and the Vivarana-(35) Nyāyamālā-(36) Suvarṇasūtra- contents of Vidvanmandana-other commentaries-Suvarṇasūtra-its title-(37) Āvaranabhāṅga-Yojanā-three chapters of the Tattvadīpanibandha-Vallabha's Prakāśa on it, not complete-Viṭṭhaleśa's Prakāśa also not finished.-Puruṣottama's Yojanā on the remaining part-Chapter I-contents-does 'Sāstrārtha mean Cītārtha?-Prakāśa-commentaries on it-Āvaranabhāṅga-question of authorship-chapter-II.contents-chapter.III-Āvarana-bhāṅga and Yojanā-interrelation of three chapters-(38) Sōdāśaparakaranagranthasaṅgati-(39) Commentary on Yamunāstaks-(40) Commentary on Bālabodha-(41) Commentary

- on Siddhāntamuktāvalī-(42) Commentary on Puṣṭipravāha-
 maryādā-(43) Commentary on Siddhāntarahasya- (44)
 commentary on Navaratra- (45) Commentary on Anthākarana-
 -probodha- (48) Commentary on Pañcapādyā- (49) Commentary
 on Sannyāsanirṇaya- (50) Commentary⁹² on Nirodhalakṣaṇa-
 (51) Commentary on Sevāphala- (52.53) Commentaries on
 Bhaktihansa- Tīrtha and Viveka- (54) Bhāvārthādhikāraṇa-
 bhāṣyaprakāśa- Vallabha's Bhāṣya on Pūrvamīmāṃsā ,
 incomplete- Commentary, ascribed to Yādupati- Puruṣottama-
 the author-(55) Pūrvamīmāṃsākārikāvivarana- contents of
 the Kārikās- Commentary of Puruṣottama- Nirṇāyaka-kārikās
 on the first Sūtra-(56) Subodhinīprakāśa- Subodhinī only
 on some parts of the Bhāgavata- comparison with the
 last chapter of the Nibandha- (57,58) Minor commentaries
 on Bhāgavata- (59) Gāyatrīārthaprakāśakārikāvivarana-
 (60) Nyāsādeśavivṛtivivarana- Nyāsādeśa verse- its
 authorship- (61) Patrāvalambantīkā- (62) Vallabhāṣṭaka-
 vivarana.
- (V) Commentaries on other works- (63) Māṇḍūkyaopanīṣaddīpikā-
 Puruṣottama's commentaries on Upanīṣads - Commentary
 on first two chapters of Gaudapādakārikās also-
 (64) Nṛsimhottaratāpinīyupanīṣaddīpikā- Arthasaṅgraha-

(65)Kaivalyopanīśadārthasaṅgraha- (66)Brahmopanīśadārthasaṅgraha(67)Introduction to Amṛatarāṅginī- study of the commentary- the commentary not of Puruṣottama but of Vrajarāya-Introduction of Puruṣottama.

(VI)Remarks -Account of as many works of Puruṣottama, as could be found-chronological order of his works, not possible nor necessary.

Chapter.IV.

Dialectics and interpretation.

- (I) Introductory- style of Sanskrit Śāstric- writers- style of Puruṣottama.
- (II) Method and approach-Pramāṇa and Prameya methods of exposition-Puruṣottama's method, comparative and analytical- instances.
- (III)Dialectics-Platonic Dialectic and Vādapaddhati- Vāda as explained by Naiyāyikas- Jalpa and Vitandā- three features of a Vāda-Vādagrāntas of Puruṣottama, examined- Prahasavāda-Pāṇḍitakarabhindipālavāda-Bhedābheda- Svarūpanirṇaya-Srṣṭibhedavāda- Khyātivāda- Andhakāroṣāda- Pratibimbavāda-Jīvapratibimbavakhaṇḍanavāda-Khalālapana-vidhvamsavāda-General observations of the Vāda-grāntas of Puruṣottama-conditions of an Indian Vāda-satisfied-Hetvābhāsas, explained by Puruṣottama-

Puruṣottama, an honest debator- high standard of Vēda, maintained-charge of Punarukta against Puruṣottama, discuss-
-ed.

- (IV) Important refutations-of Śūnyavēda, Syādvēda, Paramānuvēda, abhāvas, Dehāparimāṇa and Vyāpakatva of Jīvas-refutation of Dualism-against Rāmānuja and Bhāskara-defence of Bhāskara against Vācaspati Miśra-against Śaṅkara-Refutation of Pratibimbavēda-against Dharmarāja Dīkṣita-against Śaṅkara-general observations on his refutations.
- (V) Interpretation of the Śrutis-relative authority of the four Prasthānas-Svāt^ah^hprāmāṇyavēda and Apauruṣeyatva-attempts at ^hHarmonisation of various passages-Śūddhādvaita way of interpretation-Brahma and its attributes-Upabrmha-na- relation of the Pūrva and Uttara Kāṇḍas-Upāsana-explanation of Upaniṣads-critical examination of Puruṣottama's commentary on Māṇḍūkya Upaniṣad and Gaudapāḍakārikās.
- (VI) Interpretation of the Sūtras-examination of Vallabha's interpretation of Brahmasūtras in the light of Puruṣottama's commentary.
- (VII) Interpretation of the Gītā-Puruṣottama's explanation in his introduction to the Amṛtatarāṅginī-Bhāgavatapurāṇa.
- (VIII) Puruṣottamaś, as an interpreter-very faithful and brilliant exponent and interpreter of the Śūddhādvaita works.

Chapter.V.

Exposition of the Śuddhādvaita.

- (I) Introductory-Vallabha, very brief in his writing-Vitthaleśa, more concerned with the establishment of the Sampradāya-Purusottama's attempt to explain clearly the theories of Vallabha-Purusottamas, credited with expounding wrong theories-hence an attempt to show his exposition.
- (II) Theory of knowledge-knowledge is infinite but it can be understood as tenfold-knowledge, not transitory-another classification into Sāttvika, Rājasa and Tāmasa-indeterminate and determinate knowledge-theories of Śaṅkara and Rāmānuja about the same-classification of the determinate-doubt-error-khyāti, according to the Śuddhādvaita, compared with the views of others-decision-Pratyakṣa and Parokṣa jñāna-Śaṅkara's view criticised-memory-dream-difference between dream and waking state-deep sleep-reflection, shame, fear etc-Correctness of experience-Śaṅkara's position in the subject-object-relationship-criticism of it-Rāmānuja's view-Śuddhādvaita view.
- (III) Means of proof-Pramāṇa, explained by Purusottama-perception-Indriyas-Objects of Indriyas-Tamas and Pratibimba-Abhāva, not accepted-function and operation of sense-faculties-Vṛtti-Buddhi-Process of our ordinary knowledge-intuitive perception of God-Anumāna-process of inference-three

divisions-Purusottama does not accept the Kevalānvayi-
 further classification into Svārtha and Parārtha-Syllogism-
 verbal testimony-Vedas, independent Pramāṇa-character of
 words and their relation to object-Śuddhādvaita view-
 how a word is heard-Śabdabrahman, Nāmaprapaṇca-Vācakatva-
 Śaṅketa-Śabdaśakti-Śabda, not Pravartaka-Smṛtis-Purāṇas-
 other Pramāṇas not accepted-about self-validity of
 knowledge.

(IV) Brahman-its attributes-Brahman, known only from the Vedas-
 not an object of worldly dealings, but it becomes an object
 of its own desire-Incarnations-Contradictory qualities of
 Brahman-for those who do not accept the contradictory
 qualities-Śuddhādvaita view compared with those of
 Śaṅkara and Rāmānuja-relation between Brahman and its
 attributes-views of Śaṅkara and Rāmānuja, compared-
 relation of Tādātmya-Brahman has no body.

(V) Brahman-essential form-Akṣara-Kāla-Karma-Svabhāva-Antaryāmin-

(VI) Brahman-Causal form-28 Categories-difference between Sāṅkhya
 and Śuddhādvaita-Ātman-Puruṣa-Prakṛti-other Categories.
 explained-comparison with the Sāṅkhya-Caturvyūha theory.

(VII) Creation-its process-concept of Māyā.

(VIII) Brahman-effect form-individual soul-Nitya-not produced-
 relation of individual soul and Brahman-Amśatva-Monism,

explained-Theories of Śaṅkara and Rāmānuja, compared-Tādātmya-Brahmabhāva-Ekātmavāda and Nānātmavāda-Parimāṇa-Vyāpakatva of individual soul not accepted-except when Brahman is realised-sentiency of individual soul-Vaiśaṃyā and Nairghrṇya-dosās-explanation of the same by Vallabha, Viṭṭhaleśa and Puruṣottama-world-Śaṅkara's theory of Mithyātva-Rāmānuja's view-world is real-distinction between Jagat and Samsāra-Māyā, Avidyā and Vidyā-comparison with Śaṅkara's theory.

- (IX) Theory of causation-Abheda-gross causes give rise to subtle effects-Buddhistic theory, refuted. Brahman, a Samavāyikāraṇa-term Upādāna, not preferred-Asamavāyikāraṇa, not accepted-Avikṛtaparināma-Vāda-Āvirbhāva-Tirobhāvavāda-Brahman, as without Sajātīya, Vijātīya and Svagat Bheda-Anvaya and Vyatireka in causation-Abheda according to Śuddhādvaita-Vivartavāda and Parināmavāda-Tādātmya.
- (X) Sādhanaś and Phala-Puruṣottama's contribution more on the Philosophical aspect of the Śuddhādvaita-Mokṣa, full of unmixed joy-God can be obtained by his grace-Sarvātmabhāva or Brahmabhāva-Sāyujya-God is Sādhanarūpa also-Upāsanaś-Devotion, superior to other means-Bhakti-Sneha-Puṣṭi.
- (XI) Conclusion-Śuddhādvaita, in comparison with the theories of other Ācāryas-positive idealism.

Chapter.VI.

Evaluation.

- (I) Introductory-conditions of his time- aims and achievements of Puruṣottama.
- (II) Puruṣottama and the Sampradāya-called Vedapaśu and ~~śhād/śh~~ have taught wrong theories-three hearsays,going against him-Puruṣottama and Harirāya-Puruṣottama's remarks about the Sampradāya-explanation of theories, found necessary-no apasiddhānta-Puruṣottama pays homage to Āpīnātha-his typical conservative outlook-emphasis on self-restraint-his explanation of Brahmasambhāda-respect to predecessors.
- (III)Puruṣottama's influence on the Sampradāya-he set a very high standard of scholarship-many works written after him-Gokulot^āśya and Gopeśvara-Surat remains a seat of learning.
- (IV)Puruṣottama's place in Indian Philosophy-Puruṣottama, called a Sarvatentrasvatentre-Puruṣottama and Vācaspati-Miśra-Puruṣottama's work for the Śuddhādvaita.

-ABBREVIATIONS-

A.B.: Anubhāṣya.

A.B.P.: Anubhāṣyaparakāśa.

A.B. with P. & R.: Anubhāṣya with Prakāśa and Raśmi.

Pr.: Prasthānaratnākara.

Prh.: Prahastavāda.

S.S.: Suvarṇasūtra.

T.S.: Tattvadīpanibandha-Śāstrārthaprakaraṇa.

T.S.P.: Tattvadīpanibandha-Śāstrārthaprakaraṇa-Prakāśa.

T.S.Ab.: Tattvadīpanibandha-Śāstrārthaprakaraṇa-Āvaranabhaṅga.

T.Sn.: Tattvadīpanibandha-Sarvanirṇayaprakaraṇa.

T.Sn.P.: -Tattvadīpanibandha-Sarvanirṇayaprakaraṇa-Prakāśa.

T.Sn.Ab.: Tattvadīpanibandha-Sarvanirṇayaprakaraṇa-Āvaranabhaṅga.

T.Bh.: Tattvadīpanibandha-Bhāgavatārthaprakaraṇa.

T.Bh.P.: -Tattvadīpanibandha-Bhāgavatārthaprakaraṇa-Prakāśa.

T.Bh.Ab.: -Tattvadīpanibandha-Bhāgavatārthaprakaraṇa-Āvaranabhaṅga.

U.P.: Yāvat-Prāpya-Utsava-Nirṇaya-Grantha-Samuccaya.

V.M.: Vidvenmandana.

CHAPTER. I.

VALLABHA-SAMPRADĀYA-ITS GROWTH AND DEVELOPMENT.

(I).

Introductory.

In the History of India the mediaeval period was rich in religious activities. The Vedic age was something belonging to the times of yore. The creative period of the Upanisads, of the Epics of Buddhism, and Jainism, when thinkers propounded and propagated whatever theories they thought correct, was just a memory of the past. The orthodox brāhmanism of the Mīmāṃsists was too old to have its sway upon the Masses and even the classical systems like the Sāṅkhya, Nyāya and Vaiśeṣika lost all their freshness and vigor. The Hinduism-including Buddhism, Jainism and Brahmanism, was in a dire need of invigoration. Its flow was limited and its vision was conservative. While the Pandits were engaged in hair-splitting controversies, the masses could not understand anything and lived in serene blissful ignorance. The controversies, however, did not stop there. The development of various sects, owing allegiance to the popular Gods of the Purāṇas also added to the chaotic conditions of the time. The Vedic duties of valour and power lost their importance with the emergence of new Gods and Goddesses like Nārāyaṇa and Śiva, Śakti and Gaṇpati. Vaiṣṇavism and Śaivism became more and more powerful and competed with each other for supremacy.

The Śākta Sects⁷ was also trying to get a field of its own. All these sects were again divided into various sub-sects. The followers of these sub-sects quarrelled with one another and all of them looked down upon the followers as well as the deities of the rival sects.

In this state of affairs Śaṅkara came like a powerful whirlwind. He tried to uproot the old contraventions and petty theories and gave a sound philosophical system to Hinduism^{ism}. But his theories proved too high for the people; his reasoning appeared too powerful. The light that was shed by him was a blinding flash. He said that Brahman alone is real and everything else is unreal in the highest sense. All the souls, the wide world with all its variety, all our weal and woe, all that we see and do—everything is false. There is no dualism. "I am God". "I" am not different from "GOD". The difference upon which this world subsists are only māyā and therefore unreal. ^{Even} From the God whose form, attributes, virtues and greatness, we have imagined, is not real in the highest sense. We may say that God has created us, but really speaking we have named him, we have fixed for him a particular form, we have thought that he has no vices. The personal God is a product of ignorance. Brahman is just Being. It can be described only negatively because it is beyond the power of our speech.

Śaṅkara's teaching, even though appealing to reason, was a powerful flood that drowned all beliefs and practices. Thus while it was hailed in the highest esteem from some quarters, it was vehemently attacked and severely condemned by others. Naturally a human being wants a God and he has something of feeling in him besides something of thinking. The evaporation of the God in the scorching heat of Śaṅkara's logic was somewhat too much for a Hindu to bear.

There were also other forces at work. As we have already stated, the Systems of Vaiṣṇavism and Śaivism, the origin of which goes to a very early period, were popularized in the South by the Tamil saints, Ālvārs and Nāyanamārs. They, especially the former, carried the masses with them by their teaching of simple and sincere devotion depending upon the grace of the highest Lord.¹ Their hold on the masses was very strong. They penetrated deep in to the country and reached the common folk with their easily understandable and even appealing theories. The monism of Śaṅkara was naturally outright rejected by the people.

Another force, still stronger came from the aliens. Hordes of Muslims came from the Northwest and brought with them a new

1. For a discussion of the probable dates of Alvars, see

Bhendarkar: Vaiṣṇavism, Śaivism etc. P. 68- 71.

religion, simpler and more powerful, and strongly backed with military strength. The age-old Hinduism was not only old but was also conservative and had so many divisions and distractions within itself that it failed to unite and give a common front to the menacing, destroying power that came with the Muslims. With Koran in one hand and sword in the other, the foreigners came to India. They massacred the masses, looted their property and broke their idols. The Hindu kings were not weak but they lacked the unity that was required to fight the Muslims. They were so engrossed in fighting with one another that they could not give a united front ^{against} a common foe. India was not one nation; it was a land of petty principalities. All the princes tried to encounter the mohammedans singly, while others showed callous indifference and slowly and slowly all of them were defeated. The northern part of India was grabbed by the Muslims first who later on turned their attention to the South. The spread of Islam in India is an unforgettable chapter in Indian History, full of treacheries and treasons, murders and conversions.

This had a shaping influence on the Indian life and thought. People who used to live and work quietly without ~~worrying~~ caring for the political changes till then, could not continue their way of life any longer in the same manner. Hinduism became more and more conservative as the Hindus were enslaved in a larger number. Islam could not wipe out Hinduism

completely in spite of all this but it made Hinduism turn more and more inwards. There was an air of cynicism and the common men wanted something to fall back upon. Here comes devotion-the whole-hearted devotion to God, combined with a strong unswerving faith that God alone will save them and their religion. It can be said that Hindus might have given prominence to devotion because of that. While thus we can find out the impact of Islam on Hinduism, it may also be said that Hinduism especially the philosophical part of it, had its influence on Islam.² Whatever may be the opinion regarding influences, it can not be controverted that the philosophical absolutistic trend in Indian theories had to change over to the religious and the theistic side on account of this contact.

~~When~~ When the infiltration of Muslims was slowly but strongly carried on towards the South, attempts were also being made in another direction. Vaisnavism, which started as popular religion of the Sāttvatas became a powerful and popular faith of the people. But it was not in the fold of the orthodox Hinduism just as was the case with the Vedāntic or mīmāṃsist system. While it was not a heterodox system like Buddhism or Jainism, it drew largely from the Purāṇas and the Mahābhārata, the --- pāñcarātrasamhitā and the later and definitely sectarian

2. We may not enter into a discussion on the influence or counter-influence, for which see Ramahrisinha Dinkar: Sanskritike cāra adhyāya: adhyāya III.

Upanisads. It was not evolved, as it were, from the earlier Upanisads. A number of Vaisṇava Ācāryas came forward^d to graft the branches of Vaisṇavism on the age-old Vedic tree. Śaiva ācāryas also followed in their footste^ps and tried to connect Śaivism with the Vedic literature.

(II)

Ācāryas.

Śaṅkara's commentary on the Brahmasūtras is the earliest extant commentary. It is possible, however, that he might have followed other commentators whose works are not with us. Śaṅkara was followed by Bhāskara who flourished in about 900 A.D. His commentary which is known as the Bhāskara-bhāṣya³ is not a sectarian work and does not favour either Śaṅkara's views or those of Pāñcarātra Vaisṇavas. He advocates the theory of Bhedābheda, upholding equal reality of both unity and plurality. In his theory Bheda is aupādhika or due to limiting adjuncts, the reality of which is also admitted. Another commentator Yādavaprakāśa propounded in the eleventh century the ^Bdrhmaparināṁavāda, a theory of the transformation of Brahman. He happened to be Rāmānuja's preceptor for sometime.

Rāmānuja was born in the first quarter of the eleventh century in Shriperumbūdur. He lived at Conjeevaram in his ~~you~~ t youth, as a student of Yādavaprakāśa. He could not however

3. Radhakrishnan: Indian philosophy Volume II P.670.

agree to the Advaitic interpretations of his teacher, and so left him. He studied carefully the prabandhas of the Ālvār saints side by side with the vast Sanskrit philosophical literature. Yāmunācārya, who was impressed by this youth, thought of appointing him as his successor to the apostolic seat at Shreerangam. Unfortunately Rāmānuja could not see him at the time of his death. As a successor of Yāmunācārya, he lived at Shreerangam and toured South India. He also visited the noted holy places of North India, converting many persons to Vaisnavism. He renounced the world perhaps because he could not live a happy married life. As a sannyāsin he was very popular among the masses. His important works are Vedāntasāra, Vedāntadīpa, Vedārthasaṁgraha, and the Bhāṣyas on Brahmesūtras and the Bhagavad Gītā. His Śrībhāṣya is a very brilliant work of mature scholarship.

Rāmānuja propounded viśiṣṭādvaita or qualified monism. As against Śaṅkara, he ~~he~~ believes in the reality of the world. In his opinion the world and the individual souls are the gross forms of the non-sentient or acit and the sentient or cit respectively; and are thus effects of the subtle acit and cit. Both cit and acit constitute the body of Brahman. The causal form is Brahman with the subtle cit and acit while ~~the~~ the effect form is Brahman with the gross cit and acit. Brahman is qualified or viśiṣṭa by the cit and acit; there is thus oneness between Brahman on the one hand and the cit and acit on the other on the ground of the body-soul analogy.

---Oneness between the cause and the effect can also be understood as the Brahman with the gross cit and acit is the cause and the Brahman with the subtle cit and acit is the effect.

In this way Rāmānuja maintained the ultimate reality of the world and the jivas. In his opinion the Highest Lord Viṣṇu is endowed with all the virtues and is devoid of all the vices. He can be realized not by knowledge alone as contended by Śaṅkara but by devotion. Rāmānuja can be credited with being the first Ācārya who tried to evolve Vaiṣṇavism and Bhaktimārga from the Upaniṣads, the Bhagavad Gītā and the Vedānta-sūtras. He also holds Viṣṇupurāṇa in very high esteem. The Bhakti, which he advocates is however the same as meditation or Upāśanā preached in the Vedic literature. It is thus slightly different or modified from the sincere and ardent devotion of the Ālvārs depending upon the grace of God alone. Rāmānuja's system is however peculiar in as much as it accepts the pañcarātra theory of vyūhas.

Rāmānuja was followed by Nimbārka, son of Jagannātha and Sarasvatī. He was a Telugu Brahmin living in a village called Nimbā. While his death date is uncertain, he is said to have flourished in the latter part of the eleventh century after Rāmānuja. His Sect is called Śaṅkaraśāstrīya. His commentary on the Brahmasūtras, called Vedāntapārijātasaurābha, is a very small work. His another work Siddhāntaratna, popularly known as Daśaślokī gives the essence of his --- system in ten verses. His theory is called Dvaitādvaita or

Bhedābheda; thus admitting both identity and difference. The world, the jīvas and God are different from one another, but they can also be called identical in so far as the first two are dependent upon God for their existence. The difficulty, however, is that his system has not been well explained and elaborated. There are two important points which deserve special notice. Firstly, Nimbārka differs basically from Rāmānuja in his teaching of the path of devotion. Rāmānuja, in his enthusiasm to find an Upaniṣadic backing for his--- advocacy of Bhaktimārga, makes Bhakti almost similar to meditation or contemplation. Nimbārka, on the other hand, does not change the original character of Bhakti and puts emphasis ~~more~~ on love and devotion. Secondly, 'the great difference between the two teachers is, that, while Rāmānuja confines himself to Nārāyaṇa and his consorts Lakṣmī, Bhū, and Līlā, Nimbārka gives almost an exclusive prominence to Kṛṣṇa and his mistress, Rādhā, attended on by thousands of her female companions.' ⁴

Madhva was born at Kallianpur in Udipi Taluka of South Kanara district. His father's name was Madhyagehabhatta and his own name was Vāsudeva. In the beginning he was a disciple of one ~~Acutar~~ Acyutaprekṣa^ā who was a follower of Sāṅkara; but as it happened in the case of Rāmānuja, Madhva also parted with his teachers and proclaimed his own

4. Bhandarkar: Vaisnavism, Śaivism etc. P. 93.

dualistic philosophy. He lived a fairly long life of 79 years. He went on ^texpensive tours of India, discussing, debating and finally putting down the theory of Māyā. He is also known as Ānandatīrtha, Pūrṇaprajña and Madhyamandāra. His important works are a commentary on the Brahmasūtras, Anuvyākhyāna, commentaries on the Bhagvad Gītā and the Upaniṣads, a gloss on the Bhāgavata-purāṇa, a commentary on the first forty hymns of Rgveda, Bhāratatātparyanirṇaya, and several other prakaraṇas. Jayatīrtha's commentaries on his Brahmasūtra-Bhāṣya and Anuvyākhyāna are very brilliant.

Madhva's system is the sharpest criticism of the system of Śaṅkara. He condemns Śaṅkara and criticises Rāmānuja. He believes in five eternal distinctions, (1) between God and a Jīva, (2) between God and inanimate objects, (3) between Jīvas and inanimate objects, (4) between one Jīva and another, (5) between one inanimate object and another. He is not prepared to admit monism in any case. He thinks that God is only the efficient cause of the universe and not the material cause. He upholds the path of devotion and admits the grace of God in attaining to the state of final liberation. Even though Madhva interprets the Upaniṣads and Sūtras so as to teach his dualistic doctrines, he relies more upon Purāṇas. He holds the Bhāgavata Purāṇa in very highest esteem. The principal difference of Madhva's system from those of Rāmānuja and Nimbārka is that

unlike the former he does not support the orthodox Pāñcarātra theories, and does not accept the Rādhā-kṛṣṇa element which is found so prominent in the system of Nimbārka.

Coming to the last Vaiṣṇava Ācārya before Vallabha, we are not treading on sure ground. Viṣṇusvāmin is said to have flourished in the thirteenth century. It is stated that he has written commentaries on the authoritative works of the Vedānta but none of them is extant. Some scholars however have advocated the theory that Vallabha belonged to the same school and only restated his position. Prof. G. H. Bhatt of Baroda has considered this question fully. He has shown that Viṣṇusvāmin actually taught a dualistic theory and the alleged connection between the two does not appear to be correct. The learned Professor has also given reasons that might have led to the rise of such theories.⁵

~~You~~ We would also note here two Ācāryas who belonged to Śaivism and not Vaiṣṇavism. Śrīkantha alias Nīlakantha lived in the fourteenth century. He has written a commentary on the Brahmasūtras and interpreted them in the light of Śaivism. He followed, in fact, in the footsteps of Rāmānuja.

5. cf. Prof. G. H. Bhatt's papers on the subject read at the 7th and 8th all India Oriental Conference. See Proceedings of the A. I. O. C. Vol. VII p. 449 ff & Vol. VIII p. 322 ff.

He attempted to give a systematic reconciliation between the two traditions, that of the Vedas and that of Śaiva Āgamas. He rejects both the absolute identification of Śaṅkara and the absolute distinctions of Maḍhva. ~~Substituting~~ Substituting Śiva and Ambā for Viṣṇu and Lakṣmī, he generally accepts the theory of Rāmānuja. That is why he is often referred to as a thief of Rāmānuja's doctrines—Rāmānujamatacaura.

Another commentator of importance is Śrīpati Paṇḍitācārya, who flourished in c.1400 A.D. His Śrīkarabhāṣya is a valuable work in which he upholds the theory of Bhedaḥbhedā. The author has commented upon the Sūtras from the Vīraśaiva point of view.⁶

6. Three important writers posterior to Vallabhācārya should be noted here. Śuka who lived in c.1550 A.D. propounded a dualistic philosophy ; while Vijñānabhikṣu (c.1600 A.D.) explained the Sūtras in the light of the Sāṃkhya theories. His system is known as Avibhagādvaita. Lastly , there is Baladeva (c.1725 A.D.) who taught the Acintyabhedaḥbhedā. cf. C. Hayavadanrao: Śrīkara Bhāṣya of Śrīpati Paṇḍitācārya Vol.I. Intro. p.221.

(III)

Popular Movements.

While on the one hand the Learned Acaryas commented upon the authoritative work in Sanskrit, and propounded their own Systems, the masses were, however, led on the other hand by the popular saints and teachers who carried on their activities in regional languages which could be easily understood by all the people. Their method was simple and their approach was sincere. They did not enter into the dialectical feasts of scholars. They did not discuss and debate absolutism, monism or dualism. They just sang the songs in praise of God and through these simple and beautiful songs they could reach the heart of the common folk. They threw away the barriers of castes. They opened the doors of religion to any sincere man or woman who aspired to find out the truth. The path of devotion taught by the Acaryas was certainly for the benefit of the lower classes but they were too learned, too orthodox and too much engrossed in their own hair-splitting controversies of isms. A number of saints have flourished in North India and while some of them actually established their own systems, there were others who did not care to do that.⁷ Rāmānanda, Nanak, Kabir, Pipa and Dhanu, Sena and

7. For a study of these saints see Chaturvedi: Uttari Bharataki Santaparamparā.

Raidas, Miranbai and Padmavati, Namadeva and Narasinha Mehta and Tukarama—all these and many more lived and preached their faith for the uplift of the weltering men and women of India. Rāmānanda was a pioneer in bringing about radical reforms. He did not care for castes and creeds, he taught in the regional languages; and more than that he substituted the Radha-Kṛṣṇa worship by the purer form of Sita-Rama worship. He was followed by Kabir, Tulasidas and many others.

Another point which is worthy of note is that these teachers did not care for the political changes in India. Who ruled India was not for them to see and think. Whoever adored the thrones of Delhi and other capitals, they went on with their own teaching, unmindful of the ruling powers. People had rather religious consciousness than the political consciousness. They were used to the suppressive power of Muslim rulers. Gradually there arose a tendency to find out the common points between Islam and Hinduism and to effect a compromise between the two. Guru Nanak, Kabir and other saints turned their efforts in that direction.

The most important movement, contemporaneous^e with that of Vallabha was that of Caitanya in Bengal. The original name of Caitanya was Viśvaṁbhara Miśra. His father was Jagannātha and his mother Śacī Devī. He had one elder brother named Viśvarūpa, who was afterwards known as Nityānanda. Caitanya was born in 1485 A.D. He married at first with one Lākṣmī Devī and after

her death married another. He began his mission of life at the age of 23, when he returned from Gaya after making offerings to the manes. He denounced the ritualism of Brahmins, did not admit the distinctions of castes and preached faith in God alone and love for Him. He wandered from place to place singing songs in praise of Kṛṣṇa and Rādhā. In 1510 A.D. he became an ascetic and did his work with a missionary zeal. After—travelling through various parts of India he returned to Puri and lived there for the last eighteen years of his life. He died in 1533 A.D. During his travels in India he had many disciples and had disputations with many scholars. Chaitanya, Nityānanda and Advaitānanda are called Prabhus in the school of Caitanya. Caitanya's pupils Rupa and Sanātana were brilliant writers, but the Prabhus themselves left no important composition. While Caitanya mainly preached ^aardent and sincere devotion to Hari, his Vedāntic theory as explained by his followers is very much ~~akin~~ akin to that of Nimbārka.

We may also take notice of one important movement which comes just after Vallabhācārya. Hita Harivaṁśa who was born in 1530 (or 1553) A.D. founded the Rādhāvallabhīya Sāṃpradāya, which teaches mādhyabhāva in Bhakti.⁸

8. For a study of this sect, see Vijayendra Snataka: Rādhāvallabhīya Sāṃpradāya-Siddhānta aur Sāhitya.

(IV).

Vallabhācārya.

Vallabhācārya's family belonged to the Bhāradvāja Gotra of the Taittirīya Śākhā of the Black Yajurveda. It was a Vellanāṭīya Brāhmin family of Andhra. One of the ancestors of Vallabha, named Yajñanārāyaṇa Bhaṭṭa was a wellknown Vaiṣṇava. One Gaṇapati Bhaṭṭa was the author of a book called Sarvatantranigraha, and his son Bālam Bhaṭṭa wrote Bhaktidīpa. Bālam Bhaṭṭa had two sons, Lakṣmaṇa Bhaṭṭa and Janārdana. Lakṣmaṇa Bhaṭṭa married Vallamāgāru, daughter of Suśarnā. He lived in Benares, moving about in the Society of great scholars of the time. Once a rumour about the Muslim invasion of Benares was spread and Hindus left the city. Lakṣmaṇa Bhaṭṭa started South-ward. In the course of this journey Vallamāgāru gave birth to Vallabha in Samvat 1535 (or Samvat 1529 according to some followers of the school) in Campāranya near Raichur. The family returned ^{to} Benares because the rumour of Muslim invasion was wrong. Vallabha was the fourth child of his parents, the others being Rāmakṛṣṇa, Sarasvatī, Subhadra and Keśava. After his Upanayana in the eighth year, Vallabha began his studies under Viṣṇucitta. He was a very brilliant student and mastered various Śāstras in a very short time. In 1490 A. D. Lakṣmaṇa Bhaṭṭa unfortunately passed away and the family had to return home in Southern India, when Vallabha was only eleven.

Vallabha's journey Southward was like the pilgrimage of a Brahmācārī. He came to Vijayanagara in about 1493-1494 A.D. At that time there was a prolonged debate going on between the followers of Śaṅkara and the Vaiṣṇavas led by Vyāsatīrtha, a follower of Madhva under the patronage of the great king Kṛṣṇadevarāya. When the former were on the point of winning, Vallabha could manage to go to the royal court with the help of one of his relatives. He reinforced the side of the Vaiṣṇavas, and after a long controversy defeated the opponents and propounded his Brahmvāda. He was then declared as the greatest teacher and was honoured with Kanakābhiṣeka, 'the golden anointing.' Vallabha's ~~so~~ followers have given very much importance to this event, as a glorious victory of his scholarship and power of debating. The historicity of it can, however, be easily questioned, as Kṛṣṇadeva came to the throne of Vijayanagara in 1509 A.D., whereas the Kanakābhiṣeka is said to have taken place in 1493-1494 A.D. It is likely that the event might have taken place later and not when Vallabha first went to Vijayanagara.

After this, Vallabha was approached by Vyāsatīrtha and others and requested by them to lead the Madhva Church. Vallabha however declined and started on a pilgrimage. He is said to have gone on pilgrimage thrice. As a pilgrim he visited many holy places and shrines, discussed and taught

his doctrines to many and gathered a large following. After the second round of pilgrimage, he married one Mahālakṣmī in about 1500 A.D. which is the year of the foundation of the shrine of Śrī Govardhananāthajī. Once at about the same time when Vallabha ~~was~~ was in Gokula on the eleventh day of the bright half of the month of Śrāvaṇa, he received at midnight the command of God to initiate the people in the new path that the God revealed to him.⁹ Unfortunately we do not know the year of this event.

After his third round of pilgrimage Vallabha settled down at Benaras and then shifted his head quarters to Adel, a small village not far from Allahabad. He stayed there for about twenty years and wrote important works. After settling down he built up his Saṁpradāya and put it on a firm footing. Many disciples came to him at Adel. His meetings with Caitanya are worthy of note. The records of these meetings are preserved by the followers of both, but the descriptions are biassed and colourful. The meetings must have, however, been very important and cordial, though the relations of their followers were strained.

When Vallabha was returning from Puri he received a call from God, but as his commentary on the Bhāgavata was still to be completed, he did not leave the world. He hastened to complete the work, but his scribe Mādhava Bhaṭṭa Kāśmīrin died having been shot by an arrow. He was again

9. cf. Siddhānta Rahasya. v.1.

called by God before he could complete this work. This time the call was too powerful. He thereupon decided to renounce the world and informed his mother and wife about his decision. One Mādhavendrapuri who was a follower of Madhva initiated him as a Sannyāsin. (According to some he was initiated by one Nārāyaṇendra Yati.) He then went to Benaras and at the Hanuman Ghat entered the holy river Ganges and disappeared for ever. It is said that a bright flash appeared at that spot and he went to heaven in the presence of many spectators. This happened on the 3rd day of the bright half of the month of Āṣāḍha in V.S. 1587 corresponding to 1531 A.D.

Vallabha was a great writer. He ~~is~~ is said to have written eightyfour works but the number is more legendary than real corresponding as it is to the number of disciples and shrines of the system. The most important work of Vallabha is his Anubhāṣya, which remained incomplete and which was completed by his son Vitthaleśa. Similarly he is said to have written a commentary on the Pūrvamīmāṃsā Sūtras of Jaimini. Only a fragment of this has come down to us. He has also written the Pūrvamīmāṃsā Kārikās. His commentary Subodhinī on Bhāgavata Purāṇa is only on the first three books, on the tenth book and five Adhyāyas of the eleventh book of the Purāṇa. He is said to have written Sūksmatīkā on the same work but it is not extant. One of his very important work is the Tattvadīpenibandha in three chapters, and a commentary on it. The commentary is, however, found only on the first two chapters

and a portion of the third. The most popular works of Vallabha are ,however, his sixteen tracts or Ṣoḍaśagranthāḥ, which expound his religious teachings. Here also the Puṣṭi-Pravāha-Maṛīyādā-Grantha is not complete. He wrote other small works also like Paṭrāvalambana. In all he is said to have written thirty books, all in Sanskrit.

(V).

Vitṭhalanātha and his descendants.

Vallabha had two sons, Gopīnātha and Vitṭhalanātha. Gopīnātha was born in V.S. 1567. He was a sincere devotee of God, and ~~he~~ is said to have decided to take his food only after reading the Bhāgavata Purāṇa. As this took a long time, Vallabha gave him Puruṣottama-Nāma-Sahasra. This could be read in a shorter time. He died at an early age. He wrote two works Sādhana-dīpikā and Sevāvidhi. He had a son named Puruṣottama, who also died very young.

Vitṭhaleśa was junior to Gopīnātha by five years. He was born at Caranāṭa near Allahabad in V.S. 1572. It is said that he was given to worldly playfulness and resiled from that mood after being remonstrated by Dāmodaradāsa, a well known Vaiṣṇava. It is also said that he was sent by his father to study under Mādhava Sarasvatī but instead of attending to his studies, he just devoted himself to the study of Bhāgavata-Purāṇa. After ^{the} death of Gopīnātha and his son, Vitṭhaleśa

became the recognised representative of his father, and he planned various tours with the sole purpose of propagating the thoughts and practices of the Sāṃpradāya. He visited Gujarat for about six times, during the period between V.S. 1600 and V.S. 1638. He visited Jagannathapuri in V.S. 1616. After that he seems to have stayed at Adel, from where he moved to Bandhegadh. After staying there for a couple of months, he went to Gadha, which was ruled over by the --- famous queen Durgāvatī. He could foresee that the independent Hindu Kingdom of Durgāvatī was perhaps not going to last long. He left his residence at Gadha and went to Mathura and lived there in the 'Seven houses' (Sāt-ghara), built for him by Durgāvatī. However, he preferred the quiet smaller place of Gokula to the city of Mathura. In V.S. 1629 he made Gokula his permanent residence. He carried on his literary and other activities at this place. He seems to have had very happy meetings with Akbar, and became the recipient of the Royal Firmans. He had also connections with Raja Todarmal and Birbal. He ousted the followers of Caitanya from the worship of Śrī Nāthajī, taking advantage of these connections.

His family-life was quite happy. He married one Rukminī, daughter of Viśvanātha Bhaṭṭa and Bhavānī. He had six sons and four daughters by her. His seventh son

Ghanasyāma was born of his second wife Padmāvatī. Two daughters of Gopīnātha, Lakṣmī and Satyabhāmā also lived with him. ~~In sp~~ In spite of bearing the burden of such a large family, he passed his time in devotion to the Lord Kṛṣṇa. He lived a fairly long life of seventy years and died in V.S. 1642 on the seventh day of the dark half of the month of Māgha.

While Vallabha propounded a new theory and established a system based upon it, it was left for Viṭṭhaleśa to put that school on a sound footing. He was a man of genius and knew how to propagate his beliefs and practices. He started all the practices of the Sāṃpradāya and gave it an artistic touch with his fine sense. He was an artist, painter, and singer. He incorporated that art in the service of the Lord. The worship was carried on in houses with separate rooms for bath and bed and dinner rather than big temples. He infused life in religion.

As a writer, Viṭṭhaleśa's contribution to the Suddhādvaita is great. There were, however, certain difficulties which he had to face at the outset. A family quarrel cropped up between himself and his sister-in-law, the widow of Gopīnātha. As a result of this, the widow went away with whatever manuscripts of Vallabha's works she could get. Many of the works were thus lost, and some of those that could be found were incomplete. Viṭṭhaleśa made it his mission to complete them. A part of the commentary on Tattvadīpanibandha. III, and the latter part of the

Anubhāṣya are from his pen. Further, he added many passages also in the body of his father's works. Besides these he has composed so many stories commentaries and shorter tracts. The most important of his works is the Vaidānmandana.¹⁰

We have already noticed that Viṭhaleśa had a large family. All his seven sons were sincere devotees and good scholars. All of them tried in their individual and collective capacity to propagate their faith which was then having a large following in the Western regions of the country. Viṭhaleśa distributed his seven images of the Lord Kṛṣṇa among his seven sons.

Gokulanātha, the fourth son of Viṭhaleśa, was the most prominent of all of the seven sons. He was born in V.S. 1608. He is famous for the fight that he gave to Cidrūpa who, because of his cordial relations with Jehangir could successfully manage to prohibit the use of the Tulasī-string which is one of the outward marks of the ^{Pu}ṣṭimārgīya Vaiṣṇavas. Gokulanātha saw Jehangir personally, convinced him of the Vaiṣṇava position, and got the ban removed. He has written some commentaries in Sanskrit on the sixteen tracts, the Subodhinī etc. He has also written stories of 84, and 252 Vaiṣṇavas in the Vrajī dialect. Though not much of an author, Gokulanātha was well-versed in various śāstras,

10. For a list of his forty eight works: see V.C. Shah:

Ṣṭimārgaṇaṇ Pāñcava Varṣa: p. 239.

and is said to have successfully carried on his controversy with Ćidrūpa. His contribution to the 'Suddhādvaita lies in the propagation and regulation of the Saṁpradāya. He is honoured as the third great man of the Saṁpradāya. He died in V.S.1697 at the age of 89.

Kalyāṇarāya, born in V.S.1625 was the son of Govindarāya, the second son of Viṭṭhaleśa. He has commented upon the sixteen tracts and has also composed some Kīrtanas. He had two sons, Harirāya and Gopeśvara. Harirāya, who lived a fairly long life of about 120 years, was born in V.S.1649. After Gokulanātha, he became a very important personality in the Saṁpradāya. Being a sincere devotee himself, he has written so many small works in Sanskrit, discussing and deciding various problems of the Saṁpradāya. The most important of his works are, however, the letters that he wrote to his brother Gopeśvara, who found consolation in them when he lost his wife. These letters known as--- Siksāpatras are written in simple language and are capable of appealing to the masses. They have been translated into Gujarati and Vraj and are often read in the religious meetings of the Vaiṣṇavas even to-day. He had many students whom he taught the principles and practices of his school.

Besides the teachers noted above, there were several

others who stayed at various places and contributed to the Suddhadvaita literature. Of these the immediate predecessors of Puruṣottama were Pītāmbara, Vrajarāja and Kṛṣṇacandra. We shall however refer to them in the next chapter, as their relation with Puruṣottama is very close.

(VI).

Spread of Vallabha-Sampradāya in Gujarat.

As Puruṣottama, the subject of our thesis, lived and worked in Surat, it would be proper to add a few lines in the introductory chapter, regarding the religious conditions of the province of Gujarat, before and during his occupation of the pontifical chair at Surat.

The charming and fertile land of Gujarat with its natural beauty of rivers and plains has been for ever the recipient of various ideas, religious and others. Gujarat claims to have been the holy land of Lord Kṛṣṇa and the Yādavas. The Rudradāman inscription of Girnar is the finest historical record of the existence of Vaiṣṇavism in Gujarat. One Cakrapālita is said to have built a temple of Cakradhara Kṛṣṇa in 456 A.D. In 526 A.D. there flourished in Vallabhā, a king Dhṛvasena who called himself Parama Bhāgavata. Poet Māgha, (9th century) pays homage to Hari in the first verse of his Śiśupālavadna. The inscription at Dhamadacha, dated 1074 A.D. begins with 'Om namo Bhagavate Vāsudevāya' and praises the Varāha-incarnation. Hemacandra, (1088-1172 A.D).

refers to the existence of the Vaisnava temple in Patana, in his Dvyāśrīśyakāvyā. The prevalence of Vaisnavism has also been referred to by Someśvara (c. 1230 A.D.) in his Kīrtikaumudī and Surathotsava. Rājasekara in his Caturvimsatiprabandha refers to the building of the temple of Vīranārayana by Viradhaval (1233-1238 A.D.). One Nṛsiṃhāranya Muni wrote a work called "Viṣṇubhakti Candrodaya" in 1413 A.D. The inscription on the Revatī Kunda of Girnar, dated 1417 A.D. begins with the praise of Dāmodara who steals butter. Vaghela Mokṣasimha (1499 A.D.) is said to have protected the hosts of the Bhāgavatas. The king who reigned in Baroda in 1511 A.D. was a devotee of Govinda.¹¹ For the centuries the current of the Kṛṣṇa-cult- always came to Gujarat and was received there faithfully and enthusiastically, the more so because Dvaraka came to be known as the holy seat of Lord Kṛṣṇa. This had its effect upon the regional literature of Gujarat. A very powerful influence was welded by Gītagovinda of Jayadeva. We may note here the examples of Mayanachanda of Madana (V.S. 1500) and the Phāgu poem of Natersi (1495 A.D.), Vasantavilāsa. Gītagovind was actually translated into Gujarati in c. 1600 V.S.¹²

11. Gujarātī Sāhitya Bk. V: Madhyakālano Sāhityepravāha:
Ed. K.M. Munshi pp. 309-311.

12. Ibid. pp. 313-15.

Of the Sampradāyas, established by the Vaiṣṇava Ācāryas of the South, that of Rāmānuja seems to have had its sway over the people of Gujarat for some time. The followers for of Rāmānuja are found in Gujarat even to-day. Shri. Munshi says that there is reason to believe that the Khijāda Māndir Sampradāya of Saurashtra is a branch of the same.¹³ Mādhaḥva and Āmbārka could not exercise any influence in Gujarat. The worship of Rāma, propounded by Rāmānanda, of the 'Sri Sampradāya, seems to have had its influence in Gujarat to a very great degree; in the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries. The well-known poet Bhalana, and his son Viṣṇudāsa were devotees of Rāma. One Miṭha Vaiṣṇava of Talaja wrote a tract on the characteristics of Vaiṣṇavas in V.S. 1587. Kabir, the famous disciple of Rāmānanda, had some hold on the lower strata of the Gujarati society in the seventeenth century. Poet Vaccharaja was a follower of Kabir. Dadu Dayala, was born in Ahmedabad in V.S. 1601 and was initiated in the fold of Kabir, by Kanai (or Budhan). He left Ahmedabad at the age of eighteen and established his seat at Narana, near Ajmer. The Dadu-Sampradāya had many followers in Gujarat.¹⁴

All these and many other sects and movements came to Gujarat. However, the immense popularity of the Purāṇis and the teachers of the Puṣṭimārga ousted them from the field.

The most important religion, not sect or movement that held its sway over Gujarat for centuries and which commands

13. (Ibid. p. 321).

14. (Ibid. pp. 323-4).

a large following even to-day is Jainism. It became the royal faith of Gujarat, when Kumārpāla Solanki accepted it at the instance of his teacher Hemacandra. With its rigorous emphasis on non-violence and good conduct, it could very easily appeal to the characteristically soft and tender nature of the mercantile community of Gujarat. It could not, however, stand the test of time any longer, and many Jains came over to the Pustimārga, when it was introduced by Vallabha and his son. The reason for this is not far to seek. While Jainism was old and worn out, the new faith was fresh and young; again the Pustimārga did not close the doors of happy and prosperous life while Jainism was rigorous and rigid. It may also be added that there is no God in Jainism, which is an ethical religion, whereas Vallabha taught of an eternally playful Kṛṣṇa. The appeal to the masses of this playful sportive God was naturally very deep.

The most important point, which we should note, is the political upheavals and anarchy in the country. The last Hindu king of Gujarat—Karana Vaghelo was defeated by Allauddin Khilji in 1297 A.D. For hundred years after that, Gujarat was ruled by the Subas appointed by the Sultans of Delhi. The invasion of Taimur Lang however shook the very foundation of the Delhi Empire and so the Subas took advantage of the weakness of the Central Government. They

were tempted by the circumstances to become independent kings. Zafar Khan proclaimed his independence and established the reign of the Sultanat in Gujarat in 1407 A.D. The kingdom saw illustrious kings like Ahmedshah and Mohammed (popularly known as Begado), but the Sultanat could not retain its power against Akbar. It was on the ^{year} 18th November 1572^{-73 A.D.} that Gujarat became a Province of the Moghul Empire. The rebellion of Muzaffarkhan proved abortive and once again Ahmedabad became the seat of the Moghul Viceroy. From an independent country, Gujarat turned into a Province of the Moghul Empire. The period, immediately following this annexation, was that of peace and prosperity. The Viceroyalty of Mir Aziz Koka, Shah Jehan and Dara Shikoh added to the security and prosperity of the people, and even though there have been occasional incidents like the plundering of Surat by Malik Ambar in 1609 A.D. and the feuds during the reign of Aurangzeb as Viceroy, ~~the picture on the whole~~ the picture on the whole is decisively bright. It was in this age that Vallabhācārya spread in Gujarat and its neighbouring areas.

Vallabhācārya in his travels visited Gujarat very often and moved at various places. He is said to have visited Surat, Broach, Morbi, Navanagar, Khambhalia, Pindar, Dekor, Dvarka, Junagadh, Prabhas, Godhra, Waroda and many other villages and cities. The visits are recorded in the literature of the Sāṃpradāya. The propagation of the Sāṃpradāya in Gujarat, however, goes to the credit of Vitthaleśa, who visited

Gujarat six times: (1) He came to Gujarat from Adel in V.S. 1600 (2) He repeated his visit from Adel in V.S. 1613 (3) In V.S. 1619, he came from Gadha (4) From Mathura he came to Gujarat in V.S. 1623 (5) and from Gokula in V.S. 1631 (6) Lastly, he came to pay homage to Dvārakādhiśa in V.S. 1638. It appears that he exercised his influence over Gujarat for nearly forty years. The visits of Vitthaleśa to Gujarat were incidental to his visits to the holy shrine at Dvarka. Vallabha himself visited Dvarka thrice and installed the image of Dvārakānātha at Bet Dvarka. Fortunately, however, Vitthaleśa could get enthusiastic and sincere associates who were devoted to him and who were working for the propagation and expansion of the Sampradāya. Vitthaleśa initiated one Nāgajī Bhaṭṭa, a Sathodara Nagar brahmin, who was an influential officer of the Government in Godhra. Nāgajī Bhaṭṭa was an intelligent pupil, who asked many questions to Vitthaleśa and got their answers. He not only accompanied Vitthaleśa during his travels in Gujarat but even himself went to Adel for paying homage to his preceptor. Bhāilā Kothāri of Asarva, near Ahmedabad, was another devotee. His Son-in-law Gopāladās^{who} was dumb got the powers of speech by chewing the betel-leaf offered by Vitthaleśa. This Gopāladās is the author of Navākhyāna, a popular Vaisnava poem which is responsible for the most tender feelings, with which the Mahārājas are looked upon in Gujarat. Whenever, Vitthaleśa visited Bhāilā Kothāri, many people

came to see him and embraced his faith. In Cambay also there was one Jīvā Pārekḥ who contributed much to the rapid spread of Vaisṇavism in Gujarat. The wave of Vaisṇavism, thus begun in Gujarat, went on for years that came and many people belonging to various sects accepted this faith.

The peace and prosperity, which the Province enjoyed under the Moghul rule, was largely instrumental in setting a particular standard of life. This naturally led to a very happy life full of luxuries and comforts. The fall in the moral standard slowly crept in and there were voices of protest raised against this from various quarters. The most prominent among them is the poet-saint Akho. (c.1615-1674 A.D.). Popular works of devotion and purāṇic tales were, however, written and sung. The most important of those poets was Premānanda. (c.1636-1734. A.D), who was followed by Sāmālā Bhatta (c.1700 A.D) They were contemporaries of Puruṣottama.

The age of peace and glory of Gujarat, ended in the reign of Aurangzeb when the great Shivaji plundered Surat, and Gujarat became a scene of a hundred feuds and fights. Religious and social life was in peril and though prosperous and wealthy, the cities of Gujarat were not very quiet. Surat, ~~was~~ the head quarters of Puruṣottama, was no exception to this.

Surat enjoyed a unique place not only in Gujarat but in the whole of India. Its wealth and prosperity lay in its being on the Bank of the river Tapti. Vinayavijayaganivara, who flourished in the later part of the seventeenth and the earlier part of the eighteenth century has written a poem Indudūta, in which he has given a beautiful description of Surat. He compares the Tapti with the river in the heaven. He says:

Potaśrenīparicayamisāt tīravellad vimānā
 Majjadvrndāarakaveravadhūnāgarair nāgarībhih;
 Svādusvacchasphaṭikarucirāmbhobharair uttarangā
 Tāpī tatra śrayati tatīmī Svargagangēnukāram. (v.87.)

It had a beautiful garden full of various kinds of flowers.
 Vinayavijaya says:

Dīptā puṣpair aviraledalā maṇḍalī cāmpakānām
 Tatrodyēne tulayati phalair lakṣitā pallavaś ca;
 Nāgaśrenīm amasṛṇasṛṇim hemaghantāvalīdhām
 Citrair gucchair vividhabharanair maṇḍitam vastrakhaṇḍaiḥ.
 Udyānānām nagaram abhiteḥ santatir bhāti nānā
 Vrkṣair lakṣair vividhasumanahsaṁvitānām latānām;
 Krīḍad dāmpatyucita-kadalīmandirair bālakānām
 Gehaiḥ krīḍābhavenasarasīdīrghikavāpikābhiḥ. (v.91-2).

Surat had a strongly built fort full of all types of weapons:

Durge bhargojjvalavapur ihotkendharās candraśālā-
 Dambhāt saudhacchadir upātito mauktikacchatraśālī;

Nānāyentrapreharanadhara yuddhasajjograsāstrah

Kṣatrasyaśa śrayati suśamā dhairyaśarvoddhurasya.(V.94).

There was a mint also in Surat, which is aptly described by Vinayavijaya:

Rūpyasvarṇaprakaraghaṭanaprotthitaiḥ taṅkaśālā

Garbhodbhūtapratiravaśataiḥ tārātāraiḥ takāraiḥ;

Nātra kṣvāpi prabhavitum aḥam duṣṭadaurgatyabhūtaḥ

Pūtaḥ kṣaudre hyupaśamavidhau mantrasārastakārah.(V.98).

The prosperity and pelf of Surat was due to its being one of the prominent centres of business in India. Merchants of Surat entered into business transactions with businessmen staying in distant places in India and abroad. Ships sailed in and out of Surat to Africa, Iran, China, Japan, Arabia and Turkey. Surat had many market-places like Kanpith, Danapith, Machhalipith, etc, where various commodities brought from outside were sold. Every year some twenty to forty thousand persons came to Surat with a large number of caravans. The inhabitants of Surat were rich and their life was colourful. In spite of all this they were not very happy. They were always worried about the protection of their wealth that they accumulated with tact and toil. After Shivaji's attack they were always afraid of such onslaughts. The Subas of Surat also extracted money from them for paying their dues to the Moghul Emperors of Delhi. Even then there was freedom of religion and the Hindus were not subjected to harassment simply because they were hindus.

CHAPTER- II.

PURUSOTTAMA'S LIFE.

(I)

Geneology.


Unlike the founders of other systems, Vallabha was a householder. He became a sannyāsi in Benaras only in his last days. Not only so but in his small work 'Sannyāsa-nirṇaya', he revealed his thoughts on asceticism as such. As a result of this, while in other systems we have the line of teachers and their disciples who adored the pontifical chairs, here we have the line of direct descendants. These descendants have done much to propound and explain the Sāmpradāyic theories and practices. Vallabha's system has given us three orders of scholars, the Vaiṣṇavas who were followers of the School, the Bhaṭṭas who were related to the Gosvāmīs by matrimonial alliance, and the direct descendants of Vallabha. Out of these, the last have served the system most. They had the right of service of the images that they kept in their own possession. Many of them were great scholars. Again they were looked upon with very high regard by their followers, perhaps because they were direct descendants of Vallabha.

The title 'Gosvāmi' which was assumed by them and which is retained by them even to-day, does not appear to be the original title of Vallabha himself. Vallabha calls himself just 'Dīkṣita'. Even Viṭṭhaleśa calls himself 'Dīkṣita' in some of his works. Viṭṭhaleśa however, was allowed to graze his cattle at Gokula, Mathura etc. by the imperial firmens issued by the Moghul Emperors-Akber and Jehangir. It was an account of this that Viṭṭhaleśa was called a Go-svāmi-'the owner of cows' and this title went on for centuries. Even to-day the Mahārājas are called Gosvāmis.

Viṭṭhaleśa had 7 sons. The third son was Bālakṛṣṇa, who again had 6 sons. His second son was Vrajanātha while the fourth son was named Pītāmbara. Vrajanātha had a son named Kṛṣṇacandra. Pītāmbara has two sons 'Śyāmalāla' and 'Yadupati'. Śyāmalāla was the father of Vrajapāla and Vrajarāya. Yadupati's son was Pītāmbara whose son was Puruṣottama. Puruṣottama refers respectfully to his father and his grand-father in his works.¹ We do not know the name of Puruṣottama's mother. The geneology is given on the next page.

1. Bhaktyā naumi pītāmbaram^{ak} Yadupati^{ak}m tātām ca Pītāmbaram.

Geneology



(II).

Date and place of Birth.

The generally accepted year of Puruṣottama's birth is V.S.1724. Shri.Chimenlal Shastri of Bada Mandir at Surat however told me that this did not appear to be correct. I, therefore wrote to Pandit Kanthemani Shastri of Kenkroli, who directed me to write to Shri.Nrisimhalalji Pandya of Nathadvar, who supplied me with the horoscope of Puruṣottama. He has informed me that his ancestors were appointed Jyotisis and family-priests of Gosvāmi Viṭṭhala-nātha and he has got a thousand such old horoscopes. We would like to suggest that apart from the astrological importance, if these horoscopes are published, they will be very helpful in finding out the exact dates of many of the Gosvāmis, and thus in tracing the history of the family of Vallabha. Puruṣottama's horoscope is given in the appendix No.1. On the strength of that horoscope, we can be definite that Puruṣottama was born on the 10th day of the bright half of the month of Bhādrapada in V.S.1714, corresponding to A.D.1658.

We do not know definitely where he was born. It is quite likely that he was born in Gokula, as tradition relates.

(III).
The Temple at Surat.

We do not know anything about Puruṣottama until he came to Surat and settled in the temple of Bālakṛṣṇa as an heir of Vrajarāya. We may here note the history of the image of Bālakṛṣṇa till it was installed in Surat by Vrajarāya.

The image of Bālakṛṣṇa owes its origin to the sacred river Yamunā. Once when Vallabha went to the river for a bath, the image came out entangled in the sacred thread worn by him, and told Vallabha that it would come to his house. Vallabha welcomed the Lord and taking the image to his house, placed it together with other images in the Sevā. There is another tradition also stating that the image came from the Karnakūpa in Vraja. At that time Vallabha had five images and he was spending his time in their devotion at Adel near Prayag.

A curious incident has also been recorded in connection with this idol. Vallabha's son Viṭṭhaleśa was just a child at that time. He also served the small image of Bālakṛṣṇa, he decorated it, played with it, served it with the Bhoga and did all sorts of things. Once he served

'Thora' (ठोरा) as the Bhoga. To his surprise he found that the image began to eat it. Viṭṭhaleśa thought that if the Thora ^{was} eaten by him in this way, nothing ^{would} remain for him. He then tried to take it away from the image but Bālakṛṣṇa also pulled it in another direction. In the mean time Vallabha came there and was delighted to see this friendship. He asked Viṭṭhaleśa to give away the Thora to the idol and another dish of thora was prepared for Viṭṭhaleśa himself.

This image of Bālakṛṣṇa remained with Vallabha at Aḍaī, Kāshī and Gokula. After Vallabha, it came to Viṭṭhaleśa. Viṭṭhaleśa had seven images in all and also had seven sons. So he distributed these images to his sons thus:

<u>Name of the son.</u>	<u>Name of the image.</u>
(1) Giridhara	Mathureśa.
(2) Govindamāya	Viṭṭhalanātha.
(3) Bālakṛṣṇa	Dvārakādhiśa.
(4) Gokulanātha	Gokulanātha.
(5) Raghunātha	Gokulacandramā.
(6) Yadunātha	Bālakṛṣṇa.
(7) Ghenaśyāma	Madanamohana.

It will be seen that the image of Bālakṛṣṇa thus came in the possession of Yadunātha, the sixth son of Viṭṭhaleśa. Yadunātha kept this image together with that of Dvārakādhiśa, and stayed with Bālakṛṣṇa, the third son of Viṭṭhaleśa. We do not know why Yadunātha took such a steps. One of the possible reasons may be that the image of Bālakṛṣṇa is very small. After Yadunātha his son Madhusūdana also stayed with Dvārakeśa, the son of Bālakṛṣṇa. After sometime however Madhusūdana wanted to be independent of Dvārakeśa and hence he demanded the ~~in~~ image of Bālakṛṣṇa from the latter. Dvārakeśa however was not inclined to comply with that demand. The matter was referred to Gokulanātha, the fourth son of Viṭṭhaleśa. Gokulanātha told Dvārakeśa that the image of Bālakṛṣṇa belonged in fact to Yadunātha who stayed with his father only due to affection. Again Viṭṭhaleśa himself had ordered that whenever Yadunātha or any of his descendants desired to serve the image independently, that desire should be fulfilled. Madhusūdana could thus get this image of Bālakṛṣṇa. After one year's service, the Lord wished to remain in the company of another image of Dvārakādhiśa. Madhusūdana thereupon brought it to

~~At~~ Dvārakeśa who accepted the image on the condition that Madhusūdana should not demand it in future. Madhusūdana agreed to this in writing. Thus the images of Dvārakādhīśa and Bālakṛṣṇa were kept in Gokula together. After Dvārakeśa, they were served by his son Giridhara. Giridhara's son Dvārakānātha possessed the images after his father. He served them together with his sister Gaṅgābetījī and his wife Jānakīvahuji. Dvārakānātha went to Kashi for study and managed to get the Sarasvatīmantra on his tongue. He became a profound scholar and then returned to his father at Gokula. But the same night, the God Dvārakādhīśa informed him that he had committed the ²²fault of 'Anyāśraya' by resorting to the Sarasvatīmantra and therefore he was no longer fit for devotion. He had to leave his house. Similar such incidents is also reported in connection with his father Giridhara. His wife Jānakī therefore with the help of Gaṅgā adopted Vrajabhūṣana, son of Śrīvallabha, in the year 1717.V.S. On the eighth day of the bright half of Bhādrapada.

This deed of adoption was challenged by Vrajarāya, son of Śyāmalāla, who recently returned to Gokula from Kashi. He demanded one of the two images served by the

trio of Gaṅgā, Jānakī and Vrajabhūṣaṇa. The demand of Vrajarāya was refused. He thereupon approached the Emperor but without any result. He then went to Gokula with ~~both~~ some associates and took away both the images by force. The matter was referred to the Emperor Aurangzeb, who ordered that the images should be returned to Vrajabhūṣaṇa. Vrajarāya again met the Emperor in a forest and pleased him. He reiterated his demand in the form of a request. The Emperor however did not agree. Vrajarāya then asked for only one image, that of Bālakṛṣṇa as a right. The Emperor accepted the request and issued the necessary order. With this order in hand, Vrajarāya came to Gokula, but Gaṅgā and Jānakī together with Vrajabhūṣaṇa went to Agra. When Vrajarāya went to Agra, they left the place for Ahmedabad, taking away with them both the images. They stayed there in an underground room and served the images secretly. Vrajarāya came to Ahmedabad and began his search for the images. After four months he could find out where the images were kept. Once he found that thousands of betel leaves were daily purchased from one shop. He thereupon asked the shop-keeper who informed him that those betel leaves were purchased for the images, that were kept secretly in a house in the

Raipur locality. Vrajarāya took the help of the Moghul Viceroy in Ahmedabad and went to that place. At that time both the images were lying in a cradle, and Gaṅgā, Jānakī and Vrajabhūṣaṇa were serving them. Vrajarāya showed to them the imperial order and took away the smaller image of Bālakṛṣṇa with his own hand from the cradle. Jānakī was very angry at this and cursed Vrajarāya to the effect that as he was taking away the image from the cradle, there would be no cradle in his house. Vrajarāya accepted the curse and left Ahmedabad.

From Ahmedabad Vrajarāya came to Surat. On account of his scholarship and his devotion to the Lord, he could exercise very good influence on the local Vaiṣṇavas. He settled in Surat and built a temple of his own in V.S. 1727. As he had no son, he adopted Puruṣottama as his heir. Puruṣottama thus occupied the pontifical chair of Surat after Vrajarāya.

The account given above is according to the tradition current in the Sampradāya. It seems to have a fairly large degree of historical truth. There is another tradition current in the Sampradāya, explaining how Puruṣottama could secure the image of Bālakṛṣṇa. It

is said that Puruṣottama took away this image from Gokula and brought it to Surat, hiding it in the locks of his hair. On account of this the Mahārāja in Gokula cursed Puruṣottama with childlessness. This tradition does not appear to be correct. That Puruṣottama could secure the image of Bālakṛṣṇa from Vrajarāya, is borne out by the statement of Puruṣottama himself. In the introductory verses in his Ānubhāṣyaprakāśa, Puruṣottama pays homage to Vrajarāya and says:

Vande tam Vrajarājam anvayamaṇim yadrociṣā mādrśo-
Pyāsin mūrdhni kṛpāparaḥ Prabhuveṣa Śrībālakṛṣṇaḥ svayam.²

The historicity of the feud between Vrajarāya on the one hand and Gaṅgā, Jānakī and Vrajabhūṣaṇa on the other is corroborated by documentary evidence also. In the Sudder Diwani Adaulat Case No. 43, was produced a release executed by Gaṅgā, Jānakī, and Vrajabhūṣaṇa to Vrajarāya. The document which is given in appendix No. 2, bears the date third day of the bright half of the first Āśvina, V.S. 1737, corresponding to 1681 A.D. It is stated in the document that they had settled their old dispute regarding

2. A.B.P. Intro. V. 7. p. 2.

the two images and the Pādukā of the Ācārya. The idol of Bālakṛṣṇa should be given up to Vrajarāya, while that of Dvārakānātha should be kept by them. Gaṅgā should keep the Pādukā till her death and after that the Pādukā would devolve to Vrajarāya. It was stated in conclusion that no cause of dispute remained between the parties after this. The document was signed by Harirāya, son of Kalyāṇarāya and others as witnesses.

It appears from the document that the quarrel between Vrajarāya on the one hand and Gaṅgā, Jānakī, and Vrajabhūṣaṇa on the other went on for a long time. Harirāya, who was a famous personality living at that time in the Saṃpradāya, seems to have used his good offices to work out a compromise solution.

One important point should however be noted in this connection. The year, given in the document is V.S.1737. The traditional account given above informs us that Vrajarāya came to Surat after receiving the idol of Bālakṛṣṇa in V.S.1727. In the Gujarat Sarvasaṅgraha prepared by Kavi Narmadashankar, it is stated that the temple of Bālakṛṣṇa at Kanpith was built in 1695 A.D.³

3. Gujarat Sarvasaṅgraha p.531.

In the History of Kankroli, Pandit Kanthamani Shastri expresses certain doubts about the authenticity of this document on the following grounds:-

(1) The script of the document is Gujarati; and it is quite possible also but as Gaṅgābetījī herself used Hindi (Vraj) in all her dealings, the language of the document should have been Hindi(Vraj) and not Gujarati.

(2) Ten years before the date of this document all of them left Gujarat and settled in Mewad.

(3) Gaṅgābetījī was not alive in V.S.1737.

(4) When all of them were in Ahmedabad, in V.S.1727, there is no evidence to show that Harirāya also stayed in Gujarat.

On these grounds, Kanthamani Shastri says that the document is doubtful. It is likely that Vrajarāya might have settled firmly in Surat by about V.S. 1737 and might have got this document prepared so as to avoid any problem in future.⁴

Shri.Chimenlal Shastri of the Bada Mandir at Surat is writing a history of the idol of Bālakṛṣṇa and the

4. Kankroli.Part.II.appendix No.2.pp.154-155.

Bada Mandir, Surat. The work is not yet published. Shri. C. H.

Shastri informed me of his arguments which are as follows:-

(1) The correct year in the document should be V.S. 1727 and not 1737. According to mathematical consideration the additional month of Āśvina is found in V.S. 1726-27. He also supplied me with a table showing the additional months. The relevant portion of the table is given below:-

Samvat Year: beginning with Kārtika.	Samvat year : beginning with Caitra.	Śaka year.	Additional month.
1723	1724	1589	
1724	1725	1590	Jyestha.
1725-	1726	1591	
1726	1727	1582	Āśvina.
1727	1728	1593	
1728	1729	1594	
1729	1730	1595	Śrāvana.
1730	1731	1596	
1731	1732	1597	
1732	1733	1598	Jyestha.
1733	1734	1599	
1734	1735	1600	
1735	1736	1601	Vaiśākha

Samvat Year: beginning with Kārtika.	Samvat year : beginning with Caitra.	Śaka year :	Additional month.
1736	1737	1602	
1737	1738	1603	Bhādrapada.
1738	1739	1604	
1739	1740	1605	
1740	1741	1606	Āṣāḍha.

(2) The document was produced before the court in the Sudder Diwani Adaulat case No.43.

(3) Harirāya had mastery over Gujarati language, as can be seen from the Padas, he composed in Gujarati. It is likely that as the writer of the said document was a Gujarati, Harirāya might have got it written in Gujarati, and Gaṅgābetījī and others signed it.

(4) Gaṅgābetījī died in V.S.1736. Hence the date of the document cannot be V.S.1737. Aurangzeb attacked Mathura in V.S.1726 and so the trio of Gaṅgābetījī, Jānakīvahuji and Vrajabhūṣana could not stay in Gokula. In V.S.1727, Harirāya was about 80 years of age. Śrī Nāthajī was shifted from Girirāja to Mewad in V.S.1728 and that is why the Pātotsava of Śrī Nāthajī was celebrated in Mewad in V.S.1728. There is

a possibility that Harirāya lived in Gujarat in V.S.1726-27, because Mathura was not peaceful and the residen^{ce} in Mewad was not yet established. In the letters that Harirāya wrote to his younger brother Copeśvara, there are references to Surat and to one Gujarati gentleman named Premaji. Harirāya visited Gujarat very often. The news of the death of Copeśvara's wife was known to him when he was in Gujarat.

It appears from all this, that the idol of Bālakṛṣṇa was brought to Surat in V.S.1727. As regards the date given in Gujarat Sarvasangraha, it can be understood as the year in which the temple was built completely.

We do not know when Puruṣottama came to Surat. Any way he did not come to Surat before V.S.1727. We also do not know when Vrajarāya died and when Puruṣottama succeeded him. After Puruṣottama, the image was given to another Puruṣottama, son of Muralīdhara and great Grandson of Vrajālakṣmī. This Puruṣottama had a son called Govardhana. As he died without any male issue, his wife Mahārānī vahujī adopted Gokulotsava, who belonged to the family of the ^{Second} ~~first~~ son of Viṭṭhaleśa. Thus the image went to the possession of the ^{Second} ~~first~~ house. On the next page we have shown how the image of Bālakṛṣṇa has changed hands, by means of a chart.

Chart showing how the idol of Balakṛṣṇa changed hands.

1. Vallabha.

I

2. Viṭṭhaleśa.

I

3. Yadunātha. (Sixth son of Viṭṭhaleśa).

I

4. Bālakṛṣṇa. (Third son of Viṭṭhaleśa).

I

5. Dvārakeśa (Son of Bālakṛṣṇa).

I

6. Madhusūdana (Son of Yadunātha).

I

7. Dvārakeśa. (Same as No. 5).

I

8. Giridhara. (Son of Dvārakeśa).

I

9. Dvārakānātha (Son of Giridhara).

I

10. Gaṅgā (Sister of Dvārakānātha), Jānakī (Wife of Dvārakānātha),
Vrajabhūṣaṇa (Son of 'Srī Vallabha).

I

11. Vrajarāya (Son of Śyāmalāla).

I

12. Puruṣottama (Son of Pītāmbara).

I

13. Puruṣottama (Son of Muralīdhara).

I

14. Govardhaneśa (Son of Puruṣottama, No. 13).

I

15. Mahārāṇīvahuji (Wife of Govardhaneśa).

I

16. Gokulotsava (Adopted by Mahārāṇīvahuji).

(IV).
Study and Scholarship.

We do not know much about the childhood of Puruṣottama. His teacher was Kṛṣṇacandra, whose date of birth is probably V.S.1661. He was the son of Vrajanātha, the second son of Bālakṛṣṇa, the third son of Viṭṭhaleśa. He was a very great scholar. Nirbhayarāma Bhaṭṭa in his Kalpavṛkṣa calls him 'Śāstravittama'⁵ We do not know much about the life of this Kṛṣṇacandra. The Dhāvaparakāśikāvṛtti is ascribed to him. Puruṣottama pays homage to him as his preceptor in the beginning of his Anubhāṣyaprakāśa.⁶ Shri Telivala thinks that very probably Puruṣottama owes much to Kṛṣṇacandra for the profound scholarship, which is revealed in his works. Telivala says that Puruṣottama is obliged by two Gosvāmīs, Vrajarāya and Kṛṣṇacandra. A comparison of the works of Vrajarāya with those of Puruṣottama would show that there is

5. Evam Śrī Bālakṛṣṇānām jyeṣṭhasyaṇvaya īritah,
 Vrajanāthābhīdhasyātha dvitīyatanayasye tu ;
 Kṛṣṇacandra iti khyēto nandanah śāstravittamah. Kalpavṛkṣa.
 quoted by Telivala in Venunāda Vol.I.No.5.

6. Tatputrēn saha sūnubhir nijagurūn śrīkṛṣṇacandrāhvayēn....

a basic difference in their respective methods of presentation. Naturally the profound scholarship of Puruṣottama does not owe its origin to the genius of Vrajarāya. It is likely that it may be due to the teaching of Kṛṣṇacandra. The argument of Telivala appears convincing, but the term Guru may mean only the initiating preceptor and nothing more. Telivala also refers to the Bhāvaṇīprakāśikāvṛtti and compares it with the Anubhāṣyaṇīprakāśa. The Bhāvaṇīprakāśikāvṛtti is a very suspicious work and we will discuss its relation with the Anubhāṣyaṇīprakāśa in the next chapter. It is difficult to say anything for or against the view of Telivala that the scholarship of Puruṣottama owes its origin to the teaching of Kṛṣṇacandra.

There is one curious tradition in the Saṃpradāya, which tries to account for the scholarship of Puruṣottama. It is said that when Puruṣottama was only seven years old, one great Pandit (Appaya Dīkṣita according to the Saṃpradāya) came to Surat and challenged the scholars for the Śāstrārtha. As the elderly persons in the Surat temple were absent, Puruṣottama's mother accepted the challenge and said that

her son would be prepared for the Śāstrārtha after three days. Puruṣottama then went to the underground room in the Surat temple and continuously muttered the Sarvottama-stotra for three days and nights. (According to some he muttered the Trividhanāmāvalī.) At the end of this the Lord Bālakṛṣṇa, Vallabhācārya and Viṭṭhalanāthajī presented themselves before him and blessed him with a thorough understanding of all the works, if he saw just the beginning and the end of the same. When Puruṣottama pays homage to Bālakṛṣṇa in the Anubhāsyaprakāśa he says:

Kṛīḍan Śrībālakṛṣṇaḥ paramakarūṇayā manmanah prerayātva
Bhāṣyārtham yo' tigūḍham prakāṣitam akarot sampradāye-
-nivṛtte...?

The verse is taken as a proof for the tradition by some. After the blessings that he received, Puruṣottama received the blessing from his mother also. He was thus fully prepared for the Śāstrārtha and defeated the Pandita in Surat.

Whatever may be the value of the traditional story, Puruṣottama's scholarship is really profound. He had a thorough study of all the Bhāṣyas. He refers to almost all of them at the end of the Sūtras or Adhikaranas in

his Anubhāṣyaprakāśa. He knows of six Bhāṣyas, of Śaṅkara, Rāmānuja, Śaiva, Bhāskara, Madhva, and Bhikṣu. At one place when Vallabha refers to someone by 'Kaścit paraśabdena dehādīn āha', Puruṣottama says in his comments, 'Idam ca na prasiddhaśadbhāṣyastham... Ata idānīm utsannasyaiva Kasyacin matasyollekhaḥ'.⁸ It may appear rather curious that Puruṣottama does not refer to Nimbārka at all, not only so, but even does not appear to know of him.

He also refers to Vācaspati, Jayatīrtha, and Vedāntadeśika, the famous followers of Śaṅkara, Madhva, and Rāmānuja respectively. Regarding the literature of his own school, his study is so very deep that he points out where and what exactly Viṭṭhaleśa added to the bulk of his father's works. Even in minor commentaries, such as those on the sixteenth tracts, he shows a thorough study of the interpretations given by the elders of the school, like Devakīnandana, Harirāya, Cācā Gopīśa, Dvārakeśa, etc. Apart from the Vedāntic works, he reveals a profound study of the authoritative works of other systems also. He refers to the Bhāṭṭas, the Prābhākaras, Kapila, Īśvara-kṛṣṇa, Gautama, Kaṇāda, Udayana, Pārthasārathimīśra, Maithili Bhavedeva Mīśra, Vanamālīdēsa, the Bauddhas,

the Jainas, Madhusūdana Sarasvati, Appaya Dīkṣita and many others very often. He also refers to Pāṇini, Patañjali, and Bhaṭṭojī Dīkṣita, and even Rāmakṛṣṇa, the author of Siddhāntaratnākara. He shows his study of rhetorics and refers to Kāvyaṭīkā, Dhvanyāloka and similar standard works on the subject. He refers even to Arkaṭīkā, a work on medicine and discusses how the Cinīyāpots are manufactured. His study of the Dharmaśāstra-nibandhas is simply astonishing as can be seen by the scores of references to such works in the Dravyasūddhi and Utsavaprakāśa. He is thoroughly well-versed in the sacred lore. His passages beam with the references to the Śrutis, the great Epics, Smṛtis and Purāṇas. From the classical literature, he refers to Prabodhaśūdhayā. He also refers to Narasimha Mehta the famous Gujarati poet-saint. The above is not an exhaustive list of the works referred to by him, but it would be sufficient to show how great a scholar Puruṣottama was. There is a traditional verse in the Saṃpradāya, showing that he was a very great scholar and composed about nine lacs of verses. The verse runs:

Nāśīd ena samah samastanigamasmrtyēditattvārthavid

Vaktā cāpratimāḥ sadāḥsu viduṣāṃ adyāpi bhūmau budhaḥ,

Yah sarvam navalakṣapadyakamitapraudhaprabandham vyadhāt
 Sa Śrīmān Puruṣottama vijayatām Ācāryacudāmaṇih.

Puruṣottama was not only a great scholar himself, but he also kept so many other scholars with him. Puruṣottama does not appear to have been a man of very narrow outlook. Whenever he found a Pandit, irrespective of the system which that particular Pandit followed, Puruṣottama treated him with due respect. It is perhaps because of this that Puruṣottama is very exact in his references to other systems. ~~and~~

(V)

Travels and Digvijaya.

Puruṣottama is said to have travelled all over India. He went to various provinces and challenged all the great Pandits of the time for the Śāstrārtha. This is the reason why he was given the title of Daśadigantavijayī. It is said that he won over many of them and received written statements of his victory from them. My efforts to secure those statements have not been fruitful. If they are found out, it may be possible to trace the account of his travels.

He is also said to have gone to Dumas very often.

Dumas is a place of resort on the Sea-shore, about ten miles from Surat. It is said that Puruṣottama wrote many of his works there. Prof. M. G. Shastri goes still further and says that after finishing the daily work in the morning and serving the Lord Bālakṛṣṇa with Kājabhoga, Puruṣottama went to Dumas every day. He stayed there for the whole day and returned in the evening to serve the Lord Bālakṛṣṇa again. When he went to Dumas, he kept with him cartloads of Books. It is impossible to believe that Puruṣottama went there every day in those days when the means of communication and transport were not speedy.

Shri. Telivala in his account of Puruṣottama's life says that Puruṣottama used to go to Dumas very often. Many of his works were written and copied there. Telivala further says that Puruṣottama gave some sort of a letter to a Brahmin Devotee of his at Dumas and the descendants of that devotee are still alive.

Though I have not been able to get any definite information regarding this, I could get some hints from Dumas, which I visited often in connection with this purpose. There is a temple of Ranchhodji, built in December 1956.

The image however is old by centuries. It is made of black-stone and is similar to that of Dvāarakādhiśa at Dakor with the order, Padma, Cakra, Gadā and Śaṅkha. Below this image certain letters are inscribed. The first line could be read with difficulty. It reads:

महाशक्ति श्री य श्री सूत्र

The second line could not be read because it is below the pīṭha, upon which the image is fixed. There are five other copper images and also a conch. All of them appear to be very old.

Shri. Chhaganlal Delpatram Upadhyay, Popularly known as Chhaganlal Shastri, offers his service to the image. He stays just near the temple. When approached, he readily showed his eagerness to give me as much information as he could. He informed me about some hearsay in Dumas that one Gosvāmi Mahārāja, who was perhaps a very great scholar, used to come to Dumas before some two hundred and fifty years or so. As regards the image of Ranchhodji he told me that it was quite possible that some one might have brought it in a ship in the Dark days of Hinduism. His family was in possession of this image since centuries, and he was not in a position to inform me when and how exactly his ancestors came to

possessed this image. It ^{is} difficult to make out exactly what is meant by the letters which are inscribed under the image. According to Shri. Upadhyay 'Śrī Sūtra' means that the image is of Lakṣmīnārāyaṇa. 'Mahāraula' can not be understood by us. It may perhaps signify that the image is from Rajasthan or Kutch. The image does not appear to owe its origin to South Gujarat. Shri. Upadhyay further informed me that in the Talav Falia, where his ancestors were staying at first, there was a fairly large number of Nagar Banias living in Dumas in that street. The Nagar Banias are generally Vaiṣṇavas belonging to the Puṣṭimārga. Thus there appears to have been some sort of Vaiṣṇavite influence of the Puṣṭimārga, exercised on the natives of Dumas. It is very likely that the said influence might have come from Surat which is the nearest centre of the Puṣṭimārga. Shri. Upadhyay also informed me that his ancestors possessed many Sanskrit manuscripts but unfortunately they could not be preserved. He showed to me one old manuscript of the Rāmāyaṇa of Vālmīki. The manuscript is now deposited in the manuscript-library of the Chunilal Gandhi Vidyabhavan, Surat. As the manuscript is important for our purpose, I have given a

short description and the colophons of the manuscript in appendix No.4. The following points should be noted in this connection:-

(1) The manuscript was copied in V.S.1786.Puruṣottama who was born in V.S.1714,lived a fairly long life and inspite of his gift deed in V.S.1781,we can say that he lived even after that time.The question will be discussed later in this chapter,but there is nothing wrong in assuming that Puruṣottama was living in V.S.1786.

(2) The handwriting found in the folios of the Kāṇḍa VI,were seen by Shri.Chimanlal Shastri,Secretary of the Bālakṛṣṇa Śuddhādvaita Mahāsamāhā,Surat.He told me that -there are manuscripts in the Surat temple,with a similar handwriting and it is very likely that the scribe might be one and the same.

(3) That the manuscript has been found at Dumas leads us to^a fairly reasonable conjecture that it might have been copied at Dumas. Had it been copied elsewhere,it is not likely that the ancestors of Shri.Upadhyay might have possessed it.

(4) In the very beginning of the Kāṇḍa I we have 'Om namo Bhagavate Vāsudevāya' which precedes the salutation

to Rāma. It is really curious in a manuscript of Rāmāyana. In the beginning of the Kāṇḍa V we have one verse:

Jitam Bhagavatā tena Hariṇā lokadhārīṇā,

Ajane viśvarūpeṇa nirguṇeṇa guṇātmanā.

This verse is followed by the usual Maṅgala, 'Jayati Raghuvanśtilakah...'. The verse shows the contradictory attributes of the Lord. That Brahman has contradictory attributes is advocated by Vallabha alone and by no other Ācārya. What is the use of this additional verse in the manuscript of Rāmāyana? Both these points show that the owner as well as the scribe must have been definitely a follower of the Śuddhādvaita.

Thus it is clear that Puruṣottama was present in Dumas when the manuscript was copied out, and it is very likely that he shew it, if he did not own it. He might have given it to his followers in Dumas and perhaps some one ancestor of Shri. Upadhyay might have got it. It is also likely that Puruṣottama might have had some connection with the image of Ranchhodji, but about this we do not know anything.

(VI).

Private Life .

We do not know much about the private life of Puruṣottama. He had three wives, Rānī, Candrāvalī, and Padmāvatī. He had two sons, Yādupati and Dāmodara and one daughter named Haripriyā. Yādupati was born in V.S. 1749, and Dāmodara in V.S. 1760. Both of them died during his life time. Tradition runs that as Puruṣottama brought the image of Bālakṛṣṇa concealing it in the locks of his hair, the Gosvāmi Mahārāja of Kank that place became very angry and cursed him with childlessness. Hence even though Puruṣottama had two sons, both of them died very young.

Puruṣottama seems to have passed most of his time in the composition of his works. Many of his works were written in Dumas. In Surat, it is said that he used to ~~write~~ write in an underground room in the Surat temple. He kept about nine scribes with him. He dictated to them whatever he thought at a particular time. Thus some three or four works were being written simultaneously. This perhaps is the reason why there are mutual references found in many of his works, as Shri. Telivala thinks. It is said that he used to ~~prepare~~ prepare three copies of all his works. One was kept for himself,

while the other two were sent to other Gosvāmis. He had cordial relations with Gosvāmi Viṭṭhalarāya Campasenivāla and one of the copies was sent to him. Whenever he went out, he kept with him cartloads of books rather than clothes or ornaments and things of luxury. Teliwāla says that he kept some about 32 carts. Puruṣottama again had a very big library of his own. He used to study the works of Vallabha and Viṭṭhaleśa very often and used to copy out those works in small handwriting. Telivāla saw one such manuscript of the Subodhinī on the first ten Adhyāyas of the tenth Skandha of the Bhāgavata. He found it very clear and the handwriting was quite good. Puruṣottama was a very good scribe himself. Śrī.Telivāla who saw many of his manuscripts while preparing critical editions of his works, says: " From his manuscripts we find him putting a point where we use ~~the~~ a comma; for a full stop he makes one stroke, and for a complete idea he makes two perpendicular strokes. When he wants to begin a fresh paragraph, he puts two perpendicular strokes and leaving a space of about half an inch he puts another two strokes and then begins a fresh paragraph. Important words are coloured with red senna. Śrī.Puruṣottamsjī has revised his manuscripts

atleast three or four times. Where he thought that an addition was necessary he would affix a fine slip and re-write over it. Where the angle mark was above the line, we had to look for the addition on the top of the page on the margin, counting the number of lines mentioned at the end of the addition. Where the angle was below the line we had similarly to look for the addition at the bottom of the page." ⁹

It appears that Puruṣottama was always busy writing something. This perhaps is the reason of his being called 'Lekhavālā'. Another title given by the contemporary Gosvāmīs to him was 'Vedapaśu'. It was a jeer at him.

Puruṣottama led a very simple life, even though like other Gosvāmīs he was blessed with vast fortune. He was staying in Surat, which was at the height of its glory as the chief emporium of trade on the Western coast of India. It was a main centre of business not only in Gujarat but in the whole of India and it attracted the famous Chhatrapati Shivaji for plunder. Puruṣottama was untouched by the pomp and glory of the city. He was an author and scholar, and liked to remain a real author and real scholar.

9. Telivela, quoted by M.C. Parekh in 'Shri. Vallabhacharya.!!


We do not know much about him as a devotee, as much as we know about Herirāya. He is however said to have been a very good artist. His Holiness Gosvami Shri Vrajaratnalalji Maharaj of the Surat temple obliged me by showing certain articles, which are kept in the Sevā and which contain one picture, said to have been painted by Puruṣottama and five paper-cuts said to have been prepared by Puruṣottama. A short description of them is as follows:-

(1) The picture is of Muralīmanohara. It has three colours. Lord Kṛṣṇa ^{is} painted as playing upon his flute. There are two female deer at his feet. Above the head are painted the peacock-feathers. The picture is painted on the basis of the verse 'Dhanyas te mūdhamataye ...etc.' ¹⁰ In the verse the Gopikās describe the female deer which are at the feet of the Lord, hearing his Venunāda with rapt attention and worshipping him with loving glances. The idea in the verse is aptly revealed in the picture.

(2) Paper-cut of a Palm-tree, with two men ascending the tree with pots. Below at the root of the tree are designed one cow and one pot. There is a border design also.

10. Bhāgavata Purāṇa X.21.31.

The cutting is very minute and exact. The leaves of the tree, the helmets of two men, and all the details are quite clearly visible. The paper used is white.

(3) Paper-cut of four rams with one face. The four rams are shown as  and the one face which is designed can be fitted to any of them in different postures. There is also a border design. The paper-work is minute and the design is artistic and beautiful. The paper used is white.

(4) Paper-cut of a Seru tree with an artistic border. Below the tree are shown four birds, two on either side. The paper work is minutely executed. White paper is used.

(5) Paper-cut of a leafless dried up tree. The work is done with fineness. The paper is not white but has the dark colour corresponding to that of the trunk and branches of the tree.

(6) Paper-cut of a Kadamba tree. Two apes are shown in the work. One is mounting the tree, while the other is plucking the leaves. The work is so minutely designed that even the tail of the monkey can be seen easily.

The tree is fairly big.

Under the Saru tree and the Kadamba tree, the words 'Śrī' and 'Śrīh' are written respectively in ink. Gosvami Shri Vrajaratanalalji Maharaj told me that the handwriting was of Puruṣottama, and that this is a proof for the paper-work being done by Puruṣottama himself. He also informed me that according to requirements of the tradition of their family, if 'Śrī' is not written on the paper, it can not be included in the Sevā. Any way, it should be stated that the designs are fairly well preserved.¹¹

(VII)

Contemporaries.

By the time of Puruṣottama, the family of Vallabha became a very big family and his descendants spread over almost the whole of Western India. Thus Puruṣottama had many contemporary Gosvāmis.

11. Besides what has been described above, there are two copies of the picture of Viṭṭhaleśa, said to have been drawn by himself. There is also a picture of Śrīnāthajī.

In it are seen Govindarāya and others. There are also four manuscripts, ^{two} in the handwriting of Vallabha and two in that of Viṭṭhaleśa.

The most important and famous of the contemporary Gosvāmis, was Harirāya, who was born in V.S. 1649 and who lived a fairly long life of about one hundred and twenty years or so. It is said that he was alive in V.S. 1772. He was thus a senior contemporary of Puruṣottama. Regarding the connection of Harirāya with Puruṣottama, two stories have been preserved by tradition; both of them are intended to establish the superiority of Harirāya to Puruṣottama, as a devotee and as scholar. Both of them are narrated below.

Since the time of Viṭṭhaleśa, there is a convention in the Sampradāya that, whatever wealth is accumulated by a Gosvāmi in the first round of his travels, should be dedicated to Govardhananāthajī. Accordingly, Puruṣottama travelled all over India and with all his wealth went for dedicating it to Śrīnāthajī. It was the summer season, and as a rule shoes can not be presented to the Lord. But Puruṣottama brought with him very costly foot-wear studded with pearls. Looking to this, the Gosvāmi of that place allowed Puruṣottama to present the same to Śrīnāthajī for the limited time of Rājabhoga only. The young Gosvāmi

Puruṣottama wanted that the shoes should be kept for the whole day and attempted to do so by giving bribes to the chief servant of the temple. He did not think that this would be trouble some to God. Harirāya, at that time was staying at Khimnor, not very far from Nāthadvar. Śrīnāthajī informed him about this. Harirāya immediately came to Nāthadvar on horse-back and ordered that the shoes be taken off. The story thus shows that Harirāya was fortunately enough to obtain the grace of God, who informed him of what He thought and felt, while Puruṣottama was not blessed with similar favour.

Another story runs that once when Puruṣottama was dictating to a scribe his Prakāśa commentary on the Subodhinī, he had doubts about the exact significance of some particular point. Even though he pondered over it for a long time, his doubts could not be resolved. One old lady saw him in a sorry mood and on inquiry could know the reason. She said that she had heard the explanation of that particular point from Harirāya and she was prepared to explain the same to Puruṣottama. Puruṣottama thereupon asked for the explanation and on hearing the same he was satisfied. This story suggests

that Puruṣottama had to take the help of even an ordinary lady who just heard from Harirāya.

Both these stories are current among the followers of Harirāya. We do not know if there is any historical truth in either of them. So far as Puruṣottama is concerned he shows the same respect to Harirāya as he shows to others.

Another Gosvāmi with whom Puruṣottama seems to have had special relationship, was Viṭṭhalarāya of Capaseni. He was born in V.S. 1751 and was thus much junior to Puruṣottama. It is said that Puruṣottama sent one copy of all his works to him. He actually commented upon his own Prahasṭavāda at his request.¹²

Another Gosvāmi, with whom Puruṣottama seems to have had cordial relations was Śrīvallabha, the author of 'Lekha' on Subodhinī. Puruṣottama refers to him in his Subodhinīprakāśa on Bhāgavata X. iv. 20 by: 'Yathānevamyida ity atra. Vedanam wit. Bhāve kvip ... ity artha iti

12. Kṛtavan etām Prahasṭatīkām Viṭṭhalarāyapramodāya.

'Śrīvallabhah. Tan mamāpi sammatam iti'. The singular in 'Śrīvallabhah' as against the plural used in the references to other Gosvāmis, would show that Śrīvallabhah was junior to Puruṣottama. Śrīvallabha's father was Viṭṭhalarāya. He was born on the dark eleventh of the month of Kārttika in V.S. 1729.

Shri. H. O. Shastri could get from Vaisnava Manilal of Jamnagar a list of Gosvāmis, who were contemporaries of Puruṣottama. The list is very long and does not appear to be conclusive. We have given below the same with certain subtractions:

<u>Name.</u>	<u>Place.</u>	<u>Samvat Year.</u>
1. Gopīkāśha	--	1699
2. Bālakṛṣṇa	Gokulā.	1700
3. Kṛṣṇa	Gokulā.	1700
4. Mādhavarāya	Shergadh.	1700
5. Viṭṭhalasā	Kenkroli	1700
6. Vrajevallabha	Gokulā.	1701
7. Śrīkanta (Son of Cācā Gopīśa)	--	1701
8. Bensīdhara	Kashi	1702
9. Kākāvallabha	Nathadvar	1703
10. Ramanalal (Son of Cācā Gopīśa)	---	1704

<u>Name</u>	<u>Place.</u>	<u>Samvat Year.</u>
11. Gokulamāni	Shergadh	1705
12. Kalyāṇarāya	Shergadh	1706
13. Ranachoda (Son of Viṭṭhalanātha)	Burhanpur	1707
14. Gokulalakāra	Gokula	1707
15. Vrajarāya	Surat	1707
16. Dvārakeśa	--	1708
17. Dvārakānātha	---	1708
18. Harirāya (Son of Vrajeśvara)	Gokula	1709
19. Bāburāya	Jamanagar	1711
20. Dāmodara	Nathadvar	1711
21. Raghunātha	----	1711
22. Raghunātha	-----	1715
23. Viṭṭhalanātha	Shergadh	1715
24. Gopīnātha	Gokula	1717
25. Viṭṭhaleśa	Shergadh	1718
26. Kalyāṇarāya	Shrijidvar	1718
27. Muralīdhara	Kankroli	1718
28. Śrīgopāla	---	1719
29. Ghanaśyāma	---	1720
30. Vrajabhūṣaṇa	Kankroli	1720
31. Vrajālakāra	Gokula	1721

<u>Name.</u>	<u>Place.</u>	<u>Samvat Year.</u>
32. B alakṛṣṇa	Kankroli	1721
33. Mohana	Shrijidvar	1722
34. Dvārakānātha	Shrijidvar	1722
35. Giridhara	Gokula	1725
36. Gopāla	Kankroli	1725
37. Gopīnātha	Shrijidvar	1725
38. Bālakṛṣṇa	Gokula	1725
39. Jayadeva	---	1725

(His descendants began the Jayagopāla sub-sect)

40. Raghunātha	Kota	1727
41. Mathurānātha.	Nagarthattha.	1728
42. Giridhara.	Shrijidvar	1728
43. Gokulacandranā.	----	1728
44. Giridhara.	Kota	1728
45. Govardhaneśa.	Jamnagar.	1729
46. Jīvanlāl	Bundikota	1729
47. Muralīdhara.	Kashi	1731
48. Kṛṣṇacandra.	Gokula	1732
49. Dvārakānātha.	Gutch-mandvi.	1734
50. Govardhaneśa.	Shrijidvar	1735
51. Gokularāya.	Gokula	1736
52. Giridhara.	Kashi	1737

<u>Name.</u>	<u>Place.</u>	<u>Samvat Year.</u>
53. Vrajaratna.	Gokula.	1737
54. Gopīnātha	Shrijidvar	1737
55. Puruṣottama (Son of Muralīdhara)	---	1738
56. Vraja-pāla	Kashi	1739.
57. Vrajanātha	Shrijidvar	1740.
58. Viṭṭhalanātha	Amreli	1741
59. Mohana	Kashi	1742
60. Venkateśa	Gokul	1742
61. Dvārakānātha	Gokul	1742
62. Viṭṭhalanātha	Shrijidvar	1743
63. Vrajanātha	---	1744
64. Muralīdhara	Shrijidvar	1744
65. Giridhara	Dhandhuka	1745
66. Gopīnātha	Kota	1745
67. Gokulādhiśa	Gokul	1745
68. Muralīdhara	---	1747
69. Vrajabharanēdīksita	Gokul	1747
70. Viṭṭhalarāya	Shrijidvar	1747
71. Jagannātha	Shrijidver	1747
72. Yadupati (Son of Puruṣottama)	Suret	1749
73. Śrīvatsa	Capaseni	1749

<u>Name.</u>	<u>Place.</u>	<u>Samvat Year.</u>
74. Mādhavarāya	Gokul	1749
75. Gokulanātha	Giriraj	1750
76. Dānirāya	Shrijidvar	1750
77. Viṭṭhalarāya	Capaseni	1751
78. Puruṣottama	Shrijidvar	1752
79. Gopāla	Kota	1755
80. Yadunātha	Shrijidvar	1756
81. Vrajaramana	Jaipur	1757
82. Jīvanalāl	Shrijidvar	1758
83. Vrajādhīśa	Jodhpur	1760
84. Dāmodara	Surat	1760
(Son of Puruṣottama)		
85. Dāmodara	Shrijidvar.	1761
86. Gokulacendra	Shrijidvar.	1762
87. Raghunātha	---	1762
88. Pradyumna	Shergadh	1762
89. Goverdhana	Shrijidvar	1763
90. Vrajabhūṣana	Nagerthattha.	1765
91. Gopendra	Gokul	1769
92. Rāmakṛṣṇa	Gokul	1770
93. Jagannātha	Kashi	1771
94. Kalyāṇarāya	Shrijidvar	1771

<u>Name.</u>	<u>Place.</u>	<u>Samvat Year.</u>
95. Kalyāṇarāya	Gokul	1772
96. Lakṣmaṇa	Gokul	1774
97. Ghaṇaśyāma	Shrijidvar	1774
98. Madhusūdana	Shergadh	1775
99. Bālakṛṣṇa	----	1775
100. Mathurānātha	Shrijidvar	1775
101. Jīvanalāl	Kashi	1775
102. Bālakṛṣṇa	Nathadvar	1777
103. Vrajananda	Shergadh	1778
104. Bālakṛṣṇa	-----	1778
105. Nṛsiṃhalāl	Gokul	1778
106. Gīmanlāl	----	1779
107. Rājīvalocana	----	1779
108. Gokulanātha	Kota	1780
109. Gopāla	Porbunder	1781
110. Govindarāya	Shrijidvar	1781
111. Viṭṭhalanātha	Girirajā	1781
112. Śrīvallabha	Kankroli	1781
113. Govindarāya	Kota	1782

The original list, as I have already stated is sufficiently long and runs upto V.S.1799. This much however is sufficient for us to show how big the family of Gosvāmis was at the time of Puruṣottama.

Coming to the scholars who did not belong to the Vallabha-Sampradāya, we find that a host of scholars and authors flourished in the Seventeenth and Eighteenth centuries. The famous authors on Dharmaśāstra like Kamalākara Bhaṭṭa, Mitramiśra and Vaidya-nātha Pāyagunda alias Bālam Bhaṭṭa flourished at about the same time. Similarly Dinakara Bhaṭṭa and his son Gāgā Bhaṭṭa were also famous contemporaries of Puruṣottama. Both of them were proteges of Chatrapati Shivaji and it is said that Gāgā-Bhaṭṭa was actually called upon to officiate at the coronation of Shivaji in 1674 A.D. Bhaṭṭojī Dīkṣita, Nāgeśa and Konda-Bhaṭṭa were great grammarians. Gaḍādhara Bhaṭṭa, Gopīnātha Mauni, Annam Bhaṭṭa, Laugākṣi Bāhaskara, and many other writers on Nyāya and great scholars like Paṇḍitarāja Jagannātha also lived in these centuries. In fact many of them were all-round scholars and contributed to almost all the branches of knowledge. Thus the age in which Puruṣottama lived was an age of activity, Though one may perhaps feel that many of the works written at that time were more of the nature of commentaries and compilations, rather than original independent works. New theories were propounded only through the medium of commentaries and compilations. It was thus not the creative but the interpretative period in the history of Indian thought.

It has been maintained according to the tradition of

the Puṣṭimārga, that Puruṣottama had direct contact with Appayya-Dīkṣita. It is said that Puruṣottama had ^{saṁskṛta} ~~Sastabha~~ with Appayya-Dīkṣita, when he was only seven years old. Dīkṣita was a prolific writer and wrote some about hundred works. His father was Raṅgarāja and his grand-father, (according to some his great grand-father) was Vakṣaṣthalācārya. The gretest question however that has baffled scholars, is his date. The generally accepted dates of his life are from 1554 A.D. to 1626 A.D.

Shri. Mahalinga Shastri who is a descendant of Appayya himself, gives his dates as 1520 A.D to 1593 A.D. MM. Dr. P. V. Kane has ably discussed the question in his History of Sanskrit Poetics.¹³ Shri. H. O. Shastri in his Hindi Biography of Puruṣottama¹⁴ has tried to show that Appayya was a contemporary of Puruṣottama. He says that in 1657 A.D. there was a meeting of scholars in Kashi in the Mukatimandapa and the decision was arrived at there to the effect that the Pañcadrāvida Brahmins could sit in the same line with the Devarṣi Brahmins of Maharashtra at dinner. The decision was signed by scholars like Khaṇḍadeva Miśra, and others who were present in that meeting. One of the signatories was Appayya Dīkṣita. The Nirṇaya-petra has been published in the 'Citale Bhaṭṭa Prakaraṇa' of Pimpurkar. Thus

13. Sāhityadarpaṇa .Intro. pp. 307-309.

14. Avatāravādēvalī. Hindi Intro. pp. 12-13.

Appayya Dīkṣita was present in Kashi in 1657 A.D. Shri.H.O. Shastri further argues that Appayya is said to have met Jagannātha in Kashi. Jagannātha who was a protégé of Shah Jahan, must have come to Kashi in or after 1658 A.D, when Aurangzeb put his father into prison. The point is really a complicated one. Even if we rely on all that H.O. Shastri has said, can we agree that there was a meeting of Puruṣottama with Appayya Dīkṣita? Puruṣottama was born in 1658 A.D. We should also bear in mind that according to H.O. Shastri he was born in 1668 A.D. Vrajarāya came to Surat in V.S. 1727. i.e. 1671 A.D. The meeting could have been possible only after that. Thus we shall have to assume that Dīkṣita came to Surat after 1671 A.D. Again according to the tradition, Puruṣottama was only seven when he discussed with Appayya and defeated him. Hence it must be in 1675 A.D, as the traditional account should tally with the generally accepted year of Puruṣottama's birth i.e V.S. 1724. It can not tally with the correct year i.e. V.S. 1714, because in that case Puruṣottama himself could not have been in Surat at the age of seven. This is too much to assume. The whole tradition of the Śāstrārtha between Puruṣottama and Appayya Dīkṣita seems to have arisen on the strength of Puruṣottama's composition of the Prāhastavāde, which was a 'slap' to the Śaivas and which was intended to be a rejoinder

to the Śivatattvaviveka of Appayya Dīkṣita. I am inclined to believe that the traditional record of Śāstrārtha between Puruṣottama and Dīkṣita does not appear to have any element of historical truth.

Another scholar with whom Puruṣottama is said to have direct contact according to the tradition, was Bhāskaraṛāya. Shri. H. O. Shastri says that some works of Bhāskaraṛāya are preserved in the Babu Dixit Jade Collection of Benaras. The said collection also contains some letters written by Bhāskaraṛāya. In these letters Bhāskara has passed caustic remarks against Puruṣottama. H. O. Shastri says that, it appears from this that Bhāskara, who was defeated in the Śāstrārtha by Puruṣottama, might have referred to him with Vengeance.¹⁵

I have gathered some information about Bhāskaraṛāya and his teachers Śivadatta Śukla from various sources.¹⁶

15. Avatāreavadāvalī. Hindi. Intro. p. 9.

16. Sources: (i) Bhavānī no Vad alias Bahucarakhyāti. Ed. M. T. Jarmanvela.

(ii) Pūrvamīmāṃsā: Ganganath Jha. with a critical bibliography by Dr. Umesh Mishra.

(iii) Lalitāsahasranāma with Saubhāgyabhāskara. Ed. V. L. S. Panshiker.

(iv) Sarvajenika—M. T. B. College, and Sarvajenik Law College Magazine. October, 1941. pp. 104-107.

Śivadatta Śukla belong^{ed} to Surat and stayed in Gujjar Falia, Haripura, Surat, where even today there is a street bearing the name of Vedabhāi Śukla, as Śīvadatta was popularly known.

Śivadatta's father was Mahādeva and his mother was Gaṅgā.

They were Audicya Brahmins and were deeply devoted to God Śiva. They had however no son. Once God Śiva appeared in their dream and asked them to go to Somnath, if they wanted a son.

They went on a pilgrimage to Somnath and pleased God Śiva and Goddess Pārvatī, who blessed them with a son. The couple then returned to Surat. A son was born to them on account of this blessing. He was named Śiva Datta or Śīvanārāyaṇa. When

he was five, his Upanayana ceremony was performed and he married at the age of twelve. At the age of sixteen, he finished his study of the Vedic lore and mastered Sanskrit and Persian. He began teaching students even^{at} that young age.

Once while Śiva-Datta was teaching students, a Yogin belonging to the Tripurā Sampradāya of the Nātha Pantha came to his place. On seeing him Śivadatta could understand that the guest was a Siddha Yogin. He served him as his Guru for a fairly long time. When the Guru was pleased, he bestowed upon him the Pūrṇābhīṣeka and Mahāsāmrajya Dīkṣā, which is

considered to be the highest honour in the Nātha Pantha. After attaining to this status, Sivadatta was named Svāmi Prakāśānandanātha. He soon became well known in the whole of India and was honoured by all. His preceptor then went away, when he found that his work was finished.

So many miracles are recorded round the name of Vedabhāi. In the beginning of the sixteenth century, someone sent two Bunyan trees and one Palm-tree flying in the sky. Prakāśānandanātha got them down with the help of Bālā Tripurā-sundarī. One Bunyan tree came down at Haripura, Sivadatta placed there the Yantra of Bahucarājī for its protection. That is known by the name of Bhavānī Vad. The other tree came down at Begumpura and was known as Mumbai Vad. The Palm-tree got down at Navsari Bazar near Dhed Talavdi. Ksetrapāla Bhairava was established there for its protection.

Vedabhāi used to go to the river Tapti every day at dawn for taking his bath. It is said that the Bangi was calling out for prayer every day at that time. Vedabhāi used to hear it and every time he said that it was wrong. The Muslims who heard this became very angry and complained to the Suba. The next day the Suba himself came there at

dawn and as Vedabhāi was going away after passing his usual remark, he was presented before the Suba, who demanded an explanation from him. Vedabhāi said that it was useless to shout when in fact it was necessary to call the devotees of Allah together together for prayer. The call should be such that a sucking child, a grazing calf, a grinding woman and even the flowing water would leave their respective activity on hearing it. When Vedabhāi was asked to prove his statement, he spoke out the Sūktas of Atharvaveda so loudly and seriously in the presence of a sucking child, a grazing calf, and a grinding woman, that all of them left their work and even the water of the Tapti ceased to flow for a while and meditated upon God with complete concentration. Vedabhāi was thereupon released and he went home. He became very famous on account of this incident. The jealousy of other Brahmins however led ~~him~~ them to complain to the Suba that as Vedabhāi was following the Kaulamārga, he used wine and such other things. The Suba thereupon went to Bhavānī Vād personally on an elephant with his large retinue. Vedabhāi came to know of this and asked one of his disciples to place a blade of Darbhā-grass on the road. The elephant of the Suba and the horses of his servants could not cross over this blade

and proceed further, inspite of all their attempts to do so. The Suba then sent for Vedabhāi, who sent a reply that as it was the place of Mother Goddess, one could come there only on foot. The Suba thereupon went on foot to the temple and asked Vedabhāi to show him the contents of the pots, which were kept there. Vedabhāi showed him the pots in which there were only roses, and rose-water. The Suba was pleased at this, gave him a valuable shawl and left. Vedabhāi could not accept the Shawl, which was given by a non-hindu. He therefore threw it away in the fire-alter. This was reported ^{to} the Suba, who again visited the temple and demanded the Shawl. Vedabhāi took out some shawls from the alter and asked the Suba to find out his own. The Suba was thus convinced of and awed by the superhuman powers of Vedabhāi, and bowed to him with respect. He requested Vedabhāi to ask ~~ed~~ for whatever he wished. Vedabhāi just said that the Suba should arrange for the protection of the temple. The Suba granted the wish and left.

Another miracle, said to have been worked out by Vedabhāi is regarding the drawing of boundary line of the crematory at Ashvinikumar. At that time people were very much afraid of ghosts and evil spirits, which haunted in the dark. There were some communities in which they observed a convention

of carrying a dead body to the crematory within a short time after death. It was again very dangerous to go to Ashvinikumar at night. Once a brahmin belonging to the community of Vedabhāi, died at night. Vedabhāi also went with the corpse. In the way to the crematory, the corpse was carried away invisibly by ghosts. Vedabhāi, with his spiritual power could know that the body was in the possession of ghosts, and he took its possession from them. The Brahmins then requested Vedabhāi to find out a remedy for this. Vedabhāi then fixed nails on the ground at various places and thus marked the boundaries, which the ghosts and evil spirits could not transgress.

His meeting with Bhāskaraṛāya is also said to have contained some miracle. Bhāskara was a very great scholar, who wished to enter into Śāstrārtha with the Pandits of Surat. They however directed him to go to Vedabhāi. When Bhāskara went to Haripura, Goddess Tripurāsundarī was playing outside the house of Vedabhāi. She told Bhāskara that as Vedabhāi was busy with Pūjā, he would better ~~talk~~ talk with the cow which was grazing there. That cow talked with him in Sanskrit. Bhāskara was so much awe-inspired at this that he bowed down to Vedabhāi when he met him and became his

disciple. Śivadatta Śukla then taught him for some time and gave him the Pūrṇābhiseka-Mahāsāmrajya-pada, ^{naming} ~~naming~~ him Bhā^{su}ṣrenandenātha.

Bhāskararāya was the second son of Gambhīrarāya and Konāmbikā. He was born in Bhāgānagari (Sangli?) and went to Kashi with his father. He studied the 18 lores under Nṛsimhādhvarin and Tarkaśāstra under Gaṅgādhara Vājapeyin. His first wife was Ānandīdevī and his second wife was named Pārvatīdevī, who was a daughter of the brother of the Ācārya of Madhva's school. He was ³very great scholar and defeated the Ācāryas of all the schools. He wrote so many works, like Saubhāgyabhāskara, Setubandha, Vēdakaut²²āhala, Var^{ra}īśyārāhasya, etc.

Some miracles are recorded even for Bhāskararāya. In the Saubhāgyabhāskara he has written about 64 crores of Yoginīs. Some Pandits from Benares objected to this by saying that the Yoginīs are 64 and not 64 crores. They went on discussing it with Bhāskararāya for three days, when sage Kumkumānanda finally applied the water of the holy river Gaṅgā in the eyes of the Pandits. They could then see Mother-Goddess discussing with them. They then left the discussion. It is said that he was doing the Mahāśoḍhā Nyāsa. One who

performs this cannot bow down to anyone except his teacher and istadevatā. This being the case, Bhāskara generally did not go out of his house. Once however the Ācārya of Śaṅkara's mutth came to Benaras and all the Brahmins went to salute him. Bhāskara did not go there but he was called by the Ācārya. He went there but did not salute him. The Ācārya said that the Brahmins who were householders generally paid respects to the Ascetics and it therefore did not behove him not to pay his respects. Bhāskara explained to him his position but the Ācārya wanted a proof. Bhāskara then put his Danda, Kamandalu and Pādukā before him and bowed down to them. Immediately all of them were rendered to pieces and were scattered here and there.

V. L. Panshikar in his Sanskrit introduction to Lalitā-sahasranāma says that Bhāskara was a contemporary of Nārāyaṇa-Bhaṭṭa, Grand-father of Kamalākara Bhaṭṭa. Kamalākara finished his Kirṇayasindhu in V. S. 1668. Hence Bhāskara must have lived some about fifty years before it. Panshikar has however relied upon the tradition about the Vivāda between Nārāyaṇa Bhaṭṭa and Bhāskararāya.¹⁷

17. Lalitā-sahasranāma with Saṅghāgyabhāskara. Sanskrit Intro.

Dr. Umesh Mishra in his Critical Bibliography, suffixed to 'Pūrvamīmāṃsā in its sources' by Dr. Ganganath Jha says that Bhāskaraśāstra lived in the first quarter of the 18th century. His commentary *Setubandha* on the *Nityaśodeśikā* ^ś *Śikārnava* Tantra was written in V.S. 1789, corresponding to 1732 A.D. His *Saubhāgyabhāskara* was written in V.S. 1785, corresponding to 1728 A.D.¹⁸ Now Bhāskara refers to Śivadatta Śukla in his *Saubhāgyabhāskara* in the first verse thus:

Yas ca Śrī Śivadatta-Śuklācāranaih Pūrnābhīkṣito bhavat.¹⁹

Hence he must have come to Surat before V.S. 1785. Puruṣottama came to Surat after V.S. 1727 and lived there for almost the whole of his life, except occasional travels. Hence the possibility of direct contact between Puruṣottama and Bhāskara and even Śivadatta Śukla can not be ruled out.

We have seen above what Shri. H. O. Shastri has to say regarding the *Sāstrārtha* between Puruṣottama and Bhāskara.

18. Cf. *Pūrvamīmāṃsā*; Critical Bibliography p. 65. Also see:

Modacchāyāmitāyāṃ Śaradi Śaradrtav āsvine kālayukte,
Śukle saumye navanyāṃ atanuta Lalit^{nāma}śāhasrabhāṣyam.

Saubhāgyabhāskara. concluding V. 1. p. 240.

19. *Saubhāgyabhāskara*. Intro. V. 1. p. 1.

The followers of Bhāskararāya say that Bhāskara defeated the Ācārya belonging to the Vallabha Sampradāya. In the Bhāskara-Vilāsa Kāvya of Jagannātha, printed in the beginning of the Lalitāsahasranāma, refer^{red} to above, there are two verses which are important for our purpose. They are:

- (1) Śivadatta Śuklacaranāsāditapūrṇābhiṣekasāmrājyah,
Gurjaradeśa Vidadhe jarjaradhairyam sa Vallabhācāryam. V.30.
- (2) Līlāmātreritayā nīlācalapūrvayā capetikayā,
Vimatādr̥tam prahastam vyatanistā^a vihastam abjanibha-
-hastah. V.43.

V.30 shows that Bhāskara defeated the Ācārya of the Vallabha Sampradāya, while V.43 shows that the Prahasta was rendered futile by Bhāskara. It is very likely that the second line of V.30 refers to Puruṣottama or Vrajarāya, and Prahasta in V.43 refers to Prahastavāda of Puruṣottama. It is likely that the words 'Nīlācalapūrvayā capetikayā' may be referring to his work, bearing the name Nīlācalacapetikā, which might have been written in reply to Prahastavāda of Puruṣottama. Together with the references to Puruṣottama, seen by H.O. Shastri in the letters written by Bhāskara, both these verses show that Bhāskara and Puruṣottama must have come in direct

contact with each other and their contact was very probably not a very cordial one. As regards the result of the Saṣṭrārtha, one should not be surprised to find that the followers of both the scholars have claimed victory for their side.

(VIII).

Disciples of Puruṣottama.

As a Vaiṣṇava Ācārya, Puruṣottama naturally must have had a large following in Surat. Some of his pupils were well known scholars. Unfortunately we do not know much about all of them. One such pupil was Bhaṭṭa Tulajārām²⁰, who as his name indicates was a Gujarati. Tuljārām²¹ was a great Pandit himself. His Utsavanirṇaya, also known as Vratotsavanirṇaya is written in Vraj. It is a summary of the Utsavaprataṇa of Puruṣottama. Tulajārām²¹ compiled this work at the instance of Govindarāya. He refers in this work to Puruṣottama as his Guru, thus: 'Ata eva Utsavanirṇaye asmadgurucaraṇair uktaṃ.'²⁰ This is followed by a quotation: 'Pūrvavidhāprāsastyāt...etc.'²¹ This is found in the Utsavaprataṇa.²¹ It should be noted that

20.U.P. p.16.

21.U.P. p.112.

Utsavenirnaya as well as Utsavapratāna (this^{is} also named Utsavenirnaya) has been mentioned by MM. Dr. P. V. Kene in the list of works on Dharmaśāstra.²² The Śodāśagopikāsaṅkhyā-tātparyavarnana of Tulajārām² has been printed as an appendix by Telivala and Sankalia in the Subodhinī Daśamapūrvārdha-tāmasaphalaprakaraṇa, with the Lekha of Śrīvallabha. The work is incomplete, since the first two folios of the manuscript were lost. In the Colophon, Tulajārām² calls himself 'Śrī-Puruṣottamajīcaranāntevāsin'. The work tries to show some significance of the number 16 of the Gopikās, engaged in the Rāsa. Another work Viruddhādharmāśrayatvavivecana has been found in the manuscript form in the Library of Pandit Gattulalji in Bombay. The manuscript bears No. 168 and has 6 folios. In the beginning, the author refers to Puruṣottama as his Guru, 'Saputrān Śrīmadācāryān gurūn Śrīpuruṣottamān'. At the end he calls himself, 'ŚrīgosvāmīPuruṣottamāntevāsin'. The manuscript was copied in Śaka 1784. The said library also contains another manuscript of 12 folios. The work is Navaratnasamākhya of Tulajārām². The manuscript bears No. 59.

22. History of Dharmaśāstra. Vol. I. p. 522.

Another manuscript, No. 68, dated Śaka 1792, contains the work *Sarvātṛabhāvanirūpaṇa*. Though the colophon does not mention the name of the author, in the body of the text we have one sentence: "Evam samādhānam 'Na matam devadevasya' iti Siddhānta-
rahasyaṭīkāyām asmadgurucarapaśrīmatPuruṣottamaḥ svāmibhir
eva kṛtam". It is very likely that the author is Bhaṭṭa
Tulajārāma-

Shri. H. O. Shastri says that Venīdatta Vyāsa Tarkapañcāna Bhaṭṭācārya was once a scholarly pupil of Puruṣottama. This Venīdatta was a descendant of Mahīdhara, the famous commentator of the Śukla Yajurveda. He made a thorough study of the Mādhyandina branch of the Śukla Yajurveda, and became a great Pandit in sacerdotal work. He worked as an Adhvaryu in many soma-sacrifices. He stayed at Ghasitola in Kashi. He studied Grammar, Vedānta, and Mīmāṃsā from the Pañcadrāvida Brahmins. He was a great scholar of the Navya-nyāya, which he learned from the logicians of Bengal. He went to Bengal himself and got the title Tarkapañcāna Bhaṭṭācārya. He wrote many Vādagranthas and Kroḍapatras, mostly after a style of the Navya-nyāya. He was at first a devotee of Rādhākṛṣṇa, but after his contact with Puruṣottama, he was converted to the

Puṣṭimārga. It is also said that Venīdatta accompanied Puruṣottama in his tours. He stayed in Kāshi for a long time and wrote many letters to Puruṣottama. Some of them have been preserved in the Sarasvatī Bhavan, Benaras. In these letters Venīdatta used to address Puruṣottama thus: 'Śrījñānavatārāṇām GuruvaraśrīPuruṣottamagoṣvāmīṇām careṇeṣu Venīdattasya koṭiṣaḥ praṇatayah.' When Venīdatta's daughter married, Puruṣottama sent one person with a letter to the Vaiṣṇavas of Kāshi, stating that Venīdatta was a great scholar of the Saṃpradāya and therefore he should be helped by them. It appears from this that the relation between Puruṣottama and Venīdatta was very cordial.

According to Kalyāṇji Shastri, (as I am told by Prof. C. H. Bhatt) Gopālajī Sācorā was also a pupil of Puruṣottama. Some of his works are preserved in the manuscript library of Pandit Gattulalji in Bombay. One of them is Māyāvādamatakhandaṇa. The manuscript is numbered 160. The colophon runs: 'Goṣvāmī-ŚrīprebhuṃjigoṣvāmīśrīVrajanāthajīmahārājaprasādena Ramanakadvīpasthena Sācorā Gopālajīhāmṇā...etc.' The manuscript is dated V.S. 1922 and belonged to Goṣvāmī Yadunātha. It has 33 folios. The work is written in prose, having the extent of

about 840 ślokaś. Another work Bhakti^ddrohimukhamardana is a fairly long work. The manuscript No. 161 has 101 folios and bears the date V.S. 1873. The colophon runs: 'Iti... Bhakti-drohimukhamardano... Śrī Śaṅkhoddhāra sthiteṇa Sācorājñātiya Gopārajñānā... kṛtaḥ'. Besides there is one more manuscript No. 172 of the same author. The work is Abaddhavādimukhabādhā. The extent is 12 folios. From all this we can say that Gopārajñā Sācorā belonged to Śaṅkhoddhāra and lived earlier than V.S. 1873. It is likely that he might have been a pupil of Puruṣottama but one can not be definite about this.

(IX).

Ending years.

We do not know when Puruṣottama died. We have noted above that Puruṣottama had two sons, but both of them died during his life time. Puruṣottama therefore gave his Sevā together with all his wealth to another Puruṣottama, son of Muralīdhara who was his nearest heir. This Puruṣottama was the great grandson of Vrajālaṅkāra, the fifth son of Bālakṛṣṇa, the third son of Viṭṭhaleśa. The document executed in this connection is given in appendix No. 3. According to this document, Puruṣottama, whilst in full health and of his own

free will gave to another Puruṣottama, son of Muralīdhara, all his property, being the idol of Kālakṛṣṇa, that of Vrajeśvara and another; also the Pādūkā and all the ornaments and utensils connected with the care and worship of these idols, with a house and other property situated at Surat. The document bears the date Thursday, tenth of the bright half of the Second Āṣāḍha, V.S. 1781, corresponding to 1725 A.D.

Some scholars are of the opinion that Puruṣottama did not live long after that. The document however cannot be taken as an evidence for drawing any conclusion that Puruṣottama died in or immediately after V.S. 1781. He might have lived long even after that. Some scholars like Lallubhai Pranvallabhdas and others are of the opinion that Puruṣottama lived for 45 years only. The said document is a proof against the said view, because in that case he would not have lived even upto V.S. 1781. Telivala says that while he saw the manuscript library of Pandit Gattulalji in Bombay, he found one manuscript dated V.S. 1810. The manuscript contains the Kārikās of the twelfth Skandha of the third chapter of Tattvadeśīpanībhaṇḍa. On the manuscript is written: 'Puruṣottamānām.' Again the manuscript has marginal notes, containing explanations written in very

small handwriting. This was the practice followed by Purusottama. The manuscript thus belonged to Purusottama, who was therefore alive in V.S. 1810.

The tremendous work that Purusottama has done, would also require a long life. We may say that Purusottama died not earlier than V.S. 1810 corresponding to 1754 A.D. Thus he lived a fairly long life of about 96 years. We can not however be definite about this. It is really unfortunate that we do not know much more about the life of such a great scholar and author.

CHAPTER- III.

PURUSOTTAMA'S WORKS.

(I)

Introductory.

Vallabha and his followers have enriched the Vedāntic literature with a large number of books. It would be no exaggeration to state that Puruṣottama tops the list of the authors in the Sāṃpradāya. He wrote on almost all the topics connected with the Śuddhādvaita school. Over and above a series of independent works, he has written extensive commentaries on almost all important works of Vallabha and Viṭṭhaleśa. The fame of this prolific writer so reached the scholars of the school, that the commentary of Puruṣottama came to be regarded as a standard to judge the authenticity of a particular work. Thus the authorship of a work which has not been commented upon by Puruṣottama is considered with some doubt. Shree H.O. Shastri records a case of this type.¹ One work Bhagavat-Pīthikā has not been commented upon by Puruṣottama, nor is it referred to by him in any of his works. Hence some scholars in the Sāṃpradāya doubt whether Vallabha himself wrote Bhagavat-Pīthikā.

1. Cf. Avatāravādāvalī: Hindi Intro. pp. 5-6.

Works of Puruṣottama are listed by Shree H.O.Shastri and Shri. M.T.Telivala.² I am giving below the list as given by H.O.Shastri.

- (1) Bhāṣya-Prakāśa.
- (2) Suvarṇa-sūtra.
- (3) Āvaranabhanga.
- (4) Subodhinī-prakāśa.
- (5) Prasthānaratnākara.
- (6) Commentaries on sixteen tracts.
- (7) Prastāvāda.
- (8) Paṇḍitakarabhindipālavāda.
- (9) Sṛṣṭibhedavāda.
- (10) Āvirbhāvatirobhāvavāda.
- (11) Khyātivāda.
- (12) Pratibimbavāda.
- (13) Andhakēravāda.
- (14) Brāhmaṇatvādidēvatāvāda.
- (15) Jīvavyāpekātva-khaṇḍanavāda.
- (16) Jīvapratibimb-tva-khaṇḍanavāda.
- (17) Ūrdhvapūṇḍranirṇayavāda.
- (18) Tulasīmālādhāraṇavāda.
- (19) Śaṅkha-cakradhāraṇavāda.
- (20) Mūrtipūjana-vāda.

2. Ibid.p.4: Telivala's artical on Puruṣottama's life in Puṣṭibhaktisudhā.Vol.V.No.3.

- (21) Bhāgavataśāṅkīrāṣavāda.
- (22) Upadeśaśāṅkīrāṣavāda.
- (23) Bhaktyutkāṣavāda.
- (24) Vastreśavāda.
- (25) Bhedaśāṅkīrāṣavāda.
- (26) Abhāṣavāda.
- (27) Ātmavāda.
- (28) Svavṛttivāda.
- (29) Jayāśrīkṛṣṇaśāṅkīrāṣavāda.
- (30) Utsavapratāna.
- (31) Dravyaśuddhi.
- (32) Bhaktiśāṅkīrāṣavivṛti.
- (33) Bhaktiśāṅkīrāṣavivṛti.
- (34) Pūrvamīmāṃsāśāṅkīrāṣavivaraṇa.
- (35) Nyāyāśāṅkīrāṣavivṛti.
- (36) Gāyatrīkārikāvivṛti.
- (37) Vallabhāṣṭakavivaraṇa.
- (38) Kaivalyaopaniṣaddīpikā.
- (39) Brāhmaṇopaniṣaddīpikā.
- (40) Nṛsiṃhatāpinyupaniṣaddīpikā.
- (41) Chāṇḍogyaḍīpikā.
- (42) Śvetāśvataraḍīpikā.
- (43) Upaniṣadārthasaṅgraha.
- (44) Dvātriṃśadaparādhaśāṅkīrāṣavivaraṇa.

(45) Adhikaraṇamālā.

(46) Bhāvaṇaparakāśikāvṛtti

Shri.M.T.Telivala gives almost the same list.He adds the Khelālapanaṇavidhvāṃsavāda and the Māndūkyopaniṣaddīpikā. As regards the Dīpikās on the Kaivalya,Brahma,and Nṛsiṃhatāpinīya Upaniṣads,Telivala calls them Arthasaṅgrahas. Regarding the Dīpikās on the Śvetāśvatara and Chāndogya, he says that they are not available.

To study the works of Puruṣottama,we may divided them into two broad divisions-independent works and commentaries.Even here the division cannot be followed fastidiously,because a work which,strictly speaking,can be called a commentary may have close connection with an independent work or viceversa. Thus for example, Puruṣottama's own commentary on his Prahastavāda is considered together with the Vāda. Similarly the Śoḍaśaprakaraṇagranthasaṅgati which is an independent work will be dealt with while examining Puruṣottama's glosses on the sixteen tracts.Some of the works are, again,not found by me.I have simply referred to them in my account of the works/~~that have been described~~ connected with them.For the sake of describing them it will be convenient to deal with them in four sections dealing with the Avatāravādāvalī,Puruṣottama's other independent works, his commentaries on the works of Vallabha and Viṭṭhaleśa and those on other works.A list of the works that have

been described in the following pages is as follows:-

Avatāravādāvalī .

- (1) Prahastavāda.
- (2) Commentary upon Prahastavāda.
- (3) Paṇḍitakarabhindipālavāda.
- (4) Bheda-bheda-Svarūpanirṇeye.
- (5) Pratīkṛtipūjanavāda.
- (6) Śrītibhedavāda.
- (7) Khyativāda.
- (8) Andhakāravāda.
- (9) Brāhmaṇatvādidovatāvāda.
- (10) Jīvaśrītibimbatvakhaṇḍanavāda.
- (11) Āvirbhāvatirobhāvavāda.
- (12) Pratibimbavāda.
- (13) Bhaktyutakarsavāda.
- (14) Khalālapanaavidhvaṁsavāda.
- (15) Nānavāda.
- (16) Mūrtipūjanavāda.
- (17) Ūrdhva-puṇḍradhāraṇavāda.
- (18) Śaṅkha-cakradhāraṇavāda.
- (19) Tulasīmālādhāraṇavāda.
- (20) Upadeśaviśayaśāṅkānirāsavāda.
- (21) Bhāgavatasvarūpaviśayaśāṅkānirāsavāda.
- (22) Svavṛttivāda.

- (23) Jīvavyāpakatvakhaṇḍanavāda.
- (24) Abhāvavāda.
- (25) Vāstrasevāvāda.
- (26) Ātmavāda.
- (27) Bhaktirasatvavāda.

Other independent works.

- (28) Prasthāmaratnākara.
- (29) Samarpaṇanirṇaya.
- (30) Mukticintāmaṇi.
- (31) Dravyaśuddhi.
- (32) Utsavapratāma.
- (33) Utsavabhāvanukrama.

Commentaries on the works of Vallabha and Viṭṭhaleśa.

- (34) Anubhāṣyaprakāśa.
- (35) Nyāyamālā.
- (36) Suvarṇasūtra.
- (37) Āvaraṇabhāṅga-Yojanā.
- (38) Śoḍaśaprakaraṇagranthasaṅgati.
- (39) Commentary on Yamunāṣṭaka.
- (40) Commentary on Bālābodha.
- (41) Commentary on Siddhāntamuktāvali.
- (42) Commentary on Puṣṭipravāhamaryādā.
- (43) Commentary on Siddhāntarāhasya.
- (44) Commentary on Navaratna.
- (45) Commentary on Antaḥkaraṇaprabodha.
- (46) Commentary on Bhaktivardhinī.
- (47) Commentary on Jalabheda.

- (48) Commentary on Pañcapādyā.
 (49) Commentary on Saṁnyāsaniṣṭhāya.
 (50) Commentary on Nirodhalakṣaṇa.
 (51) Commentary on Sevāphala.
 (52) }
 (53) } -Commentaries on the Bhaktiḥansa.
 (54) Bhāvarthā^{pāda}~~śikṣā~~abhāṣyaprakāśa.
 (55) Pūrvamīmāṃsākārikāvivarana.
 (56) Subodhinīprakāśa.
 (57) }
 (58) } -Minor Commentaries on the Bhāgavata.
 (59) Cāyatriyādyarthaprakāśākārikāvivarana.
 (60) Nyāsādeśāvivarana.
 (61) Patrāvalambanatikā.
 (62) Vallabhāṣṭakāvivarana.
 () Commentaries on other works.
 (63) Māndūkyopaniṣaddīpikā.
 (64) Nṛsiṁhottaretāpinyupaniṣaddīpikā.
 (65) Keīvalyopaniṣadarthasaṅgraha.
 (66) Brahmopaniṣadarthasaṅgraha.
 (67) Introduction to Amṛtatarāṅginī.

We shall now attempt a short description of these works.

(II).

Avatāravādāvalī.

Puruṣottama's Avatāravādāvalī is not one work, but it is a collection of many Vāda-Granthas. Puruṣottama is said to have written fiftytwo Vādagranthas; According to tradition. There is also another view that he has composed twentyfour Vādas. The number twentyfour seems to have some connection with the number of twentyfour incarnations of Viṣṇu and therefore the title given to this collection is Avatāravādāvalī.³ All the Vāda-Granthas have not been printed and some of them which are mentioned by Shri.M.T. Telivala and Shri.H.O.Shastri in the list of Puruṣottama's works are not found. Again, while the colophons of some of the Vādas bare the number of the Vāda, many of them do not bare the number and so it is not possible to be exact in that matter. The numbers that are found in the Colophons of some individual Vādas will be given while dealing with them. It is, however, impossible to treat them all in a definite order because while we know the numbers of some Vādas, we cannot ~~filling~~ fill in a large number of

3. c.f....Puruṣottamasya Ōkṛtāv Avatāravādāvalyām... etc

Brh.p.246.

gaps that still remain.

In the beginning of the Avatāravādāvalī, Puruṣottamas says that he has composed the string of Vādas after carefully going through the Upaniṣads, the Śrutis, the Smṛtis, the Bhāṣyas and the Sūtras together with the various Prasthānas.⁴

He further says that the Vādas which are subtly incorporated in the works like the Tattva-dīpa-nibandha, the Anubhāṣya etc are revealed by him by means of reasoned out sentences, after suggesting them in verses.⁵ Puruṣottama thus explains the method which has been followed in these treatises. A Vāda-grantha is a short treatise which discusses a particular topic fully. Puruṣottama begins his treatise with the-- introductory verse, the contents of which are challenged by the Opponent and then the discussion starts. All these topics he says, are discussed on the basis of the suggestions that are found in the major works like the Anubhāṣya and Tattva-dīpanibandha. Many of these discussions are found in Puruṣottama's commentaries on those works.

4. Saṁvīkṣyopeniṣacchṛtismṛtiganam bhāṣyāṇi sūtrāṇyapi;

Prasthānair vividhair yutāny atha mayā vādāvalī tanyate.

Prh.V.3.p.2.

5. Ye tattvadīpabhāṣyaprabhṛtiṣu sauksmyeṇa susthitā vādāḥ;

Padye tām avatārya prakāṣīkurve' tra yuktimaadvākyaiḥ.

Prh.V.4.p.3.

(1.2). Prahastavāda and its commentary:-

The first Vāda is called Prahasta. It is one of the well-known works of Puruṣottama. The word 'Prahasta' means a slap. The rather curious title of the work owes its origin to the circumstance in which it was composed, and the aim it desired to achieve. Appayya Dīkṣita, who was a prolific writer was also a staunch follower of Śaivism. He has written a metrical work Śiva-tattva-viveka in 64 verses. In this work he maintained that Śiva is the highest Lord, greater even than Viṣṇu, and Brahmā. This short work roused a great deal of controversy in those days of sectarian enthusiasm and the followers of Vaiṣṇavism could not tolerate it. The work was hailed by the Śaivas and condemned by the Vaiṣṇavas. Puruṣottama reacted against it sharply and, in his youthful zest, wrote out this 'slap', passing as many strictures or perhaps more on Śaivism, as has been done by Dīkṣita on Vaiṣṇavism.

The Prahasta is divided into three Sub-vēdas. The first is Vedāntatātparyanirūpaṇa, the second is Bhārantaśaiva-nirākarṇa, and the last is Mūlarūpenirdhāra. The introductory verse of the Prahasta contains starting points for all the three discussions.

The first part discusses and proves that all the Vedāntic texts teach of Brahman. Brahman is possessed of

supramundane qualities, the negative descriptions in the sacred texts refer to the worldly attributes, which Brahman is devoid of. Here the author attacks the Upādhivāda and the Māyāvāda and explains the avikṛtaparināmavāda as the correct theory. The second chapter is the most important part of the works, because here the author strongly repudiates almost all the statements of Dīkṣita. He refers to all the authorities, referred to by Dīkṣita and many more. He thoroughly discusses all these texts and proves that according to him all of them extol Viṣṇu rather than Śiva, who is the Chief Vibhūti of Viṣṇu.⁶ In the third part Puruṣottama says that Kṛṣṇa is the highest Reality. Puruṣottama proves this on the basis of the Tāpanīyas, Bhāgavatapurāṇa, Brahmaivaivartapurāṇa and the Chāndogya Upaniṣad. He also refutes the charge that Kṛṣṇa-Svarūpa is illusory. At the end, again, after the customary salutes, he says that there are rogues who call themselves

6. Para-brahmaṇas tad eva mukhyaṁ svarūpaṁ, itarāṇi tu taratamabhāvāpennāni vibhūti rūpāni, teṣu śivo mukhyavibhūtirūpa ity eva sakalāśāstrīya-niścayaḥ-Prh. p.

Vaidikas and who harass the good. This slap is hurled at them so that they may lose their strength.⁷

That Puruṣottama gave importance to this work can be seen from the fact that he has himself written a commentary upon it. He says that he is commenting upon the Vāda for the understanding of those who do not possess mature--intelligence.⁸ The last verse of the commentary, however, informs us that Puruṣottama wrote this commentary for Viṭṭhalarāya.⁹ The pertinent point here is whether Puruṣottama thought of writing similar commentaries upon all the Vādas. The first verse of the commentary shows that he thought of writing Vivṛtis on all the Vādas.¹⁰ The verses at the end of all the three parts confirm this view.¹¹ The

7.Prh.V.2.p.246.

8.Bālabodhavidhaye'dhunāmayā vādavāravivṛtir vitanyate.

Prh-vivṛti.p.1.

also

Bālāvabodhanakṛte'racayac ca ṭikā.Prh-vivṛti.p.246.

9.Kṛtavan/ etēmpṛahasta-ṭikā Viṭṭhalarāya-pramodāya.

Prh-vivṛti.p.246.

10.Vādavāra vivṛtir vitanyate.Prh-vivṛti.p. 1.

11.Ādyamvādam nijakṛtau vyāvṛnot Puruṣottamaḥ-Prh-vivṛti.^P34.

Uvītīyam vyāvṛnot vādam svakṛtau Puruṣottamaḥ-Prh-VivṛtiP.233

Trtīyavādam svakṛtau vyāvṛnot Puruṣottamaḥ. Prh-vivṛti P.246.

question here is about the exact meaning of the term nijakṛtau, or svakṛkau. Does it mean Avatāravādāvalī or Prahastavāda? I think, it means the former, because while the Prahasta really begins with the verse: 'Śrutiśirasi yasya mahimā etc', the commentary begins with the introductory portion which consists of four verses. Not only so, but for the above-mentioned verse Puruṣottama says that-Ādyaṃ vādam avatārayati śrutīty ādi.¹² I think that Puruṣottama first thought of writing a commentary on all the Vādas, but finding it unnecessary, he commented upon the Prahasta only, which he thought important. It was probably after he stopped writing commentaries, that the Vivṛti was dedicated to Viṭṭhalarāya. This view is, however, open to objection. Svakṛtau or Nijakṛtau may be said to mean the Prahasta and the numbers ādya, dvitīya and tritīya at the end of each part refer to the Vādas which form part of the Prahasta. This brings in the question of the structure of the Prahastavāda.

As we have seen above, the work contains three parts, and this has been made clear in the commentary also.¹³ Only one

12. Prh-vivṛti. p. 3.)

13. Atrājavāntarās trayo Vādāḥ. Pūrvam Vedāntatātparyanirūpana-rūpaḥ. Sarvamūlatvād asya prāthamyaṃ. Dvītīyas tu bhrāntaśaivanirākaraṇarūpaḥ. Trītīyas tu Bhagavato mūlarūpanirdhāraḥ. Prh-vivṛti. p. 3.

introductory verse is given in the text for starting all the three discussions. In the Vivṛti again, Puruṣottama says that the Vāda is based upon the Tattvadīpanibandha. A careful perusal of all the three parts ⁴⁰shows that except for their having only one verse as the starting point, they are independent of one another. Some sort of connection can be established among them by pointing out that, while the first discusses Brahman as the subject of the Vedāntic texts, the second is negative in approach, since it proves that Śiva is not the highest God; whereas the third again discusses the original form of Brahman viz. Kṛṣṇa. The Vāda, thus, not only rejects the contentions of Dīkṣita, but reinforces the position of the Vaiṣṇavas. The argument, however, is not so impressive for in that way all the Vādas have some connection with one another. I believe that the Prahasa is a composite, rather than an integrated work and the three component parts are independently understandable. The term Svakṛtau or Nijakṛtau should better refer to the Avatāravādāvalī. In fact, Puruṣottama himself is not ^{clear}~~exact~~ on this point.

There is not much to be said about the commentary, as such. It explains the text, but more than that it fills in the gaps by adding important discussions. It does not repeat or unnecessarily elaborate the statements made in the text.

(3) Paṇḍitakarabhindipālavāda:-

It is a shorter work written with the same purpose. In fact, it supplements the second part of the Prahasta. ~~Which is~~ This is made clear by Puruṣottama himself in his Prahastā-vivṛti when he says that whatever regarding the Purāṇas has not been stated here, is stated in the other Vāda, the Bhindipāla.¹⁴ Here he refers to the Bhāgavata, Kūrma, Śiva, Garuda and Padma Purāṇas. He also explains how even the highest Lord is said to worship Śiva. He refers to the Śrutis and corroborates his statements by the Bṛhmasūtras. Puruṣottama himself explains the word Bhindipāla, which here means a sling. He says that the good should take the Bhindipāla in their hands and easily hurl stone-balls for protecting the line of fields which are crowded by bad twice-borns.¹⁵ Not only that, but he even asks the wise to challenge his arguments if they find any drawback in his reasoning.¹⁶ Both Prahasta and Bhindipāla are written by Puruṣottama in a challenging mood.

14. Norkam purāṇaviṣayeyad ihāprasāṅgād

Vādāntare tad uditam khelu Bhindipāle. Bṛh-vivṛti. p. 233.

15. Durdvijasamājasaṅkulanigamakṣetrālirakṣaṇāyālam;

Adāya Bhindipālam santo gulikāḥ sukhād ajata. Bhindipāla. p. 277.

Bhindipāla means a javelin or an arrow that can be shot by hand or in a tube. It also means a sling. The word Gulikāḥ in the verse has led me to understand the term as meaning a sling.

16. Bhindipāla: last verse p. 277.

(4) Bhedābheda-Svarūpa-Nirṇaya:-

This is known as Bhedābheda-vāda also. It is a short work which discusses the theory of Tādātmya viz. ¹⁶ Bhedasahiṣṇur abhedah-identity which tolerates diversity. This is pure Monism- Śuddha Advaita. Puruṣottama proves it on the authority of the Śrūtis, while refuting the absolute Monism of Śaṅkara. The number of this Vāda is six, as given in the colophon. ¹⁷

(5) Pratīkṛtipūjanavāda:-

Also called Bhagavatpratīkṛtipūjanavāda or Bhagavatpratīpūjana, it discusses how the worship of an idol is a source of uplift for a Brahmanavādin, while this is not the case with those who follow other systems. Again, the worship of an idol does not presuppose the want of intellect in a worshipper; on the other hand it is better from the point of view of Karma and Jñāna also. He argues out at the end for his preference of the idol of Kṛṣṇa. The last verse informs us that the Vāda depends upon the eleventh book of the Bhāgavat and

17.1ti.... Puruṣottamena kṛtō vatāravādāvalyām

Bhedābheda-svarūpenirṇayo Nāma Ṣaṣṭho vādaḥ...

Vādāvalī.p.23.

the Sarvanirṇaya chapter of Tattvadīpanibandha. We know from the colophon that the number of the Vāda is fifteen.^{18.}

(6) Sṛṣṭibhedavāda:-

It is a small but very important work, from the point of view of the Śūdhādvaita. It discusses the various views of causation. Puruṣottama refutes the atomism of the Vaiśeṣika and the pariṇāmavāda of the Anīśvara sāmkhya. He gives the refutation of the Sāmkhya as given by the Māyāvādins and then refutes the adherents of Māyāvāda also. Finally, Puruṣottama explains the Brahmvāda and proves it, on scriptural and other grounds. The Vāda, as said by our author is based upon the Mibandha and other works. Its number is five.^{19.}

(7) Khyātivāda:-

Like the Sṛṣṭibhedavāda, it deals with the theory of Khyāti. Here the author discusses all the different theories of Khyāti, as advocated by the Buddhists, the Mīmāṃsakas, the Māyāvādins, the Sāmkhya, and the followers

18. Iti....Puruṣottamaviracito Bhagavat^Pratipūjanah
pañcadaśo vādah... Vādāvalī.p. 81.

19. Iti...Pañcamaḥsṛṣṭibhedavādah...Vādāvalī.p.118.

of Madhva, Rāmānuja and other teachers. Puruṣottama refutes all these theories except that of Rāmānuja, which also is not accepted in toto. In the Śuddhādvaita, akhyāti is accepted for those who have obtained knowledge and anyakhayāti for those who have not. The Vāda is based upon Subodhinī and does not bear any number.

(8) Andhakāravāda:-

This Vāda is a short work proving that darkness is a substance. Other theories are discussed and rejected. The Vāda is based upon Subodhinī and bears number nine.²⁰

(9) Brāhmaṇatvādevatāvāda:-

This Vāda is an interesting work, which tries to prove that Brahminhood is some Devatā. A man is a Brahmin or otherwise according as this deity is present or not. It is based upon Subodhinī and is tenth in number.²¹

(10) Jīvapratibimbatvākhaṇḍanavāda:-

Also called Pratibimbatvākhaṇḍanavāda, it is a polemical work directed against the Pratibimba-theory of the followers of Śaṅkara. Here all the six explanations of

20. Iti....Navamo'ndhakāravādaḥ. Vādāvalī.p. 141.

21. Iti....Brāhmaṇatvādevatāvāda daśamaḥ...Vādāvalī.p. 169 .

the theory are thoroughly refuted. It is proved at the end that the individual soul is a part of Brahman and yet Brahman is not partite. The number given to this Vāda is twelve. ²²

(11) Āvirbhāvatirobhāvavāda:-

It explains, in eleven pages, how Āvirbhāva and Tirobhāva are powers of Brahman. While so doing, Puruṣottama refutes the positions of other systems. This Vāda bears no number and like the previous one, is not based upon any particular work of Vellabha.

(12) Pratibimbavāda:-

This is a short discussion on the real nature of an image according to the Śuddhādvaita. Number eight is given to this Vāda. ²³ It is based upon Tattvādīpanibandha.

(13) Bhaktyutkarṣavāda:-

As its name indicates, it is intended to show the superiority of devotion to other means of emancipation. It is based upon Subodhinī and bears no number.

(14) Khalālapanaavidhvāmsavāda:-

This is a metrical work in 102 verses. Just as the Prahasa and Bhindipāla are written against the Śaiva

22. Iti.... Dvādaśaḥ Pratibimbavakhaṇḍanavādaḥ. Vādāvalī. p. 182.

23. Iti.... Aṣṭamaḥ Pratibimbavādaḥ. Vādāvalī. p. 201.

system, this Vāda is written against the Śāktas. An important difference between the two cases is that while the Prahasa and Bhindipāla are offensive in character, this work is defensive. The Śāktas have contended that Vaiṣṇavas are really speaking Śāktas because the ornamentation on the image of God leads to its being understood as that of Śakti. The arguments is further corroborated by the composition of a work styled Svāminīstotra by Viṭṭhaleśa and by the consecration of the image of Sarasvatī during the Navarātrī days. Puruṣottama refutes all these arguments. The Vāda can be divided into three parts as has been done by some. The first part consists of 39 verses, in which the author emphasises the masculine character of God. The second part begins with the fortieth verse and ends with the seventysixth. It deals with the Svāminīstotra. A separate title has been given to it by some. viz. Svāminīyastakaviṣayakeśāṅkānirāśavāda. The third part dealing with the Sarasvatīsthāpanā begins with the seventyseventh verse and is continued till the end. To this also a title viz. Sarasvatīsthāpanaviṣayakeśāṅkānirāśavāda, has been given. The Vāda bears no number, nor does it mention any work upon the basis of which it is composed.

(15) Nāma-vāda:-

It is variously known as Jayasrīkṛṣṇaccāraṇavāda

or Nāmaphalāḍiprakāravāda. The last is given by Puruṣottama himself in the colophon. The doubt here expressed is whether the name of God, known or otherwise, will bear fruit. The conclusion arrived at after discussion is that the main fruit can be secured only by knowing the name of God. The Vāda is based upon Subodhinī, Vidyaṇmaṇḍana and Tattva-dīpanibandha. It bears no number.

(16) Mūrtipūjanavāda: -

This Vāda is intended to establish that the image of Lord Kṛṣṇa should be worshipped by the Vaiṣṇavas. This Vāda is not numbered nor are we informed about its basis.

(17). Ūrdhvaṇḍradhāraṇavāda:-

It deals with the Sāṃpradāyic practice of having a vertical mark on the forehead with Candana etc. The mark with the ashes is a Śaivite~~tem~~ custom and so that should not be adhered to by the Vaidikas. The Vāda bears no number.

(18) Śaṅkhaśakradhāraṇavāda:-

It also deals with the Sāṃpradāyic practice of marking the conch and the disc with clay. The prohibitions against such marks found in other works do not hold water during the actual worship of God. The Vāda is eighteenth in number and is based upon the Nibandha.²⁴

24. Iti....Śaṅkhacakredhāraṇavēdaḥ Astādaśah...Vādāvalī p.281.

(19) Tulasīmālādhāraṇavāda:-

Also named, Mālādhāraṇavāda, this Vāda intends to prove that the followers of Vaiṣṇavism should invariably wear the string of Tulasī beads. The discussion more or less follows the same pattern as in the previous two Vādas. The Vāda is seventeenth in number. It is written on the basis of various Nibandhas and the practice followed by the Vaiṣṇavas.

(20) Upadeśaviśyāśaṅkānirāsavāda:-

Also called Bhaktimārgīyopadeśaviśyāśaṅkānirāsa, this is not a very short work. It deals with the topic of initiation in the Śuddhādvaita. Puruṣottama first states that the Cāyatrī brings in only the Brahminhood which is a prerequisite of karma. Devotion to God is necessary for an individual soul, and the Sāṃpradāyic initiation is a prerequisite of devotion. In the path of devotion, therefore, the Śaraṇamāntropadeśa is required. After discussing this Puruṣottama says that there is no harm if both a husband and his wife have only one preceptor. The devotees are of various types, out of which a Śuddha-bhakta is the best. The Vāda does not bear any number.

(21) Bhāgavatasvarūpaviśayakaśaṅkānirāsavāda:-

It bears number thirteen and deals with the Bhāgavata

Purāṇa, which is accepted in the Puṣṭimārga as one of the Prasthānas. He says that the Bhāgavata is a Mahāpurāṇa and should be included in the list of eighteen Purāṇas. He also quotes references from various works to prove that the Bhāgavatapurāṇa is very ancient. The work is based on the Tattvadīpanibandha.

(22) Svavṛttivāda:-

It has been published in the Puṣṭibhaktisudhā Vol.III. No.9. The work deals with the Vṛtti of the maintenance of a teacher. It is a very short manual discussing the Vṛtti of a Guru which should be in keeping with the usual practice of the sect and the purity etc. of the pupil. The Vāda appears to be based upon the Tattvadīpanibandha.

(23) Jīva-vyāpakatvakhandanavāda. (24) Abhāvavāda and

(25) Vestrāsevāvāda could not be traced. Over and above these one (26) Ātmavāda has been ascribed to him by Shri.

Telivāla and Shri.H.O.Ghastri.

Jīva-vyāpakatvakhandanavāda has been referred to by Puruṣottama himself twice. ²⁵ We shall see in the next

25- Idam Sarvam Mayā Jīva-nuvāde samyak prapēñcitam
ato nātrocyate. A.B.P. II. ⁱⁱⁱ 32.p.735 and
Ity Anvātmavādaḥ. TS. Ab:53.p.95.

chapter how many of the Vāda-granthas contain the same arguments and even the same phrases found in other important works of the same author. And again, the sentence—"Ity Anvātma-Vādah" in the Āvaranabhanga coming after the refutation of the Jīva-vyāpakatva is very suggestive. We can safely say that the said Vāda should therefore be considered, as dealing with the problems connected with the atomic measure of the soul; and must be containing the same arguments which are found at the places where the work is referred to.²⁶

Similar is the case with the Abhāvavāda. In the Prasthāneratnākara, a thorough discussion on the concepts of Prāgabhāva and other Abhāvas is followed by a remark—"Ity Abhāvavādah."²⁷ The arguments that are found here, are also found in the Āvaranabhanga on the Sarvanirṇaya chapter of the Tattvadīpanibandha.²⁸ It thus appears that the Abhāvavāda contained a refutation of various Abhāvas as separate concepts.

26. In the Manuscript-Library of Pandit Gattulalji in Bombay there is an incomplete Manuscript of Jivānutvavāda. It has nine folios. It ends abruptly. It is dated Śaka 1796. The number of the manuscript is 147. It begins with -
Ātmā nityaś citsvarūpaḥ... etc.

27. Pr. p. 123.

28. T Sn. A B. 117. pp. 89-92.

Vastrasevāvāda could not be found, and the present writer was unable to find any references to it in the works of Puruṣottama, he studied. It may however, be conjectured, that it may be dealing with the worship of the clothes of the Ācārya and not of any image of God. Even today, there is a section of Vaiṣṇavas who worship the clothes of the Ācāryas. The followers of Gokulaṇātha do not worship any image of God.

The word Ātmavāda has been used by Puruṣottama while discussing the Satkāryavāda.²⁹ He argues that the invisible (Adṛṣṭa) should not be understood as regulating the rise of a particular effect from a particular cause, because 'Ātmavāde tasyāpi dūṣyatvāt.' It is difficult to state whether Ātmavāda, here, should refer to a book or a theory. It seems that the reference here, is to a work rather than a theory, because Puruṣottama does not argue out against the Adṛṣṭa here. One Ātmavāda of Gopeśvara has been printed in the Vādāvalī. Puruṣottama, seems to have been written one Ātmavāda, but unfortunately we have not got it.

One (27) Bhaktirasatvavāda is printed in the Vādāvalī. It is ascribed to Pītāmbara. This short work is written with the intention to show that devotion is a Rasa,

29. T.S. Ab. 82. p. 141.

different from the nine Rasas accepted by the rhetoricians.

The work is also published in the Puṣṭibhaktisudhā, where the editor Ganpatiram Kalidas Shastri says that this is in fact composed by Puruṣottama.³⁰ If the style of the writer is taken to prove the authorship, the opinion of C.K. Shastri seems to be correct because the analysis that we find in the works of Puruṣottama, is found here also. The way in which Sneha is differentiated from desire, knowledge and all that, is found in the Suvernāsūtra.³¹ The phraseological and ideological similarities may thus be adduced in support of Puruṣottama's authorship.

We have already referred to ^{the} absence of any authentic information regarding the number of the Vādas written by our author. It ^{is} quite possible that he might have composed more Vādas than those which are known to us. Any way, we know of twenty-six Vādas.

A short analysis of the Vādas, that we have seen above, would reveal that out of the twenty-six Vādas,

30. Iyam kṛtir vastutaḥ ŚrīmatPuruṣottamagoṣvānicaranam. eva. Pn.P.B.S. Vol. III. No. 5.

31. Compare-Snehaś ca mecchāviśeṣaḥ... etc. Vādāvalī. p. 204. with Snehaś cātmano manaso vā yogyo dharmaviśeṣaḥ na tv ichhā... etc. S.S. p. 7.

we have referred to, four are not extant. Out of the remaining works, which are extant, twelve are numbered. The highest number is eighteen given to Śaṅkhaśāstradhāraṇa-Vāda. Puruṣottama himself informs us about the basis of thirteen Vādas. One of them Tulasīmālādhāraṇavāda is based on various works and the Sāṃpradāyic practice, the Pratikṛtipūjenavāda is based on Subodhinī and Tattvadīpanibandha. Out of the remaining, six are based upon Tattvadīpanibandha, and five upon Subodhinī.

From the point of view of contents, these works can be classified as follows:-

(i) Works dealing with Philosophical concepts:-

The first part of Prahasṭavāda,
 Bheda-bheda-vāda,
 Pratikṛtipūjenavāda,
 Sṛṣṭi-bheda-vāda,
 Andhakāravāda,
 Khyativāda.
 Pratibimbavāda,
 Āvirbhāvatirobhāvavāda,
 Bhakti-yutkarṣavāda,
 Bhakti-rāst^ātvavāda, and
 Ātmavāda.

(ii) Works mainly polemical in character:-

The second part of Prahasṭavāda,
 Bhindipāleavāda,

Jīvapratibimbatvakhaṇḍanavāda,
 Khalālapanaavidhvāṁsavāda,
 Jīvavyāpakatvakhaṇḍanavāda, and
 Abhāvavāda.

(iii) Works dealing with the Sāṃpradāyic beliefs and practices:-

The Third part of Prastāvāda,
 Brāhmaṇatvādidēvatāvāda,
 Nāmanavāda,
 Mūrtipūjanavāda,
 Ūrḍhvapauṇḍradhāraṇavāda,
 Śaikhacakraśāstraṇavāda,
 Tulasīmālādhāraṇavāda,
 Upadeśaviśayaśāṅkānirāsaṇavāda,
 Svavṛttivāda, and,
 Vāstraśeṇavāda.

(iv) Work dealing with one particular book:-

Bhāgavataviśayaśāṅkānirāsaṇavāda.

(III)

Other independent works.

(28) Prasthāneratnākara:-

This is one of the most important works of our author. Unfortunately, it is not complete. The part of the work, that is extant, includes the first chapter called Pramāṇaprakaraṇa, and a part of the second chapter named Prameyaprakaraṇa.

The second chapter is not complete.

A short analysis of the contents of the first chapter and a part of the second will show how the work is planned and how it is carried out by Puruṣottama.

After paying homage to the God Nēmodara (Nēmnā baddhaḥ) Puruṣottama says that whatever is found scattered, explained or unexplained, in the authoritative works has been described here with reasoning.³² He says that Vyāsa has first discussed the principles on the strength of Śabda-pramāṇa and has then thought of the Prameya, Sādhana and Phala. Vallabhācārya has done the same thing in his Subodhinī. This is quite proper, because the Mēya depends upon the Māna. Hence in this work also Pramāṇa is described in the beginning. After explaining that the word Pramāṇa means uncontradicted knowledge, as also the means for obtaining such knowledge Puruṣottama begins the discussion on the theory of knowledge. This ^{is} followed by a full-fledged discussion on the Pramāṇas, Śabda, Pratyakṣa, and Anumāna. He discusses other Pramāṇas and rejects them. Finally he enters into a discussion whether

32. Yat prameyam urudhā'kare sthitam

Nopapāditam utopapāditam;

Viprakīrṇam iti tanmanīṣayod-

Grhya yuktibhir ihopavarnyate. Pr.V. 2.p. 1.

the Prāmānya of knowledge is directly understood or indirectly. At the end he says that whatever is left undescribed and whatever is described but was lying scattered in the authoritative works regarding the Pramāna has been put together here by him. ²⁵ In the beginning of the Prameyaprakaraṇa Puruṣottama says that Brahman is the main Prameya. He explains the Sṛṣṭiprakriyā and then gives the three divisions- Svarūpakoti, Kāraṇakoti and Kāryakoti. He thoroughly discusses the twentyeight principles which are included in the Kāraṇakoti. At the conclusion of this the extant part of the work comes to an end.

From the foregoing short analysis of the extant portions of Prasthānamākars, we can understand quite clearly the plan of the work as thought out by our author. He first refers to Vyāsa, the author of the Brahmasūtras and says that he has carried out his work according to a certain plan- Pramāṇas, Prameya, Sādhana and Phala. This is also the position in Vallabhācārya's Sabodhinī. We may add here that in the Sarvanirṇayaprakaraṇa of the

33. Evam pramānaviṣaye' nupapāditam yat,

Yed viprakīrṇam upapāditam Ākaraṇa

Saṅgrhya tad geditam atra mayā tathānyat

Prāsāngikam ca sujanavrajatoṣṇāya. Pr.p. 155.

Tattvadīpanibandha, Vallabha has also followed the same plan. Puruṣottama thus thought of writing four chapters dealing with Pramāṇa, Prameya, Sādhana and Phala. He actually refers to the Sādhana-prakaraṇa in the beginning. 34

That the second chapter is not finished can also be easily understood. The chapter does not contain the colophon or any concluding verse. Again, it does not discuss each and every problem connected with the Prameya, e.g. the Kāryakoṭi, the Jīvasvarūpa, the distinction between the Jagat and the Saṁsāra etc. These points are really important and we can not believe that Puruṣottama has neglected them.

The pertinent point, which remains to be seen is whether Puruṣottama finished the work and some ^{of} its portions were lost or that he left the work unfinished. When Puruṣottama has written so many works, it is difficult to imagine that he might have left unfinished so important a work. The work is really a treasure, a Ratnākara and quite naturally Puruṣottama must have completed it.

Again, many references to it are found in his other works like Bhāṣya-prakāśa and Āvaraṇa-bhaṅga. If these references

34. Siদ্ধānte Prakāras tu sādhanaprakaraṇe vakṣyate.

are a clue to the earlier composition of Prasthānaratnākara , we should accept that it was finished by our author and it is our misfortune that we have not been able to obtain the complete text.

(29) Samarpananirnaya:-

In the manuscript Library of Pandit Gattulalji in Bombay, there is one work of Puruṣottama called Samarpananirnaya or Ātmanivedanapaddhati. The manuscript bears number 150 and consists of 16 folios. It is a small work which contains, as its name indicates, the discussion on the Samarpana or surrender to God.

(30) Mukticintāmaṇi:-

In the same Library we have one work mukticintāmaṇi, also called Bhagavatprasādanāhātmya. The manuscript has 11 folios and is dated V.S.1728. Number of the manuscript is 176 and the name of the scribe is Vāgbhata. The colophon runs : 'Iti Śrī mukticintāmaṇau Śrīpuruṣottamadevena Saṅgrhya viracītaḥ.' It is not improbable that Śrī. Puruṣottamadeva is our author. The work is just a compilation and Puruṣottama might have written it at the young age of 14, which would have been his age in V.S.1728.

(31) Dravyaśuddhi:-

Dravyaśuddhi is an important contribution of Puruṣottama to Dharmaśāstra. The work, apart from collecting the rules of purification, as its name indicates, is written with an express purpose. While the rules of purification have been laid down by the works on Dharmaśāstra, for the purpose of maintaining purity and sanctity of things and men, Puruṣottama felt it to be his duty to review them and bring them in line with the Sāṃpradāyic practices. The devotion to God, thanks to the imagination of Viṭṭhaleśa, has been a fairly long procedure in the Puṣṭimārga, involving the use of a lot of things and requiring ~~ix~~ a good deal of time. It was thus necessary to preserve the purity of all the utensils used in the Harisevā. Hence the rules of Śuddhi had to be so adjusted and explained as to get sanction for the Sāṃpradāyic traditions. Puruṣottama makes this quite clear in the first verse. 35

Another important point is also to be noted. Puruṣottama, as we have seen, flourished at the time when

35. Nstvā Śrīvallabhācāryān harisevopakārikā,
bāhyāchāḥyantarī dravyaśuddhir atra vicāryate.

Dravyaśuddhi.p.4.

the throne of Delhi was occupied by Auranzeb, under whose reign the Hindu society was always in danger. The Hindus who had to struggle for their existence became more and more conservative; all the rules formulated and observed since centuries had to be reviewed in the context of the new situation that arose. Puruṣottama felt it to be his duty to put together and interpret the rules which appear in different works.³⁶

The work contains 29 sections as follows:-

- (i) Śnānēcamaṇṣimittavicāra,
- (ii) Vastrādyaṇṭaritasparśe buddhipūrvakasparśe ca śnānādivicāra,
- (iii) Śītoṣṇodakasmānāvicāra,
- (iv) Rātrou śnānavicāra,
- (v) Rātrou kedyādijalasnānavicāra,
- (vi) Rātrou janma-mṛtiraṇṇesu kālavibhāgādivicāra,
- (vii) Caturthadinēdeṇ rajasvalāśudhivicāra,
- (viii) Parimitadinottaram punā rajodarśanevicāra,
- (ix) Rajasvalāyē aśucya-parasparśe rajasvalayoḥ parasparasparśe ca vicāra,

36. Nibandheṣu vivicyoktāpy adhunā budhahidoṣataḥ,

Yeṣāṃ na bhūṣate samyag tata eṣa samudyamah.

Dravyasūddhi. p. 4.

- (x) Rajasvalāśnānādivicāra,
- (xi) Atah param etadvyastiriktasūnānādiyoganimitlavicāra ,
- (xii) Sperśe doṣābhāvavicāra, -
- (xiii) Bhagavatsevāyām caivapitryekarmasu snānādina
śuddhasya ke vā aśucihetaveḥ kṛkṣa katham vā
tataḥ śuddhir iti vicāryate,
- (xiv) Vastrādiviṣaye śuddhivicāra,
- (xv) Pātrādiśuddhivacāra,
- (xvi) Uchhiṣṭasprṣṭapātraśuddhivicāra,
- (xvii) Amoghya-sprṣṭapātraśuddhivicāra,
- (xviii) Śaṅgyādiśuddhivicāra,
- (xix) Dhānyādiśuddhivicāra,
- (xx) Siddhāntaśuddhivicāra,
- (xxi) Chṛtapāyasaḍdibām śuddhivicāra,
- (xxii) Chṛtapācitādīnām bhakṣyābhakṣyevicāra,
- (xxiii) Uḍakaśuddhivicāra,
- (xxiv) Jalāśayaśuddhivicāra,
- (xxv) Bhūśuddhivicāra,
- (xxvi) Oṣhaśuddhivicāra,
- (xxvii) Rathyāśuddhivicāra,
- (xxviii) Prakṛm, aśuddhivicāra, and
- (xxix) Ātmaśuddhivicāra.

The work is full of quotations from standard
treatises on the subject, like the Śartis, Nirṇayasindhu,

Dinakarodyeta, Bhagavad Bhāskara etc. Puruṣottama tries to make it as complete as possible by leaving out nothing that is important.

(32) Utsavapratēna:-

Festivals have played an important part in the Puṣṭi Saṁpradāya. We have got many works of the scholars of the Saṁpradāya, discussing when and how certain important festivals are to be celebrated. The Utsavapratēna enjoys a very high position in these works. It begins in the form of a commentary on the Jan/māṣṭamīnirṇaya of Viṭṭhaleśa, and after it is finished, Puruṣottama begins to discuss other festivals independently. ³⁷ While so doing, he also includes a commentary on the Rāmanavamīnirṇaya of Viṭṭhaleśa.

Apart from the description of the festivals, Puruṣottama's purpose is to decide the exact time when these festivals are to be celebrated. This ^{is} what he himself says in the first verse. ³⁸ He says the same

37. Atah paṇam svantaṁtratayā nirṇīyante. U.P.p.107.

38. Śrīmad ācāryacareṇa n prabhūn Śrīviṭṭhaleśvarēn,
Nativotsavānām samayaḥ sopapattika ucyate. U.P.p.90.

thing at the end also.³⁹ Thus the Utsavapratāna is more or less a Kālanirnayagrantha. It should be noted in this connection that the title of the work, as given in the Colophon, is Samvatsarotsavakālanirnayapratāna. The work contains a critical discussion on all the festivals referring to the views of many authoritative works like Kālamādhava, Bhagavad Bhāskara, Dinakarodyota, Nirñayasindhu and many Purāṇas and other works. The work sometimes makes an interesting reading, especially in the description of various festivals. Thus for instance, while dealing with the Balipūjāvidhi, Puruṣottama refers to the tug of war (Rajjvākarsaṇa) as described in the Āditya Purāṇa.⁴⁰

Sri. D. H. Shastri of Surat has edited a collection of the available works on the subject by the writers in the Sampradāya. The title given to it is Yāvatprāpya-utsavanirnaya-granthasamuccayaḥ. In this we find another work of Puruṣottama named Vijayānirṇaya, dealing with the festivals of Vijayādaśamī. Śāstrī Gaṅgādhara in his Utsevapratānodāharaṇa says that Puruṣottama has written two works on the Vijayādaśamī, and he has commented upon both of them.⁴¹ One Vijayāviveka of Gaṅgādhara Shāstrī is printed in the collection stated above.

39. Samvatsarotsavānehonirnayo yam mayā kṛtaḥ. U.P.p.156.

40. U.P.p.116.

41. U.P.p.65.

It explains the portion of the Utsavapratāna, dealing with the Vijayādaśamī. As for the other work dealing with the Vijayādaśamī, which is printed in the said collection and which, Gaṅgādhara says, he has commented upon, I could find after a careful study that it is just a larger version of the relevant portions in the Utsava-pratāna. I do not think, therefore, that it deserves separate consideration.

The high esteem in which this work was held, can be seen from the fact that it was actually abridged and explained either wholly or partly by the followers of the Saṃpradāya. A short explanation of difficult words and sentences has been named Pratāna-tippaṇī. The manuscript of the work together with the Tippaṇī is dated V.S. 1758 and was copied in Surat. The Tippaṇī refers to Puruṣottama as 'Guru' ; it thus appears to have been composed by one of his disciples. ⁴² We have already noted that one Gaṅgādhara Śāstrī wrote commentary called Vijayāviveka on the portions of the Pratāna, dealing with the Vijayādaśamī. The Vijayādaśamīvāda alias Vijayādaśamīnirṇaya of Gaṅgādhara Bhaṭṭa is also based upon the same. The Vratotsavenirṇaya of Bhaṭṭa Tulajārāma, written in the Vraja dialect is based upon the

42. U.P.p.156.

Utsavapratāna.⁴³ Similarly there is one Utsavapratāna-sandoha written in the Vraj dialect. The manuscript is dated V.S.1785 and copied by Vaiṣṇava Nrsiṅhadāsa.⁴⁴

Govardhana, son of Rāmakṛṣṇa, commented upon the Candana-yātrotsava in the Pratāna. The Utsavapratānodāharana of Śāstrī Gaṅgādhara is also written in the Vraj dialect. Rāmakṛṣṇa's son Govardhana wrote one Vijayādaśamī-Pratānāśayaprakāśa and the Dolotsavapratānaprakāśa in Sanskrit. Jagannātha Shastri has translated Utsavapratāna in Hindi.

(33) Utsavabhāvanukrama:-

It is a short compilation of verses appropriate for different festivals that have been described and discussed in Utsavapratāna. The work is also called Utsavakramabhāvanā. It is published together with the 'Prakaranānām saṅgati' in the collection of Vrata-works, referred to above.

43. Iti ŚrīmatPurusottamajīkṛta-utsavapratānamate

Vacanasaṅgrahapūrvaka Utsavanirnaya...Etc. U.P.p.26.

44. U.P. p. 27.

(IV).

commentaries on the works of Vallabha and Vitthalesa.

(34) Anubhāsyaprakāśa:-

This voluminous commentary on the Anubhāsyā of Vallabhācārya is the magnum opus of Puruṣottama. Vallabha wrote his Bhāsyā on the Brahmasūtras, which are taken to be one of the Prasthānas of the Vedāntic philosophy. He thus tried to explain through this his theories of the Śuddhādvaita. The Anubhāsyā, however, was written in a laconic style and stood in need of commentaries for its explanation. Puruṣottama, by carrying out this great work, has supplied to us more than what was needed.

The Anubhāsyā is a work of dual authorship. On the authority of Puruṣottama, we know that the Anubhāsyā from the beginning upto III.ii.3³/₄ was composed by Vallabhācārya, while the remaining portions were written by his son Vitthalesa. ⁴⁵ Puruṣottama must have definitely noticed the distinction between the two portions. In the beginning of the fourth Adhyāya there are eighteen verses while there are

45. Ita ārabhya Prabhūnam iti pratibhāti. A.B. P.III.ii.34

only five in the beginning of the third, and there is no such metrical introduction to the first two Adhyāyas. The style of Vallabha is terse and laconic, almost ~~ex~~ epigrammatic while that of Vitthaleśa is more explanatory, and tends to be ornate with long compounds, and descriptions full of imagination, sometimes uncalled for in such a work. Further, the former part of the Bhāṣya contains violent attacks on other theorists, especially Śaṅkara; this is not the case with the portions written by Vitthaleśa. Vallabha often refers to the older Upaniṣads, whereas Vitthaleśa refers more to the minor Upaniṣads and the Purāṇas. The second interpretation of the Sutra I.i.11. ~~is~~ is from the pen of Vitthaleśa, as has been pointed out by Puruṣottama. ⁴⁶•Puruṣottama's ~~of~~ commentary itself would, on a careful reading, show the case of dual authorship very clearly. Puruṣottama has to explain much more while commenting upon the portion written by Vallabha than upon those ~~commented~~ by Vitthaleśa.

We have noted above that on account of the laconic

46. Sāṃpratam tu Prabhucaraṇair akhaṇḍabrahmavādena...etc.

style of Vallabha, Anubhāṣya stands in need of an explanation for its complete understanding. A host of commentaries, besides the Prakāśa of Puruṣottama, have been written with that purpose. Giridhara (born in V.S. 1819) has written Vivaraṇa on the Anubhāṣya, while a similar work of Muralīdhara is called Vyākhyā. One Mathurānātha who was a great mīmāṃsist has written one Prakāśa. The Pradīpa of Icchārāma Bhaṭṭa and the Yojanā alias Gūdhārthadīpikā of Lālu Bhaṭṭa are easier explanations helpful to a student. Besides these there are other commentaries also like Vedāntacandrikā, probably of Vrajarāja, Vāgīśaprasāda of Bālakṛṣṇa, the Marīcikā of Bhaṭṭa Vrajanātha etc.

Of all the commentaries on the Anubhāṣya, the best and the most important is that of Puruṣottama. He introduces the Sūtras, explains the Bhāṣya fully and then notes the interpretations of other Bhāṣyakāras and views of other theorists on the particular topic at the end of the Sūtra or the Adhikaraṇa as the case may be. He discusses the views of others and refutes them if so required. Thus Śaṅkara, Rāmānuja, Madhva, Śaiva, etc. are referred to a hundred times. Udayana, Vācaspati-miśra, Jayatīrtha and many others are often mentioned. Thus the commentary is more critical than explanatory.

Sometimes we feel that the Prakāśa is very scholastic and difficult to be understood. Gopeśvara has written a fairly long sub-commentary over the same called Raśmi, in which he explains the Prakāśa and adds many more discussions which, he thinks, are necessary.

One very important question has been raised with regard to the larger version of the Anubhāṣya called the Śrīmadbhāṣya or the Brhadbhāṣya and the Bhāvaṇīprakāśikā-vṛtti. The problem requires a discussion here, in as much as it has some bearing on the Anubhāṣyaprakāśa of Puruṣottama.

A case has been made out by Shri.Telivala⁴⁷ and Prof:M.G.Shastri to the effect that Vallabha wrote two commentaries on the Brahmasūtras; the one known as the Anubhāṣya which is extant and well-known, and the other which has been lost to us but which was voluminous and consequently called Brhadbhāṣya or Śrīmadbhāṣya.

Prof:Jethalal G. Shah does not agree to this and refutes the arguments advanced by Shri.Telivala and Prof.M.G. Shastri.⁴⁸ The important arguments and counter-arguments

47. A.B. with P. and R.III.i.Intro.p.5,6.

48. Prof:J.G.Shah: Anubhāṣya:Gujarati Translation

Vol.I.intro.p.9ff.

are as follows.

The title of the Bhāṣya- Anubhāṣya-itself, shows that this commentary is smaller than the other, which may be named Brhadbhāṣya or Śrīmadbhāṣya. Prof: Shah says that the term Anu stands for the atomic measure of the individual soul as against the Vibhutva of the same as propounded by Śaṅkara. It should be remembered that Vallabha considers Śaṅkara as his chief adversary. It is necessary for us to understand exactly what Shri. Teliwala has to say in this connection. In the editorial note at the end of the Anubhāṣya(with Prakāśa and Reśmi)III.iii.he says , " It seems Vitthalesvara got Vallabhācārya's Bhāṣya on the Brahmasūtras upto III.ii. 33. It seems this was the only portion in his possession when he composed the Vidvanmandana. It was at a late stage.... that he undertook to complete the Bhāṣya-fragment of his father on the Brahmasūtras. In order to distinguish this Bhāṣya from that of his father, he seems to have named it Anubhāṣya. In Subodhinī,Vallabhācārya does not refer to his commentary on Brahmasūtras as Anubhāṣya, but only as Bhāṣya without the word Anu." The argument thus based on the word Anu, does not appear to be plausible,because if we believe that Vitthalesa

has given the name Anubhāṣya, naturally it does not mean that the portion written by Vallabha himself also represents a smaller version of the original text. The explanation of the term Anu, as given by Prof: J.G. Shah may not appear to be satisfactory, because it is unbelievable that Vallabha, even if he wanted to distinguish his System from that of Śaṅkara, would have hit upon not so very important a point.

Vallabha in his Prakāśa on the Śāstrārtha Prakarāṇa of Tattvadīpenibandha says: "Cakārān Mīmāṃsādvayabhāṣyam. 49

This, says Telivāla, would rather suggest an accomplished fact. Similarly in the Subodhinī on Bhāgavatapurāṇa. II. i. 5 he refers to the Pūrvamīmāṃsābhāṣya also, as an accomplished fact. 50 Telivāla further points out that in the Subodhinī on the Veda-stuti, Vallabha says: "Bhāṣye Vistarasyektatvāt." No such Vistāra has been found in the extant Anubhāṣya. Similarly in the Subodhinī on the Bhāgavata III. iv. 7. Vallabha says: "Itāny eva guṇopasamhāra-pāde śoḍaśadhikeranyā pratipāditāni." This means that

49. T.S.P.^v 5. p. 33.

50. Bhāvanēpakṣaś ca Pūrvamīmāṃsābhāṣya eva nirākṛtaḥ.

sixteen Adhikaraṇas of the Brahmasūtras III.iii. are regarded as Viśeṣaṇas. There is no such reference in the extant Anubhāṣya. Puruṣottama does not seem to have known this in the beginning. He knew this after writing his Prakāśa on Subodhinī on the third book of the Bhāgavatapurāṇa. So he added the required references in his Anubhāṣyaprakāśa in the revised version.

In reply to the argument of Teliwala that the references to the Bhāṣya suggest an accomplished fact, Prof. Shah says that when one author is writing commentaries on various works simultaneously, he may think of discussing a certain point in a particular work and may forget the same thing while actually writing that portion of that particular work. The argument of Prof. Shah is convincing. Naturally, the references to the Bhāṣya in other works can not prove an accomplished fact.

Shri. Telivala has further pointed out certain inconsistencies in the extant Anubhāṣya. In the Īkṣatyadhikaraṇa, there is no refutation of the Sāṃkhya theory; however, in the beginning of his Bhāṣya on Brahmasūtras I.iv, it is said that the Sāṃkhya theory is refuted in the Īkṣatyadhikaraṇa as unscriptural.

Similarly, the Tadananyatvādhikaraṇa should contain a discussion on the theory of Āvirbhāva-tirobhāva, but it is silent. Prof. Shah says that even though the word Sāṃkhya is not used in the Īkṣatyādhikaraṇa, the refutation is, in fact, implied. As for the second case Prof. Shah just says that the arguments/ is equally weak. It is surely too much to imagine a separate Bhāṣya on account of these inconsistencies. The explanation of the inconsistencies, given by Prof. Shah is very farfetched. Inconsistencies, if they are there, should be accepted as such and it is useless to give a farfetched explanation to prove otherwise.

Shri. Telivala has further pointed out that we find ~~the~~ some Sūtras of the third and fourth Adhyāyas of the Brahme-sūtras, explained in the Subodhinī, the explanation of these Sūtras as given in the Subodhinī, is different from that given in the Anubhāṣya; hence the explanations as found in the Subodhinī must be concurring with those in the Brhadbhāṣya. Prof. Shah says that the explanations should be viewed in the context in which they are given. One important point, which we should note, is that such Sūtras belong to the portions of the commentary written

by Viṭṭhaleśa.

Shri. Telivala argues that on a perusal of the Anubhāṣya itself, we find that it is an abridgement of a bigger work and that almost all the works of Vallabhā-cārya have double editions. Prof. Shah correctly dismisses the first argument on the ground of the laconic style of Vallabha. He also says that the arguments of double editions is not conclusive, because there are other works which do not have two editions e.g. Patrāvalambana ~~and~~ and the sixteen tracess except the Sevāphala.

The whole discussion has enjoyed prominence by the publication of some parts of the said Śrīmadbhāṣya or Brhadbhāṣya in the Puṣṭibhaktisudhā Vol. VI. Prof. M. G. Shastri wrote an article about it 'Prāptamīmāṃsā-bhāṣyavibhāgārtha' in Puṣṭibhaktisudhā.⁵¹ In this article Prof. Shastri says that the parts of the Bhāṣya published in the Puṣṭibhaktisudhā, are really speaking portions of the said Śrīmadbhāṣya or Brhadbhāṣya. Shri. Telivala, however, observes 'In conclusion we ought not to omit reference to one work which passes in the name

51. Puṣṭibhaktisudhā (Vol. VIII, Nos. 5-6, p. 75), referred to by J. G. Shah: Śrīmad Brahma-sūtra-anubhāṣyam - Guj Trans. Vol. I. Intro. p. 9

of Śrīmad Bhāṣya of Śrī.Vallabhācārya.... From the style this seems to be a clumsy attempt of a writer of recent times. All copies seen by us are new. The style is such as leaves little doubts in our minds as to the spurious nature of this production." ⁵². Thus, the proof, that has been made much of, loses its value.

All this rather long discussion has a direct bearing on the study of Puruṣottama. It has been stated by the scholars of the Sāṃpradāya that the erudite performance of Puruṣottamajī, seen in the comparative method as found in the Anubhāṣyaprakāśa, is an abridgement of the said Śrīmadbhāṣya. ⁵³ One thing, that we must note in this connection is that never in his works, Puruṣottama refers to the alleged Śrīmadbhāṣya. Puruṣottama, as the study of his works reveals, is not a plagiarist and if he has borrowed bodily from the Śrīmadbhāṣya of Vallabha himself, there is no reason why he should not refer to such a work

52. Anubhāṣya with Prakāśa & Rāśmi.III.i.Intro.p.12.

53. Śrīmadbhāṣye Śaṅkarācāryādinām pūrvabhāṣyakṛtām
 samīkṣā kṛtāsti, saiva Śrīpuruṣottamakṛteprakāśa
 Udalekhīti sāmpradāyikāh. Anubhāṣya-Ed.S.T.Pathak
 Vol.II.Intro.p.48).

at all.

The Bhāvaṇaprakāśikāvṛtti, ascribed to Kṛṣṇacandra, is a work that poses a problem for a student of the Śuddhādvaita. Is it written by Puruṣottama or Kṛṣṇacandra? If it is written by Kṛṣṇacandra, how much does Puruṣottama owe to it? Is it based upon the Śrīmadbhāṣya, other than the extant Anubhāṣya? All these questions require a careful study.

The Bhāvaṇaprakāśikāvṛtti is an independent commentary on the Brahmasūtras, based upon the Bhāṣya of Vallabha. It explains the Sūtras in line with the explanations offered by Vallabha and Viṭṭhaleśa in the Bhāṣya and also discusses some other important points. The explanation on the first Adhyāya appears to be critical though not so much as the Prakāśa of Puruṣottama. Thus, for instance, in the very beginning there is a discussion on the adhyayanavidhi and the views of various thinkers on the same. Again, there are references to Śaṅkara and others, while explaining I.i.2. etc. This, however, does not go on for a longer time, and after some Adhikaraṇas, the Vṛtti is more or less explanatory. Thus the Vṛttikāra does not criticise Śaṅkara in the Ānandamaya Adhikaraṇa and the work is, on the whole free from polemics. The Vṛtti on the

Adhyāyas II, III, and IV is still less critical and sometimes barely explanatory. Thus, for instance, the Vṛtti on the Tadananyatva-adhikaraṇa is less critical even than the Bhāṣya of Vallabha. The strictures which have been passed again/st Sāṅkara by Vallabha in II.i.15, II.ii.8 etc. are totally absent. Thus the nature of the work is that of a short explanatory imitation of the Anubhāṣya.

As for the authorship of the work, we should ~~to~~ take into account the colophons. The colophon~~s~~ at the end of the first Pāda of the first Adhyāya reads: "...Śrīkṛṣṇacandra-viracitāyām tacchiṣyaPuruṣottamaśaṁgrhītāyām Bhāvaprakāśikā-bhīdhāyām brahmasūtravṛttau...etc." ⁵⁴ That at the end of the second Pāda substitutes "Tacchiṣyapurūṣottamalikhitāyām" instead of "Śaṁgrhītāyām." Thereafter, there is no reference to Puruṣottama in any colophon. Shri.M.T.Telivala in his Sanskrit introduction to Adhyāya IV says that the manuscript of the Vṛtti is written by Puruṣottama himself. The last folio is written by one Kṛṣṇadatta in V.S.1850. Someone has written on it, "Iyam Vṛtṭiḥ Gosvāmīpurūṣottamāiḥ svagurunāmnā kṛteti śrutam." Thus the Sāṁpradāyic tradition

54. Bhāvaprakāśikā I.p.45.

is that the work has, actually, been composed by Puruṣottama and fathered upon his teacher Kṛṣṇacandra. Puruṣottama has actually done so and used the names of his father and his grandfather as the authors of his own works, as we shall see in this chapter. It does not however appear that the Bhāva-prakāśikā is really a work of Puruṣottama. We should not forget that the Vṛtti, as it is, is more critical in the first Adhyāya than in the other three. Not only so but the comparative and argumentative style of Puruṣottama is not found in the three Adhyāyas. Again, the word 'Saṁgrhīta' in the colophon is a pointer for this purpose. It seems to me that the work, especially the beginning of it, is revised by Puruṣottama, when he prepared a manuscript copy of the work. The later portions do not appear to have been even revised.

The relation of this work with the Prakāśa can be and should be discussed, because it ~~is~~ has been argued that Puruṣottama owes much to his teacher Kṛṣṇacandra. It has been said that Puruṣottama has been obliged by two descendants of Vallabha. It was due to Vrajarāya that he got the service of the image of Bālakṛṣṇa but the profound scholarship that Puruṣottama shows to have possessed is due to his teacher Kṛṣṇacandra. Thus, it is said that Puruṣottama's Prakāśa contains so many

passages, that are found in the Bhāva-prakāśikā. If they are not copied out, they are atleast summarised or expanded.

A careful comparative study of the two works, has, however, led me to quite another conclusion. The Bhāva-prakāśikā very rarely contains the references to other commentators, which is the chief merit of the works of Puruṣottama; and even the references, which are found, are suspicious, because they might have been added by Puruṣottama himself. One instance will be sufficient for this. In the very beginning, we have a discussion on the Adhyayana-vidhi, which is found in both the works. In the Bhāva-prakāśikā, the author first refers to the Bhāṭṭas, the Prābhākaras, Rāmānuja, Śaṅkara, Śaiva, Bhāskara, Madhva and Bhikṣu. Out of them the Śaiva, Śaṅkara, Bhikṣu and Madhva are just mentioned. Then follows the siddhānta. The views of others are put in as less words as possible. In the Prakāśe we have a complete explanation of the theories of the Bhāṭṭas, Prābhākaras, Rāmānuja, Śaiva and Bhāskara. Puruṣottama does not refer to Śaṅkara, Bhikṣu and Madhva separately, perhaps because they follow one or other of those views. After this, follows a detailed explanations of the Siddhānta, accompanied with the refutation of others' views when required. Last comes a definite refutation of the Śaiva. If we compare the two,

we find that the Bhāvaṇaprakāśikā does not refute the views, held by others and that it mentions Śaṅkara, Bhikṣu and Madhva separately. If now Kṛṣṇacandra has written these portions himself, why did he not refute the views of others? Is it that an author like Kṛṣṇacandra should have thought of enumerating the views without arguing against them? It seems that these portions have been added to the Bhāvaṇaprakāśikā by Puruṣottama himself after finishing his Prakāśa. Hence he might not have thought it necessary to give the arguments all over again. He, again, might have thought of mentioning the names of Śaṅkara, Bhikṣu and Madhva also when he revised the Bhāvaṇaprakāśikā, so as to make the list more complete and up-to-date. That comparative study of various views is actually ~~by~~ added by Puruṣottama and does not belong to the original, can be made out by some more arguments also. Firstly, at two places I.ii.32 and I.iv.27, the references to others' views are not found in the earlier manuscripts, while they are found in the later ones. These passages are again found ad verbatim in the Bhāṣyaprakāśa. This is said by Shri. Telivala himself.⁵⁵ Secondly, we may actually compare a

55. Cinhāntargato bhāgo matsannidhau vidyamāneṣu Prācīna-
-hastalikhitatṛiṣv api pustakeṣu nāsti. Bhāṣya-prakāśe
yam bhāgo kṣeraṣo mudrito dr̥ṣyate. Sa evātra niveśita
iti pratibhāti. Bhāvaṇaprakāśikā I. p. 71. footnote. See also
footnote on p. 123.

passage or two. Let us take, for instance, the discussion on the Adhyayanavidhi. In the Bhāvaṇaprakāśikā the views of the Bhāṭṭas is given in only one long sentence with numerous clauses and phrases. The same is given at some greater length in the Prakāśa, with shorter sentences. Similar is the case with the views of the Prābhākaras, Rāmānuja, and Bhāskara. This, however, is not the usual style which we meet with in the Bhāvaṇaprakāśikā. It thus appears that these passages are actual summaries of those in the Anubhāṣyaprakāśa. Thus the lack of uniformity in style is an additional argument.

It is stated that the Bhāvaṇaprakāśikā-vṛtti is based upon the alleged Śrīmadbhāṣya or Brhadbhāṣya.⁵⁶ We have discussed the various arguments and counter-arguments for the Śrīmadbhāṣya. As regards the Bhāvaṇaprakāśikā itself we have to note the following points.

In the beginning the author salutes Vallabha and

56. Pūrvokteśrīmadbhāṣyam anusṛjyaiva Bhāvaṇaprakāśākhya
vṛttir vartate- Anubhāṣya: Ed. S. P. Pathak. Vol. II.
Intro. p. 48.

Vitthaleśa and says that he intends' to speak out' the Sūtravṛtti in accordance with the Śrīmadbhāṣya.⁵⁷ What is meant by Śrīmadbhāṣya here? Is it the title of some work or is the term Śrīmad just honourific? At three places, the author refers to the Bhāṣya. In I.i.3. while arguing against Rāmānuja the author enters into a discussion and then says - 'Viśeṣas tu Bhāṣyavibhāgād avadhātavyah'.⁵⁸ Under the same Sūtra again at the end, we have the sentence:- 'Viśeṣo Bhāṣyavibhāge prapañcitah'.⁵⁹ Here the author is arguing for the Samavāyitva of Brahman. Under I.i.10 he says that some persons understand the Īkṣatyadhikarṇa as a refutation of the Sāṃkhya theory. Then he says: 'Idam yathā takhā matāntarānām dūṣaṇam Bhāṣyavibhāgād avagantavyam'.⁶⁰ Before that, however, he says that even the refutation of the Sāṃkhya view may be accepted.⁶¹ Which Bhāṣya-vibhāga

57. Śrīmadbhāṣyānusārena sūtravṛttim bruvē' dhuna.

Bhāvaṇaprakāśikā.I.p.1.

58. Ibid p.12.

59. Ibid.p.14.

60. Ibid.p.21.

61. Tadyapy ānuṣṅikātvenāsmākaṃ abhimatam.

Ibid. p. 21.

is referred to here? It can not ~~be~~ surely be the Anubhāṣya which does not contain any such discussion.

It may appear that the references here are to the Śrīmadbhāṣya. We may, however, note here that, while the attempts to prove the composition of a larger version of the Bhāṣya have not been found conclusive, as we have seen, there are certain other points also particularly regarding the Bhāṣyaprakāśikā. The colophons of the Bhāṣyaprakāśa and the verses in the beginning and at the end would show that Puruṣottama himself refers to the Bhāṣya, simply as Bhāṣya and not Anubhāṣya.⁶² Only at one place the name Anubhāṣya is mentioned.⁶³ Thus even Puruṣottama does not appear to make any distinction between Bhāṣya and Anubhāṣya, as such. Again, in the Bhāṣyaprakāśikāvṛtti, in the Ānandamaya-adhikaraṇa the interpretation of Viṭṭhaleśa has been summarised and separately noticed.⁶⁴ Again,

62. See Anubhāṣyaprakāśa: Tam Vyāsāśayagocaram prathayitum yair bhāṣyam ābhasitam. V.4, p.1; Bhāṣyaprakāśe prayate' tidīno... V.8. p.2; Bhāṣyārtham yo' tigūḍham prakṣiptam akarot.... V.1. p.1441. All the colophons read: Puruṣottama-sya kṛtau Bhāṣyaprakāśe...

63. Sri. Viṭṭhaleśapadābjaprasādavaralābhataḥ
Prakāśam Anubhāṣyasya Vitanven Puruṣottamaḥ. A.B.P.V.4.
P.1441.

64. Prebhucaraṇās tu annamayādīnām api... tebhyo bhedaṁ
varṇakāntarena sādhayanti. Bhāṣyaprakāśikā. I. p.23.

the Bhāva-prakāśikā-vṛtti clearly distinguishes between the portions of Vallabha and Viṭṭhaleśa. At the end of III.ii.34 we have : "Ita ārabhya Prabhūṇām lekha iti pratibhāti."⁶⁵ Further we should note that the interpretations of all the Sūtras, even the latter part, fully concur with those given in the Anubhāṣya. Thus if we believe that the Vṛtti follows the alleged Śrīmadbhāṣya, we shall have to accept that the said Śrīmadbhāṣya also has dual authorship and is in complete agreement with the Anubhāṣya. This would cut the very ~~base~~ basis upon which the super structure of the Śrīmadbhāṣya is worked out.

It thus appears that the Bhāṣyavibhāga to which the Vṛtti refers, cannot be the Śrīmadbhāṣya. What else can it be? I think that the reference here is clearly to the Anubhāṣya-prakāśa of Puruṣottama. The reasons are as follows:-

These discussions are actually found in the Anubhāṣya-prakāśa. Again the term used at all these places is Bhāṣyavibhāga and not Bhāṣya. It should also be noted that such references are found in only the first Adhyāya and not in the other Adhyāyas of the Vṛtti, and as we have seen above, there is every reason to believe that only the

65. Ibid. III. p. 30.

first Adhyāya is revised by Puruṣottama and not the other three. At the end of the whole discussion we may arrive at the following conclusions:-

(a) The Bhāvaṇīprakāśikāvṛtti was written by Kṛṣṇacandra and its first Adhyāya was revised by Puruṣottama.

(b) It is not based upon the Śrīmadbhāṣya, the composition of which is more or less a piece of imagination of some scholars rather than a fact.

(c) The revision of the Vṛtti by Puruṣottama was undertaken after the composition of the Anubhāṣyaprakāśa.

(d) There is no evidence of value to show that the Anubhāṣyaprakāśa is based upon the Vṛtti and is an expansion of the same.

Another important point also requires consideration in this connection. Shri. Telivala has found out one commentary on the Guṇopasamhārapāda, which he has printed as an appendix in the Anubhāṣya with Prakāśa and Rāśmī III. iii. In the editor's note he says: 'We beg to draw the attention of the scholars of the Sāṃpradāya as well as others to the Parīṣiṣṭa printed here. It is almost a complete commentary on the Guṇopasamhāra Pāda of the Anubhāṣya... On a comparison of the same with the Prakāśa, we find that almost the whole of it is incorporated in the Prakāśa. It seems possible from the style of expression and method of writing

that Puruṣottamajī owes much to this. Its style resembles that of Kṛṣṇacandrajī's Vṛtti. If so, the comparative method of exposition followed by him in Prakāśa owes its origin to the genius of Kṛṣṇacandrajī....It is possible that Kṛṣṇacandrajī wrote his commentary from the very beginning and the same is incorporated in the Prakāśa... The copy of the Guṇopasamhārapāḍavivarana....seems to be the original in Kṛṣṇacandrajī's own hand.'

The portions which have been published are not complete. The commentary breaks off in the middle and runs upto III,iii.53 only. The Vivarana does not contain any colophon, and naturally bears no date. We have no means to understand how Shri.Telivala could find out the handwriting of Kṛṣṇacandra. There may appear to be some truth in the statement that the whole of it has been incorporated in the Prakāśa, because the similarities are surely there. But even here, we find that the Vivarana is very short and its references to the views of others are not so clear as in the Prakāśa. The Vivarana, for instance, does not contain any refutation of Śaṅkara and others though they are mentioned at the end of the Sūtra III.iii.4. The Prakāśa contains such refutations. The Vivarana is again not Sūtrawise but Adhikarana-wise and it does not explain the whole of the Bhāṣya. The author seems to be

more interested in bringing out the arguments contained in the Adhikaraṇas rather than writing an explanatory commentary. The distribution of the Sūtras in to Adhikaraṇas in the Vivaraṇa is also different from that in the Prakāśe, as will be seen from the following table:

<u>Vivaraṇa.</u>		<u>Anubhāsyaparakāśa.</u>	
Adhikaraṇa	Sūtras.	Adhikaraṇa.	Sūtras.
1	1- 4	1	1-15
2	5- 8		
3	9-11		
4	12-15		
5	16-17	2	16-17
6	18-19	3	18-23
7	20-23		
8	24	4	24
9	25	5	25-26
10	26		
11	27-28	6	27-28
12	29	7	29
13	30	8	30
14	31	9	31
15	32	10	32
16	33	11	33-34
17	34		
18	35-36	12	35-37

<u>Vivarana.</u>		<u>Anubhāsyaprakāśa.</u>	
Adhikaraṇa.	Sūtras.	Adhikaraṇa.	Sūtras.
19	37		
20	38	13	38-39
21	39		
22	40-41	14	40-41
23	42	15	42
24	43	16	43
25	44-53	17	44-53

If Puruṣottama would have followed this Vivaraṇa, we can not understand why he did not follow the Adhikaraṇa-vyavasthā also. The Vivaraṇa need not be compared with the Bhāvaṇaprakāśikāvṛtti, for, while the former is critical and succinct, the Vṛtti is more explanatory. Its style of course does not resemble the Vṛtti though it may be said to resemble the Prakāśa. Any way, it is difficult to arrive at any definite conclusion on account of our scanty knowledge. The only thing, which I want to point out, is that had there existed an old commentary like this, Puruṣottama's words- 'Sāmpṛadāye nivṛtte' at the end of the Prakāśa⁶⁶ would have lost all their force. Perhaps he might not have made such a statement in the face of such a commentary written by his own teacher.

66. A.B.P.V.1.p.1441.

Thus the Anubhāṣyaprakāśa does not owe much to the Bhāvaprakāśikāvṛtti. The so-called Vivaraṇa is doubtful in nature. The Anubhāṣyaprakāśa is really the *Magnūopus* of Puruṣottama and we should fully endorse the high praise of Pandit S.T.Pathak that Puruṣottama by composing the Anubhāṣyaprakāśa has become the very life-blood of the 'Suddhādvaita'.⁶⁷

(35) Nyāyamālā:-

It is a short work, written with the express purpose of summarising the Sūtras according to the Anubhāṣya and facilitate the undersending of the same by those, who are unable to go through the whole of the Bhāṣyaprakāśa. This is stated by Puruṣottama himself in the beginning.⁶⁸ He repeats the same thing at the end also.⁶⁹ The work is popularly known as the Adhikaraṇamālā or the

67. Vayam tv etatkathane'pi na sāhasam āṅgikūrmo yat
Bhāṣyaprakāśapraṇayanena Śrīpuruṣottamamahārājā
jīvātubhūta eva 'suddhādvaitametasyeti.

Anubhāṣya: Ed. S.T.Pathak. Vol. II. Intro. p. 45.

68. Bhāṣyaprakāśe vistīrṇo' rtho' vagantum na śakyate,
Sarvair ato' rtham saṅgrhya Nyāyamālā vitaneyate.

69. Vedāntīyanyāyamālām Anubhāṣyānusārinīm
Saukaryēyārthebodhasya cakāra Puruṣottamaḥ.

Vedāntādhikaraṇamālā, but the author himself gives the title Nyāyamālā or Vedāntīyanyāyamālā in the first and the last verses respectively. That is why I have accepted that title.

Shri. Telivala and Sankalia believe that the work seems to have been composed by our author at an advanced stage. We can be sure that the work must have followed the Anubhāsyaprakāśa rather than preceded it. We cannot say whether it follows the revision of the Bhāvaṇaprakāśikā also, though it is very likely.

Ordinarily an Adhikaraṇamālā is a summary explanation of the purport of each Adhikaraṇa. Puruṣottama however, gives the purport of all the Sūtras except in III.iii.&iv. In the very beginning he gives the purport of the whole Sāstra. In the beginning of each Adhyāya, he states the purport of all the Pādas. In every Adhikaraṇa he clearly shows the five component parts—Viśaya, Viśaya, Pūrvapakṣa, Uttarapakṣa and Saṅgati.

The Adhyāya IV of this work was not found by Gopeśvara, who thereupon wrote a Caturthādhyaya-adhikaraṇa-mālā himself. It is interesting to compare the two. Gopeśvara, though a very great scholar, does not appear to be as vigorous or pointed as Puruṣottama.

(36) Suvarṇasūtra:-

Suvarṇasūtra is a commentary of Puruṣottama on the Vidvanmandana of Viṭṭhaleśa. Vidvanmandana or 'The ornament of the learned' is one of the independent works of Viṭṭhaleśa. Besides finishing the incomplete work of his father, Viṭṭhaleśa wrote some independent works also out of which the Vidvanmandana is the most important. It is divided into 58 sections. After the usual Maṅgala/verse the author immediately discusses a question of Brahman and its attributes, including the problem of the Brahman being the material as well as the efficient cause of the world. (Sections. 1, 2) This is followed by a discussion on the theory of Nescience and Superimposition as advocated by Śaṅkara's school. (Section 4-5). Then follows the discussion on the theory of Avidyā, as related to the individual soul and a spirited refutation of the bimāpratibimba bhāva and the imaginary nature of the individual soul. (Sections 6-9). Viṭṭhaleśa then proves and fully explains the theory of Āvirbhāva-tirobhāva, replying to the objections raised against it. (Sections 10-13). He explains the Mahāvākya. (Section 14). Viṭṭhaleśa again attacks the theory of Avidyā (Section 15)., and the Kalpitakartr̥tva of Brahman in connection with the individual souls. (Section 16).

Thus the author introduces the problem of the individual soul which is an *Aṅśa* of Brahman, (Section 17) and which has the *tādātmya*-relationship with Brahman. (Section 18-19)

This again brings in the question of variety in the effects of only one cause. After answering it on the ground of the desire of God, the author uses the same argument to remove the contingency of the *Kṛtāhēni* and *Akṛtābhyāgama* and to show that Brahman is not dependent upon the actions of the *Jīvas*. (Sections 20-22) The *Āśatva* of the soul is not ~~metaphorical~~ but real and the spark-fire analogy shows that the individual souls have emanated from Brahman and not created by Him. (Sections 23-25). The size of the individual soul is atomic. It is discussed with all the arguments based on scriptural authorities. (Section 26-29). Viṭṭhaleśa then enters into a fairly ~~long~~ long discussion that Brahman is endowed with contradictory attributes, which are ^P*Su~~t~~raworldly* and which are not illusory or imagined. (Sections 30-40) All the remaining sections are devoted to the consideration of the *Līlā* of God. This *Līlā* is eternal and real, there by implying the reality of the world. This includes a discussion on the *Bhakti*. (Sections 41-57) In these, 4 sections 53-56

are used to show that the Prabhāsīya Līlā is illusory.
 The last section is made ^{up} of the verses in which
 Viṭṭhaleśa pays homage to his father and God. (Section 56)

According to Shri. J. K. Shastri, who has written
 a Sanskrit preface to the work, the Vidvanmandana is
 worth comparing ~~it~~ with the Khandanakhandakhādyā of
 Śrīharsa. Just as that is an important work of the
 Kevalādvaita system, this is an authoritative treatise
 on the Śuddhādvaita. In the benedictory verse Śrīharsa,
 by saying : "Vande 'numayā pi tam", implies that Brahman
 is an object of inference while for Viṭṭhaleśa Kṛṣṇa
 is an object of perception. That is why he says:
 "Asmādrśām viśayaḥ sadā", in the benedictory verse.

Similarly the second verse in the Khandana implies
 the love in separation by the words 'manāpanodanavinoda'
 while Viṭṭhaleśa expresses the love in union by
 'Prabhuh prakāṭibhavat pratiyuvatisambhedena'.

Whatever it may be, perhaps the subtle and acute
 dialectics, found in the Khandana cannot be found in the
 Vidvanmandana.

The purpose of this work, as stated in the
 Suvarṇasūtra by Puruṣottama is: Here Prabhucarena who

is not able to bear the grief caused by the non-propagation of the main path of devotion and the theory of Brahmvāda, necessary for the same, has composed this ornaments of the learned.⁷⁰ These words of Puruṣottama reveal that for Viṭṭhaleśa the propagation of the path of devotion was the main thing and the Brahmvāda was subordinate to it. A glance at the analysis of the work, as given by us above, will show that Viṭṭhaleśa cared more for the refutation of the theories of Śaṅkara rather than the explanation of his own doctrines. He launches a violent tirade against Śaṅkara for whom he uses condemnatory words as has been done by his father.⁷¹ At one place he jeers at Śaṅkara⁷² by using his own words against him. Even in the first of the verses at the end, he calls Śaṅkara and his followers as Buddhists in disguise.⁷³

In spite of all this, it should be admitted that Viṭṭhaleśa is clearer in his writing than Vallabha. Whereas Vallabha is too laconic and can not be understood

70. S.S.p.2.

71. Pracchannanāstika.VM p.63, Pracchannabauddho'si.....
Atidhrsto'si.VM.p.56.etc.

72. Bādham bravīsi, nirāṅkuśatvāt te tundasya.VM.p.57

73. Pracchannabauddhās tu te.VM.p.353.

without the help of a commentary, this is not the case with Viṭṭhaleśa. Especially when the objects of devotion are described he is even verbose.⁷⁴ One may not perhaps like the fantastic interpretations of the Vedic verses given by him.⁷⁵ One should however note that there was a tendency among the mediaeval teachers to give flagrantly wrong interpretations for their own purpose and Viṭṭhaleśa could not be an exception to this.

The Vidvanmandana, because of the authority it enjoyed in the Śuddhādvaita, was commented upon by many scholars. The Suvarṇasūtra appears to be the earliest and the most important commentary. Many other commentaries are also found. Giridhara, son of Gopāla and Kṛṣṇāvatī wrote a commentary called Haritoṣiṇī alias Dīpikā. It explains the words of the Vidvanmandana and sometimes elucidates the topics. Bhaṭṭa Gaṅgādhara Śāstri's commentary is very short and concise. The colophon seems to call it Vidvanmandanavivṛti.⁷⁶ The verse at the end however suggests

74. Cf. VM p. 280, 289 etc.

75. Cf. VM p. 293, 296, 305, 313, etc.

76. Gittopāhvagaṅgādharaḥṭṭasya kṛtiḥ Śrīmad Vidvanmandana-vivṛtiḥ sampūrṇā. VM. p. 355.

the name Gaṅgādharaśobhinī, while J.K. Shastri calls it Mandanaprakāśa. Siddhāntaśobhā is another commentary, which is unfortunately anonymous and incomplete. The commentary ends abruptly while explaining sections 32. It is full of discussions which are critical and scholarly. The commentary is surely not explanatory. J.K. Shastri says that though the manuscript of the work seen by him bears the title Lekha, the author accepts Siddhāntaśobhā as the title, as can be seen from his own suggestion.⁷⁷ A short anonymous commentary called Vidvanmandanavākyaṛtha has been seen by J.K. Shastri. It just gives the meanings of words and does not elucidate the topics.

One Sadānanda, at the end of the nineteenth century, wrote a work Sahasrākṣa with the express purpose of refuting the Vidvanmandana. As a rejoinder Viṭṭhalanātha Gosvāmi of Kōtā composed a work called Prābhāṅjana. Pandit Cattulalji wrote a critical commentary on this called Mārutaśakti. In both these works many parts of the Vidvanmandana and Suvarṇasūtra are explained. Important explanations from these works have been collected together and compiled in the Tippanī, which is also published together with other commentaries.

77. Asyām Siddhāntaśobhāyām viśadīkariṣyāmeḥ.

Of all the commentaries, the Suvarṇasūtra of Puruṣottama is the most important and authentic. Puruṣottama calls it Suvarṇasūtra or the Golden String which may be used for holding the Vidvanmaṇḍana or the Jewel of the Learned.⁷⁸ The commentary, as is usual with Puruṣottama, not only explains the words and sentences but whenever necessary adds discussions to elucidate the knotty problems suggested by Viṭṭhaleśa. As a true commentator, he even shows the figure of speech in the benedictory verse.⁷⁹ While explaining dozens of scriptural passages he gives the interpretations of the Suddhādvaita thinkers side by side with those given by Śaṅkara and others. He also shows the distinction between the interpretations.⁸⁰

Puruṣottama again refers to the six views regarding the Pratibimba quite independently of Viṭṭhaleśa and refutes them.⁸¹ He refers to Śaṅkara, Rāmānuja, Madhva, Śaiva, Bhikṣu,

78....Puruṣottamas tanute; Vidvanmaṇḍanayuktau Suvarṇasūtram

S.S. Introductory. V. 4. p. 2; also
Vidvanmaṇḍanadhārane sukaratāsiddhyai yathābuddhyayam
Taddāśah Puruṣottame Vyāracayat Suvarṇasūtram mudā.

S.S. Verse. 4. at the end p. 357.

79. S.S. p. 7.

80. S.S. p. 12-19.

81. S.S. p. 61-62.

Vanamālīdāsa, Bhāskara, Jayatīrtha, Udayanācārya, Vācaspati Miśra, Mīmāṃsēkas, Sāṃkhya, Niruktamata, Navīnamata, Sāṃpradāyikamata, Abhinavamata and a host of such schools and authors. In its dialectics Suvarṇasūtra is comparable to the Siddhāntasobhā but while the latter does not care to explain the text, Puruṣottama does. It is therefore quite proper that J.K. Shastri has given it the first place.⁸²

(37) Āveranabhaṅge-Yojanā:-

Puruṣottama commented upon the Tattvadīpanibandha of Vallabha. It is an authoritative metrical treatise divided into three chapters: Śāstrārtha-prakarana, Sarvanirṇaya-prakarana and Bhāgavatārtha-prakarana. Vallabha has also written a commentary called Prakāśa on the first two chapters and a part of the third, upto V.33. on Skandha IV. Viṭṭhaleśa tried to finish it and began writing the Prakāśa from V.34 on Skandha IV, but he could write only up to V.135 on Skandha V. It is quite possible that Vallabha might have finished the whole of the Prakāśa and Viṭṭhaleśa would not have been able to secure it in its entirety. Similarly there is a possibility of Viṭṭhaleśa's having finished the Prakāśa, but the portions after V.136 on Skandha V. might have been gradually lost. Any way Puruṣottama had before him the Prakāśa only up to V.135.

82. Tatraitāsu epi prāmāṇyaprakarsavaśena Suvarṇasūtravivṛtiḥ

Sarvataḥ Prathamam sanniveśya sabhājita. VM. Vol. III. Intro. p.9.

on Skandha V. Puruṣottama wrote his Āvaranabhanga on the Tattvadīpenibandha and the Prakāśa up to V.135 on Skandha V. As for the remaining verses of the third chapter, he wrote an independent commentary which he called Yojanā. All these chapters have been treated below separately.

Chapter. I.

The Śāstrārtha Prakaraṇa consists of 104 Kārikās. A brief analysis of the contents is given below:-

In the introductory verses 1-6 Vallabha pays homage to Lord Kṛṣṇa and states his plans for writing the three chapters. This followed by a brief mention of the Pramāṇas as accepted in the Śuddhādvaita. (V.7-12).

Vallabha then discusses the Sādhanaśūlana, Karma and Bhakti, and the Adhikāra. (V.13-22). The regular Śāstras begins with V.23. Verses 23-53 contain the Sat-prakarana. It begins with the discrimination between Jagat and Samsāra, and an explanation of Avidyā. (V.23-24). Then follows the description of the nature of Brahman, the Jada, Jīva, and Antarātmā (V.25-30), the Samsāraprakāra of the Jīvas, Vidyā and Avidyā. (V.31-34), the Vilaya-Prakāra of the Jīvas as also their Brahmabhāva. (V.35-36).

This is followed by a discussion on creation.(V.37-41).

Vallabha explains the nature of devotion (V.42) and various forms of the Highest Lord(V.43-44),followed by the five divisions of Vidyā.(V.45-46)Finally Vallabha discusses the question of emancipation,tīrthas,love to God etc.(V.47-52)

From V.53 begins the Cit-Prakarana dealing with the individual souls. They are atomic in measure. (V.53-55).

Their sentiency is known only by means of the divine sight.(V.56). The Ābhāsavāda and the Pratibimbavāda are wrong.(V.57-60). The Mahāvākya is discussed,it does not teach the Mithyātva and Jīva-brahma-aikya as taught by Sāṃkara.(V.61-63). Vallabha again brings in his theory of devotion (V.64).From verse 65 begins the Brahma-prakarana.

The nature of Brahman is explained as possessed of contradictory attributes(V. 65-67,71) and as the cause of the world (V.68).Brahman is everything(V.69-70),and it is because of its capacity of Āvirbhāva and Tirobhāva that it is manifested in various ways.(V.72-75)Because of self-creation the contingencies of partiality and cruelty do not arise,Brahman is the Kartā and is yet not Saguna.(V.76-77).

Vallabha then enters into the refutation of other theories.

The Māyāvāda is refuted in verses 78-91,dualism in V.92, the Sāṃkhya and Yoga are dealt with in verses 93 and 94

respectively. While V.95 refers to the means of liberation, V.96-100 refutes others' theories from the point of view of Pralaya. The path of love is established in V.101-103, while V.104 gives the conclusion.

The foregoing analysis will show that almost all the theories taught by Vallabha are found in this ~~work~~ work. He calls it the Śāstrārtha-prakaraṇa and explains Śāstrārtha as Gītārtha.⁸³ It is also stated that the Gītā is the only 'Śāstra'.⁸⁴ The chapter however does not seem to be so closely connected with the Gītā, as the third chapter is connected with the Bhāgavatapurāṇa. Shri. H. O. Shastri in his Sanskrit introduction has tried to show how the doctrines taught in the Gītā are incorporated here and he has given a list of 25 topics of the Gītā that are dealt with here.⁸⁵ But it cannot be said that the chapter necessarily deals with the Gītā. If we are to depend upon the list of topics dealt with in the Gītā and in this chapter, we can as well say that almost all the Śāstras, the scriptures, the Sūtras, the Purāṇas and all that can be shown to teach the same thing. Just as two verses-25b-26a, 90-are direct quotations

83. Śāstrārtho gītārthah. T.S.P. V.5.p.31.

84. Ekam Śāstram Devakīputragītam. T.S.V.4.

85. T.S. Sanskrit intro. P.11 ..

from the Gītā, three verses 43, 44, and 69 are bodily quoted from the Bhāgavatapurāṇa. V. 27, 58 contain references from the Upaniṣads.⁸⁶ V. 58 speaks of the Jīva as 'Gandhavad vyatirekavān' which is very close to the Brahmasūtra II.iii.26. 'Vyatireko gandhavat'. V. 83 runs :'

'Vācārambhaṇavākyaṇi tadananyatvaḥodhanāt,
Na mithyātvēya kalpante jagato Vyāsagauravāt.'

It should be placed by the side of the Brahmasūtra II.i.14.

'Tadananyatvam ārambhaṇaśabdādibhyah'. Similarly V. 61-62 explain the famous Mahāvākya: 'Tat tvam asi.' Many more such instances may be found to prove that the chapter is quite independent of and is in no way closely connected with the Gītā so as to be even an independent free exposition of the Gītā. The term Śāstrārtha thus should refer to all the Śāstras. Even H.O. Shastri admits this.⁸⁷ Why then should Vallabha have explained the Śāstrārtha as Citārtha? My explanation is just this: It has long been the tradition in India that the founder of a new system of philosophy should comment upon all the Prasthānas.

Now, Vallabha has commented upon only the Brahmasūtras and the Bhāgavatapurāṇa, which also is a Prasthāna in his

86. 'Bahu syām prejayeya' in V. 27 and 'Dvā suparnā' and 'Guhām pravistau' in V. 58.

87. Vastutas tu Śāstraśabdash śabdapramāṇabodhaka eva.

opinion. He has dealt with the important passages of the Upanisads, while explaining the Brahmasūtras. Though the Gītā has been referred to in the Brahmasūtrabhāṣya, and explanation of the same cannot be taken for granted. Vallabha did not write a separate commentary on the Gītā and that is why perhaps he stated that the Śāstrārtha given in this chapter is the Gītārtha, or it is not different from the teachings of the Gītā.

Prakāśa is Vallabha's own commentary written to explain the verses and elucidate the arguments contained therein. The Prakāśa is of course in the usual terse style of Vallabha and very often needs an explanation. We are also informed by Puruṣottama that the Prakāśa on V.75 beginning with, 'Yad vā evam nirūpatvena, nirākāratvam brahmany āyāti ty ārucyā pakṣāntaram āha- athaveti.' is from the pen of Viṭṭhaleśa. It is actually a different interpretation given by Viṭṭhaleśa to make his father's point more clear.

Four commentaries are available on the Prakāśa. The Tippanī of Kalyāṇarāya and Satsnehabhājana of Gattulalji are available on only some portions of the Śāstrārthaprakaraṇa, as said by Prof. J.G. Shah.⁸⁸ Lālūbhāṭṭa has

written a commentary called Yojanā, Puruṣottama's commentary is named Āvaranabhanga. The last is the best of all because it is the most scholarly and exhaustive. It not only explains the verses and the Prakāśa, but gives so many other discussions with arguments and quotations to corroborate the position of Vallabha. 'Thus by adopting the method of comparison, elucidation, corroboration and argumentation, it proves to the scholars of immense value for the thorough understanding of both the Kārikās and the Prakāśa.'⁸⁹ The very name of the commentary is suggestive. Puruṣottama himself says that he wants to break open and uncover the meaning of Vallabha's statements.⁹⁰

The question that arises in connection with this work is that of authorship. The Āvaranabhanga in the first chapter is fathered upon Pītāmbara, and not Puruṣottama. The colophon reads: 'Iti Gosvāmi Śrī. Yadu patisutasya Śrī Pītāmbarasya kṛtau Tattvedīpaprakāśāvaranabhange Śāstrārthaprakaraṇam prathamam sampūrṇam.' We should also note that in the Suvarṇasūtra Puruṣottama refers to this

89. T.S. Preface . p.8.

90. Vivecayann āśayam atra Tattva-
Dīpaprakāśāvaranam bhanajmi.

T.S. AṬ. Intro. Verse. 4.

work as a composition of his father.⁹¹ The Sāṃpradāyic tradition however records that Puruṣottama, out of respect to his elders, passed on some of his works to them and this is one such case. We shall thus have to depend upon the internal evidence for the authorship. The last verse of the commentary reads:

Bhagavata iha śaktyā Tattvadīpaprakāśe-

Varaṇabharaviḥhange prakriyādyā samāpnot. 92.

It shows that the author planned to write a commentary on all the three chapters. That on the second and third is written by Puruṣottama, so we would naturally conclude that Puruṣottama wrote the commentary on the first chapter also. It may be argued that Pītāmbara might not have been able to finish all the three, and the second and the third might have been left to Puruṣottama, but it is difficult to understand why in that case Puruṣottama does not state a single word for it. In the last verse of the commentary on the second chapter, it is said that the *Āvaraṇabhanga* has been finished even on this chapter,

91. Tad asmatpitṛcaranair Āvaraṇabhange samyak pradarśitam
iti neha prapñocyate. S.S.p.340.

92. T.S.Ab.p.168.

because of the merciful glances of the Highest Lord.⁹³

The force of the word 'api' is a pointer to the single authorship with regard to both the chapters.

Further, the remarkable characteristics of Puruṣottama's comparative style and treatment are found in the Āvaranabhanga on the Sāstrārthaprakaraṇa. The same style is seen in the Āvaranabhanga on other two chapters and in other works of Puruṣottama. We find here references to Puruṣottama's own works.⁹⁴

Under V.53 the author discusses that the individual soul is atomic and not pervasive. At the end of the discussion he says : 'Ity Anvātmavādaḥ.'⁹⁵ Puruṣottama is said to have written a Vāda dealing with that topic. Under V.57-58 there is a discussion on the nature of an image and a refutation of all the six theories of

93. Yat tasya pūrṇaiḥ karuṇākataḥsaiḥ

Pūrṇo bhavat Sarvavinirṇaye pi

....Āvaranasya bhaṅgaḥ. T.Sn.Ab.p.232.

94. See T.S.Ab.Prahasta and Bhindipāla are referred to on p.48; Prasthānaratnākara on p.94,95,97,125.

Andhakāravāda on p.126; Tāpanīya-prakāśa on p.136,146; commentary on Gaudapāda's Kārikās on p.158.

95. T.S.Ab.p .95.

Pratibimba of the Jīva. The same discussion is found almost bodily in the Pratibimbavāda and the Jīva-pratibimbatvakhendānavāda, both of which are written by Puruṣottama. All these arguments, as also the phraseological and ideological similarities that this work bears with the other works of Puruṣottama, lead us definitely to believe that the work is actually written by Puruṣottama and dedicated to his father by writing his father's name as the author.

Chapter.II.

The second chapter, Sarvanirṇaya is fairly longer than the first. It has 329 verses. It has four sections, the Pramāṇa (V.1-83), the Prameya (V.84-184), the Phala (V.185-294), and the Sādhana (V.295-329). We may analyse the contents as follows:-

(a) Pramāṇaprakaraṇa: The first 32 verses deal with the Vedic Literature viz. the Śrutis. He gives a general interpretation of the Pūrva and the Uttara Kāṇḍas. Verses 33-48 deal with the Smṛtis, their importance, their contents, their basis, their authority in relation to the Śrutis and their purpose. The subject matter of verses 49-71 is the Purāṇas, their subject matter, their number, their relative authority in respect to the Śrutis and Smṛtis, their divisions according to the

Kalpas etc. Just as the Gītā is the leading Smṛti, the Bhāgavata is the foremost among the Purāṇas. The six Vedāṅgas are touched upon in verses 72-78, the Upavedas in V.79, the Kāvya in V.80, Rāmāyaṇa in V.81, the Vāsiṣṭharāmāyaṇa and other works in V.82-83.

(b) Prameyaprakaraṇa: Hari is the only Prameya, for the sake of convenience it may be understood in three forms. (V.84-85) The causal form has 28 elements, but the causality is only of the Sat and not ^ścit or ānanda. (V.86-87) The effect form is manifold. (V.88) The Swarūpa is three-fold. Its description and Pramāṇas are given in V.89-92. The effects are many and need not be enumerated. (V.93) Vallabha mentions 28 elements and says that the Ādhyātmika is the same as the Ādhidaivika; and the Māyā etc are not separate categories. (V.94-97). Vallabha then explains the Akṣara (V.98-108), Kala (V.109), Karma (V.110-112) and Svabhāva and the theory of Āvirbhāva, Tirobhāva. (V.113-116) The Abhāvas cannot be included in the causal form (V.117) The effects are then discussed with their classification. (V.118-119) With all this there is complete unity in all these forms. (V.120) There is a discussion on the Ādhidaivika, Ādhyātmika and

Ādhibhautika.(V.121-134)Vallabha then explains the Jñāna and Kriyā(V.135)He refutes the theory of Pratibimba(V.136), and describes the Vṛtti of Buddhi,Jñāna-Phala etc.(V.137-139). Then follows an explanation of the theory of Āvirbhāva-Tirobhāva.(V.140-145)The Prakārabhedas do not pose any problem.(V.146)Ordinary perception is not a Pramāṇa but only the Vedas should be depended upon.(V.147-149)Even the Vedas are Pramēya.(V.150)Here Vallabha enters into a discussion on the Nāmāprapañca.(V.151-161)He refers to the Purāṇas, the poems of Kālidāsa etc. (V.162-163)Only that which concerns with the Vedas should be accepted as Pramāṇa(V.164-165) Then ~~the~~ follows the problem of Varnanityatva etc.(V.166-176). Kṛṣṇa alone is the pravartaka and not the words. (V.177-182) Verses 183-184 conclude this section.

(c)Phalaprakaraṇa:At first is given the Phala according to the dharma of men,belonging to a particular varṇa and a particular āśrama.(V.185-195)Then the author touches the point of Bhakti. (V.196-197) Vallabha discusses the Sadyomukti and Kramamukti according to the Sāṃkhya and Yoga.(V.198-207); and says that there is only hell for those who do not follow the path laid down by the Vedas. (V.208-214)So only the Bhāgavatamārga should be adhered to(V.215-216).The fruit for those who are born śūdras is explained.(V.217)Vallabha

speaks of the fruit in the Bhaktimārga first (V.218-219) and then in all the remaining paths. (V.220-223) He then tells us about the Sāttvikas, their Gurus, how they should worship, their connections in the family, the tīrthas etc. (V.224-235) He then shows the phala in the Karmamārga, the worship of other Gods etc. (V.256-273) He explains the result in the Sāmkhya and Yoga (V.274-276) & the Śākta (V.277-285). The explanation of sukha and duḥkha follows: - (V.286-292) The Bhoktr is treated at the end. (V.293-294).

(d) Sādhana-prakaraṇa: - The chapter begins with an explanation of and a discussion on the Jñāna as the means of liberation. (V.295-302) Bhakti is stated to be the best. (V.303-307) Other Sādhana-s are not helpful. (V.308-311) Vallabha again discusses Jñāna and Bhakti and finally says that 'Love' is Highest. (V.312-328) The last verse (V.329) is just a conclusion indicating the next chapter.

The foregoing analysis will show that the chapter is carefully planned and written. It contains Vallabha's views on many points which are not touched upon in other works. Puruṣottama has enriched the work with his scholarly commentary. He informs of that the passages from ¹Yad,uktam

kiñca.....tannirūpanam,⁹⁶ and ' Atreṣam.....sādhikā!⁹⁷ are added in the Prakāśa by Viṭṭhaleśa.

Chapter.III.

This chapter called the Bhāgavatārthaprakaraṇa contains 1920 Verses divided into 12 chapters according to the 12 Skandhas of the Bhāgavatapurāṇa. Vallabha gives in this work a summary exposition of the meaning of the Bhāgavata. He says that the meaning has to be understood in seven ways: (i) the Śāstra, (ii) the Skandha, (iii) The prakaraṇa, (iv) The Adhyāya, (v) The Vākya, (vi) The Pada, and (vii) The Akṣara.⁹⁸ In the chapter, under consideration, Vallabha explains the Bhāgavata from the first four points of view. It is thus something like an independent interpretation of the Purāṇa, while Subodhinī is a regular commentary.

Vallabha wrote his prakāśa on the kārīkās only upto kārīkā 33 on Skandha IV. The work of finishing the Prakāśa was undertaken by Viṭṭhaleśa. Puruṣottama informs us of this when he says: ' Etad antam Śrīmadācāryaiḥ kṛtā vyākhyā, etad agre Prābhaviyā.'⁹⁹ There are other proofs also for this.

96.T.Sn.Ab.p.24.

97.T.Sn.Ab.p.114.

98.T.Bh.V.2.

99.T.Bh.Ab.p.170.

The Prakāśa on V.6 reads: 'Tattveṣu sarveṣāṃ āsaktyabhāvāya Ācāryaiḥ kālas tattveṣu pravīṣṭa...etc.'¹⁰⁰ The mention of Ācārya found here shows definitely that Vallabha has not written it. Similar mention is also found in the Prakāśa on V.132.¹⁰¹

Even Viṭṭhaleśa could not finish the Prakāśa. He could go only up to V.135. So, from V.136 Puruṣottama himself began his Yojanā.¹⁰²

Puruṣottama's Āvaranabhanga in this chapter is not so long but is comparatively short. The reason perhaps is that there are not many discussions in this chapter, which explains only one work. His Yojanā is more extensive, because here he explains the kārīkās and he has no Prakāśa to comment upon. He begins his Yojanā with a separate Maṅgala and says that the Yojanā was shown to him by Prabhucaraṇa.¹⁰³ It is very likely that there might have been some short of traditional explanation of the unexplained verses handed down orally by

100. T.Bh.P.p.261.

101. Tarhy Ācāryair adholokamānam kuto noktam iti ced...etc.

T.Bh.P.p.305.

102. Iyad evadhy eve Prabhucaraṇā nibandham Prakāśitavantah.

T.Bh.Ab.p.307.

103. Cf. Iti Śrīmatprabhucaraṇaiḥ Puruṣottamasya darsitā ...

Nibandhoyojanā.... in all the colophons.

Vitthaleśa and his sons and Puruṣottama might have incorporated it in his Yojanā.

It will not be out of place here to consider the inter-relation of the three chapters. Vallabha says in the beginning of the first chapter that he will compose the Śāstrārtha, Sarvenirṇaya and Bhāgavatārtha chapters.¹⁰⁴ He explains the term Śāstrārtha as the Gītārtha in his Prakāśa. As for the second chapter, Puruṣottama says that it is the Nirṇaya or decision of the knowledge and the like as means of liberation, and of the things as found in the world, such as this is of this nature, this is the fruit or means of this etc.¹⁰⁵ Vallabha also says that the second chapter is for removing the asambhāvenā and viparītabhāvenā. The Śāstrārtha is a smaller chapter and so the Bhāgavatārtha is for its vistāra. Puruṣottama says that the Sāttvikas are of various kinds, those who are bent upon the pramāṇa are satisfied with the first, while the second chapter is

104. T.S.V.5.p.30-32.

105. Jñānāder mokṣasādhanaṁmārgasya prāpañcikādīpadārthajātasya
vā yo'yaṁ nirṇayaḥ, idem evamrūpam evambhūtaphalasādhanaṁ
iti niścayaḥ, saṁparikarāḥ svarūpaniścayo vā.

for those who prefer the prameya and for whom asambhāvanā is possible.¹⁰⁶ In the Prakāśa on the last verse, Vallabha says that he has explained the Śāstrārtha by taking recourse to the pramāṇabala, and now he will speak out the Sarvenirṇaya by resorting to the prameyabala.¹⁰⁷ Puruṣottama's explanation here is almost the same as given above, though here he adds an explanation of the Pramāṇabala and Prameyabala. In the Āvaranabhanga on the second chapter, Puruṣottama explains in the beginning the saṅgati and the purpose of this chapter at some length. He explains how the Asambhāvanā and Viparītebhāvanā are possible. Thus for instance, the Śrutipramāṇa cannot prove something which is contradicted by perception. What again of the Smṛtis? Again, when the scriptural authority is established what about their teaching? Is everything entirely one with Brahman or has Brahman something more than the Jīvas? So many Sēdhanas have been taught, why then accept devotion only? What is the difference in the fruits obtained by pursuing various Sēdhanas? All these questions would naturally

106. T.S.Ab.p.32-33.

107. Pramāṇabalam āśritya śāstrārtho vinirūpitaḥ;

Prameyabalam āśritya sarvanirṇaya ucyaate.

arise, to those who are of mediocre intelligence or who are dull. As for those who are wise, such decisions as of these questions would just reinforce the theories in their minds.¹⁰⁸

The connection of the third chapter with the second is easily found out by Vallabha. Vallabha ends his second chapter with a discussion on the Prema-bhakti. By knowing the meaning of the Bhāgavata alone, such devotion can arise. If the Bhāgavatārtha is not understood or is wrongly understood, there can be no Bhakti. Hence Vallabha finds out a remedy for this and explains the Bhāgavata.¹⁰⁹

To a modern reader, the distinction between the Pramāṇabala and the Premeyabala is also between the Uttamā on the one hand and the Madhyama and Manda on the other may not have a strong appeal. Both the chapters may be taken quite independently. Some of the questions that may arise in the first chapter and that are not answered in it are found in the second. The second

108. T.Sn.Ab.p.1-2.

109. Śrībhāgavatātātāvāṛtham ato vaksye suniścitam

Yejjñānāt paramā prītiḥ kṛṣṇaḥ śīghraṁ phaliṣyati.

T.Sn.Verse.329. See also:

Bhāgavatārthe ajñāte, anyathājñāte ca bhaktir na bhavati. Adhikāre'pi jāte phalam na bhaviṣyatīti mayāopāyaḥ kriyate, Tattvārtho vivicyate. T.Sn.P.p.231,

chapter is definitely more elaborate and goes into the details of various problems. There are however certain points in the first chapter, which are not found in the second. Thus for instance the Jagat-samsāra-bheda, the

Jīva-parimāṇa, and the whole question about the individual soul—all these is not touched upon in the second chapter. Thus the chapters mutually supply the missing links of one another. Even then, ~~the~~ they are independently understandable.

Similarly the third chapter is also something like a long appendage very loosely connected with the first two chapters. While the first two chapters are of the nature of an independent composition, the last is a summary as also an interpretation of one particular work. If we have to take into account the connection of chapters II, III as given by Vallabha, we can say that the summary-cum-interpretation of any of the Prasthānas can be easily tagged on with these chapters and connections can be found out. The work is thus not an integrated whole, but a composite one made up of three independent units.

(38) Śoḍaśaprakeraṇagranthasaṅgati:

Before dealing with this work we may make some preliminary observations, regarding Puruṣottama's

commentaries on the sixteen¹¹⁰ tracts. Vallabha's sixteen tracts known as the Sodasagranthas have remained very popular among the followers of Pustimarga. Purusottama is said to have commented upon all of them. I have not however been able to trace all the commentaries, and I doubt whether he actually wrote Vivrtis on all of them. Thus for instance in the Introduction to the Vivekadharmyaśraya, the Editor Shri.C.H.Shastri says that only four commentaries are available on this work, those of Gopīśa, Gokulotsava, Raghunātha and Vrajarāya. As Shri.Shastri had at his disposal a good deal of manuscript-literature, I do not think we should doubt his statement. It is very likely therefore that Purusottama did not comment upon all the sixteen tracts. Before however taking a short notice of the tracts and Purusottama's commentaries upon them, we should note one independent article, not even a work of Purusottama,

In the Pustibhaktisudhā Vol.V.No.8-9 is printed the Sodasaprekarenegranthānām saṅgatiḥ of Purusottama. A similar Saṅgati is also printed in the collection of Vrata-works, edited by Shri.C.H.Shastri, Surat.¹¹⁰ Here Purusottama has explained the inter relation-not the chronological order-of these tracts in two ways. The

110.U.P.p.52.

Lord of the world has ordered devotion to Kṛṣṇa by mind, speech and body. After explaining the removal of sins and love to Mukunda in the (1) Yamunāṣṭaka, and deciding the 'sāstrārthe' in the (2) Bēlabodha, devotion as a principle is expounded in the (3) Siddhāntamuktāvalī. Devotion is two-fold, external and internal. For the former it is necessary to maintain the purity of the external objects as taught by the Ācārya in the (4) Siddhāntarahasya. For the internal devotion purity and steadiness of mind are required. The (5) Navaratna and the (6) Antahkaranaprabodha are for teaching this. The (7) Vivekedhairyaśraya describes both the types of devotion. The (8) Kṛṣṇāśraya makes our dependance on Kṛṣṇa steady, while the (9) Catuḥślokī explains in short the sarvanigamaṇa. This ^{is} followed by the (10) Puṣṭi-pravāha-maryādā-grantha which expounds the three different paths. Devotion begins with this and its increase is told in the (11) Bhaktivardhinī. Bhajana requires the speaker and the hearer, for which we have the (12) Jalabhedā and the (13) Bhaktalakṣaṇa. (Is it Pañcapādyā?) Renunciation is determined in the (14) Sannyāsanirṇaya. Then comes the (15) Nirōdhalakṣaṇa which tells of 'Bhāvo bhāvanayā siddhah'. Finally we have the (16) Sevāphala.

Another way of understanding the inter-relation of these works is this: The (1) Yamunāstaka is the first followed by the (2) Bālābodha for acquiring the Svarūpayogyatā. Svakiyatā being established, one's own way is preached in the (3) Siddhānta-muktāvalī. For a description of the Jīva in that path, the teacher has written the (4) Puṣṭipravāhaṁaryādā. This is followed by a desire to know the duties which are told in the (5) Siddhāntarahasya, taught by the Lord himself. Then comes the (6) Navaratna to remove the worry as to whether or not the Lord has accepted the Jīva. The ātaropadeśa is taught in the (7) Antahkaraṇaprabodha and the tadāṅgopadeśa in the (8) Viveka-dhairyaśraya. This is followed by the (9) Kṛṣṇāśraya which should be adhered to even without the upadeśas. The (10) Catuḥśloki serves to remove the doubt that this is the path of others. After thus teaching devotion it is increased in the (11) Bhaktivardhinī. The hearer and the speaker are described in the (12) Jalābheda. The (13) Pañcapādyā is independent. The (14) Saṁnyāsanirṇaya is for knowing the time of renunciation as taught in Bhaktivardhinī. Its sādhana is told in the (15) Nirodhalakṣaṇa. The fruit of one who follows this path is explained in the (16) Sevāphala.

The Saṅgati printed in the collection of the Vrata-works corresponds to the second order given above. We shall now turn to those works which have been commented upon by our author.

(39) Commentary on the Yamunēṣṭaka:-

Yamunēṣṭaka is a small tract in nine stanzas in the Prthivī/ṭyē metre. It is written in praise of the river Yamunā. In fact it is an aṣṭaka but the last verse is something like the Phalaśruti. It is a good piece of work, having some poetic qualities also, so rarely found in Vallabha's writing.

The commentary of Viṭṭhaleśa is more or less explanatory. Purusottama in his sub-commentary has, however, made good the loss by bringing in a halo of sanctity and explained fully each and every word trying to fit it in with the accepted principles of Vallabha's system. He refers to Harirāya twice in V.1,7 and under the first verse shows how according to Harirāya these eight verses bring out eight kinds of Aśvarya of the river. He points out what has been left unexplained by Viṭṭhaleśa,¹¹¹ and explains it fully.

(40) Commentary on the Balabodha:

Balabodha has nineteen verses and a half. Vallabha says in the very first verse that he wants to decide the

111. Namatu Kṛṣṇetūryapriyām...etc.V.3.

Siddhāntasāṅgraha for the enlightenment of those who are ignorant.¹¹² Puruṣottama explains that the Bāla here refers to those who are confused on account of the various ways of worshipping many Gods, various ways of liberation and all that.¹¹³ He begins with a statement of four Puruṣārthas and then discusses only Mokṣa. He refers to the concept of Mokṣa according to the Sāṅkhya and Yoga. He then explains the Parāśrayaṁ Mokṣa. Viṣṇu gives Mokṣa while Śiva gives Bhoga. Finally Vallabha comes to the point of devotion with love and surrender. The commentary of Puruṣottama is critical as well as explanatory. He refers often to the other commentators Dvārakeśa and Devakīnandana and shows how their explanations differ from his; he does not refute them. His Vivṛti is definitely more extensive than those of the other two.

(41) Commentary on the Siddhāntamuktāvalī:

Siddhāntamuktāvalī in 21 verses begins with the teaching of Kṛṣṇasevā. Kṛṣṇa is the Highest Lord. Vallabha then

112.Servasiddhāntasāṅgraham,

Bālaprabodhanārthāya vedāmi suvinīścitam. V.1.

113.Iti Sandihānānām svānām sandehajanakam tatra
tatropādeyatābhṛamam vārayitum...etc. Under V.1.

explains the Akṣara which is manifested as the world and which is meditated upon by those, who follow the path of knowledge. It is explained with the long drawn out metaphor of Gaṅgā. The same metaphor is continued through ~~out~~ the work to explain the distinctions between the Puṣṭi, Pravāha and Maryādā also in the course of which Vallabha says that devotion is higher than knowledge. Thus according to Vallabha the work explains the mystery of the Śāstra.¹¹⁴

It would be interesting to note here that while Vallabha himself says nothing regarding the title of this work, Viṭṭhaleśa calls it Siddhāntavāṇmālā. The colophon of the work reads-Iti Śrīvallabhācāryaviracita Siddhāntamuktāvalī sampūrṇā. The last verse of Viṭṭhaleśa's commentary runs:

Iti Śrīpitṛpādābjaparāgarasasiktaḥ

Śrīviṭṭhaleśa tatsiddhāntavāṇmālāṃ hrdaye dadhau.

Puruṣottama also calls his work Siddhāntavāṇmālāprakāśa.

The colophon reads -Iti....Puruṣottamasya kṛtau Śrīmad-
ācāryasiddhāntavāṇmālāprakāśaḥ sampūrṇaḥ. In the last verse
also he says -Svīyasiddhāntavāṇmālā kṛpayā samprakāśitā.

Kalyāṇarāya in the last verse of his commentary gives the

114. Evam svaśāstrasarvasvaṃ mayā guptam nirūpitaṃ.

title Siddhāntamuktāvalī. Other commentators generally give the same title. It is very likely that originally the title might have been Siddhāntavāṇmālā.

The work is commented upon by Viṭṭhaleśa, Gokulanātha, Kalyāṇarāya, Puruṣottama, Vallabha, Vrajanātha and Lālu Bhaṭṭa have written sub-commentaries. Dvārakeśa's commentary is not complete. One Haridāsa has explained verses 15 b-17a. Of all these the commentary of Puruṣottama is very helpful in understanding the work. Puruṣottama is as usual not only explanatory but also critical.

(42) Commentary on Puṣṭipravāhamāryādā:

This is an incomplete work. Vallabha here sets out to explain the characteristics of Puṣṭi, Pravāha and Māryādā. He differentiates them in the beginning and then explains the prayojana, sādhanā, aṅga, kriyā, phala etc. of the Puṣṭi souls. The work then breaks off. Gokulanātha in his commentary says that only this part of the work is well known. Raghunātha says: 'Ita ūrdhvaṃ granthaḥ trītiḥ.' Puruṣottama says: 'Etadagre pravāhamārgīya prayojanasādhana-ṅgaphalāni māryādāmārgīyaprayojanasavarūpāṅgakriyāḥ Sādhanaṃ phalaṃ ca yēvatā jñāyate tāvān grantho'pekṣita iti jñeyam.' He is thus the only commentator who informs us about what is wanting. It is not possible that Vallabha

might have himself left it incomplete. It is likely that the portions might have been lost on account of a quarrel between the wife of Gopīnātha and Viṭṭhaleśa. It may also be possible that the portions dealing with the Pravāha and Maryādā being uninteresting to the exclusive tendencies of Viṭṭhaleśa might have been neglected with the result that even Gokulēnātha was not able to find them.

The commentary of Puruṣottama is very helpful and critical. The only problem is that it goes under the name of his father Pītāmbara. In the editor's note Shri Telivela says that the Vivṛti of Pītāmbara is actually written by Puruṣottama who seems to have dedicated it to his father. The style, he says, is evidently the familiar one which we meet with, in the other writings of Puruṣottama. Teliwala adds that a perusal of the six manuscripts of the Vivṛti reveals that the author has revised it sometime after writing it. As Puruṣottama was a great authority in the Sāmpradāya, both the revised and the original versions became current. It is difficult to come to any conclusion regarding the authorship. The analytical approach as found in this commentary is the same as that found in other works of our author. The discussions on the term Puṣṭi under V.2, on the reality of the world under V.9

bear the same arguments and phraseology as found in the works of Puruṣottama. The author of the commentary refers to the Vivṛti of Gokulenātha, Brahmasūtras, Vidvanmandana, etc., but never to the works of Puruṣottama. At one place there is a reference to the explanation of the last Sūtra in the Ānandamaya-adhikaraṇa, as given in the Vidvanmandana and Viṭṭhaleśa's interpretation of the first Sūtra of the same Adhikaraṇa. It should be noted that here the interpretation of Vallabha are not referred to. Thus we have no reason to disbelieve the tradition which fathers the work upon Puruṣottama, though it is very likely that Puruṣottama might have revised his father's work.

(43) Commentary on Siddhāntarahasya:

Siddhāntarahasya contains only eight stanzas and a half. In spite of it, its immense popularity has led to the composition of many commentaries upon it. Vallabha here says that he is speaking out *ad verbatim* what the Lord told him at night on the bright eleventh of the month of Śrāvaṇa. All the five faults of the individual souls will be destroyed by the Brahma-sambandha. Hence everything should be surrendered to the Highest Lord.

In the last two lines Vallabha gives the analogy of the

river Gaṅgā. Vallabha in this work teaches the doctrine of Samarpana or self-surrender.

The work is commented upon by Gokulanātha, Raghunātha, Kalyāṇarāya, Vrajotsava, Gokulotsava, Harirāya, Viṭṭhaleśvara, Giridhara and Lālu Bhaṭṭa, besides Puruṣottama. There is also one anonymous commentary. Puruṣottama has abely discussed the problems regarding the Brahma-saṁbandha and has fully explained the text.

(44) Commentary on Navaratna:

Navaratna is so called perhaps because it has nine verses. Here Vallabha thinks of the devotees, who should merge themselves completely in the service of God. After they have surrendered themselves they should not worry at all. Everything will be done of them by the Lord. Thus the grace of God is the gretest sādhana for such a man.

The text has been explained by Viṭṭhaleśa in his Vivṛti, upon which four sub-commentaries are written. Puruṣottama's sub-commentary is critical and explanatory. He explains the term cintā(V.1), differentiates between Dāna and Nivedana(V.2), the nature of surrender(V.3), and shows what should be done when a conflict arises between the desire of the Lord and the orders of the Guru(V.7) etc.

(45) Commentary on Antahkaranaprabodha:

Antahkaranaprabodha is a small tract written for enlightening the internal Spirit. God is independent and the devotees are dependent upon Him. We can not know what God desires and so we must obey His commands. The devotee should think that whatever is necessary for him will be done by God. He should only carry out His orders. He is ~~not~~ like a worldly boss who gets angry at the faults of his employees. He knows that the devotees are likely to commit mistakes. They should not care even for their own bodies. A total unconditional surrender is the best remedy for crossing over the Māyā of the Lord. This is the teaching contained in this work. It however reveals a personal tone, as Vallabha refers to the commands of the Lord to himself in V.5b -6-7a. Puruṣottama's commentary contains all the merits which are found in his other works. He gives the summary of the work at the end. He also discusses fully the various Ājñās (V.5b-6-7a). On these however he has written an independent Lekha which is also printed in the same book. Here he gives a different interpretation.

(46) Commentary on Bhaktivardhinī:

Bhaktivardhinī in eleven verses is mainly for the increase of devotion for the hīna-adhikārī. They

should live the life of a householder and observe the duties of varṇas and āśramas. Worldly pursuits should be given up. They should worship Kṛṣṇa. If the worldly pursuits cannot be given up, their minds should be concentrated on Hari, until the seed of Bhakti is germinated and love and passion are produced. The destruction of the worldly passions is the test of divine love, the test of āśakti is gr̥ha-aruci, and that of vyasana is inability to live without Devine presence. Bad association of evil food may make the attainment of this stage difficult. Such a devotee should therefore stay near a temple and should keep the company of devotees, so that his mind may not be defiled by external forces. Vallabha says that one who is always engrossed in the service of the Lord or the conversation regarding Him will never perish.

The work is so popular that it has called for 14 commentaries, of Bālakṛṣṇa, Gokulanātha, Raghunātha, Kalyāṇarāya, Harirāya, Gopēśvara, Puruṣottama, Vallabha, Jayagopāla Bhaṭṭa, Lālu Bhaṭṭa, Bālakṛṣṇa son of Vallabha, Giridhara, Dvārakēśa and one anonymous commentary. Every commentator has explained the text from his own point of view. Puruṣottama's commentary, written in his usual style

explains the text and elucidates important points. Thus, for instance he explains the word Bhakti(V.1) fully from all points of view. He also refers to the explanations of others.(V.5)

(47) Commentary on Jalabheda:

Jalabheda has 21 verses. It gives the characteristics of different teachers of religious subjects. The Taittirīya-Saṁhitā 7.4.12. gives a mantra stating 20 types of waters. On the analogy of these 20 kinds, Vallabha has given 20 kinds of teachers. Dr. Rajendra Lal Mitra says that it is a work on hydropathy. Telivala rightly says that it is not so.

Four commentaries are written on this work, of Kalyāṇa-rāya, Puruṣottama, Vallabha, and Bālakṛṣṇa. The term Agni in V.14 has raised a controversy. Some thought it to refer to Rudra while others to Vallabha himself. Puruṣottama does not enter into this controversy at all but explains Agni as 'The speaker of the Agni Purāṇa.'

(48) Commentary on Pañcapādyā:

Pañcapādyā has 5 verses, as its name indicates. It explains the five types of 'Hearers', those who are purely of the Puṣṭimārga (V.1), of the Puṣṭimārgyēdāmārga (V.2),

Maryādāpustimārga (V.3-4) and finally those who are generally adhikārins for Śravaṇabhakti.(V.5).Two commentaries, of Herirāya and Puruṣottama are available.There is some difference of opinion in their explanations.

(40) Commentary on Saṇnyāsanirṇaya:

This work gives Vallabha's ideas regarding renunciation. He says that Saṇnyāsa should not be taken in the Karmamārga. For those who follow the path of knowledge, Saṇnyāsa may be taken for desire of knowledge.Similar is the case with those^{who}/are already learned. Both of them are however not commendable. Regarding the followers of the path of devotion,renunciation accepted for the sake of sādhana is not likely to produce happy results.If it is for the Phela, it should be done only for experiencing the separation from the Lord,if the Lord so inspires.

Of all the commentaries on this work, that of Puruṣottama is the best. He refers to the views of Gokulanātha,Raghunātha, Gokulotsava, Dvārakeśa,Gopīśa etc and states his own opinion.

(V.1)He also explains why renunciation should not be accepted in the Karmamārga by referring to Jaimini.(V.2).

He shows that the term 'Virahānubhava' can be understood in

three ways(V.7)Puruṣottama shows after Vallabha the distinction between the paths of knowledge and devotion, in favour of the latter(V.10-11-12,14,17 etc.)At the end he describes how Vallabha himself took the Sannyāsa.

(50) Commentary on Nirodhalakṣaṇa:

Nirodhalakṣaṇa explains the Nirodha which means complete attachment to the Lord by a devotee who has forgotten the world. Thus the work is intended to lead the service of the Lord on a dāivine level. The work is explained in six~~th~~ different commentaries.Puruṣottama's Vivṛti is surely very helpful.He explains the Nirodha as 'Prapañcavismṛtipūrvakabhagavadāsaktirūpa.'(V.1)He explains the utility of the work in the beginning. He also refers at the end to the different order in which the text has been read by Ūācā Gopīśa and Harirāya and says that he has followed the text of Vrajarāya. He also says that he has not referred to different interpretations.

(51) Commentary on Sevāphala:

Sevāphala is a very small work of seven verses and a half. It explains the fruits of Sevā. Vallabha has himself written a commentary on this. The work has become difficult on account of the terse style of Vallabha. Eleven commentaries are written on this and commentators have widely differed on the meanings of particular words. Puruṣottama refers to

the views of his predecessors often (e.g.V.1).Puruṣottama generally followed the śāstriya method in interpreting the term Sāyujya,while Harirāya and others followed the point of view of Bhaktimārga.

Puruṣottama does not seem to have commented upon the remaining three tracts-Vivekadhairyaśraya,Catuḥślokī and Kṛṣṇāśraya. Any way, I have not been able to find his commentaries on them.

(52-53) Commentaries on Bhaktihamṣa:

Bhaktihamṣa is an important work of Viṭṭhaleśa explaining the nature of true devotion,as the principal means of emancipation in the Śuddhādvaita system. Viṭṭhaleśa here fully discusses the paths of action,knowledge and devotion. He also explains the trip of Pravāha,Maryādā and Puṣṭi. Besides this he also shows the distinction between the Upāsana and Bhakti,Pūjā and Bhakti etc.Puṣṭi is solely dependent upon the grace of God.

Raghunātha,born in V.S.1611 commented upon it.His commentary is called Bhakti-taraṅginī.Puruṣottama has written a sub-commentary on it called Tīrtha,so that people can enter the river of devotion through this passage and

happily see the 'swan of devotion' ¹¹⁵ Puruṣottama has also written an independent commentary upon it called Viveka. Though Puruṣottama does not say anything expressly, he might have in his mind the famous Nīrakṣīranyāya of the Haṁsa, while naming the commentary. It is interesting to compare the two commentaries of the same author. There are naturally so many similarities and almost every idea of the one is repeated in the other in the same manner though not in the same place. To take an example we may note that the explanation of the nine steps of devotion in the Tīrtha is on page 42, while in the Viveka it is on p. 57. In the Tīrtha at the end Puruṣottama gives seven verses for the Granthārthasaṁgraha. They are not found in the Viveka. In the Viveka however Puruṣottama gives an additional interpretation of the last verse of the Bhakti-haṁsa so as to avoid the yati-dōṣa. It is not found in the Tīrtha. It is rather difficult to explain why Puruṣottama would have written two works, when one could have been sufficient.

Puruṣottama ~~has~~ is also said to have commented upon the Bhaktihetunirṇaya of Viṭṭhaleśa. It has not been found by me.

115. Praviśyānena tīrthena ninnāṁ Bhaktitarāṅginīm ,

Gāhamāṇāḥ prapaśyantu Bhaktihaṁsaṁ mudānvitāḥ.

Tīrtha. Last Verse p. 72.

(54) Bhāvarthādhikāraṇaśābhasyaprakāśa:

Vallabha is said to have commented upon the Pūrvamīmāṃsāsūtras of Jaimini also. Unfortunately however, only a part of the same is available. Vallabha's commentary on the Pūrvamīmāṃsāsūtras II.i., known as the Bhāvarthapāda has been published in the Puṣṭibhaktisudhā Vol.VII.no.2-4. The Vivaraṇa alias Prakāśa thereon has been published in the same journal Vol.VII nos.5,6,7,8 and 9. There are 49 Sūtras in all in this Pāda. This work has been examined by Prof.G.H.Bhatt in two articles from the point of view of Vallabha's interpretations as also from the textual point of view.¹¹⁶

The commentary Prakāśa bears the name of Yadupati as the author. This Yadupati was the grandfather of Puruṣottama. The colophon of the commentary runs: 'Iti Śrīmadvallabha-
Mandanaceranēdāsānudāsāśrīpītāmbaratanujaśrīyadupativiracitam
Śrīmadācāryaviracetajjiminīyabhāsyabhāvarthapādavivarāṇam
sāmpūrṇam.' Tradition however informs us that the author is Puruṣottama himself, who, out of respect for his grandfather passed off this work in his name. The commentary though short reveals the special characteristics of Puruṣottama's

116. 'Vallabhācārya and Pūrvamīmāṃsā' Journal of the
Oriental Institute, Vol.I.no.4.p.353ff. and 'Vallabhācārya's
text of the Jaimini Sūtras' II.i.' Vol.II.no.1.p.68ff.

authorship. There is a reference to the theory of Nityatvavāda, and to the Vedāntimata under Sūtra 1. The commentator also refers under Sūtra 5 to those who arrange the first five Sūtras in only one Adhikaraṇa and says 'Tad etat sūtra-viruddham'. Besides, there is one strong ground to accept that Puruṣottama is the author of this commentary. In the Prakāśa on Anubhāṣya I.i.3 a similar discussion occurs. There Puruṣottama makes a reference to these Sūtras and then refers to the present work as his own.¹¹⁷

The beginning of the Vivaraṇa is note worthy. It runs: 'Śrīmatprabhucaraṇakṛpayā bhāvārthacaraṇabhāṣyam yathāmati vivriyate.' It appears from this that though Vallabha might have finished his Bhāṣya, Puruṣottama could secure only this portion and hence he commented upon it. One cannot be definite about this because it may be that Puruṣottama might have secured and commented upon the whole of the Bhāṣya, which is lost to us.

(55) Pūrvamīmāṃsākārikāvivarāṇa:

42 Pūrvamīmāṃsākārikās of Vallabha together with the Vivaraṇa of Puruṣottama have been published in the Puṣṭibhaktisudhā Vol.V.no.2. A short analysis of the contents

117.A.B.P.I.i.3.p.109.

is given here. The author explains the Anubandhacetuṣṭaya in the beginning. (V.1-12a), followed by a discussion on the question whether the Mīmāṃsā is svatantra or vidhimūleka. (V.12b-23a) The relation of the two Mīmāṃsās forms the next topic of discussion. (V.23b-25a) Vallabha then discusses the meaning of the word 'atha' in the Sūtra 'Athāto dharmajijñāsā,' whether it should be understood in the sense of adhikāra or in any other sense. If the latter, we shall have to agree to the vidhi-adhyāhāra. (V.25b-36). Last six verses again discuss the inter relation of the two Mīmāṃsās in the light of the ~~word~~ meaning of the word 'atha' from the point of view of those who understand both the Mīmāṃsās as forming only one Śāstra. (V.37-42). Vallabha is so brief and his style so compact that it is rather difficult to understand the verses without the help of the Vivaraṇa of Puruṣottama.

Vallabha has written the Pūrvamīmāṃsābhāṣya which, as we have seen above, is unfortunately not fully extant. The Kārikās which we have are something like a metrical commentary on the first of the Pūrvamīmāṃsāsūtras. Puruṣottama says in the beginning: Śrīmadācāryacaranāḥ pūrvamīmāṃsābhāṣyam cikīrṣantaḥ tatra vistareṇa pratipipadayiṣitaḥ

jijñāsāsūtrārthan sankṣepena kārīkābhiḥ sanjighrksantah
 etc. 'At the end he says: 'Iti Śrīmadvallebhācāryacarana
 viracitadharmajijñāsāsūtrārthanirṇāyaka-kārīkāvivarṇanam
 Śrīpītāmbaratānujaśrīpuruṣottamakṛtam sampūrṇam.' It is
 important to note that the forty-second kārīkā does not
 seem to contain any suggestion that it is the last. It is
 again doubtful as to whether Vallabha has fully discussed
 even the first Sūtra. I am rather inclined to believe that
 Vallabha wrote some or many kārīkās more than 42 and
 perhaps he wrote or intended to write a matrical summary-
 cum-commentary on the Pūrvamīmāṃsāsūtras. This is what
 Vallabha has done for the Bhāgavatapurāṇa also, when he
 wrote the kārīkās in the last chapter of the Tattvadīpa-
 nibandha over and above the Subodhinī commentary. Any way
 Puruṣottama had before him only 42 verses. He commented
 upon them and called them 'Nirṇāyaka-kārīkās' on the first
 Sūtra.

(56) Subodhinīprakāśa:

Vallabha maintained a very high regard for the
 Bhāgavatapurāṇa which was reised by him to the status of
 a Prasthāna. Vallabha wrote his commentary Subodhinī on the
 first three books, on the tenth book and began writing the
 same on the eleventh. On the eleventh book he could comment

only up to the second verse of the fifth Adhyāya. Vallabha is also said to have written a shorter commentary on the Bhāgavata called Sūksmatīkā but it is not extant. Vallabha's Subodhinī on Skandhas IV.-IX and on the remaining part of XI and the Skandha XII is unfortunately not available. The Sāmpredāyic tradition relates that Vallabha was asked by God not to open the mysterious doctrines in the Bhāgavata. He did not obey the orders in the beginning but when the command came forcefully, he had to carry it out. Thus there is kramebhaṅga and apūrṇatā.

Viṭṭhaleśa wrote a sub-commentary on Skandha X called Tippiṇī. Puruṣottama is said to have written his Prakāśa on the whole of the Subodhinī including the Tippiṇī, but his Prakāśa on the Uttarārdha of the Skandha X has not been found. Even in the Skandha XI his Prakāśa is found on the Subodhinī only up to V.20 of Adhyāya 4. The extant part of the Prakāśa on the Skandha X is fathered upon Pītāmbara. Tradition however runs that it is also written by Puruṣottama. Evidently the style is that of Puruṣottama, as can be seen from his comments on the interpolated chapters (Adhyāyas between X.11 and 12.)

We have noted above while dealing with the last chapter of the Tattvadīpanibandha that, while that chapter

is a summary-cum-commentary written independently though related to the Bhāgavata, Subodhinī is regular running commentary. Here he has dealt with the vākya, pada, and akṣara of the Bhāgavata. This is what Puruṣottama says when he informs us: 'Ayaṁ atra nibandhād viśeṣaḥ. Vākya-padaḥkṣarārthāṇāṁ atra vaktavyatvāt; tatra tu śāstrārthādy-upayogina evārthasyoktatvād iti.' ¹¹⁸ Vallabha also says in the beginning of the Subodhinī: 'Arthatrayaṁ tu vakṣyāmi nibandhesti catuṣṭayaṁ.' ¹¹⁹

(57,58) Minor commentaries on the Bhāgavata:

(I) 'Kathā imāste' ity etad vivaraṇakārikāvyaṅgyā:

Viṭṭhaleśa ~~XXX~~ has written 20 verses on the Bhāgavata XII. iii.14. Discussing the concept of Rasa in the Puṣṭimārga. Puruṣottama has explained them in his usual style.

(II) Vṛtrāsura-catuhśloka-vivṛti: The four verses known as the Vṛtrāsura-catuhśloka occurring in Bhāgavata VI are said to deal with the four Puruṣārthas. The first three verses are commented upon by Viṭṭhaleśa while the last by Vallabha. It is on the last verse that Puruṣottama, Harirāya and Śrīvallabha have written their sub-commentaries. The verse is explained in two ways so as to belong to the

118. Subodhinī-prakāśa III.i.1.

119. Subodhinī.I.i.

Maryādāpustī on the one hand and the Pustīpustī on the other. Puruṣottama's commentary does not contain anything quite peculiar.

(59) *Gāyatrīyādyarthaprakāśakārikāvivarana:*

An attempt has been made by Vallabha and his followers to explain the well-known Sāvitrī R. in such a way as to suit their own theory. Vallabha himself has written a commentary on this verse. Viṭṭhaleśa wrote on it a metrical commentary in 35 verses. Puruṣottama has commented upon it. Besides these, there is also one prose passage by Gokuleśa alias Śrīvallabha. Though Prof. M. G. Shastri calls it an independent work it is not different in nature from a commentary on Vallabha's Gāyatrībhāṣya. Further there is also one Gāyatrīyarthavivarana in 76 verses by an unknown author. There are also prose works of Indireśa and Govardhana Bhaṭṭa trying to explain the purport of the Gāyatrī. All these have been printed in a collection of the Sāṃpradāyic works on Gāyatrī, edited and published by Prof. M. G. Shastri.

The Sāvitrī verse is a simple prayer to the Sun God Savitr, the inspirer. It was slowly surrounded with a halo of sanctity and became the Veda-bīja or the seed of the scriptures. Attempts were then made to interpret the verse so as to suit the interpreter's own beliefs and there grew

a tendency to mystify each and every syllable of the verse. Vallabha shows how it teaches the doctrine of Grace. Viṭṭhaleśa goes a step further by explaining each and every word, the metre, the ṛsi etc.-all explained by means of fanciful etymology and fantastic imagination. Viṭṭhaleśa says that here the teaching is not just of the doctrine of Grace but even of Love, of Śrīgāra. Puruṣottama explains all the 35 verses in his usual analytical method. Under V.25 he refutes the interpretation of the Śaivas. Some of his explanations are also equally fanciful.

(60) Nyāsādeśavivṛtivivaraṇa:

The Nyāsādeśa is one verse explaining the famous verse in the Bhagavad Gītā: 'Sarvadharmaṇ parityajya...etc.'

(Bhagavad Gītā XVIII.66) The verse runs:

Ṭhe/Nyāsādeśeṣu dharmatyajanavacanato kiñcanādhikriyo-
-ktā,

Kārpanyeṣvāṅgem uktam meditarabhaṇapekṣaṇam vā
vyapodham;

Duḥsādhyeccchodyamaṇ vā kvacid upaśamitāv anya-
sammelane vā;

Brahmāstranyāya uktas tad iha na vihotē dharmā
ājñādisiddhah.

In the Bhagavad Gītā the Lord tells Arjuna of Niskāma karmayoga and performing one's dharma without

attachment. How can the verse XVIII.66 be reconciled with this teaching? The Nyāsādeśa verse tries to solve this riddle in various ways. Viṭṭhaleśa has written a commentary on it explaining it in two ways. Puruṣottama has written a sub-commentary on it. Puruṣottama does not say much about the Puṣṭi, Maryādā, and all that, as does Viṭṭhaleśa. He refers to Rāmānuja, Śaṅkara and Madhusūdana, refutes them all except the first with whom he shows just the difference of approach. Puruṣottama also refers to the Sāmpredāyika Mīmāṃsakas and their method of reconciliation. He does not agree with them in toto.

Who is the author of this verse? Some scholars in the Sāmpredāya think that it is written by Vallabha. This is not correct. It is the fifteenth verse in the Nyāsāvimśati of Ācārya Vedāntadeśika, who was a follower of Rāmānuja.¹²⁰

It is difficult to state what is the opinion of Viṭṭhaleśa and Puruṣottama about this. Viṭṭhaleśa begins by saying:

'....vicāra-kāntaḥkaraṇa-kalileṇ apanayans tad vākya -

Tātparyam ekena ślokenāha...etc.' He ends with: '... Iti

pitṛcaraṇa-kṛpāto gopīpaticerana renu dheninā yaj.

120. Cf. Rāhasya-ratna-jātaṁ : Nyāsāvimśati. p. 20.

Śrīvitthalena vivṛto bhāvo māyī sa sthīro bhavatu.'

Puruṣottama begins his commentary with:

Śrīmadvallabha-nandanacaranāmbhoje' nusandhaya,
Nyāsādeśavivarāṇasyāśayam atra sphuṭīkurve.

The last verse also has almost the same purport. Thus there is no reference to Vallabha. Again, whenever Viṭṭhaleśa refers to the author he says 'āha' and not 'āhuḥ' which he might have used, had he thought the verse to be of Vallabha. Thus probably even Viṭṭhaleśa and Puruṣottama did not mean that the verse was written by Vallabha.

(61) Patrāvalambanastīkṣā:

The Patrāvalambana is a work in 40 verses with prose passages coming between verses 29 and 30, and between 34 and 35. At the end of the prose passage after V29 Puruṣottama says that there is something wanting in the text. V.30 has only the second line and the refutation of the Māyāvāda which is referred to in V.36 is not found here. ¹²¹

121. Atra yadyapy etāvateiva nirvāho bhavati tathāpy
upasaṃhāre māyāvādo nirākṛta iti kathanāṁ atra ca
prathemapādād ito'gre etāvati tṛtīr iti pratibhāti.

Patrāvalambanastīkṣā.p.29.

The work is intended to show the correct theories according to the Brahmvāda and to refute the theories of Bhedavāda and Māyāvāda.

The title Patrāvalambana has a curious origin. As Puruṣottama informs us, when Vallabha was staying at Ceraṇādri, various followers of Māyāvāda and the Bhāṭṭa-school of Mīmāṃsā went there from Kashi for discussion. This resulted in obstruction to his work of devotion and service to God. He thereupon came to Kashi himself and wrote this tract, placing it at the doors of Kāśivīśveśa temple. Hence it is called Patrāvalambana. Vallabha's idea seems to be that others' scholars should first read this and then alone should approach him if their doubts are not resolved.

Puruṣottama's commentary is explanatory. It is very helpful in understanding the text.

(62) Vallabhāṣṭakavivarṇa:-

The Vallabhāṣṭaka in eight verses was written by Viṭṭhaleśa. It describes the nature of Vallabha as 'Fire' in the beginning and as 'Kṛṣṇa' at the end. It is said that the name of the Ācārya is explained in the Sarvottamastotra, his qualities in the ^{Sphur} ~~the~~ kṛṣṇapremānta

and his nature in the Vallabhāṣṭaka. Puruṣottama's commentary is faithful and explanatory.

(V).

Commentaries on other works.

(63) Māṇḍūkyopaniṣad-dīpikā:

Before dealing with this work we would like to write a few lines on the commentaries of Puruṣottama on the Upaniṣads. Vallabha himself did not write commentaries on the Upaniṣads. Puruṣottama is however credited with some such commentaries. He is said to have written the Dīpikās on the Kaivalyopaniṣad, Brahmopaniṣad, Nṛsiṃhottara-tāpiny upaniṣad, Chāndogyaopaniṣad, Māṇḍūkyopaniṣad and Śvetāśvataraopaniṣad. He is also said to have written the Upaniṣad-artha-saṃgrahas. I have been able to find out his Artha-saṃgrahas on the Kaivalya and Brahma, while Dīpikās on the Māṇḍūkya and Nṛsiṃhottaratāpinī. It is possible that Puruṣottama might have written the Commentaries, which he has been credited with and might have composed Arthasaṃgrahas on many Upaniṣads, and they might have been lost.

Bhatt Ramanath Shastri published in V.S. 1980 the Māṇḍūkyopaniṣad-dīpikā of Puruṣottama, in Bombay. It contains the commentary not only upon the prose passages of the

Māṇḍūkya but also upon the first two chapters of the Kārikās ascribed to Gauḍapāda. It may appear rather curious that Puruṣottama should have commented upon the verses of Gauḍapāda, the grand-teacher of Śaṅkara. Puruṣottama has explained the Upaniṣad and the Kārikās from the point of view of Śuddhādvaita.

While only the commentary upon the first two chapters of the Kārikās is extant, we should admit that he commented upon the other two chapters also. At the end of the second chapter he says: 'Sūchenāntarāṇām smārtāṇām upāśanāṇām ca sattvāt kim iti Jāṇasrīyāyupadeśa ity etaddvayanāmatam advaitākhye vicārayiṣye.' ¹²² Thus he intended to write on the third chapter also. In Āvaranabhāṅga he refers to his commentary thrice. ¹²³ All these references, especially the

122. Māṇḍūkyopaniṣaddīpikā. p. 55.

123. (1) Yat tu Gauḍavārtike- 'Bhogārtham sṛṣṭir ity enye krīḍārtham iti cāpare' ity evaṁ prayojanam vikalpya- 'Devasya iṣa svabhāvōyam ūptakāmasya kṛṣṇa sṛṣṭā'-iti siddhānta uktaḥ. Tatrēpi krīḍākeranam eva svabhāvo vaktavyaḥ. T.S. Ab. V. 68. p. 116.

(2) Etena Gauḍavārtikanurodhenāpi ye grāhītatvam/ vidadhātī, te'pi pratyuttarītā bodhyāḥ. Gauḍavārtākaprakaraṇacatuṣṭayā rthas tu mayā tadvyākhyāne sopapattiko nirūpita ity tato' vadheyāḥ. (T.S. Ab. V. 91. p. 153. (3) Tena Gauḍavārtikokta-satkārya-vādaśoṣā api Vikāraṇāṅgikārād eva parihṛtāḥ. (T. Sn. Ab. V. 140

second, make it quite clear that Puruṣottama not only intended to write but actually wrote his commentary upon all the four chapters of the Gauḍapāda-kārikās. It is really unfortunate that ~~the~~ we have not been able to secure the commentary in full.

(64) Nṛsiṃhotṭaratāpinyupaniṣaddīpikā:

The Nṛsiṃhotṭaratāpinī is a minor Upaniṣad belonging to the Atharvaveda. It begins with the four divisions of 'Om' in the fashion of the Māṇḍūkya. It has nine khaṇḍas, ~~in~~ which it appears to teach the absolutism of Śaṅkara. The influence of the Māṇḍūkya and the Gauḍapāda-kārikās is distinctly traceable. It also combines with this absolutism, the theistic trends as seen in the elevation of Nṛsiṃha. Puruṣottama has commented upon this work from the point of view of Śuddhādvaita. He seems to care only for proving that the Upaniṣad does not teach the Kevalādvaita of Śaṅkara. That is why his commentary is very short. It is strange that he does not explain so many passages.

Regarding the Arthasaṅgrahas of Puruṣottama, Telivala makes an interesting observation at the end of the Kaivalyopaniṣadarthasaṅgraha.¹²⁴ He says that Puruṣottama is said to have written 52 Vādagranthas. It

124. Cf. Puṣṭibhaktisūdhā. Vol. V. No. 6.

does not appear to be correct. It is likely that Puruṣottama might have written 52 Upaniṣad-arthasaṅgrahas, and they might have been styled Vādagranthas by some. Dayaram, the well known Gujarati poet has said in his Guru-śiṣya-samvāda, that the Upaniṣads are only 52. Hence it may be said that Puruṣottama wrote 52 Arthasaṅgrahas. It is difficult to say anything for or against this view.

What is the difference between an Arthasaṅgraha and a Dīpikā? The two terms do not appear to have any wide divergence in their connotation so far as the works of Puruṣottama are concerned. It may be said that the Arthasaṅgraha is a shorter commentary while the Dīpikā is an extensive commentary. But the Nṛsiṃhottaratāpinī-upaniṣad-dīpikā is surely not a long commentary. Puruṣottama seems to have used these words without any difference in their meanings.

(65) Kaivalyopeniṣadarthasaṅgraha:

It has been published in the Puṣṭibhaktisudhā Vol. V No. 6. The Kaivalya is a small Upaniṣad, which like the Nṛsiṃhottaratāpinī, appears to contain the absolutism of Śaṅkara with the theistic tendencies leaning towards Śaivism. Puruṣottama has interpreted the same so as to find out the Śuddhādvaita and Vaiṣṇavism from it.

(66) Brahmopeniṣad-arthasaṅgraha:

It has been published in the Puṣṭibhaktisudhā Vol.III No.1. The Brahmopeniṣad is a short work with the idealistic doctrines. Puruṣottama has explained it in such a way as to show that the first khaṇḍa shows the grandeur of Brahman, the second gives the four states of consciousness as found in the Māṇḍūkya, the Viruddhadharmāśrayatva etc.

Shri.G.K.Shastri at the end in a foot note says that this appears to be a part of a bigger work called Upaniṣad-arthasaṅgraha. This is similar to the suggestion of Telivala referred to above.

(67) Introduction to Amṛtatarāṅginī:

The Amṛtatarāṅginī commentary on the Bhagavad Gītā raises a question of authorship. It has been printed together with other commentaries in the publication of the Gujarati Press. Prof.M.G.Shastri, in his introduction to his

collection of the Śuddhādvaita works on the Gītā says :

'Śrīmatpuruṣottamaviracita (Śrīmadvrajarāyagoṣvāmiviraciteti vṛddhah) Gītāmr̥tatarāṅginī :...etc.' ¹²⁵

Thus according to some the work goes under the name of Puruṣottama, while in the opinion of others it was written by Vrajarāya. The last

125. Śrīmad Bhagavad Gītā with Tattvadīpa etc. Bhūmikā. p.5.

ten verses are not useful in throwing light upon this problem. It is a really a difficult point. We shall have to rely solely upon the internal evidence.

The commentary begins with an introduction which gives various views regarding the purport of the Bhagavad-Gītā, of Śaṅkara, Madhusūdana Sarasvati, Śrīdhara and Rāmaṇuja.

The author refutes the opinions of the first three and shows partial agreement with that of the last. The author then gives an important discussion on the purport of the Gītā as understood in the Śuddhādvaita.

The regular commentary is however far different from the introduction in its spirit. It explains only the words of the Gītā at almost all the places. It does not refer to the interpretations of other commentators even though sometimes it may be necessary. Not only so but sometimes it may appear that the meaning given in the commentary is far fetched. We may just take an instance or two. The Gītā II.28 reads: 'Avyaktādinī bhūtāni...etc.' It may be understood in a simple way that the beings are invisible before they are born, they are visible when they are alive and they are again invisible when they die. So in the beginning & at the end they are Avyakta, in the middle they are Vyakta. This is the

meaning generally accepted by the commentators, except the author of Amṛtatarāṅgiṇī. He says that Avyakta means Akṣara, which is the ādi or utpatti of the bodies, which according to him is the meaning of 'bhūtāni'. 'Vyaktamādhyāni' is explained as: 'Vyaktam jagat tad eva madhyam sthitirūpam utpattilayaḥ or madhyam yeṣāṃ tāni'. Similarly 'Avyaktanidhanāni' means:

'Avyakta akṣara eva nidhanam layo yeṣāṃ tāni te'. The commentator then adds 'Atrāyam arthaḥ. Yata utpattis tatraiva nāśe śokaḥ svasyānucita ity arthaḥ. Svasyāpi tanmāraṇāntaram na narakādisambhāvanā yata utpattisthala eva svasyāpi nāśo bhaviṣyati.' ¹²⁶ The commentator's meaning is not convincing.

The commentator again brings in the topic of Bhakti every now and then, even at places where it is entirely uncalled for.

Thus for instance in Gītā I.36, He gives two interpretations.

In the second interpretation he says 'Tavakā prītiḥ syād'

and thus brings in the idea of Bhakti. He adds after some

discussion: 'Ātātāyīmāreṇa doṣābhāvas tu dharmaśāstra vicāreṇa-

rthaśāstravicāreṇa vā nirūpita na tu bhaktivicāreṇa, bhakti-

mārgāt tu tayoṛ durbalatvāt tanmāraṇenāsmākaṃ pāpam eva bhavet

pāpāc ca bhagavatsambandho na syād ata eva narāṇāṃ kṣīṇa-

pāpāṇāṃ iti nirūpitaṃ.' ¹²⁷ It is really very difficult to agree

126. Śrīmad bhagavad Gītā with seven commentaries. p.91.

127. Ibid. p.30.

with this. We need not take many more instances to show that the explanations given in the commentary are not convincing.

A perusal of the works of Puruṣottama will show that the body of the commentary does not contain anything which may enable us to say that the work is from the pen of Puruṣottama. Not only so, but the essential characteristics of Puruṣottama's style and ~~the~~ treatment are totally absent. Puruṣottama is never unreasonable, especially when he is commenting upon some important philosophical work and if we look to the instances referred to above, we are not inclined to believe that it is written by him. Again the present writer has not been able to find references to this commentary in any of the works of Puruṣottama, though references to the Gītā are very often found. Some of the explanations of the verses in the Gītā as given by Puruṣottama elsewhere, are different from the explanations given in the said commentary. While explaining the V.21 of the second chapter of the Tattvādīpanibandha, Puruṣottama explains the term 'Vedavādaratāḥ' occurring in the Gītā II.42. as: - 'Vādaratāḥ na tu tatparyajñātārāḥ'.¹²⁸ In the commentary on the other hand it is stated: 'Vedavādaratā iti vedoktaphalakarmakaraṇam

128. T. Sn. Ab. V. 21. p. 22.

evocitam na tu niṣkāmatayā te tathā'.¹²⁹ Similarly Puruṣottama explains 'Traigunyaṁ viśayāḥ' occurring in the Gītā II.45. as :

'Traigunyam guṇatrayasamudāyo viśayo bodhyo yeṣāṁ te tathā.'¹³⁰

The Commentary however explains it as: 'Traigunyah triguna-srṣṭau srṣṭā ye jīvās tadviśayās tadartham svargaphalaka-karmabodhakā vedāḥ,' and 'Vedās traigunyaṁ viśayās trigunātmaka-svarupaphalapratipādakāḥ na tu sāksād bhagavatsambandha-pratipādakāḥ.'¹³¹

Again the tirade against the Vedas in the Gītā is explained by Puruṣottama in his Āvaranabhāṅga as:

'Laukikim pratītim ēdāyaiva vakti.'¹³² No such explanation

is given in the Amṛtatarāṅginī. Thus it may be said that the Amṛtatarāṅginī is not written by Puruṣottama but by Vraja-rāya.

The introduction is however quite differently conceived and contains all the characteristics of Puruṣottama's pen. Thus

we think that it was prefixed to the commentary *why* Puruṣottama.

It is very easy to understand how the work passed off under the name of our author. Puruṣottama has written many

129. Śrīmad Bhagavad Gītā with 7 commentaries. p. 107.

130. T.Sn. Ab. V. 21. p. 22.

131. Śrīmad Bhagavad Gītā with 7 commentaries. p. 111.

132. T. Sn. Ab. V. 21. p. 22.

works and fathered them upon his elders, so the Amṛtatarāṅginī also, to which he has written only an introduction, might have been understood to be his.

(VI).

Remarks.

We have described above 67 works of Puruṣottama in all. Puruṣottama might have written many more independent works or commentaries than those which have been noted above by me. The Sāṃpradāyic tradition has attributed to him such literature that can not be described as anything but vast. He is said to have written as many as nine lacs of verses.¹³³ Some of his works might have been lost to us. It is also possible that some of his works might have been known and studied by some one or other scholar of the Sāṃpradāya and I may not have been able to secure the same. The commentary on the Dvātriṃśadaparādhakṣamāpāna-stotra was not found by me. It is possible that there may be some such other works also. Any way, I have given an account of as many works of Puruṣottama as I could get. I think that I have reviewed almost all his important works and many of his minor works.

133. Cf. 'Yah sarvam navalakṣapadyakamitapraudhāprabandham

vyadhāt'

3rd line from the Sāṃpradāyic verse regarding Puruṣottama.

They are more than sufficient to show how Puruṣottama was a prolific writer who tried to explain almost all the important works of his great ancestors and who also wrote dozens of independent works to elucidate clearly the principles of the Śuddhādvaita system, and to criticise the theories, which were unacceptable to him.

Is it possible to find out a chronological order of his works? We have one piece of evidence for this purpose. Puruṣottama very often refers to his own works and we can easily say that the works which are referred to are definitely earlier than those in which the references are found. The evidence is however not conclusive. It is possible that Puruṣottama might have been writing some works simultaneously. It is also possible that Puruṣottama might be referring to the works which were being written or which he might have only planned to write at the time of referring to them and might not have actually written them. Hence the arguments based on these references does not appear to be sound.

Is it necessary to find out the chronological order of his works at all? The question of the chronological order

of the works of many authors has been discussed and debated, but I may be excused to say that more often than not the discussions of this type appear to be without much value.

The chronological order of the works of a particular author should be attempted if and when we are in a position to point out the development of the genius of the author and if we are able to study how the author attained to that particular state of maturity. If we can not do this, the whole question of the chronological order loses its importance and value.

What is the position of Puruṣottama? A study of the works of Puruṣottama reveals no such development or attainment of maturity. We have the same author, the same dialectician, with the same manner of presentation through out in all his works, whether they may be important commentaries or independent works or just minor tracts. We do not therefore think it necessary to enter into such a discussion at all.

CHAPTER .IV.

"DIALECTICS AND INTERPRETATION."

(I).

Introductory.

Writers on Śāstras in Sanskrit have adopted a style, peculiarly their own. It can be called the discursive or dialectical style which presents the arguments and counter-arguments for and against a particular theory, advocated by the writer. Thus there is not much scope for the literary embellishments, which are thrown in the background by the tiresome frequency of 'nanu' and 'tu'. The best thing for a writer in this branch of literature is to be as simple as possible, so that he can be thoroughly understood. Even then there are some writers like Śaṅkara who can be called stylists, but that combination of literary merits in a Śāstric work is very rare and cannot be found in others. Rāmānuja writes in a style which is mature and dignified but which may appear rather difficult. Vallabha is too sparing, too laconic to the extent that the exact meaning which he intends to convey cannot often be understood without the help of explanation. Viṭṭhaleśa is surely clear in his writing, he can be easily understood but

he shows a tendency for ornamental style, as found in some of the long sentences and compounds in his works.

Puruṣottama, as we have seen in the preceding chapter, is primarily a commentator. In the independent works also, his mission is not just to refute, what others have said and thought, but also to explain clearly his own view point. He thus adopts the style suitable for his purpose. He is simple and clear. He never embarks upon long passages studded with long compounds and difficult words. His sentences are well-balanced. He never tries to be ornamental, though he has at his disposal the vast ^{le} which vocabulary of the Sanskrit language. He does not even appear to pause for a word, suitable words come to him and his pen goes on easily. He is a Śāstric writer and naturally we will find his language full of all the technical terms in Sanskrit literature. To one who is not conversant with the terminology, may find his works a hard nut to crack, but after the terms are understood, one will find the ease and even grace with which he writes. His explanations are often brimming with homely analogies like 'Sarvam Padam hastipade nimagnam' ¹ and proverbs like

1. A.B.P.p. 318.

'Gajā yatra na ganyante maśakānām tu ka kathā'.² The seriousness of the subject naturally requires some amount of dignity and maturity of style. Puruṣottama has the depth and profundity, dignity and maturity, combined with the ease and grace in the language. Puruṣottama however does not attempt to be a stylist, he is an interpreter and argumentator. He should thus be studied from that point of view.

(II).

Method and approach.

The tradition of the Śuddhādvaita thinkers recognises two methods of exposition, the pramāṇa method and the prameya method. Puruṣottama is said to have followed the former, while Harirāya and others the latter method. What exactly is meant by this? The words pramāṇabala and prameyabala are used by Vallabha himself, when he says in his Prakāśa on the Tattva-dīpanibandha at the end of the first chapter that he has expounded the meaning of the Śāstras by taking recourse to the pramāṇabala, while he will speak out the decision on all the topics by resorting to the prameyabala.³ The distinction

2. A.B.P.p.415.

3. Pramāṇabalam āśritya śāstrārtho vinirūpitaḥ,
Prameyabalam āśritya sarvanirṇaya ucyate. T.S.P.p.168.

between the pramāṇa and the prameya methods seems to have started on the basis of this reference. The distinction however does not appear to be a very well-known one, and both the terms pramāṇapaddhati and prameyapaddhati appear to have been very vaguely used. Puruṣottama explains the term pramāṇabala as the decided implication of the pramāṇas, i.e. the prasthānas, following their mutual reconciliation and harmonisation.⁴ Puruṣottama gives two explanations for the prameyabala. Firstly prameya is the Highest Lord, who is known by all the Vedas and the like. He is omnipotent, even then He is capable of particular actions in particular forms, which He assumes. This is the prameyabala.⁵ Secondly prameya may be understood in the plural referring to the objects of our knowledge, obtained by means of our eyes etc. Their bala means their capacity to produce the particular effects.⁶ What should be understood by the term pramāṇa?

4. Pramāṇānām vedādinām śrībhāgavatāntānām balam parasparā-virodhena niścitam tātparityam ity arthah. T.S.Ab.p.168.

5. Prameyasya sakalevedādivedyasya bhagavato balam sarva-samarthatve'pi tattadrūpema pratiniyata-tattakārya-kartrtvādirūpam. T.S.Ab.p.168.

6. Prameyānām śāstrānugrहितacakṣurādijanyapremāviśayanām arthānām vā balam tattatkāryajenanasamarthyam.

T.S.Ab.p.168.

In this particular⁴ context it is to be restricted to denote only the verbal testimony. This would lead to the consideration of the svataḥpramāṇyavāda and the śabdabalaavicāra as against the parataḥpramāṇyavāda and the arthabalaavicāra respectively. On the basis of these two distinctions, Puruṣottama says that for those who accept⁵ that the means of proof are self-valid and who understand the Śāstrārtha on the strength of the word, and who do not entertain any doubt regarding the theories taught in the Śāstras, the first chapter of the Nibandha is written. Those who follow the parataḥpramāṇyavāda or who do not accept the pramāṇas to be self-proved, and who approach the Śāstras on the ground of the Arthabala, may doubt the theories, that have been propounded, or they may accept wrong theories; for them the second chapter is written by the Ācārya.⁷ It will thus be seen that the pramāṇabala is for those who follow the svataḥpramāṇyavāda and the śabdabala, while the prameyabala is for others who adhere to the parataḥ-pramāṇyavāda and the arthabala. When one proceeds on the strength of the pramāṇa, one would just make the statements regarding what is taught in the scriptures. When on the other hand, one takes recourse to the prameyabala, one would discuss the whole point from the point of view of the prameya or

7. Cf. T. S. Ab. p. 168.

prameyas which are accepted to have certain characteristics; whereas one is srutitantra, the other is vastu-tantra. This difference can be seen clearly from Vallabha's own treatment as found in the two chapters.

The difference between the two methods can thus be explained. The *pramāṇa* refers to the authoritative scriptural texts. One who follows the texts, the injunctions, prohibitions, meditation, knowledge and even devotion, according to the texts, is called a *pramāṇamārgī* or a *maryādābhakta*. But one who, irrespective of Vedic rules, approaches the Lord in the manner of the Gopīs, depending solely upon the Lord (Prameya), is called a *prameyamārgī bhakta*. In other words *pramāṇamārga* is the *maryādāmārga*, and the *prameyamārga* is the *puṣṭimārga*. The former completely follows the constitutional rules, while the latter solely relies upon the will of the Lord, irrespective of the constitution. We can thus say that Puruṣottama is out and out a *pramāṇamārgī*, while Harirāya is a *prameyamārgī*. Harirāya and others who have followed the *prameyamārga*, have something of mysticism in them; this is not found in Puruṣottama.

There are however certain distinguishing characteristics which are found in Puruṣottama's method of presentation and

discussion of various views. Puruṣottama comes very late in the philosophical field in India. As we have seen in chapter II, he had many well known contemporary scholars, who contributed some view or other, while commenting upon the works of others or by means of independent compositions. Apart from that he had before him the works of scores of illustrious predecessors, whose views were considered authoritative. The Śuddhādvaita again was a comparatively modern system. Puruṣottama therefore adopted a comparative method. When any particular point comes up for discussion, Puruṣottama is never contented by giving his own point of view regarding it. He refers to almost all the scholars, who have expressed their views on that particular topic; he refutes them if he thinks it proper or otherwise he just keeps quiet after giving their opinions and stating his own. Thus for instance, in the very beginning of his *Prasthānakara-ratnākara*, Puruṣottama deals with the determinate and indeterminate knowledge. He refers to the Bhāṭṭas, the Bāhyas, the author of *Vedāntaparibhāṣā*, the Naiyāyikas and the Prābhākaras and gives the view according to the Śuddhādvaita after that. Again after stating the view of the Bhāṭṭas, he also shows how the nirvikalpa jñāna as understood in the

Bhāṭṭa school can be explained from the point of view of the 'Suddhādvaita'.⁸ He refers to the Nihilists and shows how they should be refuted.⁹ While dealing with the savikalpaka he refers to the Sāmpradāyika Naiyāyikas and Rāmanātha, whom he refutes.¹⁰ In the Khyātivāda he enumerates and explains all the theories of erroneous perception and shows how they are acceptable or unacceptable. Puruṣottama keeps in his mind not only the different views expressed by the scholars, but also the refutations that they have given of the rival systems. Thus for instance in his Prakāśa on the Anubhāṣya. I.i.2. Puruṣottama gives the arguments of those who think that Brahman can be inferred. He then refers to Bhāskara, who refutes this position. The arguments that have been advanced could not satisfy Rāmānuja, who gives his own refutation. The statement of all this is followed by a reference to Udayanācārya, who has given independent arguments to prove that Brahman or Īśvara can be established on the ground of reasoning.

Puruṣottama then refers to the Sāmpradāyikamata, the Abhinavamata and to Viṣṇuabhikṣu and finally refutes them.¹¹

8.Pr.pp.8-10.

9.Pr.p.10.

10.Pr.pp.13-14.

11.A.B.P. pp. 70-81.

Similarly under the next Sūtra, he explains the Bhedābheda-
-vāda of Bhāskara, states its refutation as given by Vācaspati
Miśra and attacks Vācaspati himself for this refutation.¹²

This is the position not only in discussing a particular
theory, but even in commenting upon the Anubhāṣya and other
works. In the Prakāśa on the Anubhāṣya at the end of almost
every Sūtra or Adhikaraṇa, we find a statement of the inter-
-pretations of that Sūtra or set of Sūtras as given by
other commentators. While so stating the different inter-
-pretations, he shows how and why Vallabha differs from them
and how they are faulty. Sometimes he just gives these inter-
-pretations and does not make any comments. Thus for instance
under sūtra.II.ii.18. Puruṣottama gives the interpretations
of Rāmānuja and Bhāskara. The letter is similar to that of
Saṃkara. The same thing has been said with some minor
difference by others also, says Puruṣottama.¹³ It should be
noted that Puruṣottama here makes no comments of his own.
Similarly at the end of the Tarkapāda, Puruṣottama refers to
Rāmānuja's interpretation of the Sūtras.II.ii.42-45. , in
which Rāmānuja defends the Bhāgavata system. He also refers

12. A.B.P. pp. 92-95.

13. Etad eva kiñcid vailakṣaṇyenānye' py āhuh. A.B.P. p. 635.

to Madhva who interpretes the Sūtras so as to repudiate the Śākta system. But he does not say anything for or against them. That is what we want to point out when we say that Puruṣottama adopts a comparative method. He compares the interpretations, theories and statements made by the scholars of his own school with those of others, and this he does, not just for the sake of refuting the other systems, which he very often does not refute. What he puts before us is a thorough comparison of these views and interpretations with or without his comments. This is very helpful for a clear understanding of the Śuddhādvaita, when compared with other systems.

Secondly we should ~~be~~ note that Puruṣottama's approach to the problems, he would like to discuss, is analytic. Whenever a certain point comes up for discussion, he does not skip over it by saying that this has been so ordered by the Ācārya or that this does or does not appear to be so. He would like to go to the root of the problem and with a thorough presentation of the original texts, he would proceed analysing the whole topic. An interesting illustration of the same can be found in a very scholarly and very

difficult discussion of whether the affix, 'mayat' means 'vikāra' or 'prācurya'. Under Sūtra I.i.12, Puruṣottama refers to many grammatical works, right from Pāṇini's Astādhyāyī upto the Siddhānteratnākara of Rāmakaṣṇa. Similar is his discussion of almost all the topics. Whenever a certain word is used, he explains the exact implication of the term, if it is very important for the theory, that is propounded. He wants to give us a clear picture of what is implied by the particular term; he is never confused or confusing. We shall here take certain examples to illustrate this point.

Individual souls are said to be anśas of Brahman. In the Bhāṣyaprakāśa at the end of the third pāda of the second Adhyāya, Puruṣottama discusses the exact implication of this term. He says that the term anśa is used in the Smṛtis and the Sūtras, while the term pāda is found in the Śrutis. Both are homonyms and are therefore vague. The word anśa may be used for a limb, a son, a piece, a part of something specific, and a constituent part in a bundle. As the Śruti passage 'Ardho vā eṣa ātmaṇo yat patnīḥ' shows, even a wife can be called an anśa. Similarly the term pāda also means a part or

a limb. Even though any of these meanings can be used without being afraid of the contingency of resorting to lakṣaṇā, the relation of the anśa and the anśin should be understood so as to be in accord with the analogies of the spider and his web and the fire and sparks. This being the case, the anśa must be something like a part or a piece, the nature of which is not modified; it is therefore not completely or eternally separate from the anśin, nor is it just an attribute of the same.¹⁴

The term māyā is also similarly discussed and explained. Bhāskara says that māyā is a revelation devoid of its object. According to Rāmānuja it implies surprise and wonderment. In the Śuddhādvaita however māyā is a special power of the Lord. The proof for this is found in the Bhāgavata passages like, 'Naṭaven mūdha māyābhir māyeśān no jigīṣasi!'¹⁵ Māyā thus means the deluding capacity of the Highest Lord.¹⁶

The term Bhakti in the Śuddhādvaita means service and love to the Lord i.e. Premasevā. Taking his clue from the cryptic statement of Vallabha- 'Bhaktiśabdasya pratyayārthah

14. A.B.P. pp. 766-767.

15. Bhāgavata. VIII. ~~xi~~. 4.

16. A.B.P. p. 876.

prema, dhātvarthaḥ sevā'¹⁷, Puruṣottama develops the idea thus: The meaning is expressed by the affix and the base together and primarily by the affix. So the affix 'Ktin' which is capable of expressing the ordinary meaning of a root, is here combined with the root 'Bhaj' and so primarily expresses the act of worshipping. This is of the nature of service. The word sevā has the conventional sense of physical activity, preceded by constancy or frequency, as can be seen from the usages like strīsevā, auśadhasevā etc. From the passages like 'Matsevayā pratītem ca' the said activity can be stated to be of the nature of service. Again these passages inform us of the pūrnatva on account of the sevā. It is possible only when service is mixed with love, otherwise the trouble that it would give would prevent it from being called a puruṣārtha. This being the case, love is the motive and as such the dominant factor in the sevā. Thus it is the meaning of the affix, while the bodily service, which is subordinate to love, is the meaning of the base.¹⁸

While explaining that the Highest Lord is 'Rasarūpa',

17. T. Sn. P. p. 75.

18. T. Sn. Ab. p. 75.

Puruṣottama enters into a discussion of the term Rasa. The term Rasa, he says, is used for the taste, ~~that~~ viz. the quality which is grasped by the tongue, the mobile substance, the quintessence and that which produces happiness which can be enjoyed. The scriptural passages, 'Rasam hy evāyam labdhvā-nandī bhavati',¹⁹ 'Ko hy evānyāt kaḥ prānyād yady eṣa ākāśa ānando na syāt,'²⁰ 'Eṣa hy eva ānandayāti'²¹ and others show that Rasa is the bliss, has the purpose of keeping the life-breath, has its place in the cavity of the heart and produces joy. Thus Rasa is 'Hṛdayasthaprāṇitānandajanaka ānanda.' The joy which is produced of this, can be enjoyed in all the limbs and so it can be said to pervade the whole body, even then passages like 'sa mānasīna ātmā janānam' show its place to be the mind. Thus the sentiment which ^{is} produced in accordance with the theories of the Rasaśāstra, is also an effect of the same Rasa.²¹

An analysis, though short, of the concept of sneha or love is also similarly found. Puruṣottama says that sneha is an attribute of the mind or the soul, it is not desire.

19. Taittirīya Upaniṣad. II. 7/1

20. Taittirīya Upaniṣad. II. 7.

21. Taittirīya Upaniṣad. II. 7.

22. S. S. pp. 252-253.

'I like it,I have love for it,I am glad at it,but I do not want it',such sentences are used.Similarly,it is not just knowledge,because ,knowledge may be also of our enemies,for whom we have definitely no sneha.Thus sneha is a dharma-
 22
 -viśeṣa.

Important concepts of other systems have also been discussed by our author in the same way.One such concept is saṅgati.Puruṣottama explains saṅgati as:'Anantarābhidhāna-
 -prayojākāṅkṣājānanakajñānaviśayo'nthah'.This means the desire to know why a certain statement is made after that which has already been made.That which is the object of knowledge , required to satisfy that desire,is called saṅgati.It is sixfold,as stated in the work:

Saprasaṅga upodghāto hetutāvasaras tathā,
 Nirvāhaikaikakāryatve śoḍhā saṅgatir iṣyate.

Prasaṅga is that which can not be avoided,when remembered.

Upodghāta establishes the topic in hand.Hetutā is the relation between the dependent and that upon which it depends.

Avasara is something,which must be stated to satisfy the desire,which does not hinder the progress of the work.

Nirvāḥakatva serves the purpose of advancing the topic.

Ekakāryatva produces an allied effect. This is the explanation of the nature of saṅgati, and not its definition. Puruṣottama himself would like to explain saṅgati as the upekṣānarhatva, (not proper to be neglected) of that which is remembered, while the discussion is being carried on by an intelligent man.²³

Hetutā and others are the attributes of the upekṣānarhatva and are included in the saṅgati because they are related to the same. Again there is no limitation that saṅgati is only sixfold; other divisions can also be accommodated.²⁴

These and many other instances can be adduced to illustrate the analytical approach of Puruṣottama. Puruṣottama's style and method would show that there is something of a modern scholar in him. He has some sense of history, which is said to be so very rare in the works of Indian thinkers. A pointed instance of this is found in the famous Bhāgavata-svarūpaviśayakāśaṅkānirāsevāda, where in Puruṣottama discusses

23. Sāvadhānapuruṣaprayujyamāṇavākya-prayojakatvena

smṛtasyopekṣānarhatvam eva saṅgatiḥ. A.B.P. pp. 130-131.

24. A.B.P. pp. 130-131.

whether the Bhāgavata Purāṇa is an old ~~work~~. Puruṣottama says that if the Bhāgavata was a modern work, many authoritative writers would not have referred to it in their works. He then proceeds with a list of those authors and works,²⁵ beginning with Śaṅkara who in his Caturdaśametaviveka refers to the Bhāgavata. He also refers to the commentaries on the Pāṇinīyāsāstra and Upadeśasāhasrī, Samvatsarapradīpa of Prācīna Gauda (Gaudapāda?), Hemādri-vratadānakhanda, Prakriyā-kaumudī of Rāmacandra, Kālanirṇayadīpikāvivaraṇa of Nṛsiṃhācārya, Saccaritraṁmāṇsā of Vidyānivāsa Bhaṭṭācārya, Bhakti-rasāyana of Madhusūdana Sarasvatī, Bhaktiratnāvalī of Viṣṇu-puri, Kṣemendraprakāśa of Kṣemendra, Śivatatvaviveka of Appayya Dīkṣita, Nirṇayasindhu, Bhagavadbhāskara, Dīnakarodyota, and Caturvīṁśativyākhyā of Bhaṭṭoji Dīkṣita. The list found here shows that Puruṣottama has in him something of a modern scholar, who ^{would} find out such references to prove the antiquity or otherwise of a particular work. Puruṣottama thus can be compared with a modern research scholar.

25. Bhāgavatasvarūpaviśayakāśaṅkīrṇasavāda.

Appendix In T. Sn. p. 3.

(III).

Dialectics.

The term dialectics has been used by most of the modern scholars for describing the philosophical method, as found in the Bhāṣyas, their commentaries, and other works of philosophy. Baldwin's Dictionary explains the term thus:

Dialectic:....In ancient philosophy and logic: pertaining to reasoning and argument, and (as a noun) a system or course of reasoning or argument....

Dialectics: (In education): The Art of teaching by means of discussion as seen in Plato's Dialogues and involving as with Socrates inductive appeals to special instances.²⁶

Dr. P. D. Chandratre in his thesis on Methodology points out certain important distinctions between Platonic dialectic and Vāda-paddhati, as followed by Sanskrit writers.²⁷ While we may not here enter into a discussion regarding this point, it will be sufficient to say that the term dialectic has been loosely used for the Vāda method.

Vātsyāyana-Bhāṣya on the Nyāyasūtras of Gautama informs us

26-Baldwin, Dictionary of Philosophy and Psychology. Vol. I. p. 278.

27. Chandratre. Methodology. p. 238 ff.

that there are three types of Kathā or debate, Vāda, Jalpa, and Vitandā.²⁸ Vāda proceeds with the sole purpose of arriving at the ascertained truth.²⁹ Gautama calls it a discussion with students, teachers, co-students and persons, who are interested in reaching at right conclusions.³⁰ Vātsyāyana describes it as a collection of statements made by various speakers for arguing out various views leading ultimately to the acceptance of one of these views as the demonstrated truth.³¹ Gautama defines Vāda as 'Pramānatarkasāadhanopālambhaḥ siddhānta-viruddhaḥ pañcāvayavopapannaḥ pakṣepratipakṣaparigrahaḥ Vādaḥ.'³² Chendratre translates it as: 'Vāda consists in putting forward (by two persons) of a conception and counter-conception, in which there is supporting and condemning by means of proofs and reasonings-neither of which is quite opposed to the main doctrine (or thesis) and both of

28. Tisraḥ kathā bhavanti, vādo, jalpo vitandā ceti.

Vātsyāyana-Bhāṣya.p. 70.

29. Tattvanirṇayaphalaḥ kathāviśeṣo vādaḥ. Servadarśanaśaṅgraha. p. 239.

30. Tam śiṣyagurusabrahmacāriviśiṣṭaśreyorthibhir anasūyibhir abhūpeyāt. Nyāyasūtras. IV. ii. 48.

31. Vādaḥ khalu nānāpravakṛtkaḥ pratyadhikarāṇasādhano'nyatarādhikarāṇanirṇayēvasāno vākyasamūhaḥ.

Vātsyāyana-Bhāṣya.p. 6.

32. Nyāyasūtras. I. ii. 1.

which are carried on in full accordance with the method of reasoning through five factors.³³

Gautama defines jalpa as : 'Yathoktopapannaś chala-jātinigrahassthānasāadhanopālambho jalpah.'³⁴ He explains vitandā as : 'Sa pratipakṣasthāpanahīno vitandā.'³⁵ In jalpa the disputant tries to overthrow the opponent and repudiate him in any way right or wrong. The vitandā is purely destructive, wherein the opponent is just refuted, while no alternative thesis is offered. Thus the Vāda is healthier than the other two.

The Platonic dialectic, as explained by Hocking, comes very near to this. "Socrates and Plato developed a method of mental experimentation, which Plato called the 'Dialectic'-a method well-fitted for use in conversation or dialogue. It consisted in taking up any belief, one of the speakers chose to present; treating it as an hypothesis, and following it ruthlessly to its extreme conclusions.

If for one reason the consequences of the hypothesis were

33. Chandratre. Methodology. p. 31.

34. Nyāyasūtras. I. ii. 2.

35. Nyāyasūtras. I. ii. 3.

unacceptable, a new ^h Hypothesis must be tried; and the process may be continued until one is found which leads to no error. Thus the dialectic is a progressive thinking process... The true hypothesis would be the dialectical survivor.'³⁶ "

Coming to the Indian Vāda, we can say, following Dr. Chandratre, that according to the definition of Gautama, quoted above there are three features that constitute a Vāda. Firstly the contrary view points should be supported and condemned by means of proofs and reasonings. Secondly none of the view points, accepted or repudiated must be entirely against the main thesis. Vātsyāyana explains the significance of this condition when he says that the fallacy of contradiction (Hetvābhāsa) of Siddhāntavirodha, can be used in the Vāda, but the proper place for the clinchers or nigrahasthanas is the jalpa or vitandā, and not Vāda.³⁷ Third condition of the Vāda is that both the supporting and condemning must be in accordance with the

36. W. E. Hocking: Types of Philosophy. p. 489. Quoted by Chandratre: Methodology. pp. 29-30.

37. Siddhāntam abhyupetye tadvirodhi viruddhaḥ iti hetvābhāśasya nigrahasthānasyānujñā vāde. Vātsyāyanabhāṣya. p. 70. Also see. Jalpe nigrahasthānaviniyogād vāde tatpratishedhaḥ. Vātsyāyanabhāṣya. p. 70.

reasoning of five-membered syllogism. It should be however noted that mostly all the writers on the Vedānta carry on with the three-membered syllogism consisting of *pratijñā*, *hetu* and *udāharaṇa*.

In the light of what has been stated above, we would like to examine the Vādagranthas of Puruṣottama. The Vādagranthas would in themselves provide for a very important study of Puruṣottama's dialectics, because they are independent, compact and to the point. A glance at these Vādagranthas will show that Puruṣottama begins many of his Vādas with a verse, in which he makes a certain statement, according to the accepted hypothesis of his view. The said statement is challenged by the Opponent, who does not subscribe to the view and thus argues against it. Thus the discussion starts. An analysis of some of his Vādas is given below; so that we may be able to find out the salient features of his Vādagranthas.

The Prastāvāda, as we have already said, is a composite work of three actions or avāntaravādas. It begins with the verse:-

Śrutisīrasi yasya mahimā nirupadhir

Īso'pi yasya khalu mahimā,

Tem Kṛṣṇam ādimūrtim namāmi

Niravadyasadgunam brahma.

38.

The first quarter leads to the discussion on the meaning of the Vedāntas. The opponent asks as to how the first quarter can be explained. Puruṣottama replies that all the Vedāntas teach Brahman i.e. they are Brahma-para. The followers of Śaṅkara points out here the 'A-vāstāvika-brahma-paratva', to which the author says that this is a śrauta system and only the Śrutis should be accepted as the valid Pramāṇa and the thoughts, which go against them, should be countered on the strength of reasoning, which does not go against the Śrutis. The author then goes on to show how the belief in the Sopādhika-brahma-paratva of the Śrutis is untenable, as it is not vouched for by the scriptural evidence. That Brahman has attributes is made out in the Śrutis and only the material attributes are rejected. Thus Brahman is an abode of contradictory attributes. So far, Puruṣottama bases all his observations on the scriptural

passages, hundreds of which are quoted and interpreted.

Puruṣottama now attacks the theory of Avidyā on logical grounds. He asks whether Avidyā is with or without beginning, whether it is related to the jīva or Brahman, and whether it is sat, asat, both sat and asat ~~and~~ or neither sat nor asat. Puruṣottama points out that none of these alternatives is acceptable.³⁹ Puruṣottama again comes back to the scriptural passages which he explains in extenso to show how they can not be called upon to prove the theory of meya. Puruṣottama at the end proves the avikṛtaparināma-vāda on the scriptural authority and finally comes again to his point, 'Tasmāc chrutiśirahi nirupadhir eva brahmano mahimā pratipādyata iti sūpapannam.'⁴⁰

The second part of the Brahastavāda is said to be based on the second quarter of the verse quoted above. Puruṣottama begins with a question. Accepting that Brahman has endless forms, should all the forms be accepted as equal or should we think that one of them is principal and the others are subordinate? Something that it is in fact

39. Prh. pp. 21-22.

40. Prh. p. 34.

formless but assumes forms owing to māyā and so, whether they are equal or subordinate in relation to one another, does not make any difference. Others say that all the forms are māyika, of them that of Viṣṇu is the highest. Still others opine for Śiva. The followers of Bhedavāda make out that only one is Brahman, while the other is jīva. The author then says that in fact Brahman is beyond the three qualities, regulates the māyā, is an abode of contradictory qualities and is thus endowed with all the forms. It is and is not an agent, it is thus not an object of any dispute, it is faultless and on the analogy of blind men and an elephant, it assumes various forms to give the reward to various worshippers. The theory of māyā has already been refuted. The Bhedavāda is not taught by the Śrutis. Thus the difference of the forms should be discussed. Out of these the Highest is transcendental and another is of the nature of Vibhūti, the others are still inferior to it. Which of them is Mahāmahimayukta? ⁴¹ This is a sort of introduction to what Puruṣottama really wants to write. He then states the views of Appayya Dīksita as found in

Sivataddvaviveka, and refutes him thoroughly with a Vaisnavaite interpretation of the Śrutis, Smṛtis, Purāṇas, and all that. At the end he says that Bhagavat is the principal form of Brahman, and Śiva is the main Vibhūti. Thus the proposition in the second quarter of the verse is established. ⁴²

The third part deals with the third quarter of the said verse. Puruṣottama here says that Kṛṣṇa is the Ādi-mūrti and discusses it on the basis of the Purāṇas and minor Upaniṣads, and refutes the contention that Kṛṣṇatva is māyika.

Panditakarabhindipāla is something like an extension of the second part of the Prahasta. It begins with:

Vividheṣu Vividhaphaladeḥ śivādirupaḥ sadā svayam
tv agunaḥ,
Bhakteṣu nirgunatvam kurvan harir uttamo jayati.⁴³

The whole discussion is based on the first quarter and is directed against Saivism. The basis here is of the

42. Prh. p. 233.

43. Panditkerabhindipāla. Avatāravādavalī. p. 247.

Purāṇas and minor scriptural texts.

Bhedābhedasvarūpanirṇaya begins with:

Brahmābhedopāśāñāj jñānato vā
 Brahmātmaikyē'py anśatām atyajantah,
 Yasyaiśveryād āsate yanniyamyās
 Tam Śrīkṛṣṇam devadevam namāmi.⁴⁴

The verse thus states, the oneness of Brahman and ātman, the anśatva of the individual soul in spite of the said oneness and that everything is controlled and regulated by the Highest Lord. Thus it is necessary to discuss whether the abheda tolerates the bheda or not. The opponent argues that it does not, and makes out a case for absolute Monism. Puruṣottama replies that the theory of Satkāryavāda, which is based on the Śrutis, shows that everything existed even prior to the creation. So the attributes like ākāra and kāryatva should be accepted as existing in Brahman. If they are different from Brahman, it would go against the Advaitaśrutis. Hence we should accept that Brahman is endowed with the required attributes and is the cause.

44. Bhedābhedasvarūpanirṇaya. Vādāvalī. p. 16.

The effects are one with the cause, though they are mutually different from one another. Similar is the case with the relation of Brahman and Jagat. The relationship between Brahman and the jīvas is like that of gold and a lump of gold. This is also abheda, which tolerates bheda. As here the whole argument proceeds on the bases of Satkāryavāda, Puruṣottama has to refute the Asatkāryavāda, and the belief in the Prāgabhāva. This is based on reasoning and not verbal testimony. Puruṣottama again comes back to his point and shows how the Bhedasehiṣṇu-abheda is to be accepted in the states of deluge and liberation.

Sṛṣṭibhedavāda is a very important work of Puruṣottama. It begins with:

Yo līlayā kila gavāṃ avanāya gotraṃ
 Haste' tikomaśatame kṛpayā dadhāra,
 Yadrūpaṃ etad akhilaṃ yata āsa yasmāt
 Sadvad vibhāti tam ajaṃ śaraṇaṃ prapadye.⁴⁵

The statement of the third quarter is called in to question by those, who believe in the Paramānuvāda.

45. Sṛṣṭibhedavāda. Vādāvalī. p. 82.

Puruṣottama refutes them by strongly attacking the very thesis that the paramāṇus can be the cause. The definition of the atom, as given by the Vaiśeṣikas, is criticised by him vehemently. He says that it is not from the subtle that the gross is produced, on the other hand the gross cause gives rise to subtle effects, as can be surmised from various instances. Puruṣottama also takes the opportunity to refute the concept of Abhāva. After thus repudiating the ārambhavāda, Puruṣottama refers to the Anīśvara sāṅkhyas and their theories. They are answered mainly on the scriptural grounds, though the non-sentiency of the Prakṛti is also pointed out. Thus Puruṣottama says that the sentient Brahman should be accepted as the material and the efficient cause as also the agent of the world on the authority of the Śrutis.⁴⁶ Now Puruṣottama here refers to the Ekadeśin who does not agree to the theory of Parināma and who therefore advances the Vivartavāda. The author here details the arguments of the māyāvādin, for rejecting the Sāṅkhyan parināmavāda and accepting the māyāvāda. Puruṣottama refutes the māyāvāda also

46. Tasmād brahma cetanam jagata upādānam nimittam kartr
ceti śrutibhya eva mantavyam. Vādavalī. p. 96.

on scriptural authority, though he uses logic also.⁴⁷ At the end the Śuddhādvaita views of Āvirbhāva-tirobhāva and Avikrtaparināma are fully explained.

In the beginning of the Khyātivāda we have the following verse:

Yanmāyā bahihkṣiptā khyāyate buddhir arthavat,
Nivartate ca yadbodhāt tam namāmi janārdaṇam.⁴⁸

The objector can not agree to the first line, but Puruṣottama answers his objections and says that he is in favour of the Anyakhyāti. Puruṣottama refers to the Naiyāyikas, who believe in the Anyathākhyāti. This is refuted on purely logical grounds. Similarly the Bhāttas, the Prābhākaras, the Māyāvādins, the Sāṅkhya and Rāmānuja are referred to. All are refuted except the last, whose view is also not accepted in toto. The difference in the views held by the Viśiṣṭādvaita and the Śuddhādvaita is described and explained by the author. Puruṣottama shows how both Akhyāti and Anyakhyāti are accepted in his system.

47. Srṣṭibhedavāda. Vādāvalī. p. 104.

48. Khyātivāda. Vādāvalī. p. 119.

Andhakāravāda is introduced with the verse:

Darśaya nātha guhāyām tamovṛtāyām svataḥ samāgatya,
Mucukunda iva śayāne mayi kṛpayānehasāpi vapuh.⁴⁹

The opponent does not agree to the term tamovṛtāyām because the tamas which is just absence of light, can not envelope anything. Puruṣottama refers to the view that the tamas is the separate substance. According to the followers of Kaṇāda darkness is not a substance. Similar is the view of the author of Pratyaktattvadīpikā. Puruṣottama says that Tamas is a substance, which is capable of enveloping and which is an effect of māyā, which is the mūla-śakti. In proving this he refutes both the Vaiśeṣikas and the author of Pratyak-tattvadīpikā.

Pratibimbavāda similarly is intended to prove that the image is a separate object altogether. The discussion is introduced with the verse:

Jyotis tamālenīlam karuṇāśīlam mudā staumi,
Harati tamonikurembam yatpratibimbam svakīyānām.⁵⁰

The second line is objected to by the disputant who says that the Pratibimba is not an existing entity at all.

49. Andhakāravāda. Vādāvalī. p. 131.

50. Pratibimbavāda. Vādāvalī. p. 193.

Puruṣottama refutes the arguments and says that it is an entity on the ground of verbal testimony and also on account of perception. It is different from other objects because of its māyikatva. He refers to other views also, though he does not name any of the theorists.

Jīvapratibimbatvakhaṇḍanavāda begins with,

Yac cidanāṣeṣu jīveṣu pratibimbādirūpatam,

Vadanti matabhedais tam śrīkṛṣṇam sarvadaśraye.⁵¹

The Opponent does not agree with the theory of Anśatva and says that jīva is a Pratibimba or an ābhāsa. Puruṣottama here enumerates six views, held by the followers of Śaṅkara. Puruṣottama refutes those views on the basis of reasoning and scriptures both and establishes the theory of Anśatva.

Āvirbhāvatirobhāvavāda is a very important work in as much as it deals with the theory of manifestation and non-manifestation, which constitutes the basic plank of the Śuddhādvaita. The first verse runs:

Yadāvirbhāve ānande āvirbhavati sarvataḥ,

Tirobhavanti santāpās tam śraye gokuleśvaram.⁵²

51. Jīvapratibimbatvakhaṇḍanavāda. Vādāvalī. p. 170.

52. Āvirbhāvatirobhāvavāda. Vādāvalī. p. 182.

The opponent says that one who does not agree to the production and destruction of the effects can not also explain the manifestation and non-manifestation. Puruṣottama makes out a very strong case for his view. He discusses the Satkāryavāda, utpatti, prāgabhāva and all the theories connected with the Abhāvas, vehemently refutes them and finally explains the Śuddhādvaita concept of manifestation and non-manifestation and how it is to be applied to the creation of the world and the jīvas.

Lastly we shall refer to the Khalālapana vidhvamsavāda, which is metrical and thus unique in certain respects. It does not begin with a verse to which the opponent objects. Puruṣottama here straightly plunges into discussion, when he says that certain followers of the Śākta system doubt the Śaktitva of the Highest Lord, looking to the ornaments worn by him. Puruṣottama gives the authority of scriptures to prove the masculine character of God. He also refers to the Svāminyaṣṭaka and the Sarasvatīsthāpana.

We will not give an analysis of other Vādas like the Ūrdhvapundradhāraṇavāda or the Tulasīmālādharāṇavāda, firstly

because many of them are important only for the Śuddhādvaita practices and secondly because the Vādas which we have referred to will be sufficient for studying the vāda-paddhati of Puruṣottama. A study of the above Vādas will make clear the following points.

Most of the Vādas of Puruṣottama follow a definite fixed pattern. The first verse in almost each of these tracts is written in the form of a benediction, but besides, it also suggests the hypothesis, which is immediately tried. Sometimes we find, as in the first part of the Prahasa, that logic is subordinated to scriptures, but that is quite in keeping with the accepted view that the śabda is the highest authority in the Suprasensuous realms of metaphysics. It must however be stated to the credit of Puruṣottama, that whenever he is against a certain theory, he uses logic if that particular theory is advanced on the ground of reasoning and only when the opponent adduces scriptures in his support, Puruṣottama meets on that ground. The ~~first~~ part and even the whole of the Prahasa-vāda is directly concerned with the scriptures. When however the occasion arises the discourse is carried on

with reasoning. Other hypotheses are also put forward, as in *Sr̥stibhedavāda* and *Khy̥tīvāda*. They are however refuted by our author, who gives various arguments, logical and scriptural to support his own view and to refute the views of others. We may say that this comes very near to the Platonic Dialectic, as explained by Hocking. There is however one very important point of difference. In Platonic Dialectic the first hypothesis which has been put forward need not be necessarily accepted and other views are tried when the first is found unacceptable. In the *Vādagranthas*, as we have seen, the hypothesis suggested by the benedictory verse is the author's own view about the point. Thus the same is finally accepted after other rival theories are rejected. It can be pointed out, though it is very rare, that the rival theory is not entirely repudiated, while it is neither accepted fully. Thus Rāmānuja's view about erroneous perception is not completely refuted in the *Khy̥tīvāda*.

We can as well say that these tracts satisfy the requirements of the Indian Vāda. The contrary view points are supported and refuted on the basis of proofs and reasoning. We have noted above that proofs for a Vedāntin

includes scriptures as the final authority. They are to be supported by tarka or reasoning. The ancient logicians classify tarka into 11 but the modern school accepts only 5: Ātmēśraya (Ignoratio elenchi), anyonyāśraya (Petitio principii), cakraka (circle), anavesthā (regressus ad infinitum), and pramāṇabādhitārthaprasaṅga (reductio ad absurdum). The other six are: vyāghāta, lāghava, gaurava, utsarga, apavāda, and vaijātya.⁵³ Many of these tarkas are very often found in the Vādas of Puruṣottama. We may here take some illustrations.

The Pramāṇabādhitārthaprasaṅga is found in the Bheda-bhedasvarūpenirṇaya, when our author says that if the attributes like ākāra, kāryatva, and the like are not accepted as existing in Brahman before creation, the scriptural passages teaching of the satkāryavāda would be rendered meaningless. If the effects are said to exist separately from Brahman, it would go against the passages teaching oneness. Hence for reconciling these two, we shall have to accept Brahman, which is endowed with these attributes, as the cause.⁵⁴ This is Pramāṇabādhitārthaprasaṅga.

53. Cf. Sarvadarśanasamgraha. pp. 238-239.

54. Vādāvalī. p. 18.

The fault of anyonyāśraya has been pointed out by Puruṣottama in the views of those who believe that Īśvara is the sentiency reflected in the impressions of the creatures, remaining under the influences of māyā, which has its abode in Brahman; and jīva is the sentiency reflected in the internal organ imagined by māyā. To this Puruṣottama says that the reflection must be accepted only of that which is not defiled by upādhis on the ground of the illustrations of ghaṭāśkāśa etc. This being the case, Īśvara cannot possibly be accepted as existing, because the māyātamas has its own solid constituents and the like and thus they would obstruct the impressions. (Dhīvāsanās) If the constituents are not many, then the hetu cannot be explained and if one believes in the nature as such, it would lead to the contingency of svabhāvavāda. Besides there will be pătītio principii in so far as the svabhāva can be explained, only when reflection is established and the reflection can be accepted, only when the svabhāva is established. Thus there is anyonyāśraya between svabhāva and pratibimba.⁵⁵

55. Vādāvalī. p. 173.

Ātmāśraya and anavasthā are found together when Puruṣottama is refuting the concept of production in the asatkāryavāda. As it is with number, so with production also we should believe that production is produced. This is not only without any proof, but it leads to the fallacy of regressus because utpatti requires another utpatti, this again the third and so on. It should not be stated that utpatti is produced from it self, on the basis of the usages like 'Utpattir jātā', because that would be ātmāśraya.⁵⁶

Besides these which have been illustrated here, there are many other reasons found in Puruṣottama's argumentation. Thus for instance we find mānābhāva,⁵⁷ drṣṭāntābhāva,⁵⁸ prasiddhatva,⁵⁹ kalpanāgaaurava,⁶⁰ ativyāpti,⁶¹ etc.

-----The second requirement of a Vāda is that both the view points should not be completely against the main thesis. The idea behind this requirement is, as we have seen

56. Vādāvalī. p. 189.

57. Ibid. p. 86.

58. Ibid. p. 189.

59. Ibid. p. 187.

60. Ibid. p. 189.

61. Ibid. p. 201.

above, that the clinchers should not be used in a Vāda, the proper place for them being Jālpa or vitandā. In the Vādas of our author the contingency of Siddhāntabhāṅga is very often found used against the adversary. We shall see one illustration of this.

The atom is defined in the Vaiśeṣika system as :
 ' Bhautikatve sati nityo gatinān paramāṇuh. ' What is the bhautikatva here? Is it bhūta-sambandhitva? In that case all the primordial elements like earth do not exist in the beginning of creation; there can be no question of the bhūta-sambandhitva. If the opponent takes into account the existence of space, it would also include the mind, and thus the definition will be too wide. If for averting this contingency he refuses to accept the creation as such, the atoms themselves can not exist and this would be tantamount to Siddhāntabhāṅga. 62

The third requirement of a Vāda is regarding the five-membered syllogism. The writers on the Vedānta, however, do not generally give all the five but they give only the first three members viz. Pratijñā, Hetu, and Udaहरण. Puraṣottama's Vādas afford us with many

sylllogisms.

One important point which we should not note is that the Vādas of Puruṣottama never assume the form of jalpa or vitandā. Most of his Vādagranthas are intended to prove something and not to disprove something. The Prāhastā and the Khaḍḍālāpanavidhvansa Vādas are specially directed against the Śaivas and the Śāktas respectively,, but there is not just an attitude of putting down an adversary. In the Prāhastā Puruṣottama proves that Brahman is the teaching of the Vedāntas, that Śiva is the principal Vibhūti and that Kṛṣṇa is the mūlarūpa. In the Khaḍḍālāpanavidhvansavāda we find that Puruṣottama tries to emphasise the personal aspect of God. One may perhaps point out that the Jīvapratibimbatvaḥḍanavāda, as its name indicates, is meant to refute the theory of the followers of Śāṅkara. The last verse of the Vāda also lends support to this.⁶³ But we should bear in mind that after refuting the theory of Pratibimba, Puruṣottama shows how the theory of anśatva is faultless. The Prasāṅga dialectics is often found in these works, when

63. Iti 'śrīvallabhācāryavācūm āśayagocaram,

Pratibimbādirūpatvaḥḍanānam viśadikṛtam.

Vādāvalī. p. 182.

Puruṣottama- offers different alternatives for understanding the opponent's theory and rejects all of them. But the trend of arguments is never destructive for the sake of being simply destructive. The alternatives are on the other hand offered to show the inherent inconsistencies in the theory, which is attacked. Thus when he says that the māyā is neither sat, nor asat, nor again both sat and asat and not even different from both sat and asat, he points out how the theory of māyā cannot be logically explained and accepted.

The observations, which we have made regarding the Vādegranthas, are equally applicable to the discussions, that are found in other works of our author.

As regards the fallacies of reasons (hetvābhāsas) the author himself discusses the topic in his Prasthāna-ratnākara. We would like to give here his own explanations and illustrations. The Naiyāyikas classify fallacious reasons into five, savyābhicāra, viruddha, sat-pratipakṣa, asiddha and bādhitā.

Savyābhicāra is the straying reason which is explained as: Sēdhyatadabhāvasādhakatayā pratīyamānaḥ. It is twofold,

common (Sādhārāṇa) and uncommon (asādhārāṇa). The former is that which proves both the sādhyā and its absence by positive concomitance, e.g. Dhūmavān Vahneḥ. The latter does the same by negative concomitance, e.g. Śabdah anityah. Śabdatvāt. The logicians give a third variety also called non-conclusive (anupasanbharin), which is explained as, Avṛttisādhyakatva, e.g. Ākāśavān. Diśah. Sometimes it is understood as kevalānvayidharmāvacchinnapakṣaka, e.g. Sarvaṁ anityam. Prameyatvāt. The fault here lies with the obstruction in understanding the negative concomitance.

Adverse reason or viruddha hetu is explained as, sādhyā-asamānādhikarāṇo hetuḥ. The hetu is not coeval with the sādhyā but is entirely different from it, e.g. Gauḥ. Āśvatvāt. This, says Puruṣottama, is not different from the sverūpāsiddhi.

Sat-protipakṣa or opposable reason is that which obstructs the understanding of the sādhyā, e.g. Jalam uṣṇam. Sparśavattvāt. Noṣṇam. Atejastvāt.

Unestablished reason or asiddha is explained as: 'Vyabhicārādyenyaपरामर्शप्रतिबंधकतāvacchedakadharmatvam asiddhiḥ.' It has three varieties. (1) Svarūpāsiddhi,

e.g. *Ghaṭeḥ prthīvi. Paṭatvāt.* (2) *Āśrayāsiddhi*, e.g. *Gaganakamalam* *surabhikamalam. Surabhikamalatvāt.* (3) *Vyāpyatvasiddhi*, e.g. the *Dhūmanisthavyāpti* is absent in a cloud of dust. It can also be said to exist when the *Sādhya* or the *hetu* is unknown.

Bādha or stultified reason is explained as: '*Pakṣe sādhyā-sūnyatvam!*' Thus for instance fire does not exist in water.

Besides the five, which have been enumerated above, *Puruṣottama* says that *upādhi* is also a fallacy. It is defined as: '*Sādhyaavyāpakatve seti sādhanavyāpakatvam upādhiḥ.*' Thus for instance the syllogism like, '*Yūgiyā hinsā adharmaśādhānam hinsātvāt.*' has this fault because it does not take into account the *niśedha* of *hinsā* when enjoined in the scriptures.⁶⁴

One important point, which we may here note with regard to the dialectical method of *Puruṣottama*, is that as an honest debater, he does not resort to the unfair means of argumentation as employed in the *jalpa* or *vitandā*. Dialectic quibbling or *chala* is one such way which means a wilful misrepresentation of the views of the opponent.⁶⁵ It is classified into three, *vāk-chala*, *sāmānyā-chala* and *upacāra-chala*. In the first, the meaning, which is not intended to be conveyed, is assumed, when

64. Pr. pp. 144-146.

65. *Vacanāvaghāto'rthavikalpopapattyā chalam. Nyāyesūtras. I. ii. 10.*

the statement of the opponent is vague. In the second an absurd signification is urged by using too generic a term. The third is based on the secondary meaning of the words. It is necessary that the views of the opponent should be correctly presented before they are attacked, and we find this particular virtue in the discussions of Puruṣottama, who has never taken recourse to any of the chalas, mentioned above. Not only so, but at many places we shall find the quotations of the view-points of others. Thus for instance the catuṣkoṭīka dialectics of the Bauddhas,⁶⁶ the theory of Sādvāda, as explained by Anantavīrya,⁶⁷ the views of logicians, Mīmāṃsakas and others given in the ~~works~~ of Puruṣottama would show that Puruṣottama is always careful in the presentations of the opinions of others. Not only so but at some places he would also show the contents of certain books. Thus for instance he says that the Sāṅkhya, well-known by the name of Kapilasūtras, has two versions. One has 28 Sūtras and is commented upon by Pañcāśikha, the other is Sāṅkhyaprameśanasūtra in 6 Adhyāyas. While the first version

66. A.B.P.p.658.

67. A.B.P.p.664.

just mentions the topics taught in the system, it is the second which explains them fully.⁶⁸

We have noted above that Puruṣottama has the dignity and elegance of style. As a result of this he does not often jeer at his opponents. The accusations against Śaṅkara found in the works of Vallabha and Viṭṭhaleśa are almost totally absent. He treats Śaṅkara, Rāmānuja and Madhva, all the Ācāryas with equal respect, as can be seen from the fact that he never uses singular number for them. Singular is used by him only for Śrīkaṇṭha and Bhikṣu, for neither of whom he seems to have much regard. For Śrīkaṇṭha of course the sectarian spirit might have invited criticism and lowered the position of his school. Puruṣottama also has adopted a critical and liberal attitude. There is however sometimes some caustic criticism from his pen,⁶⁹ but they

68. A.B.P. p. 154.

69. Cf. (1) Ata evam satyapi yat tadevicāreṇānandamaye duḥkhā-
-stitvakatham tad grānthakṛto mahāduḥkhasamskārasya
prāblyam eva gamayati iti dik. A.B.P. p. 199. This is against
Śaṅkara. (2) Ata idam bhikṣāvaiyagryadaśayām evāvādīd iti
dik. A.B.P. p. 237. This is against Vijñānabhikṣu. (3) Vaiśeṣi-
-kadarśanasya ulūkarūpiṇā kṛtātvaṭ... Vādāvalī.
p. 140. This is against the Vaiśeṣikas in the Andhakāravāda,
etc.

are very rare. Barring some stray passages we can say that Puruṣottama maintains a high standard, below which he does not go.

The last point, which we should take in to account in relation to Puruṣottama's argumentation is whether he is himself open to the charge of punarukta, which is a clincher. In many of his works the same arguments are repeated. The theory that darkness is an object is found discussed in the Prasthānakatnākara,⁷⁰ Andhakāravāda,⁷¹ and in the Āvaranabhāṅga.⁷² Similarly the theory of jīva-pratibimbatva is refuted strongly in the Prasthānakatnākara,⁷³ the Vāda bearing the same name,⁷⁴ and the Āvaranabhāṅga.⁷⁵ That an individual soul is atomic is proved in the Āvaranabhāṅga,⁷⁶ and Anubhāsyaprekāśa.⁷⁷ The way in which God can be realised is explained in the Anubhāsyaprekāśa,⁷⁸ and

70. Pr. p. 111. ff.

71. Andhakāravāda. Vādāvalī. p. 13. ff.

72. T. S. Ab. p. 125. ff.

73. Pr. p. 129. ff.

74. Jīva-pratibimbatvatthandānavāda. Vādāvalī. p. 170. ff.

75. T. Sn. Ab. p. 102. ff.

76. T. S. Ab. p. 92. ff.

77. A. B. P. p. 798 ff.

78. A. B. P. p. 803. ff.

Prasthānaratnākera,⁷⁹ The passages being completely similar.

The Sṛṣṭiprakriyā in the Anubhāsyaprakāśa⁸⁰ should be compared with that in the Prasthānaratnākera.⁸¹ The refutation of the concept of Abhāva is found at many places.⁸² All these passages have a close affinity not only from the point of view of arguments but even expressions, to the extent that one appears to have been almost quoted from another. It is quite likely that Puruṣottama might have quoted in his works from other works of his own. But does this constitute the fault of repetition? Repetition would be a fault only when it occurs in the same work and not in different works. On the other hand Puruṣottama's intention seems to be that even if one of his works is read, the reader can understand the arguments which lead to the position accepted by the Śuddhādvaita. The repetition may strike one, who reads many of his works.

79.Pr.p.137.

80.A.B.P.p.810.ff.

81.Pr.p.160.ff.

82.Pr.p.111.ff, T.Sn.Ab.p.89.ff, Sṛṣṭibhedavāda, Āvirbhāva-tirobhāvavāda, etc.

(IV).

'Important refutations'.

Turussottama has refuted almost all other systems in one way or another. It is difficult to show here how he has refuted all these theories, because it will make a Volume in itself if we take down all his arguments, advanced by him against others. It will however be useful to see some^{of} his important refutations.

While the Buddhistic theories are rejected by him, when commenting upon Anubhāṣya, he has independently repudiated the Buddhistic theory of Śūnyavāda. He asks whether the proof by which the nihilist establishes the void, exists or does not exist. If it does exist the existence of the pramāṇa would go against the accepted principle of void. If it does not exist, how can the principle of void be established with the help of a Pramāṇa, which does not exist at all?

The Buddhists advance their famous four-cornered dialectics for establishing the theory of void. They give four alternatives, sat, asat, sadasat, and sadasadvilaksana, and reject them all. That, which does not exist at all, can not be produced by the usage of words. Thus for instance

the horn of a hare does not exist at all. That which exists can not be produced either from that which exists or from that which does not exist. The pot or a sprout is produced only by the destruction of a lump of clay or a seed respectively, and so it is not produced from bhāva. It can neither be produced from abhāva, because otherwise the essence of non-existence must inhere in the effect, but it is not seen inherent. It can not be produced from itself, because that would be tantamount to the fallacy of ignoratio elenchi, and also that of absence of purpose. It cannot further be produced from anything else because in that case everything will be produced from everything, in as much as the other thing, which is the cause, is not definite and thus may be anything. Thus when the concept of production is rejected, that of destruction is also similarly refuted. We can not again accept both sat and asat, because as sat and asat are mutually different from each other, one thing cannot be both. The last alternative is also not possible because one thing cannot be different from both sat and asat, and nothing is seen corresponding to it in the world. Hence the void or Śūnyatā, which is kept out of the four alternatives, is the only principle and the attainment of void is

salvation according to them.

Puruṣottama gives a spirited reply to this. Is the principle of void arrived at by the nihilist on the basis of any proof or just on the strength of the *vaśtu* without taking the help of any proof? It can not be latter, because then it would be well known to all like the space and there would be no dispute regarding the same. Again does that strength exist or not? If it does, then the *śūnya* which is the abode of this strength must also exist and hence it cannot be kept out of the four alternatives. Similar is the case if it does not exist. Coming to the first alternative, even the *pramāṇa* must be either existent ~~or~~ or non-existent and this would again bring the whole thing in the four alternatives. What again is the proof, by which the void is established? Is it perception or inference? The former is not possible, because the object of perception is not well known to all. Inference is also not helpful. The syllogism, whatever is inexplicable is *śūnya*, is not proper, because of the want of illustration. For the Buddhists, everything is included in the *pakṣa*. If another syllogism is tried, 'Ghaṭaḥ śūnyaḥ. Uktarītyā vicārāśaḥatvāt. Paṭaḥvat,' then

there is the fallacy of straying reason because in the case of the piece of cloth or the golden ornaments, the theory of the production of an effect after the destruction of a cause (Upamrdya prādurbhāvaḥ) is not accepted by all. Hence we must accept the theory of 'Bhāvādā bhāvotpattiḥ', and that would go against the vicārāśeḥatva, which has been made out. The nihilists are thus refuted by their own arguments.⁸³

After refuting the Jain theory of Syādvāda following Vallabha, Puruṣottama refers to one Anantavīrya, who says that the seven statements are based upon the vivakṣā or the desire to express a particular thing. Thus when we want to posit a thing, we would say 'Syād asti', and if we desire to negate, it the statement would be 'Syān nāsti'. If both positing and negating are desired in a certain order, we have 'Syād asti ca nāsti ca'. If on the other hand both are desired to be stated simultaneously then the sentence is 'Syād avācyaḥ'. If the positive is to be stated as indescribable, we have 'Syād asti ca avācyaḥ ca', and if that is a case with the negative, then 'Syān nāsti ca avācyaḥ ca' would be the sentence. If all the three are

desired to be expressed, we have the last statement, 'Syād
asti ca nāsti ca avācyaṃ ca'.

Puruṣottama asks whether the seven statements which are explained on the ground of Vivakṣā, are the natural attributes of the objects or they are adventitious or super-imposed or they have that particular thing as their object. If they are natural attributes, they definitely exist and the question of any desire to express does not arise. They cannot be adventitious, because in the absence of definite natural attributes, the adventitious ones cannot be stated, as it would go against perception. Nor they can be super-imposed, because the attributes, which are superimposed, can not make the existing ones indefinite. The last alternative is equally wrong, because just by imagining any such bhaṅga, the natural attributes can not be made indefinite. The ancient scholars have already shown how they are mutually inconsistent and contradictory.⁸⁴

Puruṣottama is very critical of the Vaiśeṣika concept of paramāṇus. He has refuted the vaiśeṣika theories of

paramānus as the cause, while commenting upon Anubhāṣya.⁸⁵

In the Sṛṣṭibhedavāda, however, he attacks the very definition of paramānus, as given by them. The paramānus is defined by them as : 'Bhautikatve sati nityo gatiṁ paramānuh.' What is meant by bhautikatva here? It can not be the quality of being related to the primordial elements, because in the beginning of creation, we can not imagine the existence of elements like the earth, other than those, which are to be created. If the Vaiśeṣikas point to the existence of space, the definition would as well apply to the mind also. If they do not accept the state in the beginning of creation, the paramānus themselves cannot be accepted and this would amount to Siddhāntabhanga. Bhautikatva again cannot be bhūtasamavāyitva, the quality of being inherent in the elements, because the primordial elements themselves do not exist as shown above. If the definition is some how understood because of yogyatā, even then it is too wide and would include the mind also on the strength of the description of the mānasa-sṛṣṭi in the Purāṇas and the Yogasāstra. If that is accepted as istāpatti, just as

85. A.B.P.p.620. ff.

the Paramāṇus would be fivefold, the mind also would be partite and this would go against the eternal nature of the mind. If that is also an iṣṭāpatti, then the Śabdaprāmāṇya is left off by the Opponent and the accepted principle is nullified. The opponent is thus on the horns of a dilemma.

The Vaiśeṣikas argue that the whole world is produced from substances having less and less of sphericity. This is the case of everything upto the trasareṇu. The dṛyaṇukas are also produced from still smaller substances because they are capable of producing the mahat and the dīrgha.⁸⁶ This would lead to the paramāṇus, which have infinitesimal sphericity and they are not produced from anything else.

Puruṣottama says that apart from the question of definition, the argument given above^{ve} can be advanced further and we can say that as the paramāṇus are capable of producing the objects of medium sphericity viz. the dṛyaṇukas, they must also be~~be~~ understood as produced and this would go against their eternity. It should not be argued that the point, where we stop, while going to the cause from the effect, is the paramāṇu, because this would

86. Vadavali. p. 83.

run counter to the accepted principle. If that is done, so as to avert the contingency of regressus, it is better to leave aside the whole theory of ārambhavāda.

Again the body is made of five elements in which the elements like water are mixed with each other. At the time of separation they would be relegated to the position of atoms and so the clay and the like would not be visible at all. Thus the theory is against perception also.

Again the substances are said to be produced not from the point of view of having a particular form (Rūpavattva), because this would include the atoms of air also. They can not again be from the point of view of mūrtatva, because that would include the mind also, but here the Vaiśeṣikas accept the sparśavattva. Even here it includes the mind, because the concept of conjunction has been accepted with regard to the mind and conjunction is not different from touch. Hence the theory is fallacious from this point of view also.⁸⁷

Puruṣottama has very vehemently rejected the concept

87. Vādāvalī, pp. 85-86.

of Prāgabhāva and other abhāvas, as advocated by the Vaiśeṣi-
 -kas, at many places.⁸⁸ Abhāva, says, Puruṣottama, need not
 be understood as an independent category but it should be
 included in the Āvirbhāva and Tirobhāva. The Prāgabhāva
 is the state of the inhering cause, favourable to the
 manifestation of the effect and co-existing with the non-
 -manifestation. Dhvansābhāva is that state, which is not
 favourable to the existence of the effect. There is no other
 proof for establishing the independent existence of the
 abhāvas. It may be argued that the very absence of a pot
 in a potsherd is a proof for the Prāgabhāva. Puruṣottama
 says that such an understanding, as understood by the
 opponent, has for its object the Abhāva, which has its
 counter-part in the existence of a particular pot. Now
 the absence of any sense contact with a pot is general
 and thus can not lead to the particular, which is required
 by the Prāgabhāva in question. The cognition of the

88. T. Sn. Ab. pp. 88-90, Pr. pp. 111-123, Sṛṣṭibhedavāda, Āvirbhāva-
 -tirobhāvavāda, etc. Puruṣottama has also written one
 Abhāvavāda, which is unfortunately not extant.

Prāgabhāva of a pot in the said potsherd is not capable of being proved because no such appearance is possible. Even though the opponent may admit it, it is not accepted by all. Puruṣottama further asks as to whether the negation prior to production, as envisaged by the said cognition, is only one for all the pots or is different with different pots. The first alternative can not be accepted, because the production of any pot would destroy the prāgabhāva altogether and there can be no particular Prāgabhāva for a particular pot. It cannot be said that it is destroyed by the production of all the pots, because in that case the production of one pot will not destroy the Prāgabhāva and the potsherds, which are the parts of the said pot, will have to be understood as showing the Prāgabhāva of the pot and not the pot itself. It can not be argued that this is not a contingency, because the existence of the pot obstructs such an understanding. If this is the position, the co-existence of the pot and the Prāgabhāva at the same place should be admitted and the contention of the destruction of the Prāgabhāva by the production of all the pots would be futile. Further as

the counter-parts are transitory, we can not reasonably speak of all the pots. Thus when that which destroys can not be explained, the definition of the Prāgabhāva as the negation which can be destroyed is also wrong. The Opponent^s points out that there can be a definition like, 'Candhādhyānādhikarānakālavṛttyabhāvatva', or 'Adṛṣṭa-tvāvacchinnānādhikarānakālavṛttyabhāvatva'. To this Puruṣottama says that as there is no knower of the produce^d knowledge before creation, there can be no such abhāvatva. The opponent says that God is there to see it all. Well, then we shall accept what is said by God and not what is said by the Opponent.

The second alternative is equally unreasonable. The knowledge of the abhāva is dependent upon that of the counterpart and so in the absence of the latter, the former cannot be known. If the knowledge of the counter-part is accepted in the form of a pot, then the Prāgabhāva will be common to all the counterparts and this would lead to all the contingencies urged above. It should not be argued that the contingency can be averted by accepting the understanding, on account of the subliminal

impressions of the supraworldly knowledge, which has for its object a thing of future, due to the common characteristics of the Ghaṭatva. No such understanding is possible because the subliminal impressions for a future object do not exist, when such an experience does not exist. As for the supraworldly knowledge, Puruṣottama says that it will have to be understood in a limited sense, as the said knowledge has, at first, for its object all the pots and this^{is} followed by the Pratiyogināśyatva of the Prāgabdhāva. Or it should be accepted that the latter comes in the beginning and so the supraworldly knowledge is limited from the first instant. After that one should explain the knowledge of the Prāgabdhāva for a future pot. This is ignoratio elenchi, because the futurity is here made up by the Prāgabdhāva. If futurity~~ty~~ is explained as the abode of production, which occurs after the present, then there can be no cognition of the Prāgabdhāva. When we see that a pot will be produced from this, there can be no cognition of the Prāgabdhāva of that pot. The future existence of the pot does not require the understanding of the Prāgabdhāva.

The cognition of the Prāgabdhāva can not again be inferred. The syllogism that can be formed is: 'Kapālam ghaṭapṛāgabdhāvavat. Ghaṭīyacaramasāmegrimattvāt. Yo yacaramasāmegrimān sa tatpṛāgabdhāvavān. Paṭīyacaramasāmagriviśiṣṭatantuvāt. 'Puruṣottama objects to this syllogism by saying, 'Prāgabdhāverūpasādhyatāvacchedakāvacchinnaśādhyāprasiddhyā anumānāsambhavāt. 'He says that there is no proof for comprehending the Prāgabdhāva and as the cognition can also be explained on the ground of the sāmāyika-atyantābhāva, the Prāgabdhāva can not be established on the ground of cognition and the like.

The opponent changes his stand and says that he may agree that the Prāgabdhāva is not established by apprehension. In the relation of the cause and the effect, subsisting in the potsherds and the pot, there must be some regulation for the production of a particular pot from particular potsherds. The regulation can not be possible in the potsherds themselves. There is again the fault of Gaurava in explaining the pot as produced from many potsherds. Hence something, that can regulate the

place of production, is required. This necessity can be fulfilled by the concept of Prāgabhāva.

Puruṣottama replies to this that in the Satkāryavāda, it is the sat, which is manifested, hence the desanīyama is possible by the cause itself. Thus the establishment of the Prāgabhāva, on this ground, is just 'abhyupagamaika-sareṇatva' (taking recourse to one's own doctrines.) The question of Gaurava does not arise, since many causes lead to one effect. The pot which is to exist to-morrow, is absent today; this involves the time factor, which is also explained in the same way by the satkāryavāda. It should not again be made out that if we do not admit the Prāgabhāva, there will be the contingency of the reproduction of that, which has already been produced. The factor of time involves a certain order. Hence the diffusion of the sāmāgrī on account of the Tirobhāva, will account for its destruction and this bars the contention of the reproduction of what is already produced. Therefore the Prāgabhāva cannot be established in this way also.

The opponent then argues that in a pot which is prepared on hearth, the touch, form, taste and smell are

produced. Here the cause and the time factor are common. So we should admit the Prāgabdhāva of touch etc. Puruṣottama says that such an acceptance is not necessary, because the transformation of touch etc. follows from the nature of touch and the like helped by the phenomenon of pāka. As svabhāva is an attribute, there is lāghava in its acceptance.

The opponent points out that the pre-existence which is found in the cause, can be explained only on the ground of our admitting the Prāgabdhāva, because the said Pūrva-vartitva is the same as existing at the time, which is covered by the Prāgabdhāva. Puruṣottama says that the pūrva-vartitva need not be necessarily explained, because a cause is just the abode of the manifesting capacity. If at all required, it can easily be understood by the knowledge of the effect, which is produced later. Again the Prāgabdhāva being the cause, what about the pūrva-vartitva existing in it? For this we have only the prāgabdhāva as an explanation and this would result in the fallacy of ātmāśraya. Thus the Prāgabdhāva, which is suggested by the special condition of the cause, which is in the process of being known, is known on the basis of the knowledge of Prāgabdhāva.

This is the fallacy of circular reasoning or cakraka. It can not be doubted that the Prāgabhāva is not implied by the condition of the cause. One does not think that a pot will be produced here and just now and there is the Prāgabhāva of a pot, when one does not see the condition of the cause, favourable to the production of a pot. It should not be contended that such an understanding arises only by practice, for then it would arise even when the cause is not seen. Thus the Prāgabhāva is not different from the cause.

Similar is the case of Dhvamsa, says Puruṣottama. One who sees the condition of the cause, detrimental to the existence of the effect, thinks that the pot is destroyed. This does not go against the terminology Dhvamsa and Prāgabhāva. Both the terms can easily be used in relation to the cause, bearing in mind that they are relative terms like cause and effect. Similarly the terms Bhāvi and Dhvasta also can be used. It should not be made out that as the effect exists in the conditions of Prāgabhāva and Dhvamsa, it must be seen; because the existence of the effect is subtle and subtlety here means that the form is not manifest.

The reciprocal non-existence (Anyonyābhāva) and absolute non-existence (Atyantābhāva) are like-wise not different.

concepts.⁸⁹

While explaining the Anutva of the individual soul, Puruṣottama enters into a scholarly refutation of those, who think otherwise.

The Jains believe that the soul⁸⁹ has middle measure or deha-parimāṇa, on the ground that, otherwise, the sentiency, which pervades the whole body, can not be explained. Puruṣottama says that the pervasion of the sentiency can be understood on the analogy of smell, which can spread to other places also. If we accept the Jain theory, the -- individual soul would be liable to transiency. The eternity of the individual soul is proved by Puruṣottama on the strength of curious and interesting arguments. A child, which is just born, sucks the breasts of its mother, due to hunger. This activity, on the part of a child, can be explained only on the ground of the memory of the experience of averting hunger, that has been experienced before. This means that the soul⁸⁹ of the child is the same as that which was present in some other body previously. This leads to its beginninglessness and indestructibility and hence eternity. Another argument given is that of the ghosts, who speak of

89. Pr. pp. 111-116.

the previous life.

The soul again can not be said to have the measure, capable of accretion and depletion. As the bodies are different and many and the soul enters them, here also the same problem of anityatva would arise. The jīva cannot have many parimāṇas, for no such thing can be seen in the world. If it is accepted as having a body, it will be partite and hence transitory.

The logicians and others have used the same arguments to refute other theories and have proved the pervasive measure of the souls on the following grounds. Things, which are produced at various places for our enjoyment, should have our own adṛṣṭa as the cause. So the cause, at the place of production, is the conjunction of the jīva joined with the adṛṣṭa. This would lead to the Vibhūṭva of the soul. If the soul is atomic, its attributes like desire and knowledge would be suprasensuous, as the attributes of an atom are. And as an atom is imperceptible, the term 'I' would be countered by perception. The mind again is atomic and the conjunction of the mind and the soul would produce a third substance, as the conjunction of two atoms results in the production of something else. The conjunction of the mind with the sense-organs would require the disjunction of the soul and the

mind and thus there can be no production of knowledge. This being the case, the individual soul must be all-pervasive.

To this Puruṣottama replies that it has many weak points. If all the individual souls are all-pervading, they would have connection with all the form-ed objects, all the sense organs, minds and bodies. This will result in the enjoyment of all by all and there will be no regulation of a particular enjoyment for a particular soul. The opponent may here point out that there is a fixed place for the non-inherent cause regarding the distinctive qualities of the all-pervading jīvas and so the enjoyment can be limited to a place, where the jīva and the mind are joined. Puruṣottama says that no such limitation is useful. When one eats a mango, it is limited in being eaten by the mouth, even then one may say, 'I eat a mango'. Even so here one may say, 'I am enjoying in the body of Devadatta'. Further just as one may say 'There is nothing in my legs but I have headache', one would also experience 'I am happy in the body of Devadatta, but unhappy in the body of Yajñadatta.' As one jīva is present everywhere, the experiences, produced at the places of conjunction with the respective minds, will be inherent. There would be nothing to bar the after-cognition

(anuvyavasāya) regarding the different minds; then all would be omniscient. This does not become an iṣṭāpatti, because the opponent does not believe in only one soul but accepts many jīvas. If for establishing the limited enjoyment, some limiting adṛsta is admitted, it would result in the middle measure of the jīva and this would controvert the accepted vyāpakatva and nityatva, for which it is necessary to admit the enjoyment, limited by other bodies also. This goes against perception. Again all the souls would be omniscient and there will be an unwarranted blending in all the three worlds. (Pratyaksavirodha, Sarvajñatāpatti and Trailokyasaṅkarāpatti). This, says Puruṣottama, is 'Ubhayataḥ pāśa rajjuh'.

Experience and remembrance have not necessarily the same field of operation. In fact remembrance does not require the consideration of the place of action, as we often see the usages like, 'Netrābhyāṁ adrākṣam karābhyāṁ asprśam', or 'Yam aham adrākṣam tam antaḥ sparśmi.' The logicians would have thus to face the ridiculous position of remembering the taste of a mango in the body of Yajñadatta, while it has actually been eaten by Devadatta's body. There is again nothing to prove that experience and remembrance would be limited to one body only,

for the remembrance of the previous birth can be explained only by admitting only one soul, not concerned with a change of bodies. This can not be accounted for by the existence of an Ātivāhika. If one is dead in Prayāga and born in Indraprastha, one may well remember one's jāti; or one staying as a spirit in Srughna but dead elsewhere may remember one's friends and relatives; but the Ātmapradeśa limited by the Ātivāhika may not include Srughna, Prayāga or Indraprastha. If for averting this the Ātmapradeśa is not considered but any place related to the Ātivāhika is taken into consideration, then memory would come to the Ātivāhika and not the jīva. Further the Adṛṣṭa would have to be inseparably connected with the Ātivāhika, otherwise the sacrifices etc., performed on the earth, would lead to the production of Adṛṣṭa in all the souls. Thus even those, who are alive, will be able to enjoy heaven by means of another Ātivāhika. Many Ātivāhikas of liberated souls exist and thus they are by no means rare. The rarity of the Ātivāhikas need not be substantiated by pointing out their transiency, for one may be able to enjoy by means of the Ātivāhika even of a deity, or that has been attracted by the Adṛṣṭa.

It is again impossible to accept the regulating power of the Adṛṣṭa. The Adṛṣṭa is due to the actions; efforts are made by

the conjunction of the mind and the soul. The conjunction thus will be of all the minds with all the souls. Thus we will have all the Aḍṛṣṭas for all. There can be no differentiation in the conjunction of the mind and the soul, for that stands in need of a separate cause. If no other cause is possible, one may believe in the desire of God for the regulation, as to which soul would enjoy what and whose Aḍṛṣṭa would be produced by which action. Similar is the case in the Anyātmavāda. Why then go a long way to establish the Vyāpakatva by accepting the Aḍṛṣṭavādātmasamyoga?

If the jīvas are all-pervasive, they would not be ruled by God. They would be egotistic on account of their greatness and eternal nature. They are also sentient equally. How then is God superior? So the atomic measure of the jīvas is necessary for establishing the superiority of God. Even though the jīva is atomic, sentiency can pervade the whole body, because it has the quality of gliding as is the case with smell. It should not be made out, says Puruṣottama, that in case of atomic souls, happiness and the like will not be perceived, as the perception of qualities requires a larger measure. He says that what is required for perception is the fitness or योग्यता. Even in the

theory of all-pervasive souls on the other hand, the perception even of the Adṛṣṭa would be irrefutable on account of the sāmānādhikarānya of ^{the} large measure. The question of the perception of the Paramāṇu will not arise at all, because there is no fitness in the atoms, which are not manifested. Again the pleasure and the like are not the attributes of the soul.

As regards the contention, 'Aham iti pratyakṣānupapattiḥ', Puruṣottama says that it is not valid. The perception is of the jīva covered with the body. As this entails co-extension with the grossness and the like, such a perception is only of the nature of illusion.

The argument, that the conjunction of the mind and soul, which are of different nature, produces something else, is based upon the theory of the production of a thing from the conglomeration of two atoms. The theory is however wholly discarded by the Vedāntin, who follows the Śrūtis. Similar is the case regarding the argument of the non-production of knowledge, as it is based on the same theory.

The jīva, according to the followers of the Śuddhādvaita, may become all-pervasive, if God so wishes, when the aspect of

bliss is manifested.⁹⁰

Puruṣottama has refuted almost all other Vedāntic theories also in ^{one} way or other. For them, however, the emphasis is more on the interpretation of the scriptures, rather than reasoning alone. Even ~~then~~ there are passages in his works, where reason finds its way and we may note some of them here.

Puruṣottama after Vallabha refutes the system of dualism as advocated by Madhva, Mīmāṃsakas and others. He asks as to how dualism can be understood. It may either be on the basis of the difference of Upādāna, or that of the natural attributes or of the Pramāṇas. The first alternative is not possible, because the scriptures tell of Brahman as the only material cause. Even in the world, if one wants gold, one does not take into consideration the effects of the lump of gold as earrings and the like. The contention that oneness can not exist between a pot and a piece of cloth is answered by saying that the distinction of the material cause in this respect is mundane. The second alternative is equally meaningless, for once the unity of essence is conceded the distinction of the attributes is immaterial. Otherwise a man on his seat will be different

90. T.S.Ab. pp. 92-95. Puruṣottama has also written a Vēda on

the subject, as we have seen above.

from the same man on his feet, or a piece of cloth, when spread out, will be different from the same, which is rolled. Even the attributes, which do not exist~~s~~ at the same time, do not differentiate the substantive; the attributes that can exist~~s~~ need not surely differentiate the substantive. Thus a pot is not differentiated by taste and form. Even those, that do not exist simultaneously e.g. entrance and exit, may have the difference in their counter parts and not the substantive. Brahman is One and Great and thus is not differentiated by attributes. In fact even the attributes also have no essential difference. The entrance and exit having different counter parts may appear as different but are really not different, for there is no proof for this. Even so at other places~~s~~ also the difference is due to egoism and is not real. The third alternative is also wrong. Perception is deluding and so is the case with other means of proof, which are based upon it. Thus we must accept what is established by the Śrutis.⁹¹

As regards the other Ācāryas, Rāmānuja has been criticised often by Puruṣottama. The criticism however is mainly based on the interpretations and the spirit or burden of the attack is that we can not accept the Brahman, which^{is} qualified by the cit

91. T. S. Ab. pp. 158-159.

and acit in the beginning of creation. It should be noted that the followers of the Śuddhādvaita have ⁹soft corner for Rāmānuja. Puruṣottama himself is not so vehement in his criticism of Rāmānuja, because he generally uses, 'Tad cintyam' etc. instead of 'Tad asangatam' etc, which he uses for others.⁹²

The theories of Śrīkantha are almost similar to those of Rāmānuja. He is however ~~criticised~~ criticised for his belief in Siva as the Highest God. Nimbārka is never mentioned by him.

The Bhedābheda of Bhāskara is criticised by him on interpretative grounds. The reasoning here is as follows:

The Śrutis say that if the cause is known, all the effects are known. If we believe in the Bhedābheda, the point of view, by which the bheda is accepted, can not be known by the knowledge of the cause, because the effect is different from the cause. If it is known, then the effect is not different and we must accept the ebheda completely. Hence we should accept only the Avasthābheda between the cause and the effect and not the Svarūpabheda.⁹³

Puruṣottama at one place ⁹⁴ defends Bhāskara against Vācaspati. As the whole discussion is very interesting we have put it here

92. Cf. A. B. P. p. 97. etc.

93. A. B. P. p. 534.

94. A. B. P. pp. 93-95.

in extenso.

Bhāskara's theory is contained in the well known verse, which is as follows:

Kāryarūpeṇa nānātvam abhedah kārṇātmanā ,

Hemātmanē yathā bhedaḥ kuṇḍalēdyāt^Ymanā bhidā.

Vācaspati asks as to what is this abhedā, which exists simultaneously with the bheda. Is it mutual absence? If it is, does it subsist between the effect and the cause like a bracelet and gold? If it does not subsist, then there is oneness and no difference. If it does, there is difference and no oneness. The bhāva and abhāva are not non-contradictory, because they do not exist simultaneously. If they do, the kaṭaka and ^Yardhamānaka also would be essentially identical, because in that case difference is not against identity. Again, if the bracelet is one with gold, just as bracelets, crowns and earrings are not different from the point of view of their essence, which is gold, even so they^Y should not be different from the point of view of their essence of bracelets. Hence only gold is the substance and not the bracelets and the like, which are not found to be identical. If it is said that the abhedā is only from the point of view of gold and not bracelets, then there surely is bheda from the earrings etc. If bracelets are non-

different from gold, why should they not follow in the earrings and the like? If they do ^{not} follow, how is it that they are non-different? That one, which is removed when the other follows, is different from the other, just as the string follows, while the flowers do not and are thus different. The earrings and the like do not follow even though gold does. Thus they are also different from gold. If everything is expected to follow together, the distinctions like 'this is not this' etc. can not be maintained, as there can be no discriminating factor. Again when we know from a distance that there is gold, we will not wish ~~to~~ know whether they are earrings or something else, because there is identity between gold and its viśeṣas and gold is known. If there is difference between them, they will not be known, when the gold is known. Well, says the argumentator, they are identical also, why are they not known? On the contrary it is quite proper that they should be known. As a rule, when the cause is absent, the effect is also absent. The absence of the effect is removed by the presence of the cause. So far as identity is concerned, ~~when it is accepted~~, the cause exists.

Vācaspati says that if the earrings and the like are known by the knowledge of gold, the attempts for knowing them are

meaningless. When one thing is not known, while the other is known these two are different. When a cub of an elephant is seen and an ass is not, the former is different from the latter. When gold is seen from a distance, its distinctions like earrings are not known and are thus different from gold as such. What then about the *sāmānādhikarāṇya* as found in 'Hema-kundalam'? It can not be explained on the ground of the relationship between the substratum and the dependent or between the two having a common resort. If the reference here is to the presence (*Anuvṛtti*) and exclusion (*Vyāvṛtti*), why should one wish to know the earrings, when gold is known? Abhedā again is not *akāntika* or *śaṅkāntika*, from which both are possible. Therefore when one of the two can be repudiated, it is proper that the *bhedakalpanā* has abhedā as its *upādāna* and not vice versa, because the *bhedā* depends upon those, which are differentiated. If there is not oneness, the difference subsisting on many can not be possible. The one again does not depend upon difference. When we say that 'A is not B', the comprehension of difference rests upon that of the counter part, while that of oneness does not depend upon anything else. Thus the *anirvacanīya-kalpanā* is *abhedopādānā*. This is also corroborated by scriptural passages. Therefore the *kūṭastha-nityatā* is real and not *pariṇāminītyatā*.

To this Puruṣottama says that it is all wrong. In the theory of Bhāskara, that is refuted, the bheda is not accepted as of the nature of reciprocal negation (anyonyābhāva) and hence to refute him on this ground is like imagining the smell of a sky-flower. Even if it is accepted, the pot and its absence, as also the pot and things which are different from it, are seen as existing simultaneously on earth and there is no contradiction, as it has been alleged. The total non-existence (Atyantābhāva) which is constant and pervading, exists everywhere, hence when the counter-part is brought, it is only an obstruction of the abhāva-buddhi. Thus abheda can exist, even when there is bheda and thus there can be no contradiction if both co-exist. The contingency again of the oneness of kataka and vardha^mkataka is not so sound because non-contradiction is never seen as leading to oneness. Vācaspati's attempts to differentiate the bracelets from gold are also futile. Bracelets are just states of gold and are therefore one with and also different from gold. Even Śaṅkara has said the same thing regarding the ocean and its waves. As for the refutation regarding the pratītivirodha, Puruṣottama says that there is no such contradiction, because even though difference is understood from the point of view of kuṇḍalas,

oneness can equally be understood from the point of view of Gold. This is corroborated by evidence. When that is conceded, whatever Vācaspati has said regarding the bheda and abheda, when gold is seen from a distance, is of no significance. Both the bheda and abheda are comprehended, and that is what the quoted kārīkā means. As the effects like the crown and bracelets are only states of gold, the sāmānādhikārya with the gold is plausible, so also the vyāvṛtti-vyavasthā and jijñāsājanakatva. So the difference is adventitious and not inexplicable. This does not go against the Śrutis which do not teach mithyātva. Puruṣottama concludes by saying that the theory of Bhāskara is not faulty in this respect.

Śaṅkara's theory of absolute monism has been the subject of the most severe criticism of Vallabha and his followers. Vallabha thought Śaṅkara to be his chief adversary and attacked him very vehemently. The same is the case with Viṭṭhaleśa and the array of writers, who followed him. Puruṣottama however shows a balance of judgement. His references to Śaṅkara are as respectful as those to other Ācāryas and what is more ^{he} is never discourteous. Even then, he never simply depends upon the interpretations of the Śrutis but supports his statements with sound reasoning.

Whatever may be the greatness of Vallabha as a writer and founder of a system, Vallabha's refutations of Śaṅkara, many and frequent that they are, are more theological than logical. Some of the very important refutations of Śaṅkara's theories, as given by Puruṣottama, are noted below:

In the Prahastavāda Puruṣottama rejects the theory of Avidyā. Avidyā is said to be an upādhi of Brahman. Is it with or without a beginning? It can not be the former. The opponent believes that Brahman, which is endowed with the upadhis, is the Īśvara. If avidyā has beginning, Īśvara would also have it; this would be similar to the theory of Īśvara as an effect, as believed by the Sāṅkhya, and it would go against the Vedāntic theories. The later alternative is equally unacceptable, because that which has no beginning has no end also. Thus there arises the contingency of non-liberation and Īśvara would then be inferior even to the individual soul. As Īśvara is bound equally as the individual soul, nobody would worship him. If it is said that the avidyā is without beginning but has an end, even then Īśvara must be accepted as omniscient. He knows all the Vedas; and there is nobody else higher than he as an Adhikārin. Those, who believe in the direct realization, should admit that such a realization

of Brahman is required even for Īśvara. When this Īśvara is liberated, this would result in the negation of the world. If Īśvara does not obtain liberation, others, who are inferior to him, can also not obtain it and this would go against the theory of direct realization. If we believe in the liberation of others, while Īśvara is not liberated, then Īśvara will be inferior to those, who are capable of self-realization.

As for the avidyā, which leads to the imagination of distinctions, is it connected with jīva or Brahman? It can not be the former, because then it can not imagine the attributes in Brahman. As Brahman is not an object of the mind or speech, and as jīva has no knowledge of the adhiṣṭhāna, the jīva cannot be related to it, and when there is no possibility of reflection, there can be no imagination either. The opponent may say that the souls, endowed with knowledge, see Brahman and thus a connection can be established. Puruṣottama says that this is wrong. As avidyā is guṇātmikā and as those, who have the required knowledge, see Brahman only after the eradication of the guṇas, there can be no such possibility. Further the advent of knowledge leads to eternity or non-destruction, while this leads to destruction. Should we accept destruction for those who have

already reached the state of non-destruction? If the avidyā in the jīvas is to imagine the distinctions in Brahman, the latter must be seen. But Brahman can be an object of visualization only after the distinctions are imagined. This is *petitio principii*. If we agree to the visualization of the qualITLESS Brahman, how can Brahman be qualITLESS? The second alternative would lead to all the contingencies, stated above regarding the Īśvara.

Again is the said advidyā existent, non-existent, both or neither? The first is not possible, because if it exists, as much as Brahman, this would result in dualism. It can not be the second, because then like the sky-flower it can not imagine anything. It is not again the third, because it is imagined itself, in that case like the conch-shell-silver. It can not be imagined by anybody at first, since as the Brahman is qualITLESS, even the jīvas do not exist. If it has no beginning, all the fallacies stated above would arise. If we believe that it has not a beginning but an end, then also the contingencies have been stated above. The ^ufourth alternative is equally unacceptable, because in that case, avidyā will not be different from Brahman which is neither sat, nor asat. Thus the belief in the upādhis

is not plausible.⁹⁵

The Pratibimbavāda, as advocated by the followers of Śaṅkara, has been the object of a very severe criticism in the works of Puruṣottama.⁹⁶ Six different view points are advanced by the followers of Śaṅkara with regard to the theory of Pratibimba. They are as follows:

1. Māyā is beginningless and inexplicable, is connected with the cit and is the prakṛti of the bhūtas. The image of the cit in it is Īśvara. This māyā has innumerable pradesas called avidyā, having the capacity of concealing and projection. The image of cit in them is the jīva.

2. The mūla - prakṛti, which is trigunātmikā, has two forms, māyā and avidyā. The māyā has mainly in it the pure sattva unsoiled by rajas or tamas. The image of cit in it is Īśvara. Avidyā has the sattva, defiled by rajas and tamas. The image of cit in it is jīva.

3. The image of cit in the same viz. avidyā, called māyā on account of its power of projection is the jīva.

4. The image of cit in the avidyā is Īśvara and the same in

95. Prh. pp. 21-23.

96. T.S. Ab. pp. 102-103. See also Jīvapratibimbatvakhaṇḍanavāda,

Vādāvalī. p. 170 ff.

the internal organ is the jīva.

5. Some believe in the four-fold sentiency of the kūṭastha, jīva, Brahman and Īśvara corresponding to the Ghāṭākāśa, jalākāśa, mahākāśa and meghākāśa. Īśvara is the image of the cit in the dhīvēśanās of all the living beings remaining in the māyētamas resting in the Brahman. The image of sentiency in the internal organ, imagined by māyā and remaining in the cañtanya, which is delimited by the subtle and gross bodies, is the jīva.

6. The caitanya, which is delimited by the upādhis of the jīva like the internal organ is the Īśvara who is the bimbs. His image (Pratibimba) in the nescience is the jīva. Even there the jīva has its specific place of manifestation in the internal organ, which is the pariṇāma of ne⁵science.

Puruṣottama says that for those, who think that Īśvara is an image in that, which is without the capacity of concealment and projection, the Īśvara can not be established. There can be no image in what is very pure, as it is seen in case of marble-stones. It is not possible to say that the substratum might have some connection with impurity from a distance, because even space was not existing before creation, and we can not thus talk of

distance. If we accept the external space, the *Īśvara* and the cit would be limited to a particular place; then they cannot be all-pervading and the *ākāśa* also cannot be accepted as being created. That *jīva* is an image in the *pradeśas* of the *Māyā*, those which are capable of projection etc., is also untenable. In that case the enveloping capacity would pose an obstruction for the image. If it does not come in between the two, how can the *jīva* be ignorant? There are further fallacies like the absence of space. Thus the view that the *bhūtaprakṛti* and its *pradeśas* are *upādhis* is not plausible. The same argument counters the second view point also.

Again as both the *māyā* and *avidyā* are all-pervading, the *rajas* and *tamas* do and do not defile the *sattva* everywhere. Thus there can be no discrimination between the *māyā* and the *avidyā* and consequently between the *jīva* and *Īśvara*. If the *māyā* and the *avidyā* are not all-pervading, the *jīva* and *Īśvara* would similarly not be all-pervading and this goes against the accepted theory. If it be argued that the *māyā* is all pervading and clear and pure from all sides and that the *avidyā*, which rests in it, is not so clear and pure, even then *Īśvara* can not be accepted, because no image can be seen in that which is all pervading. The same is

the case with the jīva, because māyā has three guṇas and there may be an obstruction between the outer cit and the inner ^{avidyā} ~~avidyā~~ by virtue of the rajas and tamas. If the cit is very near so as to avert all obstructions, that which is very near can not be reflected. If some distance is admitted, then the fallacies in such an admission have already been pointed out. The third viewpoint has the same faults, as stated before. Coming to the fifth, which takes its stand on the illustration of the ghaṭākāśa etc., Puruṣottama says that the reflection can be accepted only of that, which is unmixed with the upādhis, on the basis of the given illustration. This being the case the intervening tamas of the māyā, the tamas having many parts thickly closeted, would obstruct the dhīvāsanās. And there can be no Īśvara. If the parts are not accepted as thickly closeted, the purpose can not be explained. If it is said to be the very nature of the thing, then we have the svabhāva-vāda. The svabhāva can be established if and when the pratibimba is accepted and vice versa. This is petitio principii. There are similar fallacies in saying that the internal organ does not subsist without the māyā.

As against those, who believe that the reflection of the cit in the māyā is Īśvara and that of the jīva is the image of

Īśvara in the avidyā or the internal organ, Puruṣottama says that the māyā will block the reflection of the image and thus the reflection will not be explicable. Even though the māyā may be clear externally on all sides, even then that aspect, which is not clear, is internal and will pervade the avidyā and the internal organ; thus the fallacy remains as such. If it is believed that the avidyā with the pure sattva is inside the māyā endowed with the same and that the rajas and tamas are still inside it, then there can be no reflection in that which is very clear and pure. Coming to the sixth view point Puruṣottama says that as Īśvara is also mixed with the upādhis, as he is delimited by the upādhis of the jīva, there can be no reflection, because of the absence of any go-between. Īśvara thus can not be a bimba. If we accept something in between, then this would run counter to the accepted theory of omnipresence. The fourth view point is also refuted by the arguments, that have already been stated.

Further the reflection can be possible only of that which is an object of our eyes; and as the cit can not be seen, it can not be a bimba at all. Puruṣottama here discusses whether the echo of a sound is also a reflection. The opponent has made out the same to prove that even though the sound is not seen by our

eyes, it is reflected in an echo. Puruṣottama is however not prepared to agree that echo is a reflection.

All these view points can not be admitted from the point of view of the nature of vṛtti. If something exists, enveloping a certain place, it can not be reflected there. The cit, māyā and avidyā are all-pervading. Thus there can be no question of reflection or the reflected. Thus there can be no Īśvara, no jīva. If we believe in the reflection in the dhīvāsanās, there will be multiplicity of Īśvaras, because the abode being not one the images/ also must be many. The Pratibimba again is not co-eval with the bimba and has its existence, corresponding to that of its counter part. Here we will have to accept the sāmānādhikaranyā and bimbasthitivijṣṭīyasthitikatva, both of which can not be maintained. Puruṣottama then discusses the scriptural passages.⁹⁷

In the Prasthānaratnākara, while discussing the anumāna, Puruṣottama refutes Dharmarāja Dikṣita, a follower of Śaṅkara. Dharmarāja Dikṣita gives the following syllogism: 'Brahmabhinnam sarvaṃ mithyā. Brahmabhinnatvāt. Yad evaṃ tad evaṃ. Śūktikārejeta-
vat,' for illustrating the use of the anumāna in philosophical

97. Vādavalī. pp. 170-176.

thinking. Puruṣottama says that, as in the Prasthānas, the silver which is anirvacanīya can not be established, the illustration given here is not proper. Even if we may agree to the illustration, the falsity can be explained on the ground of the buddhyākāratva, and thus it is not proper to adduce the distinction from Brahman for the same. The hetu again is implausible, because of the sentences like, 'Idam sarvam yad ayam ātmā.'⁹⁸ Puruṣottama says that if the hetu is established on the basis of appearance, then nothing is required to be said. The appearance depends upon the buddhi and we have no objection in accepting it as false. The syllogism would thus be "Brahmānyatvena pratiyamānam avastu. Ādyantavattvāt. Svāpnikavat". The hetu need not be called common on the ground of counter-syllogism, because the dream experiences are proved to be false. If a man dreams of connections with a woman or of going out to some other country, when he is awake, he does not find a woman or another country; thus the reality of the dream experiences is sublated. This however does not lead to the falsity of the whole world. Puruṣottama gives a syllogism for this. 'Vimataḥ prapañcāḥ svotkr̥stasattākasaḍr̥śa-sr̥ṣṭipūrvakāḥ. Mithyāsr̥ṣṭitvāt. Svāpnikavat.' Scriptural passages can be cited to show that the world, which has

98. Nṛsinhettaratāpinī Upaniṣad. V.

Brahman as its essence is not unreal. What is mithyātvā?

It is that which though unreal, appears to be and is said to be real. The definition of mithyātvā given as 'Svāśrayatve-nābhimatayāvanniṣṭhātyantābhāvapratīyogitvam' does not corroborate the advaitic theory of the māyāvēdin. It rather goes against him, as it will establish the world as a counter part of the absolute negation of the world, in connection with Brahman. The opponent has given a syllogism 'Pataḥ etattantu-niṣṭhātyantābhāvapratīyogi. Patatvāt. Patāntarevat.' Puruṣottama objects to this by saying that the hetu is contradicted by perception. The opponent challenges this by saying that there is no fallacy in the hetu, because the object here is the existence of Brahman, which is the substratum. Puruṣottama asks as to what is meant by the compound Brahmasattā? Does it mean the existence of Brahman or Brahman which is existence? The first is wrong, because Brahman is not possessed of any attribute. The second goes against the Śrutis saying that it can not be experienced by our senses. Puruṣottama then shows how the scriptural passages do not go against the 'Suddhādvaita'.⁹⁹

⁹⁹ Pr. pp. 246-148.

The most important criticism of Śaṅkara is however given in the beginning of the Anubhāṣyaprakāśa. Here perhaps Puruṣottama is following in the footsteps of Rāmānuja, who has given a critical and exhaustive refutation of Śaṅkara under the first Sūtra in his Śrībhāṣya. Puruṣottama is however more careful and does not indulge in the repudiation of Śaṅkara on a large scale. Puruṣottama ~~however~~ thinks it fit to concentrate on the Adhyāsa-bhāṣya viz. The introductory part of Śaṅkara's commentary. We need not here give the Pūrvapakṣa, which is well known. Apart from the references to the Śrutis, Puruṣottama's arguments are as follows:

Śaṅkara has tried to make out the concomitance, that whatever is an object is non-sentient. This vyāpti, says Puruṣottama, is sublated by perception. The sentiency of the soul is accepted by both the parties, it can be grasped by the pratyagvitti (Inner knowledge). The soul is thus an object of the Pratyagvitti and is thus all-pervading. Hence only the vyāpti viz. whatever is non-sentient is an object, can be established by perception. The opponent need not point out that as the pratyagvitti does not apprehend the ātman, which is cit-ekarasa, it is not an object. Even if we agree to

this, the atman will have to be accepted as an object in some form or another. Otherwise, if there is no object, how can there be any vitti? It should not be said that it is the ego, which is the object and not the soul. According to the Nyāya system, it is the soul which is the object and not the ego. According to the Sāṅkhya, as the ego is non-sentient, if this is the case, the ahaṁtva and the caitanya would appear to be co-equal. In that case, when the ego as an object is removed in the pratyagvitti, only the ātman remains as the object. It should not be said that, when the ego is removed, the ātman is known as the very nature of the pratyagvitti. This can not be accepted in the absence of any other means of realization. That is what happens in the world at the time of testing a gem. Otherwise the nityā-nitya-vastuviveka is possible even from the systems like the Sāṅkhya; and thus it will not lead to the vicāra-adhikāra, as made out by the opponent. Hence even though the opponent does not wish, he will have to accept reluctantly that ātman is known by pratyagvitti. This will not lead to the non-sentiency of the atman on account of its being illuminated by an external agency, because one can fall back upon the Śruti passages like 'Atrāyam puruṣaḥ/ svayam

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jyotir bhavati'. Thus the ātman should be understood as the
 abode of sentiency and yet having the nature of sentiency;
 and the contrast between the subject and object can be
 explained away by virtue of our experience. Thus when the
 relationship of the āśraya and the āśrayin is established,
 the ^{āt}ātman and samvid will have to be admitted as different
 and thus the substance as an object should also be accepted
 as distinct. It should not be doubted that as the sattva is
 inexplicable, those which are connected with it are also
 equally inexplicable. It is necessary, even for the opponent,
 to explain the sattva, because otherwise even the samvid will
 be confounded with asattva. If existence is to be of the
 nature of luminosity, then the ātman, which is connected with
 it, surely has the sattva. It is not wise to say that the
 ātman is of the nature of luminosity and is not connected
 with it, as there is no pratyaktva there. 'I know' or 'I am
 endowed with knowledge', sentences like these show that
 knowledge is an attribute of the soul. Thus when the
 existence of the soul different from the luminosity is

conceded, the existences of the *śārtha* as an object in the form of not being superimposed, is also established, because that which does not exist can not be an object. There is no such cognition as 'I see or experience a sky-flower'. As regards the phantom or mirage it is seen in a superimposed form. It should not be said that there is the straying of existence in the *abhāva*, because it also has the *bhāvatva*. The *abhāva* is stated to be there, only in the form of the counter part which is not being experienced. Otherwise even with a counter part, it will be cognised. It should not be contended that since the *saṃvit* is inseparably connected with an object and as it does not shine forth without the object, it can not be called self-luminous. That as the lamp has its nature of light, the *saṃvit* is of the nature of luminosity and this itself is the *svataḥprakāśa padārtha*. Similar is the case of the soul. The opponent may here point out that the *ātman*, which is all-pervading, exists every where. Just as water is superimposed on sand resulting in mirage even so the bodies etc. are superimposed on the *ātman*. If we believe in the *sattva*, it is impossible to explain the limitation at a particular place. Thus we accept the *saḍ-asad-vilaksanatva* on the basis of its being seen, taking into account its *asattva*. This, says

Puruṣottama, is improper. For those who believe in the vastu-pariccheda, the samavāyin and the like of the substance exist and thus the deśa is easily established. Those, who do not accept it, believe that everything is the effect of Brahman and thus the deśa would be included in it. Thus when the deśa is established as also the bodies etc, it is easy to understand their superimposition on the soul. Otherwise it is difficult to explain it like the sky-flower. The illustration given by the followers of 'Sāṅkara viz. 'Apratyakṣa ākāśe mālīnyādhyāśavaḥ apratyakṣa ātmani śarīrādhyāśaḥ' is not correct. Ākāśa is perceptible to the non-intelligent as space, and to the intelligent on account of the nature of the thing itself. Thus the illustration does not lead to the desired conclusion. At the end of the discussion Puruṣottama discusses some scriptural passages.¹⁰¹.

We have seen above some important refutations of the theories of others, as given by Puruṣottama. It may not be possible to examine all of them here because it would add much more to the bulk of this thesis, but we may say that there is nothing wrong in stating that many of his arguments are fairly reasonable. The repudiation of the Buddhistic

101. A.B.P. pp. 13-16.

Catuskotika is really a very good specimen of Puruṣottama's scholarship and capacity as an argumentator. Similar is his rejection of the concept of abhāva, the theory of the pervasion of the soul, and that of the reflection of the soul and Brahman. The question however remains only with the last discussion, in which Puruṣottama attacks Śaṅkara and his thesis that the subject can never be an object. Puruṣottama's refutation as detailed above reminds one of the similar but more violent refutation given by Rāmānuja. There are flaws in Śaṅkara's theory, but it should be remembered that it is futile to accept everything reasonable and logical in those realms, ^{where} ~~where~~ logic has no say of its own. It is rather difficult to agree that the ātman is the object of Pratyagvitti, when there is absolute oneness and there can be no subject-object-relationship or duality. Śaṅkara could have very easily pointed out to Rāmānuja and Puruṣottama, what Puruṣottama has himself said to Vācaspati while defending Bhāskara. The whole theory of oneness, adhyāsa, inability to explain the subject-object-relationship and all that pertain to the esoteric level and not to the exoteric realm of thinking. It is useless therefore to argue that 'Ahaṃ jñāmi' and similar sentences show that

knowledge is an attribute of the 'I' ,when Śaṅkara is thinking from the point of view of 'Kena kam vijānīyāt'.¹⁰²

It is again curious to note that all the thinkers would like to conceal their weak points by falling back upon the Śrutis, while the same is denied by them to their opponents. Vallabha and after him Puruṣottama have to take recourse to the Śrutis very often. For Śaṅkara it has been stated that he first frames his system on the strength of pure reason and then tries to support it by scriptures. In so doing he is sometimes compelled quite naturally, to distort the scriptural passages-a process, theologians can never tolerate.

(V).

Interpretation of the Śrutis.

The Śrutis have always been the fountain source of Indian philosophical systems. All the systems, especially the Vedāntic ones, are said to be dependent mainly on the Śrutis and every Ācārya wishes to show that his theories are not new or invented but are the same as taught in the Śrutis, which were not properly understood by others. The Bhagavad-

102. Brhadāraṇyaka Upaniṣad. IV. v. 15.

Gītā and the Brahmasūtras also enjoy the same position of the Prasthānas or starting points of those systems. For Vallabha however the Bhāgavata is added to make up the Prasthānacatus-taya.

Vallabha says that out of these four Prasthānas, the Śrutis, the Gītā, the Brahmasūtras and the Bhāgavata, each former can be properly understood with the help of the succeeding one. This has been illustrated by Puruṣottama thus.¹⁰³ The Śruti says, 'Apāṇipādo Javano grahītā'.¹⁰⁴ Does this mean that Brahman is devoid of worldly hands and feet or that it is without hands and feet altogether? The Gītā passage 'Sarvataḥ pāṇipādam tad'¹⁰⁵ would help us in this respect and so the alaukikaśāmarthyā of God is upheld by accepting the former alternative. Similarly the Gītā says 'Nityaḥ sarvaśataḥ sthānūr acalo'yaṁ sanātanah',¹⁰⁶ and 'Mameivamśo jīvaloke'.¹⁰⁷ For understanding this the Brahmasūtras 'Utkrāntigatyāgatinām'¹⁰⁸ etc. would help¹⁰⁹ in deciding the aṁśatva. The Sūtras again say 'Janmādyasya yataḥ'

103. T. S. Ab. pp. 38-40.

104. Śvetāśvatara Upaniṣad. III. 19.

105. Bhagavad Gītā. XIII. 13.

106. Bhagavad Gītā. II. 24.

107. Bhagavad Gītā. XV. 7.

108. Brahmasūtras. II. iii. 25.

109. Brahmasūtras. I. i. 2.

This can be understood with the help of the Bhāgavata passages like 'Jenmādyasya yato'nvayād...' ¹¹⁰

The basic view point regarding the Vedas is almost the same in all the orthodox systems of India. The Vedānta believe -s in the Svataḥpramāṇyavāda of the Śrutis. As Puruṣottama says the Vedas are an independent Pramāṇa for the meta-physical knowledge, on account of three reasons. Firstly it is Sattvaśodhaka. The Sattva which helps in the right knowledge can be purified only by the means stated in the scriptures, and thus they are an independent proof. Secondly they are the sentences of the Lord Himself. The Vedas are regarded in India as Apauruṣeya. Thirdly they are of the nature of the external breath of the Highest Lord. ¹¹¹ The Vedas are thus eternal. The speciality of the Suddhādvaita is that they believe in a different nāma-prapañca altogether. We shall however discuss that point in the next chapter.

The Vedāntic writers have throughout tried to find out their own theories from the scriptures. The scriptures are the works of different sages composed at different times and

110. Bhāgavata. I. i. 1.

11. Sarvanirapekṣāḥ svataḥpramāṇa^{amāna} bhūtā vedā eva. Sattvaśodhakatvāt bhagavadvākyatvāt tanniśvasātarūpatvācca.

different places. Naturally therefore the scriptures may not appear to present a coherent system and the need for evolving such a system was felt from very early times. Even Bēdarāyana has said 'Tat tu samāyayāt'.¹¹² Everyone has tried to find-out a consistent system from a bundle of conflicting passages.

Vallabha and Viṭṭhaleśa have not commented upon the Upaniṣads and though Puruṣottama is said to have written many Dīpikās, most of them are unfortunately not found. We have thus to depend upon the interpretations of the Śrutis found in the Anubhāṣya and its Prakāśa and other works.

Puruṣottama discusses how the conflicting Śruti passages should be reconciled and interpreted. If we accept one position and reject the other, then naturally the passage which is rejected would lose the Prāmānya, though it may form an integral part of the Śrutis. This is undesirable because how can we declare that one passage is right, while the other is wrong? As a consequence, the whole of the Śrutis would be Aprāmānika.¹¹³

How then should the contradictions be reconciled?

Puruṣottama says that it can be done by accepting both as

112. Brahmasūtras. I. i. 3. Vallabha's interpretation of this

Sūtra is not taken into account here.

113. A.B.P.p.47.

equally correct and the contradiction is to be explained on the ground of the superior powers of the Highest Lord. This can be corroborated by the Śrutis themselves, e.g. 'Parāśya śaktir vividhaiva śrūyate'¹¹⁴ etc. Such passages show the capacity of the Highest Lord.¹¹⁵ Thus even if the śrutis may say that the fire is not hot, we should accept it because the Lord has the form of fire as also of being not hot. That is how the ~~Parā~~ Brahman can be both sākāra and nirākāra, i.e. with and without forms.¹¹⁶ It is thus the expressed sense in the Vedas, which is to be accepted and not gaunī or lakṣaṇā i.e. secondary. The gaunī vṛtti whenever accepted, is only for the ordinary persons.¹¹⁷ It is on the basis of this that Brahman is accepted in the Śuddhādvaita as an abode of contradictory attributes.

There are however three different approaches in connection with the relationship of Brahman and its attributes. Firstly if we take into account the strength of the word,

114. Śvetāśvatera Upaniṣad .VI.8.

115. A.B.P.p.47.

116. Tathā ca bhagavataḥ sarvarūpatvena vahnirūpatvād anuṣṇa-rūpatvād cānuṣṇatvavahnitveyor aikādhikaranyāc chivatvādīnām apy aikādhikaranyāt vahnir anuṣṇaḥ param brahma brahmāviṣṇuśivākāram anākāram ity aviruddh-am ity arthaḥ. S.S.pp.124-125.

117. Nanv evam sati gaunī sarvata evocchidyeteti tatsiddhy-
-ēdisūtrāṇi virudhyerann iti cet, na , teṣāṃ mandamadhya-
-mārthatvāt. T.S.Abb.p.37.

then Brahman is an abode of all the contradictory attributes. We may however think it out in another way also. Whenever Brahman is described there are many attributes, negative as well as positive. The negative attributes reject the mundane ones, while the positive descriptions enumerate those, which are supramundane. Thirdly if we go by implication, Brahman has the nature of all the contradictory¹¹⁸es. We can easily understand the distinction between the first two approaches. To say that Brahman contains all the attributes, even contradictory ones, can not be reconciled with another statement, made in the same breath, that it has all the supramundane attributes and the negative descriptions pertain only to those attributes, which are mundane. If everything in the Vedas is alaukika, everything must be alaukika and we can not explain one word from the point of view of the laukika and the other from that of the alaukika. This is what Puruṣottama knows perfectly well and that is why he distinguishes between the two approaches.

On the whole the approach of the Śuddhādvaita authors

118. *Evamāca śabdabalavicāreṇa viruddhasarvadharmāśreyam*

*brahmeti nirṇayeh. Śrutyuktayuktyā vicāre tu laukikadharmā-
-śūnyam alaukikasarvadharmayuktam iti nirṇayeh. Arthabala-
-vicāre tu viruddhasarvarūpam iti nirṇayeh. A.B.P.p.933.*

towards the Śrutis is that of the acceptance of a devotee of everything that is stated, whether it may or may not appeal to reason. In fact there should be no appeal to reason, because it is all beyond the world. Hundred of passages are interpreted in this way in the works of Vallabha and Puruṣottama.

While the way, in which the passages are interpreted, follows generally the pattern of the rules of interpretation, generally accepted by all, it is necessary to note one important point. Very often the Śuddhādvaita takes recourse to the Purāṇas for understanding the purport of the Śrutis. This has already been noted above, while showing the inter relation of the four Prasthānas, in the Śuddhādvaita. In the Anubhāsyaprakāśa Puruṣottama quotes a verse for this:

Anantaśākhāsāpekṣe vaidikārthasya nirṇaye,
Svabuddhikalpitād arthād baliyān upabrūhitah. ^{119.}

It is interesting to note here that the Purāṇas may be understood as an aid to the interpretation of the Vedas, especially for understanding the development of mythology. Dr. M. Winternitz at one place refers to the efforts of scholars to bring the ^{verses} ~~verses~~ of the Rgveda in to unison with the later narratives and to utilize

119. A. B. P. p. 353. Similar case on p. 1068 also.

the later in the elucidation of the Rgvedic poem.¹²⁰ So far as progressive mythology is concerned, Vedic legends can be examined in the light of the Purāṇic tales. Can the same thing be done for the interpretation of the Upaniṣadic teaching also?

The most important point that requires to be considered here is the relationship of the Pūrva and the Uttara Kāṇḍas of the Vedic literature. Puruṣottama gives the different views held by various writers and gives the necessary refutations. Śaṅkara says that the Pūrva and the Uttara Kāṇḍas of the Śrutis should not be taken together but they are rather against each other, because there is a difference in the subject and the purpose of teaching. Puruṣottama says that in that case, the Uttara Kāṇḍa can not be called the Vedānta at all. If there is no mutual relationship between the two, there is definitely no ekavākyatā between them. The Uttara Kāṇḍa is not necessary for explaining the nature of a doer in the actions, for it expounds the nature of the individual soul which is neither a doer nor an enjoyer. It again does not lend strength to the

Cf. Dr. M. Winternitz. History of Indian Literature .Vol. I. p. 105.

In the footnote, he refers to Geldner in the 'Vedische Studien! I. 243-295, and Oldenberg, ZDMG 39, 72ff and 'Die Literatur des alten Indien 'pp, 53ff.

actions on the basis of the passage: 'Yad eva vidyayā karoti...!',¹²¹ since only the Udgīthavidyā leads to the Karmapauskalya and this is not the case with the whole of the Uttara Kāṇḍa. The ekavākyatā can not be established on the ground of accentuation and grammatical rules, because it is not the proper basis and goes against the well known Mīmāṃsa rule 'Arthaikatvād ekam vākyaṃ sākāṅkṣam ced vibhāge syāt.' The relation between the two can again not be established by arguing that sacrifices create a desire to know. Mere desire of knowledge is of no use. The 'Śruti' Vedam anūcyācāryo 'ntevāsinam anuśāsti',¹²² and similar passages differentiate between the Vedas and the Upaniṣads. The term Vedānta can again not be defended on the ground of conventional usage, because it is not included in the Svādhyāya. (The view point here is of the convention and not the compound 'Vedesya antah'.) In that case its ~~is~~ ~~the~~ study and thought about it (Adhyayana and vicāra) would not be enjoined, i.e. would be avaidha. Its study can not again be included in the vicāra as found in the passages like 'Tad vijijñāsasva tad brahma',¹²³ because mere jijñāsā can not restrict it to the three upper classes. According to Śaṅkara therefore the Upaniṣads can not be called Vedānta at all.

121. Chāndogya Upaniṣad. I. i. 10.

122. Taittirīya Upaniṣad. I. xi. 1.

123. Taittirīya Upaniṣad. III. i.

Bhāskara says that the Pūrva and the Uttara Kāṇḍas have different subjects but have the same purpose. This, says Puruṣottama, goes against the Śrutis and Smṛtis teaching Brahman as the meaning of all the Vedas (Sarvavedārtha.)

Vijñānabhikṣu believes that the Uttara Kāṇḍa is subordinate to the Pūrva Kāṇḍa, as Brahman is the Dharma and all the Vedas teach of the Dharma. The Dharmavicāra is thus not useless, but is for the purpose of a complete study of the Dharma and would thus be on a par with the Kalpasūtras. Puruṣottama argues that this would go against the scriptural passages, which show that Brahman is the meaning of all the Vedas. This would again run counter to the view of the sages like Jaimini, who did not complete the Dharmavicāra and Vyāsa, who did not begin with the Dharmavicāra. The analogy of the Kalpasūtras is not proper, because of the difference in the topic of discussion (Pratī-pādyabheda) in the Uttara Kāṇḍa. The opinion of Śrīkaṇṭha is also refuted.

How are the two parts related in the Śuddhādvaita? According to the passages like 'Mām vidhatte' bhidhatte mām. ...,'¹²⁴

The term Upaniṣad can be understood to mean the knowledge of Brahman and Ātman according to the Brahmanavāda. The term vidyā means the negation of any understanding of distinctions as

124. Bhāgavata Purāṇa. XI. xxi. 43.

per the passage, 'Vidyātmani bhidābādhaḥ.'¹²⁵ So when the sacrifices are performed with knowledge, they lead to the Karma-
-pauṣkalya. The Vedāntas are thus required for the Pūrva Kāṇḍa. Knowledge again can be obtained by one, who has a pure mind and the sacrifices and the like are instrumental in the purification of the mind. Thus the Pūrva Kāṇḍa is helpful to the Vedānta. Though in both of them Karma and Jñāna are known to be respectively principal, the subject matter of both is one and the same, in as much as actions and knowledge are different attributes of the same object i.e. the Highest Lord. When they are combined, the result is the Brahmabhāva and the attainment of the highest position. Thus both of them have the same purpose. This being the case, it is meaningless to point out any contradiction between the two.¹²⁶

According to the Śuddhādvaita all the words express God. Puruṣottama says that those, who take the scriptures as having the purport of action only, are completely ignorant of the fact that the scriptures teach of the Highest Lord. This is very nicely brought out by Puruṣottama, whom we may fully quote here. "Atraivam bhāti. Vedasyopekremo hi mantra-devatāstutyādāv upayukteh. Prakaraṇam ca yēgasya. Sa ca 'yajño

125. Bhāgavata Purāṇa. XI. 19. 40.

126. A.B.P. pp. 46-49, 69-70.

vai viṣṇur'iti śruter bhagavadrūpaḥ. Devatāś pañnyādayo yāga-
 -śeṣā bhagavadamśabhūtaḥ. Kartāḥ puruṣo'pi yāgaśeṣo bhagavadamśaḥ.
 Puruṣaśeṣabhūtam phalam apy'etasyaiva nandasyānyāni'ty ādiśruter-
 -bhagavadamśabhūtam. Tathāivopakaraṇānya pi. Evam sarvaṁ sākṣāt-
 -paramparayā ca bhagavadrūpaṁ iti bhagavaty eva śrutes
 tātpariyam".¹²⁷ Additional arguments are also given by our author
 to show that the sacrifices are of the nature of the Highest
 Lord. Vedas have various branches and each sacrifice e.g.
 Jyotiṣṭoma is described in them in various ways. What is the use
 of the different descriptions of one and the same sacrifice,
 when one such a description would have been enough? If
 different descriptions are for those who are not intelligent,
 then one simple explanation for them would have worked even for
 those, who are intelligent. Nor are they for propounding the
 better results, since in that case, it is useless to describe
 the same fruit everywhere. The variety of descriptions is thus
 for establishing the similar variety of the forms of the Lord.
 In the Śākhāntarādhikaraṇa of the Pūrvamīmāṃsāsūtras, there are
 24 aphorisms to discuss and refute the contention that there
 is difference of action, corresponding to the difference of
 Śākhās and it has been established that only one karma is
 taught in various branches. We should therefore concede that

127. T. Sn. Ab. p. 21.

karma has many forms. This can be explained only on the ground of passages like, 'Vedaś ca sarvair aham eva vedyaḥ',¹²⁸ Showing that the Highest Lord is the teaching of the Vedas. The Śruti further asserts 'Yad ekam avyaktam anāntarūpanam'¹²⁹ i.e. the God has many or endless forms. Puruṣottama therefore concludes:
'Bhagavato'nekarūpatvād yajñarūpasya bahuprakārair nirūpanam.'¹³⁰

The Śuddhādvaita thinkers do not agree that the Upāśanās, which form part of the Uttara Kāṇḍa, are for the purification of the mind, as has been made out by the Māyāvādins. Meditations actually teach of the greatness of God.¹³¹

It will of course be a very useful study to see how the Upaniṣads are interpreted in the Śuddhādvaita. Thousands of passages are interpreted by Vallabha and Puruṣottama, though the former did not comment upon them regularly, while for the later, even though he is said to have done so, most of his commentaries are not extant. It is possible to show these

128. Bhagavad Gītā .XV.15.

129. Mahānārāyaṇīya Upaniṣad .I.15.

130. T.Sn.Ab.pp.24-26.

131. Udgīthādisūryādyupāśanāyā tattatprakāraṇoktam phalam tena tenopāśyena dīyate. Teṣāṃ ca pratīkatvena tatkr̥taphala-
-dānaṃ mūlarūpamāhātmyaṃ, eva pratipāditam bhavati. Jñāte
ca mahātmye tatra bhaktis teyā jñānam. T.S.Ab.p.45.

interpretations after collecting the vast number of passages found explained by them, especially by Puruṣottama in his voluminous works. This however requires a special study from that particular point of view. For the present however I have just given the fundamental approach to the Śrutis, as clearly explained by Puruṣottama. Even then I would like to examine here the interpretation of the Māṇḍūkya Upaniṣad, together with that of the Gauḍapāda kārīkās, as given by Puruṣottama. Puruṣottama's commentaries on the Nṛsiṃhotteratāpinī, Kaivalya, and Brahma Upaniṣads are also available, but the purpose of these commentaries appears to be to show that the said works can not be explained so as to teach the Kevalādvaita of Śaṅkara. Even in the commentary on the Māṇḍūkya the purpose is definitely the same. It is however an important Upaniṣad and Puruṣottama has commented upon the first two chapters of the Gauḍapāda's Kārīkās also. We will therefore study the Dīpikā of Puruṣottama on this Upaniṣad from three points of view; the interpretation of the Upaniṣad, the explanation of the kārīkās and the relationship of the Upaniṣad with the Kārīkās in the light of Puruṣottama's remarks.

The Upaniṣad begins with the syllable Om. Puruṣottama says that the Śruti wants to teach the seed of the expression of

Brahman in the whole of the Vedas. This is taught by stating the meaning of the syllable Om. The Om is of the nature of Akṣara Brahman. (Om ity etad akṣaram.) Everything that can be measured by time, past, present and future, and whatever is beyond the Time e.g. jīva etc., all this is Om. The speech which expresses, what is expressed by Om, is an explanation of it.¹³² Everything, that which is an effect and that which is not, is Brahman. Nothing is different from Brahman. That which we express by the term Om and the term Brahman, having all the forms, that soul is Brahman i.e. it is to be expressed by the term Brahman; it is not the Prakṛti.¹³³ As the term ātman is known to be used for the puruṣa and the individual souls the Upaniṣad says: 'So'yaṁ ātmā catuspāt.' This is for averting any understanding of the Puruṣa or the jīva here. The passages from 'so'yaṁ ātmā...' upto 'Sa ātmā sa vijñeyah.'¹³⁴

132/ Idam sarvaṁ tasyopavyākhyānam: Idam/sarvaṁ Omkārayoni-
-kaṁ vēṅmayam...Upavyākhyānam nikatātayā vīverāṇam
ity arthaḥ. Māṇḍūkya dīpikā. p. 4.

133. Ayam ātmā brahma. Māṇḍūkya upaniṣad. 2. This is understood by Puruṣottama as against any doubt regarding the teaching of Prakṛti of the Sāṃkhya.

134. Māṇḍūkya Upaniṣad. 7. Māṇḍūkya Dīpikā p. 20.

is something like an explanation of what has already been stated before. As Puruṣottama says 'Idam sarvaṃ vakṣyaṃāṇam ca sūtrārūpeṇa pūrvam uktasya vṛttirūpaṃ jñeyam'.¹³⁵ As the Upaniṣad is aware of the difficulty in understanding it, the ātman is divided into four pādas.

What is the meaning of the pāda here? It does not mean 'Legs' as in the case of a cow, it means 'parts' as in the case of coins.¹³⁶ Further it is instrumental everywhere, in so far as it signifies Brahman. It is not instrumental in the first three and objective in the last, for otherwise the formlessness would lead to its inexplicability.¹³⁷

The first pāda is said to be jāgaritasthāna i.e. having as its resort the sātत्वike antahkaranavṛttiviśeṣa. It is described as bahiḥ-prajñā, because, on account of it, the individual souls have the comprehension of the external objects.¹³⁸ It has

135. Māṇḍūkya Dīpikā.p.5.

136. Kārṣṇapāṇāder ivāṃśavacanāḥ pādaśabdeḥ na tu gavāder iva caranavacanāḥ. Ibid.p.5.

137. Tatrāpi brahmagemakatvāt kareṇasādhanaḥ sarvatra, na tu viśvādiṣu kareṇasādhenaḥ turīye karmasādhanaḥ. Vairūpyād brahmano nirvācyatāpatteḥ ca .Ibid.p.5.

138. Jāgaritam sātत्वiko'ntahkaranavṛttiviśeṣaḥ sthānam yasya sa jāgaritasthānaḥ. Bahir laukike bāhye viśaye prajñā avabhāso yena jīvanām sa bahiḥ prajñā. Ibid.p.6.

seven limbs and nineteen faces. The limbs are the worlds and the faces are , ten organs (Of sensation and action), five life-breaths and four internal organs. They are doors of approaching it.¹³⁹ It is described as 'Sthūlabhuk', because it enjoys the gross body of the Brahmāṇḍa or the gross objects of enjoyment by means of these doors. It is Vaiśvānara, since it leads all the individual souls to their proper worlds and enjoyments in various ways.¹⁴⁰ Puruṣottama says that his interpretation is in conformity with the Śruti, 'pādo'sya viśvā bhūtāni.'¹⁴¹ Here Puruṣottama gives a very important explanation of the term pāda, when he says , 'padyate jñāyate param Brahmāneneti pādah.'¹⁴² The term pāda thus means that by which Brahman can be known.

The second is svapnasthāna i.e. having the dream as its abode , the rājasa antahkaranavṛttiviśeṣa. It is antahprajña, because on account of it, one experiences the internal objects in a dream. It is praviviktabhuk because of the enjoyment of

139. Mukhāny upalabdhidvārāni. Māṇḍūkya Dīpikā. p.6.

140. Viśvān sarvāntarān jīvaṇ anekadhā tattaducitalokeṣu bhogeṣu ca nayatīti viśvānarah. Sa eva vaiśvānarah sarva-piṇḍātma. Ibid. p.7.

141. Rg-veda. X.90.3.

142. Māṇḍūkya Dīpikā. p.7.

the internal with respect to the sense-organs.¹⁴³ It is taijasa, because it helps in the enlightening of the *indriyas*. This is the second *pāda*. Here also Purusottama explains *pāda* as 'Jñāpakomśah.'¹⁴⁴

The *suṣuptasthāna*, the *tāmāsa antahkarana* *vṛttiviśeṣa* is the third. It is described as '*ekībhūtaḥ*', because of its in-separable connection with the *jīva* and it is called '*Prajñānaghana*', since it is the mass of *prajñānas*. Purusottama explains *prajñāna* in two ways, (1) *Prajñānāni tattadindriyājanyāni jñānāni*, (2) *Prakṛst-am jñānam yais tēnīndriyāni*.¹⁴⁵ The term '*eva*' in the *Upaniṣad*¹⁴⁶ is for averting the knowledge of everything as different from the very nature. The third *pāda* is called '*Ānandabhuk*', because as compared with the previous two, it is full of bliss. It has the essence of the attributes of Brahman, and it is also the *Brahmaloka*. It is not however the Highest Bliss, because the bliss here is measured. This however should not lead us to admit the existence of even the slightest misery, because

143. *Previviktaṃ indriyapekṣayā āntaram bhunkte iti.*

Māndūkya Dīpikā.p.9.

144. *Ibid*.p.9.

145. *Ibid*.p.10.

146. *Prajñānaghana evānandamayah. Māndūkya Upaniṣad*.5.

misery is the result of dualistic experience, which is absent here. Because it is ānandamaya, it is said to be ānandabhuk. The door of enjoyment is the cetāś. As Puruṣottama puts it 'Kevala-
-bodha^āl^ākṣaṇam svasmin^āgrāhaka^ākārenāparinatam cetāś citta^ā
mukham ānandopelabdhidvāram asyeti cetomukhaḥ.'¹⁴⁷ The viśva
and the taijasa though knowing the past and the like, show
dualism, but in the third pāda, there is no dualism and thus it
is called prajñā. The Upaniṣad, after teaching of the nature,
describes His greatness. As he inspires all the different things
he is the controller of all, like the fourth. He knows everything
as non-different from himself. He is thus Sarveśvara and Servaj-
-ña. He again enters and regulates and thus is called the
Antaryāmin. He is the Yoni, the place of origin of everything.
From him are born all the beings and they merge in him finally.

The fourth pāda is described by the Śruti at first with
negative attributes, so as to differentiate it from the first
three. He is neither antahprajñā, nor bahihprajñā, because he
does not create anything endowed with vikalpabuddhi, either
externally or internally. He is again not ubhayatahprajñā i.e.
he is omniscient and his prajñā does not depend upon the

147. Māndūkya Dīpikā, p. 11.

object or the Pramāṇas.¹⁴⁸ It is neither prajñā, nor aprajñā, nor even prajñānaghana. It is not an object of our eyes or any other sense organs. (Adṛṣṭ^a, avyavahārya) He can not again be an object of any organ of action (agrāhya). He is beyond all inferences (alaksya), comparisons (ālīnga), thoughts (acintya) and expressions (avyapadeśya). After thus distinguishing him from everything else by means of negative attributes, positive description is given for explaining his greatness. He is to be approached by those, who have knowledge of the soul.¹⁴⁹ The expanse of the world is quietened in him. As he is beyond all limitations, there can be no expanse of the world different from him. He is quiet, benign and devoid of duality. That is how people believe him to be. He is not 'such and such' alone.¹⁵⁰ He is the ātman, he should be known. Thus even though beyond mind and speech, the description of him is not futile because he is the self. This also makes clear the doctrine of grace.¹⁵¹

After this the Upaniṣad with a view to show the affinity

148. Māṇḍūkya Śūpikā. pp. 20-21.

149. Ekātmapratyeyasāram ekātmapratyayair jñānibhiḥ saro' nusanam yasya. Ibid. p. 21.

150. Etādṛśam caturthem manyante, na tv etādṛśa eva saḥ. Ibid. p. 22

151. Sa pūrvoktarītika ātmā vijñeyah, ātmatvato na vaiyarthya ity arthah. Tāvata śrutyāntaroktam varanaikalabhyatvam eva sphuṭibhavati. Ibid. p. 22.

between the syllable Om and the Brahman, compares the first three pādas with the three morae, A, U, and M and the last pāda with the moraeless nāda. Puruṣottama says after explaining these comparisons: 'Evam nādasya turīyadharmavattvena matrāntarāṇām pādānterasādharmyenādhiṣṭheyaśtvasāmye¹⁵² ca Omkāro mukhyagaunavṛttibhyām ātmābhinnas ity arthaḥ. Ātmābhinnatvād evākṣarābhinnas jñeyaḥ.'¹⁵² The Upaniṣad concludes by giving the phalaśruti., 'Samviśaty ātmanātmānam ya evam veda.' Puruṣottama explains samviśati as 'Upabhunkte' and cites the śruti, 'so'śnute sarvān kāmān saha brahmānā vipāścitā.'¹⁵³

While commenting upon the first nine verses of Gauḍapāda-Kārikās, Puruṣottama makes an important statement: 'Tathā cedam siddhyati. Sarvapindātma viśvaḥ, sarvendriyātma taijasaḥ sarvamaṇa-ātmā sarvapraṇātma vā prajāñāḥ. Evambhāvaś cānabhimānena ity evamrūpaḥ paramātmāiva jñeyo na tu śarīraḥ.'¹⁵⁴

From the analysis of the interpretation of the Upaniṣad as given by Puruṣottama, it is clear that Puruṣottama and for that matter the Śuddhādvaita teachers do not believe that

152. Māṇḍūkya Dīpikā .pp. 31-32.

153. Ibid. p. 32.

154. Ibid. p. 16.

The four quarters as described in the Upaniṣad, refer to the four states of consciousness. They are on the other hand various forms of God, who is capable of assuming endless forms. This is perhaps the reason why at many places in the dissolution of the compounds the instrumental and not the genitive is accepted. e.g. Bahihprajñāḥ: Bāhye viṣaye prajñā avabhāso jīvanām yena sah.¹⁵⁵ etc. Is this a correct reading of the meaning of the Upaniṣad? It appears that the Upaniṣad teaches about the states of consciousness, rather than what is explain^{ed} by Puruṣottama, and the interpretation according to that ~~seems~~^{seems} more natural. One will also perhaps find that Puruṣottama is unnecessarily bringing in the doctrines of the Śuddhādvaita at places. Thus for instance what is the ground for telling about the 'Ganitānandatva' in connection with the prajñā and its (his) attribute 'Anandamaya'? The explanation of 'Samviśati' as 'Upabhunkte', while interpreting the phalaśruti, appears to be far-fetched. It is no use finding fault with Puruṣottama here and there, because many such weak points can be found out. It must be said however that just as the absolutism of Śaṅkara can not be found out in the Upaniṣad in toto, similarly the Śuddhādvaita also can not be

accepted as taught here completely.

Coming to the Kārikās of Gaudapāda, we have already seen in the preceding chapter that though Puruṣottama has commented upon all the chapters, his commentary only on the first two is extant. Any way the commentary on the first two chapters, especially the second, is enough to show how Puruṣottama has interpreted the Kārikās in keeping with his own theories. We may note here some interpretations which are interesting for our purpose.

The Kārikā 'Devasyaiṣa svabhāvo'yam; āptakāmasya kāsprhā'¹⁵⁶ is taken by Puruṣottama to prove the theory of Līlā. He says 'Tena krīḍāto'yam svabhāvo na tu sprhaya karanam'.¹⁵⁷

One may note here that the term 'Krīḍātaḥ' is added by Puruṣottama here. The immediately preceding Kārikā 'Krīḍārtham iti cāpare' need not warrant such a conclusion, because it is again preceded by 'Bhogārtham sṛṣṭir ity anye.' Is it that the author of the Kārikā really accepted the theory of Krīḍā? Perhaps he did not, for how to explain the 'Apare' otherwise? In the three Kārikās I. 7-9, the author gives

156. Gaudapāda Kārikā. I. 9.

157. Māṇḍūkya Dīpikā. p. 19.

various opinions regarding creation but it may not mean that the last opinion is of the author himself. Perhaps Gaudapāda does not prefer the one to the other.

How are the Kārikās, I.16, 17, 18 explained by Puruṣottama? The verse 16 says that when the individual soul, sleeping on account of the beginningless māyā, is awake, then the unborn sleepless dreamless non-dualism is known. Puruṣottama says that Anādimāyayā etc. means that, when one gets the Adhikāra for the realization of the fourth, he knows it, which has been described before. The term 'yadā' in the verse shows some effort for obtaining, but on the basis of the passage 'Vedāntaviṣṇūnasuniścātārthā...etc.'¹⁵⁸ it is suggested that the realization occurs at the time of the end. Puruṣottama argues for this: 'Anyathā pūrvaslokena gatārthatvād etam na vadet.'¹⁵⁹ Kārikā 17 runs 'If the world exists it will no doubt be removed. This dualism is just māyā, there is advaita from the highest point of view.' Puruṣottama says that this verse is intended to teach that dualism is of the nature of interim creation. This is for removing the

158. Muṇḍake Upaniṣad. III.ii.6.

159. Māṇḍūkya Dīpikā. p.26.

dualistic ideas in the minds of those, who have the different Adhikāra and who are thus incapable of tolerating the delay. Kārikā 19 means that the distinctions, if at all imagined by anyone, will be removed. This Vāda (discussion?) is because of preaching. When truth is known there is no dualism. Puruṣottama however explains it in a different way. He says that this verse also corroborates what has been stated in the previous verse. His explanation is : "Kalpito-
vikalpō mānaso yadi kenacit upāśanena yogādisāadhanena vā
viśeṣato nivarteta. Tada śuddhe cetasi upadeśād jñāte turiye
ayam vādeḥ bhedāpādakatvāt dvaitarūpo na vidyate." "

Puruṣottama then adds "Sarvasya tadabhinnatve jñāte
bhedasyāpi tadanatirekāt so'pi pūrvabuddharūpādvaito brahma-
-iva bhavati."¹⁶⁰ The verse is really a difficult one for interpretation. Puruṣottama's explanation of 'Kenacit' and the way in which he construes the second line do not appear to be convincing.

Puruṣottama's interpretation of the Kārikās of the second chapter is worth considering. Puruṣottama says in the beginning of the chapter: "Upadekṣyamāṇajñānaviśayasya-
-tñānaḥ sarvātmakatvalakṣaṇe sverūpe bodhanīye

160. Māṇḍūkya Dīpikā. p. 26.

tadvirodhinah pratīyamānasya kālpanikasya bhedasya niśāṣāya
 bhedavādyabhimataprapaṅcasya mithyātvam pratipādayiṣyaṁ
 ...etc."¹⁶¹ Under the first three verses Puruṣottama gives

two syllogisms to prove the unreality of the dream
 experiences, following the Kārikās. They are 'Svāpnikāḥ
 sarvabhāvabhedāḥ śarīrāntahsthāḥ. Śarīrasamvṛtatvāt. Yād
 yat samvṛtam tat tad antahstham. Grhākumbhavat. Yād vā śarīra-
 -samvṛtam tac cārīrāntahstham. Śīrāntrādivat.' and 'Tathā
 ce yadi gatvā paśyet tam deśam prapaśyaṁ pratibuddhas
 tatraiva tiṣṭhet. Yato naivam ato naivam. Yato na gatvā
 paśyati tato'ntareva paśyati.'¹⁶² The second line of the

third verse according to Puruṣottama, counters those, who
 believe in the reality of the dream creation on the
 analogy of the creation of the Cintāmaṇi and the like.
 The fourth verse extends the unreality to the internal
 waking world. The internal waking creation is here of course
 the object, visualized by the mind, which is different from
 an external object. Thus the svapna and the jāgarāta sthānas
 are of the same type (Verse 5) One may point out that while

161. Māṇḍūkya Dīpikā, p. 33.

162. Ibid. pp. 33-34.

in the dream everything is created, in the waking state it is the external object that is thought of. How can it be unreal? Kārikā 6 replies to this that the object of mental deliberation^e does not exist before and after that deliberation and is thus on a par with the object, experienced in a dream. Puruṣottama says 'na hi māṇavakah sinhatvena dhyāteḥ sinho bhavati.'¹⁶³ It need not be said that the objects of our ideas should not be called unreal, because they very often produce real results. The Kārikā 7 is a reply~~ed~~ to this. This happens even in dreams. Puruṣottama gives the illustration for this, 'Svāpnikapramadāḥ sparsādīnā pāramārthikaskhalanadarśanāt'.¹⁶⁴ It should be noted here that 'Saprayojanatā vipratipadyate' is explained by Puruṣottama as 'Saprayojanatā svapnā^e pi vipratipannāto kiñcitkarā sati sattvasādhikā.'

If ādyantavattva is the criterion of unreality, the scriptures enjoining svarga would be futile. Svarga is produced of the apūrva. The apūrva is produced of our own

163. Māṇḍūkya Dīpikā.p.37.

164. Ibid.p.37.

actions and is thus liable to destruction by worship etc.

Kārikā 8 is a reply to this. Puruṣottama's explanation of the verse is that the apūrva (apūrvam ~~śmat~~kriyābhivṛkṣam karma) is an attribute of the Lord. (Sthānidharmah: Sthāninaḥ jāgrādēdisthānavato dharmah) as is the case with those, who live in the heaven. (Svargasthā hi devās tanniyā^mākātvena bhagavatā paramēśvareṇa sthāpitāḥ sarvadā tatra nivasanti)

For them heaven is not established by the apūrva, but is of the nature of the avayavas of the Lord. Similarly the apūrva is also not obtained by action but is eternal. The same is the case with heaven. It is only the connection between the two, that is produced and therefore the Karma-śruti is not futile. Tān is the second line of Kārikā 8 is understood by Puruṣottama as 'Svargavāsinaḥ svargam vā svābhīṣajais tām dharmān vā' and 'prekṣate' as-'divyacakṣuṣi labdhe sākṣāt karoti.' The last quarter specifies the prekṣana. 'Yathāiveha suśikṣitah': 'Yena prakāreṇa bhagavad rūpateyā apūrvateyā vā tatsvarūpajñāne upādhyāyena sūtarām dattaśikṣas tathā! Thus he sees the heavens, as he has been taught here about them. 165.

165. Māndūkya. Dīpikā. pp. 38-39.

If everything is unreal, even the seer would be unreal. This would lead to the *śūnyavāda*. (V.10) *Kārikā* 11 is for giving the *Siddhānta*. The term 'Devah' in the verse according to *Puruṣottama*, has its connection with the *krīḍā*. Thus the imagination of God is of the nature of sport. The three cases used in 'Ātmanā', 'Ātmēnam' and 'Ātmā' show that the Lord is the essence of all the *Kārikās*. *Puruṣottama* says 'Tatropalakṣaṇavidhayā sarvātmatvam sarvakāratvam ca sādhitam. Ākārabhede kārakabhedābhāvāt.'¹⁶⁶ The nature of the imagination is the regulation of particular names in the particular forms of his own. The term 'sva' in 'svamāyayā' is for showing that this power is non-different and dependent. He knows the distinctions as of his own nature. *Puruṣottama* gives an illustration for this. 'Yathā puruṣaḥ śankhasuraśhimatsyādimudrāḥ svāṅgulibhir vidhāya tāsu tattedrūpatām anusandhatte tadvat.'¹⁶⁷

The *Siddhānta* would thus show that nothing is unreal. What then about the arguments, advanced for proving the unreality of everything? The *Kārikās*, that follow, are for

166. *Māṇḍūkya Dīpikā*, p. 41.

167. *Ibid.* p. 41.

dispelling the doubts regarding this. The Kārikā 12 asserts that God imagines the substances thus. He transforms (Vikaroti vikṛtān karoti) the illusory substances, which are separate from his essential nature (aparān : Svātmarūpe⁶ḥyo' tiriktān). The objects are irregularly (avyavasthitān) imagined in the mind, while those of external experience are regular (Niyatān). Even in this false imagination, God does it. The following two verses 13 & 14 are for making clear the unreality of the objects, so imagined.

Verses 15 and 16 show respectively the manner of imagination, corresponding to the two verses 11^{1/2} and 12. Kārikā 15 says that the Lord first imagines (creates?) the jiva who essays to hold the life-breaths or the Hirenayagarbha. After this comes the turn of the external objects of enjoyment and the internal instruments of enjoyment. The word 'Prthag-vidhān' is for showing that the distinction in these objects is not that of the essence. Kārikā 16 gives the well known illustration of the rope and the snake. The following Kārikās 18 and 19 show how the ignorance as stated in the previous Kārikā, can be destroyed by knowledge. While explaining Kārikā 18 Puruṣottama says that just as

darkness is the cause of indiscrimination in the rope-snake example, here also the cause is the māyā of the sporting God.

It is described in the last quarter of the Kārikā 19. Puruṣottama explains 'Yayā'yam jīvo mohito bhavati tādrakprakārah svayam paramātmāiva māyetyarthah.'¹⁶⁸ Thus the māyā is the svarūpa of the Lord and it deludes the jīva.

The following nine verses are for explaining the Darśan-tika-anśa in the preceding verse 18. These verses show that the Highest Lord is the essence of everything. Verses 29 and 30 are for those, who know only one aspect. It is the desire of God, which regulates the knowledge of all these aspects. He protects him, who sees Him in various ways after becoming that which the worshipper sees Him to be! 'Tadgrhaḥ samupeiti tam' is explained as 'Tadgrhas tadekanīṣṭho vā tattadbhāvātmakam ātmānam samupaiti, prāpuoti, tasminllinas tadātmako bhavatītyarthah.'¹⁶⁹ Puruṣottama gives another interpretation also, which we have not noted above. 'Avati' is understood as 'Svāntah|rakṣati' or 'Sādā anusandhatte'. This will be connected with the worshipper. 'Sa bhūtvā' is explained on the basis of 'Devo bhūtvā devān apyoti.'³⁰ The Kārikā ~~30~~ is also understood in the same way.

168. Māndūkya Dīpikā .p.47.

169. Ibid.p.50.

Those, who know only one aspect of God, have taken Him to be different from the Prāṇas etc., which are non-different.

(Apārthābhāvaiḥ abhinnaśattākaiḥ) ^{one} one, who knows this, properly can advance the scriptural views without ~~entertaining~~ ^{entertaining} any doubt. ¹⁷⁰

The Kārikās 31 to 33 which identify the world with the māyā, gandharvanagara etc. are stated by Puruṣottama as directed against those, who believe in dualism. The world, as understood by them, is really a phantom of imagination. But even the mithyāvādin are wrong. Kārikā 34 is a reply to them. This soul is just imagined even by those, who advocate the Mithyāvāda. Puruṣottama says 'ayam ātmā esadbhir mithyābhūta-ir bhāvaiḥ prāṇādibhiḥ sādhitam yad advaitam tenāpi kalpitāḥ, arthān mithyāvādinibhiḥ. Bhāvā api advayena anyathā bhavanti tathā kalpitāḥ, arthāḥ ekaikāśavādinibhiḥ.' ¹⁷¹ Thus the monism, which accepted by both, is proper. Kārikās 35, 36 show how the advaita is to be understood. The world is not pluralistic but is non-different from Brahman. Verses 37, 38 show the means for obtaining the knowledge of the soul. And the last Kārikā states the phala. At the end Puruṣottama gives a very interesting

170. Māṇḍūkya Dīpikā. p. 50.

171. Ibid. p. 52.

summary of the contents of the second chapter.¹⁷²

The interpretation of the second chapter, as given by Puruṣottama, will make the following points quite clear. In his attempt to find out the 'Suddhādvaita from the Kārikās, Puruṣottama has to explain them in such a way that all the verses, which directly teach the theory of illusion, describe the world as such for those, who are dualists. Kārikā 11 is said to give the Siddhānta but the way, in which the following verses 12, 13 are explained in relation to it, is really more ingenious than natural. Even the explanation of the Kārikās 11 and 34 appear to be far-fetched. The explanation of the Kārikā 8 is a good piece of imagination, as also that of the last quarter of the Kārikā 19. The inclusion of the term *krīḍā* now and then may be wholly unwarranted. The editor Bhaṭṭa Ramanath Shastri says in his introduction "Srīmatpuruṣottamacārāṇair api, bhavan-matamūlaguroḥ Kārikāsv api māyāvādo na labhyate, labhyate tu Brahmanvādaḥ iti darśayadbhiḥ svapāṇḍityena vivṛtaḥ."¹⁷³ Scholarship is surely there.

The relationship of the Kārikās with the Upaniṣad has

172. Māṇḍūkya Dīpikā, pp. 54-55.

173. Ibid. Introduction.

posed a problem for modern scholars.¹⁷⁴ Some of them think that the Kārikās also form part of the Upaniṣad, while others do not agree to that view. Puruṣottama consistently calls it Gauda-
-vārtika, as we have seen in the previous chapter. In the commentary itself Puruṣottama does not give any clue regarding his own opinion. At one place in the Āvaranabhāṅga Puruṣottama says that the verses in the Māṇḍūkya Upaniṣad and the three chapters are read among the Śruti ~~and~~ by the moderns.¹⁷⁵ Any way the tradition of regarding the Kārikās as part of the Upaniṣad seems to have been current in the mediaeval times, though the Śuddhādvaita school does not appear to have accepted it.

(VI).

Interpretation of the Sūtras.

Whereas the scriptures form the first starting point of the Śuddhādvaita, as also in all the systems of the Vedānta,

174. For a discussion see. Vidhushekhara Bhattacharya. Āgama-
-śāstra of Gauḍapāda. Intro. p. xxxviii. ff., T.M.P. Mahadeven
Gauḍapāda, a study in the early Advaita. p. 31. ff. Cf. also
'The problem of the Upaniṣadic theory of the Āgamaśāstra/
Prakaraṇa of Gauḍapāda' by B.N.K. Sharma. Bheratīya Vidyā.
Vol. XVII. Nos. 3&4.

175. Vaitathyādvaitātātaśāntyākhyam prakaraṇatrayam Māṇḍūkya-
-sthāh ślokaś ca Gauḍapādīyaṇy etānīdanīntenair Upaniṣat-
-su paṭhyante. T. Sn. Ab. p. 63.

the Brahmasūtras form the third. Vallabha began to comment upon them and his son completed his work. Puruṣottama has written a voluminous sub-commentary on it called Prakāśa. At many places Vallabha disagrees from his predecessors and Puruṣottama has tried to uphold his teacher's views with admirable erudition and labour. It will be an interesting study to see how the interpretations of Vallabha differ from those of others. It is easy to say whether this or that interpretation of a particular Sūtra appears to be correct, but it is surely difficult, perhaps impossible, to say whether any particular system can be evolved out of the whole work. The Brahmasūtras, as we have them today, do not appear to be the work of a single author or the work even of a particular period and it is very difficult to find out any coherent system of set theologico-philosophical ideas in them. I have tried to examine some of the interpretations of Vallabha and Viṭṭhaleśa, taking into account Puruṣottama's remarks upon them.

Vallabha reads the two Sūtras I.i.2 and 3 as one. He refers to others, who separate those Sūtras. He does not give any particular reason for a combination of the Sūtras. He just says:

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'Naitat sūtrakārasammatam iti pertibhāti'. It is therefore left for Puruṣottama to point out why Vallabha has differed from all others. Puruṣottama says that in the Brahmasūtras, we find that the Adhikaraṇas are formed after stating that which is to be established and the proof for the same, so it is proper that both the Sādhya and the Hetu should be expressed here. The term Brahman is understood by the followers of the Sāṅkhya to mean the Prakṛti and so to avert this it is necessary to show that the causality of Brahman is stated in the scriptures. One may point out that even if two Sūtras may be read separately, we may have the Adhikaraṇa of the first three Sūtras. In the first Sūtra in the term 'Atha', which stands for the prerequisite of the Dharmavicāra, the Brahmevicāra is also implied and thus even though the Pramāṇa has not been expressly stated, Brahman can be taken to be known only from the Upaniṣads. The combination of the Sūtras is thus not necessary. Puruṣottama says that 'Atha' has many meanings and even if it means 'Ānantarya', it may not be taken to imply the Dharmavicāra. Hence it is better to have

only one Sūtra. If we agree with those, who accept two different Adhikaraṇas of the two Sūtras, the first has no hetu while the second lacks the Sādhya. Thus both are wanting and therefore cannot establish the desired Prameya.¹⁷⁷ Though Vallabha here differs from that which has been accepted by all the other commentators, the arguments of Puruṣottama appear to be plausible.

The third Sūtra 'Tat tu samanvayāt' is also interpreted by Vallabha in a different way. Samanvaya is understood by him to mean 'Sanyas anvaya'. God permeates all in the form of existence, sentience and bliss. Vallabha gives three reasons for such an interpretation. He says that the Pūrvapakṣa and the Siddhānta-pakṣa, as understood by others, are both wrong. Secondly the reconciliation of the conflicting passages is the very purpose of the Śāstra. How can it be the reason for establishing a certain proposition, when the reconciliation is yet to be explained? Thirdly the reconciliation, as understood by others, is not vouched for by the following Sūtras. The first and the third of these arguments are, in fact, matters of opinion, and of course each of the commentators will try to show that he alone is correct. To say that the Pūrvapakṣa is wrong is not a very happy

argument in any case, because the pūrvapakṣa is always proved to be wrong. The second argument of course has its value. Dr.

V.S. Chate however points out: 'The same charge, however, may be brought against Vallabha himself; for Sūtra I.iv.23 also makes out the same point. i.e. that Brahman is also the material cause of the universe.'¹⁷⁸

The Īkṣatyadhikaraṇa has been understood by all, except Madhva and Vallabha, as directed against the Sāṅkhya view of non-intelligent Pradhāna. Madhva however interpretes it in a different way. Brahman which is described as the object of knowledge (Īkṣāṇīya), can not be understood as inexpressible. Vallabha's interpretation of the Sūtras is some-what similar. We shall note his interpretation of all the Sūtras here. Brahman is not aśabda (na vidyate śabdaḥ yatra, sarvavedāntādīyapratipādyam) because of Īkṣāti. Even though Brahman is beyond all the dealings, he becomes an object of vyavahāra of his own desire. (I.i.4). The Highest Lord endowed with the attributes of Īkṣāti and the like, can not be Gaṇa (: Prakṛtiguṇasattvasambandhavan), because of the term ātman used for him. The term ātman stands for the Highest Brahman, which is Nirguṇa. (I.i.5). The term

178. V.S. Chate. Vedānta. p. 59.

ātman again can not be Gauna, because liberation or mokṣa is taught of those, who meditate upon him. (I.i.6) The creator of the world is again not saguna, because he is not censured as heya, as would have been the case with one, endowed with worldly attributes. (I.i.7) Brahman is again not beyond all the dealings, because the individual soul merges in him everyday in deep sleep. (I.i.8) Again at the time of liberation everyone becomes similar to God. (Gati: Mokṣa, sāmānya: samānesya bhavaḥ. I.i.9)¹⁷⁹ That everything is an effect of Brahman is clearly established by the Śrutis. (I.i.10) Puruṣottama at the end of the last Sūtra refers to the interpretations of other commentators. He gives the interpretation of Śaṅkara and its refutation given by Jayatīrtha. He gives his own refutation also. Bhāskara, Rāmānuja, Śaiva and Madhva are just referred to. After this Puruṣottama refers to the twofold Sāṅkhya and says that the Sāṅkhya theoreticians do cite the Śruti passages in support of their own views, but such citations do not show that the scriptures form the main source of their doctrines. That is why Vyāsa has refuted them in the Ānumānika-adhikaraṇa, because as they accept the Prakṛti as the main principle, and as it is not known through the

179. Mokṣe sarvasyāpi bhagavatē tulyatvāt. A.B.p.146.

scriptures, it is definitely asebdā.¹⁸⁰ Though Puruṣottama is not specific, he seems to imply that the attack on the Sāṅkhya finds its place in the Ānumānika-adhikaraṇa and need not thus be the subject matter of this adhikaraṇa. Puruṣottama is however not so clear here as he is elsewhere. His comments are half-hearted and his treatment is such that he is just perhaps trying to follow the work, he is commenting upon, so as not to be open to the charge of Vyākhyeya-grantha-virodha. We may here note some difficulties in the said interpretation. Vallabha begins the Adhikaraṇa with the statement 'Evaṁ Brahmajijñāsām pratijñāya kimlakṣaṇakam brahmety ākāṅkṣayām jannādisūtradya-²-yena Vedapramāṇakam jagatkartṛ² samavāyi cety uktam. Evaṁ trisūtrya jijñāsālakṣaṇavicāra kartavyatā siddhā.¹⁸¹ If now Brahman is Vedapramāṇaka, why should there be any doubt regarding its being sarva-pramāṇa-viśaya? Puruṣottama has again criticised Śaṅkara for accepting the indicated sense in the term 'Īkṣati' by believing in the Dhātvarthanirdeśa. Puruṣottama himself however takes 'Īkṣati' as Īkṣābodhaka. Is it not Dhātvarthanirdeśa? Or is it just Dhātunirdeśa? While the Sūtras 4 and 5 have something to do with Īkṣaṇa, the Sūtra 6 shows

180. A.B.P. p. 154.

181. A.B.P. p. 128.

that the creator of the world is not Gaṇa. (Gaṇa has its connection with the word Guṇa according to Vallabha) The question of Brahman being the creator has already been settled in the second sūtra, while the discussion that Brahman is devoid of Mundane attributes will find its place in ~~III~~ III.ii. What is the use of the same here? Similar is the difficulty with the seventh Sūtra. Vallabha seems to be aware of this difficulty when he says, 'Evam sūtracetuṣṭayena īkṣatīhetunā jagatkartr̥tvopapattyaḥ sṛṣṭi-¹⁸² vākyaṇām Brahmaparatvam upapāditam.' This itself may appear rather strained. The remaining three Sūtras have nothing to do with kartr̥tva at all. Puruṣottama however tries to connect the Sūtras 8,9 with the question of vyavahāryatva. He says, 'Evam cātra brahma na sarvavyavahārātītam. Suṣuptipralayaḥ jīvā-dhāratvena śr̥ṣṭatvāt. Yed yadē yedādhāratvena śrutam tat tadā tatprayuktavyavahāre viṣayam ity evam anumānam bodhyam.'¹⁸³ Puruṣottama also says 'Evam ca brahma na sarvadā sarvavyavahārā-tītam. Mokṣe tathātvāna śrāvītatvāt. Yed evam tad evam. Maitreyī-brāhmaṇaśrāvītasarvevad ity evam anumānasiddher asya hetutvam bodhyam.'¹⁸⁴ We may say that the explanations are not very convincing. Similar explanation is not given of the Sūtra 10.

182. A.B.p. 143

183. A.B.P.p. 146.

184. A.B.P.p. 148.

At the end however Puruṣottama says, 'Evaṃ atra trisūtryāṃ
 susuptivicāreṇa dainanādinapralaya~~apralaya~~kartr̥tvam, dvitīye
 mokṣavicāreṇātyantikatatkartr̥tvam tṛtīye kārṇyakartr̥tvaprati-
 -pādenena naimittikāditatkartr̥tvam bodhitam iti pratibhāti.'¹⁸⁵

The word 'Pratibhāti' should be noted here. In spite of all the
 attempts of Puruṣottama, the last three Sūtras do not seem to
 have any definite connection with the first four. What again is
 the theory, that is established here? Is it that Brahman, though
 beyond all the dealings, is the object of the Vedic teaching
 or rather becomes so by His own desire? Is it that Brahman is
 en^dowed with supramundane attributes only and devoid of the
 mundane ones? Is it, finally, that Brahman is the creator of all?
 None of these is the purport of all the Sūtras. If there is no
 one viṣaya, how can there be one adhikaraṇa?

Vallabha directs the whole Adhikaraṇa I.iii.14-21 against
 Śaṅkara. Puruṣottama says 'Asminn adhikaraṇe jīva^hbrahmaikyakṛta-
 -sarvasaṅkaravādasya māyāvādasya ca nirākṛtir eva mukhyā.'¹⁸⁶
 Vallabha and Puruṣottama appear to have realized the sheer
 anachrosism of directing the set of Sūtras of Bādarāyaṇa against
 Śaṅkara, who is just a commentator of the Sūtras. Vallabha says

185. A.B.P. pp. 150-151.

186. A.B.P. p. 394.

that as Vedavyāsa is omniscient, he knows that one māyāvāda will be taught in future and thus refutes it in anticipation. . . . Puruṣottama shows how such things are possible. In the Purāṇ^{as} also Sūta has told of future events.¹⁸⁷

The difficulty in the interpretation of the Īkṣatyadhikaraṇa comes to the fore in the beginning of the forth quarter of the first Adhyāya. Vallabha says, "Tatra 'Īksater nāsābdam' iti sāṅkhyamataṁ āśabdatvād iti nivāritam". Puruṣottama explains, 'Naṁ adṛśyatvādyadhikaraṇa etadṛśam api vākyaṁ vicāritam eveti kim anena vicārena... Tathā ca yady api tadvākyaṁ vicāritam tathāpi tanmatssya sarvathā āśrautātvaṁ eveti nopapēditam ato vicāra ity arthah.'¹⁸⁸ Really speaking both Vallabha and Puruṣottama appear to be in difficulty. There is nothing in the interpretation of I.i.4-10., which has any connection with the Sāṅkhya. Again Vallabha definitely refers to the Īkṣatyadhikaraṇa, while Puruṣottama refers to the Adṛśyatvādyadhikaraṇa. Is it that Puruṣottama knows the difficulty in the works of Vallabha and tries to defend him by going out of the way?

Sāṅkara has often been attacked by scholars, not only

187. A.B.P. pp. 401-402.

188. A.B.P. p. 475.

ancient but even modern, that his views are not corroborated by the Sūtras. It has been pointed out that the Sūtrakāra did not agree to the falsity of the world, for otherwise he would not have refuted the Buddhistic theories in the Sūtra 'Vaidharmyāc ca na svapnādivat',¹⁸⁹ It should be borne in mind that this is the position of almost all the Ācāryas. Vallabha is also open to the same charge. The Sūtrakāra, who says 'Naikasmīn asambhavāt', can not be stated to teach Brahman, endowed with contradictory attributes. While Vallabha does not keep this in mind, Puruṣottama does not miss the point. He realizes the difficulty and tries to make amends by saying that, in fact only Brahman and nothing else is possessed of contradictory attributes. He says 'Vestutas/tu viruddhadharmāntaratvam brahmany eva pramāṇasiddham nānyatreṭi khyāpayitum taddūṣaṇam',¹⁹⁰

The Sūtra II.iii.18. 'Jñāta eva' is a very important Sūtra for all. Whereas Śaṅkara takes 'jñāta' to mean jñāna, Rāmānuja and Nimbārka understand it as jñāta. I may quote here the remarks of Dr. Ghate about Vallabha. He says, "Vallabha, who also holds with Rāmānuja and Nimbārka that 'knowledge' or 'intelligence' is an attribute (...) of the jīva, interpretes the Sūtra as

189. Brahmasūtra. II. ii. 29.

190. A. B. P. 660.

stating the prima facie view, according to which jīva is knowledge and therefore Brahman itself, and all distinctions are due to the principle of māyā; though really the jīva is a part (Anśa) of Brahman and is related to it just as sparks are related to fire. And, while refuting this view, Vallabha makes very interesting remarks: 'Tasmāt tadamśasya tadvyapadeśavākya-mātram svīkṛtya śiṣṭaparigrhārtham mādhyamikasya eva aparāvata-ro nitarāṃ sadbhir upekṣyah'... Of course this interpretation of the Sūtra is far fetched, though it makes no material difference as ultimately he means that the soul is a knower."¹⁹¹ Dr. Ghate's reading of Vallabha's interpretation ~~is~~^{does} not seem to be correct. This is not a Sūtra, presenting the prima facie view. Vallabha begins to Sūtra with 'Guṇān nirūpayan prathamataś caitanya-guṇam āha,' and then explains the Sūtra as 'Jñāś caitanyasvarūpaḥ Ate eva śrutibhyo vijñānamaya ityādibhyah.' Puruṣottama explains it as 'Jñānadharmakatve'pi jñānasvarūpa ity arthah.'¹⁹²

According to Vallabha, thus the individual soul is both the knower and the knowledge. The tirade against ~~to~~ Śaṅkara is a usual feature of Vallabha's works and need not been understood in the way, in which Dr. Ghate has understood it. Vallabha thus

191. Dr. Ghate. Vedānta. p. 92.

192. A. B. P. p. 706.

combines the interpretations of Śaṅkara and Rāmānuja and of course his explanation is not so far fetched, as said by Dr. Ghate.

The Sūtra, which should be considered in connection with the different interpretations is II.iii.50. Though there are many Sūtras in this pada, that afford an interesting study, I have not here embarked upon a detailed study of Vallabha's interpretations and therefore I will just refer to this Sūtra only. It reads 'Ābhāsa eva ca.' Śaṅkara takes the word ābhāsa to mean just appearance. Rāmānuja and Nimbārka understand the term as 'Hetvābhāsa'. The later interpretation is clearly far fetched. Vallabha here agrees with Śaṅkara in the literal sense of the word. But whereas 'Ābhāsa' according to Śaṅkara means Pratibimbatva and consequently mithyātva, this is not what Vallabha means. Jīva is an ābhāsa, because the quality of bliss is not manifested in him. As Puruṣottama says, 'Tathā ca yathā'nācāri brāhmaṇe brāhmaṇābhāsaḥ, sūtradhāra katve' pi brāhmaṇyākhyadevatāyās tatas tirohātātāt, tathā jīvo' pi.'¹⁹³ If we think that the Sūtrakāra does not teach the māyāvāda of Śaṅkara, perhaps the interpretation of Vallabha is the best.

The first Adhikaraṇa of III.ii. deals with the dream world. It has been variously interpreted by the Ācāryas. We shall here

give the interpretation of Vallabha. The first two Sūtras present the prima facie view. The opponent says that there is creation in the dream state, and this has been stated by the Śrutis. In some texts the creator is also told as also the sons and the like. Thus the dream creation, created by Brahman, does exist. From the third Sūtra begins the reply. The exponent says that dream creation is māyā only, because it is not fully manifested. What is meant by Māyā and 'Kārtsnye'? Puruṣottama here says 'Siddhānte tu sām^arthyaviśeṣo māyā. ... Ata Īśvareṣyā yā vyāmoḥikā śaktiḥ sā māyā prakṛte jñeyā. ... Deśaḥ kālo viśayasannidhir indriyavyāpāro bādhābhāvaś ceti kārtsnyam.'¹⁹⁴ Thus the dream creation is not real. As

Puruṣottama explains further, 'Tathā caindrajālikena natena yathā sāmājīkavyāmoḥane keutukārthan māyāmātrāsṛṣṭiḥ kriyate, tatheśvareṇa jīvavyāmoḥanādyarthan svapnasṛṣṭiḥ kriyate iti na tasyāḥ satyatvam.'¹⁹⁵ Why then should God create it at all?

The fourth Sūtra replies to this that the dream is indicative of good and evil, as it has been said in the Śrutis and again those who are experts in reading the dreams also say so. Thus the dream is shown to the jīva for indication. Puruṣottama says

194. A.B.P. p. 876.

195. A.B.P. p. 876.

that the dream is not as negligible as the sky-flower, because in that case it can not be suggestive of anything. The fifth Sūtra says that it is on account of the desire of the Highest Lord (Parābhidyānāt) that the attributes of God are concealed from the individual soul, who suffers, as a consequence, the bondage. Or the non-manifestation of the attributes (Sah: Tirobhāvaḥ Viparyayo vā) may be due to the connection with the body.

Dr. Ghate has fully discussed the Adhikarana with reference to the interpretations of Śaṅkara, Rāmānuja and Bhāskara, giving three different views, idealistic, realistic and idealistico-realistic respectively. As for Vallabha, he says that the Ācārya 'practically follows the third view and interpretes just in the same way as Bhāskara does with the difference that he interpretes Sutra 5 just as Rāmānuja does it...' ¹⁹⁶ Dr. Ghate is correct when he implies that Vallabha follows the idealistico-realistic view by disagreeing with Śaṅkara, who takes the waking state also to be illusory and with the view of Rāmānuja, that the dream is also real. But there is a fine distinction between his view and that of Bhāskara, in as much as for him the dream creation is a creation of Brahman and not of the individual soul, as understood by Bhāskara. The problem for Vallabha however is that of

196. V. S. Ghate. Vedanta. p. 121.

the connection of the first four Sūtras with the rest. The viṣaya in this Sūtra according to Vallabha is, 'Kiñcid āśankya periharati. Nenu jīvāya bhagavān srṣṭim karoti pradarśayati ca svasya sarvalīlām. Anśaś cāyam. Katham asya duḥkhitvam ity āśankya periharati tuśabdah.'¹⁹⁷ Why should this question be raised here and not in II.iii? Even though the Sūtra contains the word 'Tirohitam', which Vallabha and his followers understand as a sure indication of the Sūtrakāra's belief in the theory of Āvirbhāva-tirobhāva, the Sūtra, as explained by Vallabha, appears to be entirely out of context as it has nothing to ^{do} with the dream creation. The Sūtra 6 again gives an alternative. Vallabha says 'Īśvaracchayā aiśvaryāditirobhāvam svamate nirūpya matāntareṇāpi niyatadharmevādena nirūpayati.... Asmin pakṣe dehaviyoge eva punar aiśvaryādi-prāptih. Pūrvasmin kalpe vidyamāne' piti śeṣah.'¹⁹⁸ What is the ground for 'Svamate' here? If the term 'Tirohite' should indicate the Sūtrakāra's belief in the theory of Āvirbhāva-tirobhāva, can we say that the term 'māyāmātram' in Sūtra 3 shows that the Sūtrakāra accepts the theory of māyā? At the end Vallabha refutes the interpretations, given by others and

197. A.B.p.883.

198. A.B.p.884.

says 'Nidrāyā vivekajñānābhāvāvasaratvād yathāvyākhyāta evārthah'. Puruṣottama says 'Idam hi nidrāprakaraṇam. Nidrā ca tadeivāvasaram prāpnoti yadā vivekajñānam na bhavati. Ato jñānatirobhāvasyaivātra vaktavyatvāt tasya cōkterītyaiva bodhāt yathokta evārtha ity arthah.'¹⁹⁹ It is difficult to understand how Vallabha and Puruṣottama call this a nidrā-prakaraṇa. Should we think that the last two Sūtras deal with nidrā, while the first four with svapna? In that case why should there be one Adhikaraṇa only?

The set of Sūtras and Adhikaraṇas, beginning with III.ii.11 is very important for our purpose, in as much as they deal with the nature of Brahman in relation to the attributes. Dr. Chate says that according to Vallabha, Sūtras 11- 21 form only one Adhikaraṇa.²⁰⁰ This is not correct, if we follow Puruṣottama. The question here according to Vallabha relates to the attributes of the individual soul and the inert matter as sometimes taught as belonging to Brahman, while at times, they are denied to it. Some believe that the reconciliation can be brought about by admitting the sthāna, i.e.

199. A. B. P. p. 886.

200. V. S. Chate. Vedānta. pp. 126-127.

the abode; thus Brahman is endowed with smell in the earth and devoid of it in water. As Vallabha explains 'Evam sthāna-tah parasyobhayakīṅgam upapadyate'²⁰¹ The term 'api' gives an alternative explanation, 'athavā kāraṇa eva rūpam arūpam cāvacchedabhedena acāntāya- sāmāthyād vā.'²⁰² Both these alternatives are wrong(na), because Brahman is taught in this way everywhere. (Sarvatra hi). Puruṣottama explains that Brahman has no svagatabheda and is of one and the same nature everywhere.²⁰³ In the next Sūtra the opponent says that the explanation of the Siddhāntim is not correct, because of the distinction in the cause and the effect. Thus Brahman, different from the world, is distinct from Brahman endowed with the attributes of the world. (Na bhedaḍ iti cet). The exponent replies that this is wrong(āp), because Brahman is said to be one everywhere. (Pratyekam atadvacanāt) Some Śrutis actually deny the bheda. (Sūtra 13) Here ends one Adhikaraṇa.

The second adhikaraṇa, beginning from Sūtra 14 gives the

201. A.B.p.900.

202. A.B.p.900.

203. A.B.P.p.902.

reconciliation in the opinion of the ekadeśin. Who is this ekadeśin? Puruṣottama says 'Ayaṁ hy ekadeśi brāhmaṇa ekadeśena jagatsamavāyaitvaṁ tadatiriktasya jagadvāilakṣaṇyaṁ svarūpataḥ sādharmaikatvaṁ svecchayā vyavahāryatvaṁ jñānātmakam brāhmaṇa ākāraṁ manvāno jñānākāraṇasya brāhmaṇaḥ prapeñcapretibimbena laukikadharmavattvādikam manute.'²⁰⁴ Brahman is different from (a) the world (rūpevat: rūpyate nirūpyate vyavahriyate iti rūpaṁ sarvavyavahāre viśayatvaṁ tadyuktam rūpavad viśvaṁ.)²⁰⁵, because Brahman is mainly taught (Pradhānatvāt) wherever it is described. Vallabha adds that the discussion here is regarding the attributes, which are different from Brahman and not those of Brahman. He concludes 'Tasmāt kāryavat taddharmēnām api kāryatvāt bhagavattvaṁ na bhagavad dharmatvaṁ iti siddhāṁ.'²⁰⁶ The next Sūtra says that just as the light of the sun is and is not an object of our senses in the absence or presence of the clouds and the like, even so Brahman can not be approached by our mundane speech and mind, but it can be approached in the absence of obstructions. Otherwise, the ^{āsto} Sūtra will have no meaning (Avaiyarthyaṭ). The Sūtra thus wants to prove that even though Brahman is not an

204. A. B. P. p. 905.

205. A. B. pp. 906-907.

206. A. B. p. 908.

object of worldly dealings, the scriptures are not futile.²⁰⁷

Well, why then not imagine the supramundane sense organs also?

To this the reply is given in the Sūtra 16 that the Śruti

teaches of Brahman as just a mass of knowledge. (Tanmātram:

Prajñānaghanamētram.) The scriptures and the smrtis themselves

show the absence of the attributes of the jada and the jīva

in Brahman. (Sūtra 17) Vallabha says 'Prapañcadharmā bhagavaty

ucyante vedādaḥ na tu taddharmā bhagavāniti jñāpayati.'²⁰⁸

The Śrutis also give the simile of sūryaka (Sūryeṇa sahitaṁ

jalam sūryakam. Sūtra 18) Vallabha says at the end 'Tasmāj

jada-jīva-dharmāṇāṁ bhagavaty upacāro niśedhas tu mukhyaḥ.'²⁰⁹

Puruṣottama at the end give the resume of which we have

quoted in extenso because of its importance. "Brahmaṇaḥ

prapañcavilakṣaṇatvena kāryasādharaṇadharmāṇāṁ kāraṇe brahmaṇy

abhāvena brahmaṇas tatsvarūpadharmāṇāṁ ca laukikamanovāg-

-agocaratvena kṛtsnaḥ prajñānaghana itī śrutyō akārasya

jñānātmatvatveṇa tattatkriyādīnāṁ dharmāṇāṁ ca naisargika-

-tvena teṣāṁ ca bhagavat-prakāṣye eva darśanādivyavahāra-viṣaya

-tvena laukikavāṇmanobhiḥ pratīyamāṇānāṁ sthānadharmatvāt ta-

thety ekadeśimatena siddham ity arthaḥ. Tena brahmaṇaḥ sthānato

207. A. B. p. 909.

208. A. B. p. 913.

209. A. B. p. 914.

jadajīvadharṁetvam svatas tu tadrahitatvam ity ekadeśimatenā-
sidāham. Etenāsyādhikarāṇasya prāsāṅgikatvam maksyamānopā-
-dghātātvaṁ veti sūcitan."²¹⁰

Sūtra 19 begins the next adhikaraṇa. It contains the
siddhānta against the view of the ekadeśin. The view of the
ekadeśin (Tathātvaṁ) is in-correct(na). Water can reflect a
substance but the attributes can not so contain any reflection.
(Ambuśad-agrahaṇāt) Thus the sarvakāma etc. are the attributes
of Brahman and are not aupacārika, on account of the connect-
-ion with the upādhis.²¹¹ How then to reconcile the conflict-
-ing passages according to the ^{Siddhānta?} Sūtra 20 gives a
reply to this. Just as space may be big or small in accordance
with its limiting adjuncts, even so here also Brahman is
endowed with all the attributes. This there is ubhaya-sāmañja-
-sya. Sūtra 21 says that all the attributes, even the contrad-
-ictory ones, are seen in God. Sūtra 22 gives the way of
reconciliation from the point of view of reason. The denial
of the attributes in the ²Sūtra relates to only those which
are mundane (Prakṛtāitāvattva), and then speaks of many other
attributes, which are supramundane.

210. A. B. P. p. 914.

211. A. B. p. 919.

Sūtra 23 starts the next adhikaraṇa. Vallabha says that the contradiction has been resolved earlier on the basis of sabdabala and now the Sūtrakāra does the same from the point of view of the arthabala. Puruṣottama says that the ~~arthabala~~-vicāra is not necessary but as other sages have taken their stand on the ~~arthabala~~ also, it is necessary to consider from that point of view also.²¹² Sūtra 23 states the prima facie view that Brahman is avyakta. The next Sūtra is a reply to it. Vallabha understands the word 'Api' as a jeer against the opponent, who is a fool. The Highest Lord is seen in the course of intense devotion (Sāmrādhana), when God shows favour. The devotee perceives him, or people like Dhruva infer him. The 'Pratyakṣānumānābhyām' may be understood as 'Śrutismṛti-bhyām' also.

Another Adhikaraṇa begins with the Sūtra 25. This and the next Sūtra form the Pūrvapakṣa. The reconciliation of conflicting passages is not proper on the strength of the perception of a devotee, because that can be no specification. (Aveśeṣyāt) The illustration given here is that of light. In the light of the sun, the moon, the jewels etc, one experiences heat or cold but the light as such is not taken

to be manifold. The prakāśa of the Lord depends upon the actions like penance etc. (Prakāśaś ca karmāṇi). This is not uniform but is various (abhāyāsāt) corresponding to different actions and different devotees. The Sūtra 26 takes the argument further. Because of this variation (atah) the Lord is manifested in endless ways (ananta). But then we should accept some frame (līṅga) of the Lord. This can be decided on the basis of the scriptures or the perception of a devotee. The Sūtra 27 gives a reply to this by saying that Brahman is both without attributes and is endowed with them, because both are taught (Ubhayavyapadeśāt). This can be illustrated by taking the instance of a snake, which may be both straight or coiled. At the end Puruṣottama says 'evam ca śeḍḍabalavicāreṇa viruddhasarvadharmāśrayam brahmeti nirṇayaḥ. Śrutyukta yuktyā vicāre tu laukikadharmaśūnyam alaukikasarvadharmayuktam iti nirṇayaḥ. Arthabalavicāre tu viruddhasarvarūpam iti nirṇaya iti bodhenā-rtham atra tredhā vicāritam.'²¹³

Sūtra 28 begins a new adhikaraṇa. The question discussed here is regarding the relationship of Brahman and His Dharmas. The Sūtra says that the abodes of light like the sun are non-

-different from light as also different from the same; both being called tejas. Similarly the attributes are both different and not-different from Brahman. We should note here that Vallabha takes 'Vā' in the sense of 'tu'. Sūtra 29 however says that Brahman should be understood as before. This, says Vallabha, is the way of reconciliation from the point of view of the ekadeśin. This is further corroborated by the next Sūtra, which says that the attributes are also denied to Brahman, as is inferred from 'eva' in the passage 'Ekam evādvitīyam.'²¹⁴

Different interpretations have been given by different Ācāryas and it is very difficult to say which of them is correct. The Sūtrakāra himself does not appear to be very clear, as can be judged from the repeated use of the term 'vā'. It may be noted that Vallabha's interpretation of 'va' in the 28th Sūtra as 'tu' is not so very happy. Similarly one may feel that the explanations of 'Arūpaved' in Sūtra 14 and 'api' and 'sāmādhane' in Sūtra 24 do not seem to be satisfactory. Vallabha's explanation of 'arūpaved' as 'jagad-vilakṣaṇa' reminds one of II.i.4, where the question has already been discussed, though ~~maxxxxx~~ in a different context. The

214. The Chāndogya Upaniṣad. VI.ii.1.

problem before the Sūtrakāra is as to whether Brahman is possessed of the Dharmas and not whether Brahman has the attributes of the jada and the jīva. The greatest problem for Vallabha however lies in his bringing in the ekadeśin. Who is this ekadeśin? Why should there be a complete adhikāraṇa for him? Again the difficulty becomes more acute, when the last two Sūtras 29, 30 are said to belong to him. Vallabha has to say 'Ubhayam api sūtrakārasammataṃ'.²¹⁵ Puruṣottama takes special pains to distinguish between the two positions.²¹⁶ Again how is ^{it} that Vyāsa's own opinion is given in the Sūtra 28, and that of the ekadeśin in the sūtras 29 and 30? Puruṣottama spares no pains to defend his teacher. He says that as the view of the ekadeśin is corroborated by another Sūtra 30, we should not think that the Sūtrakāra considers the view as equally correct. 'Ekam evādvitīyam!',²¹⁷ need not deny the attributes also. When we say that Devadatta is at home and nobody else, it goes without saying that Devadatta endowed with hands and feet is at home. The argument is given

215. A.B.p. 940.

216. See. A.B.P.p. 941.

217. Chāndogya Upaniṣad. VI. ii. 1.

only to show that there is nothing different from Brahman.²¹⁸

But it may appear that in his zest to defend Vallabha, perhaps Puruṣottama himself is facing difficulties.

The Opponent of Puruṣottama is again very searching. It is wrong, he says, to understand the ekadeśin as that of Vyāsa. In other words the opponent asks; what is the ground for believing that the Sūtra 28 gives the Sva-siddhānta? Puruṣottama replies: 'Ekadeśipade atra vyāsasyaiva ekadeśi grāhyah. Anyathā ambuvatsūtreṇa ata eveti sūtrasiddham dr̥ṣṭāntam na dūṣayet. Vṛddhihrāsādisūtradvaye yuktyanteram ca na vadet.'²¹⁹ The ekadeśin is not mentioned by name, because he may not be so well known as Jaimini. The opponent's name is equally not given in the Sūtra 'jīvamukhyaprāpa-liṅgād iti cet tad vyākhyātam'.²²⁰ Or it may be that this view is intended for the lower adhikārins. It can also be possibly stated that the ekadeśin may be one Kāśakṛtsna, who is mentioned before in 'Avasthiter iti Kāśakṛtsnah'.²²¹

218. A.B.P. p. 942.

219. A.B.P. p. 942.

220. Bṛhmasūtra. I. iv. 17.

221. Bṛhmasūtra. I. iv. 22.

It should not again be said that as the Sūtras 29 and 30 come after Sutra 28, they teach the main principle. Puruṣottama says "Dvitiyaskandhe 'itthem bhāvena kathito bhagavān bhagavattamāḥ ,anetthambhāvena hi param dṛṣṭum arhanti sūrayaḥ' ity ādibhir etadāmukhyatāyāḥ śukavākye vyāsecaranair evokta-tvāt." The view is admitted only for the lower adhikārins, who may be enlightened by it. Puruṣottama refers here to the Nāsadiyasūkt²²² and says that Vyāsa thinks from the point of view of the līlāsrsti, while others do not understand it.²²³ Puruṣottama then goes on to denounce strongly the interpretations of others.

From all that is given above, it appears that Vallabha is at times obscure, and Puruṣottama is also not satisfactory in~~def~~ defending him. At the end of the Ānandamāya-adhikaraṇe Puruṣottama takes Vācaspati to task and quotes a verse:

Yuktibhir atisithilābhiḥ samādhāno dṛḍhān doṣān,
Vācaspatir api bhāṣye vyākhyāvyājena dūṣaṇam brūte.²²⁴

Can the same thing be said of Puruṣottama here?

222. Rg-vede. X. 129.

223. A. B. P. pp. 942-943.

224. A. B. P. p. 220.

After III.ii.34. we have a different author for the Anubhāṣya. Viṭṭhaleśa's interpretations of the Sūtras are not a very creditable performance, when compared with those of Vāllabha. He distinguishes through out between Puṣṭi and Maryādā, often refers to Gokula, discusses the incarnations of Viṣṇu, and all that. With all his fantastic interpretations, he gives so many things with a sectarian bias and so many things, which the Sūtrakāra might have never intended. Puruṣottama as a faithful commentator has to explain all these things, and what is more he tries to defend Viṭṭhaleśa. We may note only three instances here.

At the end of III.iii.2. Viṭṭhaleśa says 'Iyam tūpāśanā-mārgīyā vyavasthoktā. Bhaktimārgīyā tv etadvilakṣṇā.'²²⁵ Puruṣottama in his explanation says about Nanda etc. but his opponent asks 'Nanu sūtrakāreṇ edam kutroktam yenaivam ucyate?' Puruṣottama replies 'Agrimeṣūtre dhikārasyaṇupasaṁhārahetautā kathānenātrā yathādhikāranirṇayasūcanāt sūcitam iti jānīhi.'²²⁶

Under Sūtra III.iii.28 Puruṣottama's opponent asks as

225. A. B. p. 983.

226. A. B. P. p. 984.

to the use of referring to the Purāṇas and Itihāsa, when all others refer to the maxims of the Pūrvatantra. Puruṣottama of course gives the stock reply 'Itihāsapurāṇayor vedopabrūḥanatvāt.'²²⁷

Under IV.iv.7. however Puruṣottama has to say something which, if accepted by an opponent, Puruṣottama would never tolerate. He says 'Nāyam niyamo yad viṣayavākyaṃ sautrapadānurūpam eva grāhyam iti.'²²⁸

Dr. Ghate is frank in his assessment of the Anubhāṣya. He says, "It is very difficult to assert dogmatically whether Vallabha's doctrine receives or does not receive any support from the Sūtras; but so much may be said that his commentary strikes us many times not as a very creditable performance, being in places very sectarian or unsatisfactory, although one can point out instances where he offers very interesting criticisms of others. It is to be observed however that his special references to Gokula, the Puṣṭimārga and the Māyādāmārga, and his manner of reconciling the mutually contradictory passages in the Upaniṣads by postulating the miraculous and incomprehensible

227. A. B. P. p. 1061.

228. A. B. P. p. 1396.

greatness(Aiśvarya) of the Brahman and his assertion of pure monism without any reference to plurality make it far from possible that his doctrine could have been the one propounded by the Sūtrakāra."²²⁹ One may not agree with the assessment of Dr.Chate in toto.The sectarian interpretations are mainly found in the later part of the Bhāṣya, and Vallabha need not be blamed for the weaknesses of his son.Again Vallabha's criticisms of others are more caustic than brilliant.As regards the miraculous power of God,it is indeed a moot point. The point however is that all these Ācāryas try to evolve their own systems from the Sūtras,which in their turn have tried to evolve something like an Upaniṣadic system.But on account of the enigmatic style of the Sūtras,it is very difficult to get a clear idea of the system of the Sūtrakāra.

(VI).

Interpretation of the Gītā and Bhāgavata Purāṇa.

While the Bhagavad Gītā is regarded by all as one of the Prasthānas,Vallabha includes the Bhāgavata Purāṇa also

229.V.S.Chate.Vedānta .p.177.

in the list. Vallabha himself as not commented upon the Gītā, as others have done; and though he has very often referred to it in the course of his commentaries and works, it is very difficult to piece them together and make out a full-fledged commentary. In the first chapter of the Tattvadīpanibandha Vallabha understands the term 'Śāstrārtha' as 'Gītārtha'.

The point has been discussed by me at some length in the chapter BII. Any way Puruṣottama, curiously, keeps quiet in his commentary at that place.²³⁰ The Amṛtatarāṅginī commentary is said to have been written by Puruṣottama but it is not correct. It is written by Vrajarāya. Only the introductory portion is from the pen of Puruṣottama. This is however sufficient to show the purport of the Gītā according to the Śuddhādvaita.

Puruṣottama, in the beginning, refers to the purport of the Gītā, as explained by Śaṅkara and Madhusūdana, and criticises them. He refers to Śrīdhara and offers no comments. At the end he states the views of Rāmānuja and says 'Idam Siddhāntasyānugunam.'²³¹ After this he gives the explanation according to the Śuddhādvaita.

The Lord Śrīkrṣṇa who came to the world for the liberation

230. T.S.Ab.p.30.

231. Bhagavad Gītā with seven commentaries.p.11.

of all, uplifted the devotees by explaining to them the concept of devotion. He could see the dark Kali age, which was devoid of all Dharma. Hence for creating devotion in the future generation, he preached his own essential nature to Arjuna, when an occasion for the same arose. Of the fourfold devotees, *ārta*, *jijñāsu*, *arthārthin* and *jñānin*, Arjuna had the first two *Adhikāras*. That teaching has been compiled by Vyāsa, who was an incarnation of the knowledge of God, in seven hundred verses. It has been explained by Viṭṭhaleśa in his *Gītātātperya* thus:

Pravṛttidherman bhagavān rsiadvārā nirūpyatu ,
 Nivṛttim iṣṭām sudṛḍhām nihsandigdham harir jagau.
 Sāṅkhyam yogo rahasyam ca rahasyatanam eva ca,
 Anyonyādhikyanirdhāro jñānavijñānāyor api.
 Svesvarūpavinirdhāro bhajanetarenirṇayah,
 Teddhetur guṇavāṣāṇyam sarvaśāstravinirṇayah.
 Iti gītārthanirdhāro yathābhāgo vitanyate,
 Sāṅkhyeyogau nirūpyēdau moham utsārya phalgunam.
 Bhaktipūyūṣapātāram kṛtavān iti saṅgrahah. ²³²

Viṭṭhaleśa has also discussed, says Puruṣottama, as to why should the first *Adhyāya* begin with the speech of

Dhṛtarāṣṭra. Dhṛtarāṣṭra is surely not a devotee and his son Duryodhana is an incarnation of a demon. Again as the Brahma-vidyā is being taught here, it requires a calm adhikārin, whose resignation is for getting the knowledge of the self. Here the spirit of resignation in Arjuna is for fear of sin. Again if Kṛṣṇa would teach the Brahma-vidyā to Arjuna, then Arjuna would also retire from the kingdom and the Samsāra. This is not the position. Hence the teaching is not quite up to the mark here. To this the reply is that the sons of Prthā are admitted to the path of devotion by the Highest Lord as his own. The Lord with a desire to lighten the burden on the earth made Yudhiṣṭhira perform the Rājasūya, after which the great war was fought. Again Kṛṣṇa through Yudhiṣṭhira desired to establish the realm of religion and kill the demons. This can be possible only in the reign of Yudhiṣṭhira. If however the foes are killed by them, just as brothers kill brothers, and the Pāṇḍavas begin to rule, then the kingdom will have no element of virtue. It is because of this that Kṛṣṇa made Arjuna grieve in the stated way. Hence the withdrawal from war has been described of

Arjuna himself; otherwise a warrior would have experienced the feeling of heroism and not of resignation. Hence only the Bhagavadīyatva is the cause of this feeling in Arjuna. To such a man only the Bhaktimārga should be taught and as the teaching is not of the common standard, Dhṛtarāṣṭra and his son are brought in the beginning. Again when a Bhagavadīya thinks of doing something according to the desire of God, it is a good thought, not otherwise. Thus it should not be understood that the grief of Arjuna is for showing that those who are full of grief are entitled to know Brahman, because it is not the primary purpose. The purpose in the Bhagavad-Gītā is to teach the limits of the path of devotion, the limits that are beyond the world and the Vedas. Puruṣottama thus concludes 'Ato'tra mukhyatayā bhakter evopadeśaḥ yat-punar anyat tat sarvam tasyaiva śeṣabhūtam iti dik.'²³³

As is the case with the Śrūtis and the Sūtras, the Bhagavad Gītā has also been interpreted very often and by many. It is difficult to say dogmatically as to whether the 'Suddhādvaita is or is not taught in the Gītā. It will be a

233. Bhagavad Gītā with seven commentaries. p. 12.

study in itself to see whether the 'Suddhādvaitic interpretation of the Gītā is correct.

The Bhāgavata Purāṇa is held in very high esteem in the Suddhādvaita system. Vallabha's Subodhinī on the same is not complete. He has also given a chapter-wise summary of the Purāṇa in the third chapter of his Tattvadīpenibandha. Puruṣottama has written his sub commentary on the Subodhinī and on the said chapter. Puruṣottama has also independently written one tract Bhāgavatasvarūpaviśayakaśaṅkānirāsavāda.

The 'Suddhādvaita system considers the Purāṇas as one of the Prasthānas. Bhāgavata is surely immensely popular among the Vaiṣṇavas in India and it really deserves that popularity. The date of the Purāṇa has baffled the scholars and various views are advanced for the same.²³⁴ It is interesting to note here that Puruṣottama has also tried to show that the Bhāgavata is not only a Mahāpurāṇa but is also very old.²³⁵ It is difficult to say anything about it.

234. Cf. D. K. Shastri. Aitihasika saṁśodhana. p. 187 ff, M. Winternitz History of Indian literature. Vol. I. pp. 554-557, R. C.

Hezra. Purāṇic records on Hindu rites and customs (Studies in) pp. 52-57, the Purāṇa index. Vol. I. V. R. R. Dikshitar. Intro. pp. xxviii-xxx.

235. Bhāgavatasvarūpaviśayakaśaṅkānirāsavāda. Appendix to T. Sn.

It is equally difficult to say anything about the philosophical teaching of the Purāṇa. Prince S.N. Dasgupta has written on the philosophy of the Bhāgavata Purāṇa.²³⁶ Apart from the question of date, the philosophical teaching of the Purāṇa also requires a separate study.

(VIII).

Puruṣottama as an interpreter.

We have discussed above the interpretations of the Śrutis, Sūtras and Gītā according to the Śuddhādvaita, in the light of Puruṣottama's remarks. We may here add a few lines regarding Puruṣottama's own interpretations of his predecessors, whose works he has commented upon. It should be said at the very out-set that Puruṣottama remains completely faithful to Vallabha and Viṭṭhaleśa, whose works he mainly explains. But the problem before Puruṣottama was not just to explain the words of Vallabha and Viṭṭhaleśa but to restate with his scholarship and skill the teachings of Vallabha among the scholars of the day. He has thus to write much more than

236. S.N. Dasgupta. A History of Indian Philosophy. Vol. IV.
Chapter. XXIV.

mere explanations. Vallabha's laconic style makes his works so obscure that they can not be understood without the help of a commentary. Puruṣottama's commentaries however supply much more than what is needed. Puruṣottama not only tries to explain the concepts of the Śuddhādvaita with clarity and exactitude, but compares them with other systems, defends Vallabha and Viṭṭhaleśa and refutes others. All this he does by way of commentaries, Prakāśa on the Anubhāṣya, Āvaranabhaṅga, on the Tattvadīpanibandha etc. Only rarely we find in the Anubhāṣya-Prakāśa that Puruṣottama indulges in discussions, which are not exactly called for in the Anubhāṣya. After II.iv.16 Puruṣottama discusses the jñānakriyā,²³⁷ and at the end of the same pāda there is a long discussion on the Sr̥ṣṭiprakriyā.²³⁸ Similarly at the end of I.iii.38 Puruṣottama raises the question whether the Śūdras are also entitled to learn the whole of the Mahābhārata and the Purāṇas and comes to the conclusion that only those portions which do not teach of Brahman should be read or heard by them.²³⁹

237. A.B.P. pp. 772-804.

238. A.B.P. pp. 810-813.

239. A.B.P. pp. 442-444.

Whenever he explains, he explains fully. Thus when an Upaniṣadic passage is just referred to in the Bhāṣya by a word or two, Puruṣottama would give the whole passage, interpret it and reject the interpretations given by others. He would not leave aside anything that he knows, and of course he knows everything that is required for him to know. Even the traditional story of the Vivāda between the Brahmvēdin and the Mīmāṃsāvēdin connected with the verse 'Ekam śāstram devakī-putragītam etc' does not move away from his mind.²⁴⁰

When Puruṣottama is defending the interpretations of Vallabha and Viṭṭhaleśa, he is surely brilliant though at times he seems to be facing difficulties in doing so. The most glaring example of this is found in the Suvarṇasūtra, when Puruṣottama has to perform the duty of defending the fantastic interpretations/ given by Viṭṭhaleśa of the Vedic verse 'Tā vān vāstunyo asmasi gamadhyaḥ...etc.'²⁴¹ Viṭṭhaleśa talks about Gokula and all that and Puruṣottama is of course not so enthusiastic about it in his commentary.

240. Cf. T.S. Ab. pp. 26-27.

241. Rg Veda I.154.6.

Puruṣottama however can not let it go easily. His opponent immediately asks why should there be such an explanation, when even in the Nirukta the verse is said to have the sun as its deity. Puruṣottama can of course give the answer.

"Prakaranānurodhāt. 'Vedaiś ca sarvair aham eva vedyaḥ,'

'Sarve vedā yat padam āmananti' iti śrutismṛtibhyām ca. 'Ado yaḥ dāru plovate' Ity elakṣmīprakāśakamentresya puruṣottama-kṣetramēhātmye vyāsepādair vedabhāṣya vidyāranyena ca Śrījāgannāthapareṭayā vyākhyānāt, etasyaḥ saraṇer darśitatvā ca "242

Again while explaining his master, Puruṣottama does not miss the textual problems also. Thus for instance, while commenting upon the statement of Vallabha 'Agnisūryasomavidyud-rūpā brahmaṇo haṁsoktacaranarūpā,' Puruṣottama says 'Rūpād iti pāṭhe bhāvepradhānānirdēśaḥ. Rūpeti pāṭhaḥ śrīhastākṣareṣu sandigdhatvād bodhyaḥ.'²⁴³ After III.iv.21. Puruṣottama says that another Sūtra 'Bhāveśabāḥ ca 'is read by others. He then explains why it has not been included here. "Tac ca vidhir vādhārenaved ity atra itesyaiva syāt padvid iti śrutivyākhyānena iva vyutpāditam atāḥ prayojanābhāvād upekṣitam iti pratibhāti.

242. S.S.p.295.

243. A.B.P.p.494.

Lekhakadoṣāt tr̥tītam veti jñeyam."²⁴⁴

Sometimes Puruṣottama finds that the interpretations of the Sūtras as given by Viṭṭhaleśa are different from those given by Vallabha. Puruṣottama notes the difference carefully in his Anubhāsyaprakāśa. Thus for instance at the end of Sūtra II.iii.42 Puruṣottama notes that while the term 'Prayatna' in the Sūtra is understood as an effort of the individual soul by Vallabha, Viṭṭhaleśa explains it as the effort of the Highest Lord for the purpose of sport.²⁴⁵ Similarly at the end of III.ii.18 Puruṣottama shows how the interpretation of this set of Sūtras given by Viṭṭhaleśa is different from that given by Vallabha.²⁴⁶

We have stated above that Puruṣottama is on the whole very faithful to the Ācārya and his son, whose works he explains. A very careful perusal of his commentary on the Anubhāśya will however show that there are cases, of course rare, when Puruṣottama in his zest to give a scholarly explanation slightly goes off the track. In the very first Sūtra for

244. A. B. P. p. 1212.

245. A. B. P. p. 750.

246. A. B. P. pp. 914-916.

instance, Vallabha discusses the illustration 'Daśamas tvam asi' and points out that a man knows himself to be the tenth not only because he hears that, but also because he sees himself to be the tenth. The perception here is thus stronger than the Āptavākya. Puruṣottama however indulges in a scholastic discussion and gives three alternatives, one who sees, one who is blind and one who knows that the soul is different from the body. For all the three the knowledge is only of the body and not the soul, resulting from the Āpta-vākya. Vallabha's explanation is certainly better.²⁴⁷ Such instances are very rare and again the difference wherever found does not make any substantial change in the teaching of the authors. We can say at the end that Puruṣottama, who is a very capable argumentator, is also a very faithful and brilliant interpreter.

247. A.B.P.p.30.

CHAPTER. V.

EXPOSITION OF THE SUDDHĀDVAITA.

(I).

Introductory.

While the founders of various theories in Indian Philosophy have formulated and preached their own ideas, it was left for their illustrious followers to put their doctrines in a systematic form. Thus whereas Gaudapāda in his Kārikās first brought out the theory of Māyā and that of Ajāti, Śaṅkara surpassed his grand-teacher and people now know Śaṅkara more than they know Gaudapāda. Śaṅkara was followed by Vācaspati Miśra and others, who systematised Śaṅkara's theories and preached the avacchedavāda, or the pratibimbavāda or whatever Vāda, as they thought, has been accepted by Śaṅkara. This has happened in the case of all the great teachers like Rāmānuja, and Madhva, Śrīkenṭha and Nimbārka. But Śaṅkara, Rāmānuja, and Madhva are clear in their works. Rāmānuja with his dialectical style and Śaṅkara with his easy and graceful and yet scholarly diction stand in sharp contrast with Vallabha, whose laconic and terse expressions are fused with a very subtle analysis brought forth in his interpretative method. Vallabha is so brief in his

works, that it is difficult to understand them fully without the aid of commentaries. We are even confused at times and not in a position to understand what exactly he is driving at. Viṭṭhaleśa, though clearer in exposition than his father, is more concerned with the establishment of the Sampradāya and even in his independent works like the Vidvanmandana, he seems to be launching a violent tirade against Śaṅkara rather than attempting a systematic exposition of his own doctrines. Again one may feel that at times Viṭṭhaleśa is very sectarian. His special references to Gokula, Puṣṭi, Maryādā and Pravāha, his laying greater emphasis on the minor and decidedly later Upaniṣads- all this may not appear to a critical mind as a very creditable performance. Viṭṭhaleśa was followed by Gokulanātha and Harirāya- both of whom can be called the pillars of the Sampradāya, but their share in the systematic explanation of the philosophical part of the Suddhādvaita is not so very great as to be taken into account. Puruṣottama alone, the greatest scholar of the Sampradāya, was the first writer to note this defect and to try to make ~~up~~ for it.

Again though Puruṣottama is mainly a commentator, he is not merely a writer of commentaries. His Vādagranthas and his Prasthānaratnākara-which is unfortunately not

complete, ~~so~~ show something of a modern scholar in Puruṣottama. Here his aim is not to refute the theories of others but to propound his own and the refutation of others' thoughts is just a subordinate affair. Again, as we have seen above, Puruṣottama's method is comparative and analytical. So it is by reading Puruṣottama's works that we can find out where exactly the 'Suddhādvaita' stands in the whole range of Indian, especially the Vedāntic, philosophy.

Further, Puruṣottama, who has written so much on the 'Suddhādvaita', was rewarded with an enviable title of Vedapaśu by his contemporaries and some people in the Saṃpradāya even went to the extent of saying that Puruṣottama has taught ^{us} ~~wrong~~ theories.¹ There may be various reasons for it and we shall deal with them later on. But it is necessary for us to see where Puruṣottama's analysis has led him and whether there is anything in his works, that warrants such a statement. For all these reasons, therefore, we have attempted in the following pages the exposition of the 'Suddhādvaita' as given by Puruṣottama.

1. Cf. Avatāravādēvalī. Hindi. Intro. p. 6.

(II).

Theory of knowledge.

Knowledge, says Puruṣottama, is endless, and infinite because it is the very nature of the Supreme Principle, Brahman. When the Lord desires to create and to be manifold, the sentiency which is His very nature, is revealed in many ways. Thus even though it is infinite, it can be understood as tenfold. As stated in the beginning of Prasthānaratnākara, these ten types are as follows:-

(1) Knowledge which is the essential nature of God, the essential spirit of all the beings, which is not liable to modification (vikāra) and which is to be meditated upon by all.²

(2) When this essential nature of God is manifested, like the light of the Sun, it is then called the quality of God. It inheres in the individual souls from Him.

(3) In the beginning of the creation, God accepts the Vedāśarīra and we have that knowledge, manifested in the form of the Vedas.

(4) The third kind of knowledge becomes the seed from which is manifested in the first creation, the verbal

2. Tatre sarvātmabhūtam sarvāpāśyam mukhyam avikṛtam
svasvarūpātmakam ekam- Pr.p.2.

knowledge.

These four types of knowledge are said to be eternal (nitya). The other six which are enumerated below, are said to be Kārya and are attributes of the internal organ (Antah-karana).

(5) When individual words convey the sense, we have the fifth kind of knowledge, depending upon and qualified by the association of particular words. Even for the dumb, who have no speech, gestures take the place of words.

(6) When one knows something by means of his organs of sensation, that is the sixth kind of knowledge, which may be called the sense-knowledge.

The remaining four kinds of knowledge are also related to the individual knower, but depend upon the internal organ.

(7) The Manas, which has the nature and function of conation and non-conation, (Sankalpa & Vikalpa) produces the doubt. (Saṁśaya)

(8) The body-consciousness, wrong knowledge, decision and memory—all these depend upon the buddhi.

(9) The dream consciousness depends upon the egoism (Ahaṁkāra) associated with the buddhi.

(10) Deep-sleep consciousness where the citta has the vision of the soul^y as One.

Puruṣottama does not accept the view that the knowledge which is thus produced, is just a transitory phenomenon, lasting for three moments only. Even if we admit its permanence, there can be no contingency of one particular knowledge lasting all the while. When another kind of knowledge is produced due to the presence of other objects and the set of circumstances required for its production, it supercedes the former, which is then relegated to the back-ground and which exists in the subtle form of impressions, (Samskāra) Whenever the attention of the manas is drawn towards it, it can be discovered in memory; it is not so found out when the manas is busy with other things and does not pay heed to it. It is not necessary therefore to say that the knowledge is destroyed. It is just concealed.

From another point of view, knowledge can be classified as sāttvika, rājasa, and tāmasa according as there is the presence and preponderance of one or another of the three qualities. Out of these three, the last is incapable of proving anything. It is just illusory, is condemned by the cultured people and is adhered to only by the heretics and

the low.

The sātṭvika knowledge is of the form of pramā or right knowledge; for, whenever there is an increase of sattva, right knowledge is produced owing to various causes like scriptures, action, meditation, mantras, purifications etc. When however the sattva quality is lacking, the same circumstances which produce knowledge, produce error in its lieu. Thus we can say from this positive and negative concomitance that the knowledge, which is produced by the sattva, is the pramāṇa which is not sublated or which is not liable to sublation.³

The sātṭvika knowledge does not accept any distinctions (vikalpas). It is the kaivalya, which is absolutely valid, the primary notion being the presence of the Universal Essence every where. It is sadātmaka. The syllogism⁴ given by Puruṣottama to prove that all the

3. Abādḥite jñānatvam bādha-yogyavyatiriktatvam vā tal-lakṣaṇam. Pr.p.6.

4. Vimatā bhāvāḥ sadabhinnāḥ. Ādyantamedhyeṣu sadanugatatvāt. Yed eva yad anugataṁ tat tad abhinnam. Sauverṇakundāla-katakādivat. Sadevaśeṣatvāc ca tathā. Pr.p.6.

objects are non-different from the Sat on the analogy of the non-difference of the gold and the golden ornaments, because of the inherence of Sat comes very near to the esoteric knowledge of Śaṅkara, in which all the distinctions are to be eschewed and there remains only pure being. The indeterminate knowledge according to the Puruṣottama, is the first apprehension of being alone, without any qualifications and distinctions. But while Śaṅkara's esoteric knowledge does not admit even the knower and the triplicate difference of the knower, known and knowledge, Puruṣottama does not go to that extent. The basic difference between the two is that, while Śaṅkara's nirvikalpaka is perfectly in consonance with his own theories of the nirvikalpaka Brahman, such is not the case with Puruṣottama, who is not in a position to accept the distinction in the qualityless and the qualified Brahman. Puruṣottama's explanation of the nirvikalpaka is in keeping with his theory of tādātmya.

The Rājasa knowledge, which is produced by the rājasa-sāmagri, is variously revealed and is full of distinctions. The rājasa knowledge is stated to be savikalpaka. Whenever an object is first known, it is known as pure being viz. we have the indeterminate knowledge on account of

the quality of Sattva. This is however immediately superseded by the rajas, which is moved by the internal organ in association with the senses and this leads to the distinction in the name and form of that particular object. The change-over from the indeterminate to the determinate is so rapid that the apprehension of the former is almost absent and we do not at all think that we have passed through one stage and come to another. The procedure however is the same., whether the sensory perception may be simple or complex, as illustrated in that of " a pot" or that of ' a pot on the ground'. Puruṣottama classifies the savikalpaka into two:

- (i) Viśiṣṭabuddhi-or associated knowledge e.g. ' a man with a stick.'
- (ii) Samūhālambanabuddhi-knowledge of a conglomeration of entities.e.g. ' a man and a stick,' ' a pot, a cloth and a pillar.'

Puruṣottama's explanation of the indeterminate and the determinate is as follows:-

We have at first the revelation of the pure being. This is nirvikalpaka. When the internal organ operates with the senses, that pure being is defined in its name and form; and this is savikalpaka. The distinction between the two

forms of knowledge may appear to be rather too minute and scholastic. It is an explanation of the process of perception and cognition from the simple to the complex. But the difference of opinion among various thinkers is due to the difference in their various concepts about the Supreme Principle and its relation with the diversity of the world. The nirvikalpaka-savikalpaka process thus has to be explained in keeping with the theorists' own doctrine of the creation of the world, with all its distinctions and diversities from the cause or causes, which he has postulated. It will be interesting here to compare the Buddhādvaiṣa theory with those of Śaṅkara and Rāmānuja. We have already stated before, how Śaṅkara and Puruṣottama come very near to each other in their concepts of the nirvikalpaka jñāna. Similar is the position with the concepts regarding the savikalpaka also. Puruṣottama points out that the Rājasa knowledge has no absolute validity but is useful only in the worldly dealings. He explains the vyavahāra as a bundle of the natural processes of the body and senses and produced by a similar bundle in the mind, which is replete with the egoistic thoughts of

'I' and 'Mine'.⁵ The exoteric reality of Śaṅkara has its reality in the empirical sphere only and has no absolute reality. But the distinction between the two is pointed out by Puruṣottama himself, when he defines the determinates as the interim qualities of the reality.⁶ Puruṣottama's explanation can be very easily distinguished from that of Rāmānuja, who thinks that everything, even Brahman is qualified. For him the psychological process in the indeterminate to the determinate is not that in the simple to the complex, but in the complex without the past associations to the complex, associated with the past experiences.⁷ Puruṣottama's explanation of the two types of knowledge is quite in keeping with his theory of ^Pure Monism, wherein the One becomes manifold and yet remains one and pure.

5. Ahamamābhīmānātmakamēhasasannipātajanyo dehendriyādi-
svābhāvikavyāpārātmakah sannipātah. Pr. p. 7.

6. Vikalpāḥ sataḥ avāntaraviśeṣāḥ. Pr. p. 10.

7. Nirvikalpakam api saviśeṣaviśayam eva. Śrībhāṣya. I. i. 1. p. 27.
Also, Ato nirvikalpakam ekajātīyeṣu prathamapiṇḍagrahaṇam.
And, Tatra prathamapiṇḍagrahaṇe gotvāder anuvṛttākāratā
na pratīyate. Dvitiyādipiṇḍagrahaṇeṣv evānuvṛttipratīteḥ.

Śrībhāṣya. I. i. 1. p. 28.

Puruṣottama classifies the determinate knowledge into doubt, error, decision, memory and dream.

Doubt or *samśaya* is explained by Puruṣottama as the understanding of various and contradictory characters in one substantive.⁸ It is further classified into *sama* and *utkāṭakotika*. *Sama* is that in which both the alternatives have equal force, e.g. 'This is a man or not a man' or 'This is a man or a pillar'. The *utkāṭakotika* on the other hand, is that in which one of the alternatives is stronger than the other, e.g. 'This is most probably a man'.

Viparyāsa is explained by Puruṣottama as the extraneous knowledge revealing an object different from the object, which is contacted by our senses.⁹ Here comes the theory of erroneous perception, which is called *khyāti*. Puruṣottama discusses and refutes various *khyātis* and propounds the *anyakhyāti* in his *Khyātivēda*.¹⁰ Puruṣottama's analysis of illusion is based upon the objective experience of a subjective impression. In the illusory perception of silver, the illusory silver is revealed to us on account of

8. Ekasmin dharmīni viruddhaśānākotyavagāhi jñānam samśayah.

Pr. p. 15.

9. Samprayuktabhinnārthanātrapratipēḍakam bāhyam jñānam viparyāsaḥ. Pr. p. 16.

10. Khyātivēda: Vādāvalī. p. 120. ff.

the objective and external projection of the knowledge through the instrumentality of Māyā. The knowledge of silver is existing as an impression because of our earlier experience of the same. This projected knowledge envelopes the object in view, partly or completely and thus we perceive something quite different (Anyā). It is therefore called Anyakhyāti.¹¹

Dr. P. D. Chandratre in his thesis on 'Methodology' of the major Bhāṣyas on the Brahmasūtras' says that Vallabha accepts the anyathākhyāti, so that one's mistake of something for some other thing is due to the similarity of some of the attributes between the two. 'After the attainment

11. Tat pūrvotpannasyānubhevasya saṃskārātmanā sthitasyo-
dbodhakaiḥ prābalye māyikārthākāravatī buddhivṛttir
māyayā bahiḥ kṣipyate. Tadā sē purovartīnam sarvato'
māsato vāvṛtya bahir avabhāṣata iti māyikasyānyasyaiva
khyānād anyakhyātir ity atra vyavahriyate. Pr. p. 17.
Also, Aṭaḥ śuktirajatādīsthale māyayā bahiḥkṣiptabuddhi-
vṛttirūpam jñānam evārthākāreṇa khyāyata iti mantavyam.

Khyātivāda. Vādāvalī. p. 121.

of true knowledge however the view-point in this respect is changed to Akhyāti.¹² The Anyathākhyāti is accepted by the Naiyāyikas while the Akhyāti is believed in by the Prābhākaras. Vallabha's doctrine of error has been ably explained by Prof. G. H. Bhatt in his article on the subject.¹³ Puruṣottama not only refuses to believe in the anyathākhyāti, but even refutes it. Puruṣottama says that if we believe in the appearance of an object otherwise, then that anyathātva would mean yathārthatva or reality.¹⁴ The chāmēra cannot be regarded as real and cannot therefore be said to exist. Hence we shall have to understand the instrumentality of Māyā and the external projection of our own buddhi, which reveals something other (anya) than the object with which our senses are in contact. This is known as anyakhyāti. In spite of the polemical passages against anyathākhyāti, we shall have to admit the first part of it viz. that of similarity. Thus when Puruṣottama says that the rajatābuddhi comes to the fore because of the latent impressions of the same already existing in our minds, we shall have to accept that rajata and śukāti must have some similarity for

12. Methodology. p. 97.

13. Prof. G. H. Bhatt: Vallabhācārya's view on error.

Siddha Bharati. Vol. II.

14. Anyathātve yathārthatāpatteh. Khyātivāda. Vādāvalī. p. 122.

otherwise we can not account for the rajatabuddhi alone and not the ghatabuddhi, being projected outside.

Purusottama accepts this by saying that the term *anya* means *sādrśa*.¹⁵ This however is from the point of view of those who have not attained to the true knowledge. As for those, who have correct knowledge, everything is perceived by them as the manifestation of Brahman; the theory of erroneous perception is that of *akhyāti*, which is just our inability to note the distinction between the object in view and the object which is perceived. But the question arises here, as to whether we can believe in the erroneous perception of those who have right knowledge. Purusottama himself says that their knowledge is right knowledge.¹⁶

Various theories of erroneous perception in the systems of Indian philosophy do not purport merely to explain the psychological development, involved in

15. Anyapadasya sādrśyevācakatvenānubhūtasādrśadharmānām eva khyānāt. Khyātivāda. Vādāvalī. p.130.

16. Atas teṣām jñānasya yathārthatvāt ...etc. Ibid. p.130.

wrong perception. These theories are in keeping with the doctrines about the reality or otherwise of the universe with its manifold appearances, as related to its Supreme Cause. Every one accepts that the snake perceived in place of rope or silver mistaken for conchshell is false and practically non-existent. But the question is, as to how, that which is not existing can replace something which exists and can appear as existing. Śaṅkara who thinks that the perception of everything requires its existence, says that it is inexplicable. If the snake does not exist, it can not be seen. So long as we are seeing it, it is real and we even tremble with fear at its sight. Only when we come to know that it is a rope, we feel that the snake is unreal. The snake thus cannot be said to be real, for otherwise it would not have been sublated; it can not be said to have been unreal, for then it would not have been perceived at all. For Śaṅkara all knowledge is real in its own sphere. This is not the position of Rāmānuja, who goes to the extent of taking even silver as real on the ground of the triplication of the primordial elements (Trivṛtkarṇa), as stated in the

scriptures. Puruṣottama, so to say, steers clear of the two, for he has to explain the theory in keeping with the difference between Jagat and Samsāra, maintained by Vallabha. Thus he can not accept the different levels of experience, nor the reality of everything, that is perceived. That is why he says that the silver, that appears in place of conchshell, is an erroneous objective experience of a subjective entity, while the conchshell remains there as true as ever. It is thus our fault that we see silver; it is not the conchshell, which becomes silver owing to our faulty eyes. He believes that Māyā is an instrument in false apperception. Here Puruṣottama may be said to come very near to the Ātmakhyāti of the Buddhists, who believe in the internal existence of silver as a mode of mind and who think that the error consists in regarding what is internal as external. But the two systems are wide apart in their basic theories; for the Vijñānavādins think of the internal existence alone of everything and deny the externality of all objects. This can not be admitted by Puruṣottama; who refutes the theory of Ātmakhyāti thoroughly. In the Buddhist doctrine the

externality even of a conchshell is an error.

Niścaya is defined as the correct apprehension of an object.¹⁷ It can be obtained by perception, inference, verbal knowledge or analogy.¹⁸ Decisive knowledge is said to be twofold, pratyakṣa and parokṣa. Immediate or direct knowledge arises out of a real existing contact between the object and our senses;¹⁹ while indirect knowledge is different from it. Śaṅkara also divides knowledge into pratyakṣa and parokṣa; but for Śaṅkara, immediate knowledge is not to be equated with sensory perception only, but it also includes the immediate intuition, which may not involve sensory perception. Thus the knowledge arising out of the teaching, 'That thou art' is also immediate because it is intuitive.²⁰ Thus according to him pratyakṣa is the communion of the subject-consciousness and the object-

17. Niścayo yathārthānubhaveh. Pr.p.18.

18. Analogy is explained as arising through the senses having the knowledge of similarity. Sēdṛśyādisahakṛte-ndriyārthasamsargejanya. Pr.p.19.

19. Pr.p.20.

20. Pratyakṣāvegāman cedam phalam. Tat tvam asīty asamsāryā-tmatvapratipattau satyēṁ samsāryātmatvavyāvṛtteh.

Śaṅkarabhāṣya. I. iv. 14.

consciousness; for this the body is not indispensable. ²¹

Vallabha refuses to admit that verbal knowledge can produce immediate apprehension because in the illustration like 'Thou art the tenth', the tenth person ~~sees~~ that he is the tenth and it is this perception, which is more powerful than verbal knowledge. ²² Puruṣottama, while explaining this, says that the sentence 'Thou art/ the tenth' gives us knowledge not of the Ātman but only of the body. According to Śaṅkara the passage 'That thou art' produces ātma - sāksātkāra. Thus there is disparity of illustration.

Vallabha further points out that if we agree to the intuitive knowledge based upon verbal authority, it would mean a mixture of pramāṇas, which is undesirable. ²³

Puruṣottama is more pointed when he says that Śaṅkara means something which goes off its set limits. Thus the passage 'Thou art the tenth' has not the capacity of giving

21. *Evam sati deha upalabdhir bhavaty esati ca na bhavatīti na dehadharmo bhovitum arhati. Śaṅkarabhāṣya. III. iii .54.*

22. *Daśamas tvam asīty ādau pratyakṣasāmagryā balavattvād dehādeḥ pratyakṣatvāt. A.B. I.i.1.*

23. *Pramāṇasaṅkarāpattiś ca. A.B.I.i.1.*

knowledge of the subject leaving aside that of the object, which is the purport of the sentence. Thus the communion of the subject consciousness and the object consciousness is not admissible.²⁴ Immediate knowledge thus is only due to sensory perception in the Śuddhādvaita.

Memory is explained as knowledge arising from the impression only.²⁵ The impressions are our past experiences existing in subtle form.²⁶

The dream experiences have the dream world as their object. The dream world is purely illusory and has no element of reality.²⁷ The reality, which is at times experienced in the dreams, may be explained as on a par with the chimeræ that we may at times see in the waking state. But as the knowledge is of the essential nature of the self, even that

24. Daśamas tvam asīti vākyasthayuṣmatpadasmāritapadārtho-
-llanḡhanenāsmatpadārthaviṣayakajñānajanane tasya jñānasya
pramāṇatvam na syāt. A.B.P.I.i.1.p.31. Puruṣottama also
gives an alternative explanation for the mixture of
pramāṇas.

25. Samskāramātrajanyen jñānam. Pr.p.21.

26. Pr.p.21.

27. Svāpaikī sṛṣṭir māyāmātram na vastubhūtetī niścayaḥ.

Pr.p.24.

which has the dream world as its object is true and not false.²⁸ Here Puruṣottama refuses to accept Madhva's theory that though the dream world is true and without any material cause, the dream experiences are false. Puruṣottama reduces this to absurdity by pointing out that if a man sees his head being cut off in a dream even though his vision may be untrue, he must have his head cut off and must meet with his death.

The distinction between the dream and the waking state is stated to be the continuation of the latter, while the former is seen and destroyed and there is no continuity between two dreams.²⁹ Śaṅkara distinguishes between the two from two points of view. He says that whatever is perceived in a dream is sublated in the waking state. Besides the criterion of *bādhā*, Śaṅkara also distinguishes the two by stating that the dream experiences are memory or *smṛti*,

28. Jñānam tu tadviśayakam satyam eva. Tasyātmarūpatvāt. Pr. p. 25.

29. Tathā ca svapnajāgaritadr̥ṣṭayos tātkalikānyathātvetāt-
kalikānyakālikānyathātāvābhāverūpavaidharmyān na svapna-
jāgaritadr̥ṣṭayos, tulyatvam. A. B. P. II. ii. 29. p. 656.

Vallabha is far simpler when he says: Varsānantaram api
dr̥śyamāṇaḥ stambhaḥ stambha eva. A. B. II. ii. 29. p. 656-57.

whereas the waking experiences are upalabdhi.³⁰ The orthodox Vedāntic view however is that ~~of~~ the *Anirvacanīyakhyāti*. Śaṅkara refers to this in his Bhāṣye on the Brahmasūtra III.ii.7.³¹ It may be said, the reason of Bādha-abādha, as given by Śaṅkara, is not so different from that of Vallabha, who says that a pillar remains a pillar even after years, which means that it is not contradicted or sublated; but while Śaṅkara's Bādha-abādha depend upon the change from the dream to the waking state, this is not the case with Vallabha, who intends to point out that there is no continuity between two dreams.

Deep sleep experience is stated to be a division of the dream. In deep sleep, Puraṣottama says, the self reveals itself.³² Cintā or reflection which may be of the nature of synthesis or analysis, which may be by the method of agreement

30. Kin punar vaidharṇyam? Bādhā-bādhāv iti brūmah....Api ca smṛtir eṣā yat svapnadarśanam. Upalabdhis tu jāgarita-darśanam. Śaṅkarabhāṣya. II.ii.29.

31. Cf. the quotations from Vedāntaparibhāṣā and Brahmavidyā-bhāṣana in Brahmasūtraś II.i. & ii. with Śaṅkara's comments Dr. Belvalkar. p. 164.

32. Susuptis tu svapnasyaivāvēntarabhedah. Tatrātmaphureṇam tu svata eva. Pr. p. 25.

or difference, or which may be of the nature of mental doubt or meditation is to be included in the memory and need not be separately considered. Shame, fear and the like are modes of egoism and are ^onot states of cognition. Recognition is not different from decision. Memory is auxiliary to recognition., which is produced 'in association with the present perception, directly through the operation of memory and indirectly through the operation of past impressions.'³³

The correctness or otherwise of an experience depends upon the predominance of right knowledge or false knowledge respectively. Thus paintings, idolations and stage-representations by actors [^]have the predominance of pramā in as much as they have the capacity to produce the same feelings, as would have been produced in presence of the objects, which they have imitated.³⁴

Śaṅkara believes that the subject and the object are fundamentally opposed to each other like light and darkness. The essential nature of the subject is different from

33. Śa N. Dasgupta..History of Indian Philosophy.Vol.IV.p.339.

34. Bhramapremāsaṭhālembanam tu ekadeśavikārtam ananyavad bhavatīti nyāyena bhramādhikye viparyāsa eva.Pramādhikye ca niścayaḥ. Pr. p.25-26.

that of the object. The subject is sentient while the object is nonsentient. In the opinion of Śaṅkara the subject-object relationship is purely relative. In the ultimate analysis, the subject is not even the knower viz. the substance of which knowledge is an attribute, but is knowledge itself. Thus there is complete identity between the Ātman and samvit. Our statements like 'I am thin,' or 'I am blind' are due to the superimposition of the subject upon the object and vice versa. Similarly when we say 'I know myself', we are trying to turn the subject into an object and thus think in the realm of Adhyāsa. Rāmānuja in his Bhāṣya on the very first Sūtra, gives a studied refutation of Śaṅkara's position and maintains that knowledge is different from the knower and the known. There can be no samvit without the subject and the object. Knowledge again is an attribute of the Ātman. Puruṣottama says that the vyāpti of viśayatva and jñatva cannot be maintained as has been done by Śaṅkara, because the sentient Ātman is an object of self realization like 'I know the Ātman'. If the Ātman is not an object of pratyagvitti, that pratyagvitti ceases to be a vitti at all. It is possible to say that everything that is jñāta is also

a viṣaya, but its converse is wrong.³⁵ Puruṣottama further says that Ātman and samvit are not synonymous. The relation of Ātman and samvit is^s that of a substance and its attribute or better, that of āśraya and āśrayin. In the statements like 'I know', or 'I possess knowledge', knowledge is understood as an attribute of 'I'.³⁶ Puruṣottama says that the object is also real and different from the subject. That the Ātman is revealed by knowledge (paratah-prakāśita) does not render it non-sentient, because Ātman is self-luminous. Puruṣottama says that Ātman is both, having the essential nature of knowledge and having knowledge as an attribute.³⁷ This is the real import of the ten divisions of knowledge, given by Puruṣottama. In the system of Rāmānuja, it is very difficult to find out how the attributes are organically related to the substance. For Śaṅkara the attributes and the substance are not related but are one, and the difficulty

35. Viṣayatvena jadatvena vyāpteh pratyakṣabādhitatvāt...

Jadatvena viṣayatvena vyāpter^{eva} pratyakṣasiddhatvāt.

A.B.P.I.i.1.p.15.

36. Aham jñānāmīti Jñānavān aham ity eva ātmadharmatvenaiva tasya bhānā ca. A.B.P.I.i.1. p.16.

37. Citsvarūpatve sati svayamprakāśasamvidāśrayatvasyaiva cetanatvāt. A.B.P.I.i.1.p.15.

arises when he tries to explain how Ātman, which is sentiency, becomes sentient. The theory of anirvacanīyata is infact a frank admission of the inability to explain the problem. But then a very important problem remains unexplained. Rāmānuja's refutation of Śaṅkara touches the same points. The samvit of Śaṅkara, which is regarded as one with Ātman, is the esoteric knowledge. What then is the use of refuting him with the arguments, which belong purely to the exoteric level? Puruṣottama blends the two positions and tries to avoid the difficulties by stating that knowledge is the Nature as also an attribute of the self. This involves the question of the exact relationship between a substance and its qualities, which we shall discuss later on. Again Puruṣottama does not maintain, atleast expressly, the distinction between the exoteric and the esoteric spheres of knowledge, and yet he tries to evolve the former from the latter. This can be and is done by him by falling back upon the incomprehensible powers of God.

(III).

Means of proof.

Pramāṇas have always occupied an important position in the systems of Indian thought. While beginning his Prasthāna-ratnākara, with a chapter on the Pramāṇas, Puruṣottama gives

the oft-quoted maxim, 'Mānādhīnā meyasiddih' i.e. 'the establishment of that, which is to be measured, depends upon that which measures.'³⁸ Vallabha describes pramāṇa as that by which one knows, what is unknown.³⁹ Puruṣottama says in the beginning of his Prasthānaratnākara, that the term pramāṇa has two meanings. Firstly it stands for the knowledge which is not sublated or which is different from that which is liable to contradiction; it also stands for that which brings about such knowledge.⁴⁰ It is interesting to note here that Puruṣottama distinguishes between Karāṇa and kāraṇa. Karāṇa is explained by him as 'Vyāpāravad asādhāraṇam'⁴¹ or 'A unique agent associated with a dynamic agent with reference to the effects that are to be produced.'⁴²

Vallabha has not said much about pratyakṣa, but Puruṣottama has dealt with it often and at length.

38. Pr.p.1. Cf. also Citsukhī.II.18, quoted by Dr.P.D. Chendratre, Methodology. p.44. Fn.1.

39. Anadhigatārthagant^trvāt pramāṇasya. A.B.I.i.2. p-80.

40. Tatra pramāṇaśabdo bhāvavyutpanno rūḍho vā abādhita-jñāne vartate bēdhayogyavyatirikte ca. Karāṇavyutpannas tu tādrśajñānakarāṇe. Pr.p.1.

41. Pr.p.26.

42. S.N.Dasgupta. History of Indian Philosophy. Vol.IV.p.340.

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 Perception or pratyakṣa is defined by Puruṣottama as the pramāṇa, corresponding to and depending upon various sense-faculties. ⁴³ The sense organs are six in number, eye, skin, nose, tongue, ear, and mind. Whereas most of the Indian systems do not admit the mind also as a sense-faculty, Puruṣottama is inclined to admit it as such. It is better, he says, to believe that the mind is and is not a sense-faculty, because of its nature of both knowledge and action. It has not been accepted as an indriya because it is superior to the other five. Thus he thinks that the mind has its function of a sense-faculty, but has also something more than that of an ordinary sense-faculty.

These indriyas are atomic, super-sensible and changing (Vikāri). Puruṣottama gives the objects of these faculties as follows:

The eye has as its objects the manifest form, that which has the manifest form, and the modes of the latter like number, extent, separation, conjunction, division, relation, non-relation to others, motion, action, genus and that in which it is inherent. The objects of the

43. Indriyātmakam pramāṇam .Pr.p.108.

skin are the manifest touch and whatever is connected with it. Similar are the cases of nose, tongue and ear, which have their objects as the manifest smell, the manifest taste and the manifest sound respectively, together with all their correlates. It is interesting to note that for Puruṣottama only the manifest form or sound or touch can be an object of its corresponding sense-faculty. Thus the atoms of ghosts, which have no manifest colour can not be an object of the corresponding visual sense-faculty. Thus the earth is the object of all the five sense-faculties; water of four (excluding the gustatory), fire of three (excluding the gustatory and the olfactory), air of the tactual and the auditory. Space is the object of the visual sense-faculty only on the ground of the prameyabala.⁴⁴ Directions and time are known only as attributes of the objects of knowledge and not as separate objects. The modes of the mind like desire and others are grasped by the mind. The soul and its attributes are not however objects of mundane sense-faculties.

Tamas or darkness is regarded as a separate positive entity and not mere absence of light. The followers of Śaṅkara also think in the same way. When

44.Pr.p.110.

we do not perceive objects in darkness, we actually see the darkness, which is an entity and which comes in the way of other objects and covers them. Similarly Puruṣottama is inclined to regard the pratibimba also as a separate category.⁴⁵

Puruṣottama refuses to accept Abhāva as a separate category and considers the various abhāvas as just different states of the cause. He thinks that they should be included in the āvirbhāva and tirobhāva. The abhāva came to be regarded as a padārtha by the later Vaiśeṣikas, when the Vaiśeṣika ontology gave way to and absorbed in it the consideration of the Nyāya epistemology. Kaṇāda, for instance, does not admit it. For him absolute non-existence has no meaning while other three abhāvas, the prāgabhāva, the pradhvansābhāva and the anyonyābhāva are related to the positive being. The Suddhādvaita believes in the manifestation of the Lord as the world. Hence for Puruṣottama, everything is God. When something is produced, the cause is manifested in that way; when it ceases to exist, that manifestation is withdrawn and there is

45. Vādāvalī. Andhakāravāda. p. 131ff. & Pratibimbavāda, p. 193ff.

non-manifestation. Thus there is no abhāva, nothing which is non-existent. Puruṣottama explains all the four abhāvas, as related to the Āvirbhāva and Tirobhāva of the inhering cause. The prāgabhāva or negation antecedent to production is the condition of the material cause, which is not manifested, the condition which is congenial to its manifestation as an effect.⁴⁶ Similarly the pradhvansābhāva or the non-existence posterior to destruction is the condition which is against the subsistence of the effect.⁴⁷ The anyonyābhāva or the negation of one thing in another and vice versa is just an āvirbhāvaviśeṣa because it is a manifestation of one thing, that excludes that ^{of} others.⁴⁸ The absolute non-existence, which is illustrated by the son of a barren woman or a sky-flower is nothing but non-manifestation or tirobhāva.

The function and operation of these sense-faculties are of the nature of proximity. (Pratyāsattirūpa) It can be divided into two, mundane and supramundane or laukika and alaukika. The supramundane is threefold, sāmānya, yogaja and

46. Tirobhāvesahakṛtā kāryāvirbhava-anukūlā avasthā. Pr. p. 111.

47. Kāryavasthātipretikūlā-avasthā. Pr. p. 111.

48. Tasyaiva itarevyāvartakatvād itarevyāvrttatvēc ca. Pr. p. 115.

māyā; while the former is fivefold, samyoga, tādātmya, samyuktatādātmya, samyuktaviśeṣanātā and tādātmyasvarūpa. The sāmānya is that which is useful in the knowledge of an individual owing to the general form, which is followed up in it.⁴⁹ The yogaja is the perceptual experience of the future or past events and those events, which are beyond the reach of our sense-organs.⁵⁰ The māyā is the perception of those entities, which in fact do not exist.⁵¹ When our eye sees an object, it is due to the contact of our eye with that particular object. This is samyoga, by which we know not only that particular object but also its qualities, action and species. Or it may be the identity of the two, which are in contact with each other. (Samyukta-tādātmya). Similar is the case of the skin, nose and tongue. When however we comprehend the sound by our ears, samyoga alone is the function. With regard to the knowledge of the external objects by the mind, those objects are experienced by the mind through the instrumentality of the sense-faculties, which are connected with the objects

49. Anugatākāreṇa tad vyaktijñāne upayujyate. Pr. p. 116.

50; Anagata-atīta-atīndriyādivastusākṣātkāre. Pr. p. 116.

51. Avidyamānānām padārthēnām buddhau upasthāpane. Pr. p. 116.

on the one hand and the mind on the other. The mind experiences its own attributes like knowledge and happiness because of the relation of identity or *tādātmya* between the attributes and the substantive. With regard to the comprehension of the modes of mind, the nature of those modes (*Vṛttisvarūpa*) is the means. Disappearance or *tirobhāva* is known through the *indriyasamyuktaviśeṣanātā*.

While dealing with the perceptual experience of external objects, an important point has been made out by the Sāṅkhya and the Vedāntic scholars with regard to the *vṛtti* or mode. We see a certain object with our eyes, but the same external object is seen even after the eyes are closed. This form cannot be an external object, which is not seen because it can not exist without its substance. Hence it must belong to something within, rather than to the object without. That is how the followers of Sāṅkhya admit the *vṛtti*. The followers of Śaṅkara accept the *vṛtti* as an effect or *pariṇāma* of the internal organ, produced by the contact of the senses with the objects. The Naiyāyikas do not think it necessary to accept the *vṛttipadārtha*. Puruṣottama says that the experience of an after-image is universal and cannot be rejected as

has been done by the Naiyāyikas. The vṛtti therefore has to be admitted, but it is not necessary to accept it as a separate category, different from the buddhi. It is just a specific state of the buddhi, aroused by time and produced by the qualities like sattva.⁵² Thus when an external object is produced in the waking state by means of our eyes, simultaneously with it is produced the buddhivṛtti of that particular form. When the eyes are closed we experience that very vṛtti. Thus the vṛtti is both ^{anyā} ~~guna~~ ~~janya~~ and indriyajanya. It is interesting to note that ^P Puruṣottama admits time as a category existing in the buddhi and not in the senses as done in the ~~Vedānta~~ Vedāntaparibhāṣā. For Puruṣottama time is the determinant of the buddhi and one of the accessories to mental illumination.⁵³

Buddhi, says Puruṣottama, is to be inferred from its effect i.e. the knowledge of sm something.⁵⁴ Its place is the heart. A man who is endowed with the buddhi, knows the external objects. So buddhi can be understood as the cause of knowledge, as can be seen in passages like 'a man who is

52. Budhicitattvasya kālakṣubdhasattvādiguṇakṛto'vasthā-
viśeṣa eva. Pr. p. 124.

53. Cf. T. Sn. Ab. pp. 107-110.; Pr. pp. 123-126.

54. Viśiṣṭajñānalakṣaṇakārya-anumeyā. T. Sn. Ab. p. 77.

intelligent knows the objects.' (Yo buddhimāns tasya padārtha-jñānam bhavati. Or Subuddhir ayam padārthān jānāti.) Buddhi and knowledge are used as synonyms on account of the identity of cause and effect. Thus Puruṣottama explains buddhi as 'Yogajedharmā' janyo viśiṣṭajñānasamānākāro jñānendriyā-nu-grāhakah padārtho buddhir iti.'⁵⁵ When the buddhi functions at the first movement of the operation of senses, there is indeterminate knowledge; when the buddhi is modified in the vṛtti, in association with the sense-faculty the indeterminate becomes determinate. The vṛttis appear in succession; with the rise of one vṛtti, the former disappears and remains as an impression (Samskāra). When these impressions are roused by certain causes and conditions, they take the form of memory.

Puruṣottama explains the process of our ordinary knowledge as similar to the process of any other action. According to the Bhagavad Gītā, actions of an individual are dependent upon five factors.⁵⁶ Body is the operating

55. P. Sp. Ab. p. 79.

56. Cf. Adhiṣṭhānam tathā kartā karanam ēa prthagvidham,
Vividhās ca prthak ceṣṭā daivam caivātra pañcamam.
'Serīravāhmanobhir yat karma prārabhate narah,
Nyāyayam vā viparītam vā pañcāsite tatra hetavaḥ.

Bhagavad Gītā. XVIII. 14-15.

basis, while the individual soul is the agent. Karana may be diverse, external or internal. Cestā or activity signifies the various functions of the prāṇas and body. Daiva is time, action, desire of God, the inner controller (Antaryāmin), and the superintending deities of the sense-organs, which are accessory to the chief breath. These are the factors responsible for that action which is the cause of the connection of the mind, which produces knowledge. The whole process can be explained thus. Because of the desire of God, the inner controller who is an anśa of God, inspires the internal organ with the help of time and action. The internal organ is fourfold. Rudra is the superintending deity of the ego (ahaṁkāra), which produces the consciousness of being embodied. Brahmā is the deity of Buddhi, which is responsible for the function of the sense-faculties. The citā is latent but grasps the soul in its unity in deep sleep. The manas, which is supervised by the Moon, heads the list of the organs of both actions and sensation and its function is to inspire the respective indriyas by means of its relation to the organs and their deities. Then these organs perform their respective functions. The sense-organs, when inspired by the manas,

are related with their objects and produce the indeterminate in the manas, which is also in contact with the objects ~~th~~ through the sense-organs. The manas thus has its mode in the sphere of these sense-organs. When these modes of the manas are qualified by the buddhi, through its own mode, the indeterminate becomes determinate. Because of the infinite number of external objects, the determinate knowledge is infinite; even then it can be classified into doubt, wrong knowledge, right knowledge and memory in the waking state. Similar classification is possible even in the dream state. Puruṣottama says that the buddhi can also be divided into three, the upādāna buddhi, when the mind is attracted by a certain object, the hāna buddhi, when the mind is repelled by a certain object and it wishes to avoid the same, and the upekṣā buddhi when the mind becomes indifferent to a certain object. The sense-organs enlighten an object by establishing contact with it. The eye approaches the objects with the help of its rays, or the power of the superintending Sun, or by the colour (Rūpa), which is its quality. The manas, which rules over the eyes, is also connected with the objects in the same way. Thus we perceive an object, limited by definite space, as for instance a pot on the earth or the stars in the sky.

Regarding the other organs of sensation, it is the manas, which goes to the objects together with the respective organs, because they have no rays. However unscientific this process may appear to a modern mind, it is interesting to note how carefully Puruṣottama has given an analysis of the psychology of perception.⁵⁷

This process of perception is not however applicable to the intuitive perception of the Lord. Puruṣottama says that the perceptual realization of God depends upon God himself. It is only by His grace, which is the seed of devotion, that one may see Him. He can also be seen in the state of incarnation because of His general desire that 'May all see me'.⁵⁸

As regards anumāna, Puruṣottama says that he has nothing new to say. He defines it as an instrument of inferential knowledge.⁵⁹ Vyāpti is the invariable concomitance or co-existence of the hetu and the sādhyā.⁶⁰ It thus requires

57. Cf. A.B.P. II. iv. 16. pp. 792-794; Pr. pp. 126-128.

58. Cf. A.B.P. II. iv. 16. pp. 803-804; Pr. pp. 137-138.

59. Anumitikarāṇam anumānam. Pr. p. 138. The same definition in Tarkasaṅgraha. P. 34.

60. Avyabhicaritam hetoh sādhyasāmānādhikaranyam. Pr. p. 139.

the presence of a particular sādhyā whenever there is a particular hetu, and the absence of the hetu in absence of the sādhyā. The hetu is that which is pressed into service with the object of proving something.⁶¹ The sādhyā is an object which is desired to be proved. (Sisādhayisāvisayātvaṃ). Puruṣottama is inclined to accept the division of vyāpti into sama and viśama, i.e. mutual or one-sided concomitance, following the Sāṅkhyapravacanasūtras. We have thus the sama vyāpti when the circle of the hetu and that of the sādhyā coincide; when the former falls within the latter, we have the viśama vyāpti.

Puruṣottama explains the process of inference as the decision of the presence of the sādhyā in a particular case, on the ground of the memory of the invariable co-existence of the hetu and the sādhyā, which we have seen often or once. Thus we have often seen the smoke and fire, both, in the kitchen and the like and we decide the invariable concomitance between the two. After that, when we see smoke on a hill, we remember^{mb} that concomitance and deduce the existence of fire also. We can say that the anumāna is the application to a particular case of a

61. Sādhyaṭvenopādīyamānatvaṃ hetutvaṃ. Pr. p. 139.

general rule, which again has been formed after looking into a particular case or cases.⁶²

While Gautama classifies inference into three; pūrvavat, śeṣavat and sāmānyato-drṣṭā,⁶³ The new school of Logic gives another classification into anvayavyatireki, kevalānvayi and kevalavyatireki. The first is dependent upon only the positive concomitance as no instance on the negative side is available.⁶⁴ Puruṣottama is not, however, inclined to accept it, for even if an object may be said to be knowable in one form, it is not so knowable in another form and thus the negative instances are available.⁶⁵ Puruṣottama accepts

62. Tac ca sāmānādhikaranyam bhūyaḥ sakṛd vā darśanāt sanskārodbodhe smṛtipatham ārohati. Tatas tatsmeranottaram hetuḥ sādhyam niścāyayati. Yathā mahānesādaḥ niścite dhūmasya vahnnyavyabhicaritasāmānādhikaranye paścāt parvatādaḥ
 ṛṣṭe dhūme tatsmeranottaram dhūmo vahnim niścāyayati, dhūmadeśe vahnir iti. Sa niścayo' numitih. Pr. p. 142.

63. Nyāyasūtras I, i. 5.

64. Anvayamātravyāptikam. kevalānvayi yathā ghaṭo' bhidheyah prameyatvāt patavat. Tarkasaṅgraha p. 40.

65. Sarvatrāpi kenacidrūpeṇa jñeyatvādisattve' pi rūpāntareṇa tadabhāvasya sarvajenīnatvāc ca kevalānvayisādhyakānumānasyaivābhāvāt. Pr. p. 141.

the other two, i.e. Kevalavyatireki and Anvayavyatireki. The former is arrived at, when only negative instances can be found, as in 'the earth is different from other things because of its earthness'. (Prthivī itarebhyo bhidyate prthivītvāt.) In the anvayavyatireki form of anumāna, we have both the positive and negative concomitance as in 'the hill has fire on it, because of the smoke. (Parvato vahninān dhūmāt.)

Both these, anvayavyatireki and kevalavyatireki, can be classified into svārtha and parārtha.⁶⁶ Svārtha is for resolving the doubts of one's own mind while the other is for convincing others of one's own conclusions. The latter therefore is dependent upon a syllogism, which according to the orthodox Nyāya has five propositions, pratijñā, hetu, udāharana, upenaya and nigamana. Puruṣottama prefers the syllogism with only first three propositions.⁶⁷

Puruṣottama also discusses in his ^PPrasthānaratnākara, various fallacies of reason, which we have referred to in the preceding chapter and hence the discussion need not be repeated here.

The most important pramāṇa for the Vedānta, however, is the verbal testimony, which is defined in the Nyāya-

66. Idam dvividham api svārthaparārthabhedāt punar

dvividham. Pr.p. 143. See also Tarkasaṅgraha p. 37.

67. Pr.p. 144.

Sūtras as the instructive assertion of a reliable person.⁶⁸

According to Puruṣottama, āpta is one who speaks of things as they are.⁶⁹ It can be divided into two types, laukika and alaukika. The laukika refers to persons like us while the alaukika refers to all from sages to God. Among those who are alaukika, the higher a person, the more reliable he is. The most trust worthy and absolutely infallible is therefore God. So the Vedas which owe their origin to Him, constitute the independent pramāṇa.⁷⁰

Puruṣottama discusses whether or not the Vedas can be treated as an independent pramāṇa. Ordinarily, the words of a man depend upon what he has seen or inferred, but this does not mean, says Puruṣottama, that verbal testimony

68. Āptopadeśaḥ śabaddaḥ. Nyāyasūtras I.i.7. Cf. also Sa cāptopadeśarūpaḥ. Pr. p. 34.

69. Āptaś ca yathāsthitārthavādī. Pr. p. 34.

70. It is interesting to note that a similar classification has been given in the Tarkasaṅgraha: Vākyam dvividham. Vaidikam laukikam ca. Vaidikam īśvaroktatvāt sarvaṁ eva pramāṇam. Laukikam tv āptoktam pramāṇam. Anyad apramāṇam. Tarkasaṅgraha. p. 53. Cf. also similar classification in the Nyāyasūtras: Sa dvividho dr̥ṣṭādr̥ṣṭārthatvāt. I.i.8.

owes its authoritativeness to perception or inference. Whenever a word is heard, it has the capacity of conveying to our mind a specific object, which may not have been perceived. The scriptures are not dependent upon perception as the dharma, which is nowhere found in the world, is taught in the Vedas. We may agree that the words, which establish something connected with the worldly dealings, require perception but this is not the case with the Vedas.⁷¹ The Vedas teach us of the objects, which are supraworldly. So their authoritativeness is self-established.⁷² Puruṣottama argues that if we believe in the paratah pramāṇya, i.e. its validity depending upon something else and not self-proved, then the right knowledge can be acquired only by the operational capacity of that particular pramāṇa, upon which it depends. The knowledge of that capacity again depends upon something else and so on. This would lead to the regressus ad infinitum. We shall have therefore to stop somewhere. So we may finally believe in the pramāṇatva of the internal organ, which is purified by the Yoga or in the instrumentality of the quality of

71. Ato Laukikavyavahārasādhakasyaiva śabdasya pratyakso-
pajīvakatvaṁ na Vedasya. Pr.p.38.

72. Śabda eva pramāṇam. Tat rāpy alaukika jñāpakam eva. Tat
svataḥsiddhapramāṇabhāvam pramāṇam. T.S.P.V.7.p.35.

sattva, pure and simple. The purification of the internal organ or the quality of sattva can be brought about by the scriptural means alone. Great persons can have faith only in the Vedas. So the Vedas alone, which purify the sattva, which are the words of God himself and are of the nature of His outbreathing, stand as unrivalled *pramāṇa*.⁷³

The impersonal character of the Vedas, as made out and emphasised by the *Mīmāṃsā*, has raised one of the complicated problems regarding the character of words and their relation to the objects, which they convey. If we have to believe in the Vedas as the highest authority, we must understand that relation to the ^{be} eternal, but the individual objects denoted by the words are perishable. How to explain this? Jaimini says that the words exist for ever, in an unperceived form; they are only made manifest when they are uttered. The relation of words and their meaning is eternal.⁷⁴ In that case words can not denote individuals; they have their relation with the form or *ākṛti*, which is eternal. Śaṅkara generally accepts the opinions of the *Mīmāṃsakas* and says that the words have their connection

73. Cf. *W.S.Ab.V.7.p.35*.

74. *Autpattikas tu śabdasyārthena sambandhaḥ*.

with the form and not with individuals.⁷⁵ Though Śaṅkara accepts the conception of jāti, later Advaitins like Āṇḍikha do not accept it, because it is difficult to explain the relation of jāti and vyakti, class and individuals. Rāmānuja gets over the difficulty by thinking that all the words ultimately denote God. The inner-self of all the words is God; as the external form of the objects, which are expressed, may be diverse, we should not think that the words, which ultimately denote God, are synonymous.⁷⁶

According to the Suddhādvaita, the highest Lord has many powers. God creates not only the rūpa-prapañca or the creation in form but also the nāma-prapañca or the name-creation. Thus pure monism may be said to give a theological explanation of the Vedas. As Puruṣottama puts it, the Śabdabrahman is first revealed as the Nāda of God. It is immutable at first. When it is manifested through the mouth of God, after acquiring a subtle form of the nature of

75. Ākṛtibhiś ca śabdānām sambandho na vyaktibhiḥ.

Śaṅkerabhāṣya. I. iii. 28.

76. Sarve śabdāḥ paramātmāna eva vācakaḥ. Sarvadarśana-saṅgraha. p. 104.

See also: Iha tu sarvāvasthāvesthāyāṃ paramapuruṣaśarīra-
tvena cidacitos tatprekāratayaiva padārthatvāt
tatprekārāḥ paramapuruṣaḥ sarvadā sarvaśabda-
vācya iti viśeṣaḥ. Śrībhāṣya. I. i. 1.

the mental determination of different letters, it appears in the gross form of morae, vowels and letters. It then assumes the form of Śabdabrahmātmakaveda. As that Nāda is all-pervading, it is present in us also. God then enlightens the vṛtti of the auditory sense-faculty and it is heard: it can not be heard otherwise as the door of hearing is closed. It is the same Nāda, which is known as Sphota on the ground of its etymology as 'sphutati vāg anena.'⁷⁷ It is then revealed in the form of parā, paśyanti, madhyamā and vaikharī, as accepted by the grammarians. Puruṣottama says that just as sat, cit and ānanda are aspects of God, letters, words and sentences are aspects of Śabdabrahman.⁷⁸

Puruṣottama also discusses how a word is heard. Wind, he says, is instrumental in the production of sound in or out of the body. Sometimes we hear the sound of friction. The five prēmordial elements are its samavāyins. Sound is particularly related to the Ākāśa, while it may be said to be common to the other four. Whenever a sound is produced

77. Pr. P. 56.

78. Brahmanah saccidānanda iva śabdabrahmano varṇapada-
vākyaṇi nāmāni. Pr. p. 56.

it generally spreads in various directions, because of its very nature of spreading out. So those who happened to be near to the place, where the sound is produced, can very easily hear it. Thus spread out by the air, it is gradually absorbed in the ears of the hearers and ultimately becomes inaudible.⁷⁹ We can recognise the place of the origination of the sound, because of the wind, that brings it to our ears. Thus the directions which are not independently grasped by our ears, can be comprehended as qualifying attributes of the sound, which is heard by us.

Just as Brahman in the Śuddhādvaita has contradictory attributes, the Śabdabrahman also is possessed of contradictory qualities. Consequently, letters, words and sentences also, as aspects of the same, have the viruddha-dharmaśrayatva. That is why the śabda, which is not only eternal but also pervading or vyāpaka, is heard only in certain places and not everywhere and at all times.

Puruṣottama says that the relation of a word with its meaning is eternal. He accepts the existence of ākr̥ti or form and the eternal relation of the words with it.⁸⁰

79. Dāhyābhāve vahnir iva svebhāvatāḥ kālāḍina ca tasya nāśah. Pr.p.63.

80. Tasmād asty atiriktā ākr̥tir nityeṣi tayā śabdasya sambandho'pi nitya iti siddham. Pr.p.44.

But he does not agree with the contention of Śaṅkara and the Mīmāṃsakas that the words are connected with only the form and not with individual objects. On the other hand he says that words have their relation with the individual objects and not just with the form.⁸¹ If we believe in the relation of the words with an eternal form there would arise the contingency of admitting lakṣaṇā (indication), by which we know of an individual object. Vallabha however is staunchly opposed to lakṣaṇā in the explanation and interpretation of the Vedic passages. In emphatically advocating the strictly literal interpretation of the Vedic passages, Vallabha surpasses the Mīmāṃsakas also. While stating that, by once resorting to lakṣaṇā, we shall resort to it everywhere, which is surely not a happy way of explanations, Vallabha and after him Puruṣottama give a sound argument also. The words employed in the Vedas have not always their conventional meaning, but are at times used in their etymological sense. The word 'siktaretāḥ' is an instance. It can not have relation with any eternal form that can imply any individual, on the other hand it is an attribute and as the term can be used only after the seminal discharge, it is anitya also.⁸²

81. Tasnān nāḥṛtiṃātre sambandhaḥ, kintu vyaktāḥ eva sambandhaḥ. Pr. pp. 48-49.

82. A.B.P.I. iii. 28. p. 426.

To remove this anomaly, we shall have to accept a different Vedic world with the celestial^a objects, that are the avayavas of God. Thus all the words, letters and sentences, which are the vikṛti of the Omkāra, primarily express God. What is briefly stated by the Omkāra is stated in the Vedas in so many words. ⁸³ How can we know that there is a different Vedic creation? For this is given the example of the word Jāmadagnya. One may call oneself Jāmadagnya or the son of Jamadagni, but he knows himself to be Jāmadagnya only indirectly and there is no perceptible evidence for it. Similarly the Vedic world, which is different is known only indirectly. ⁸⁴ The conventional usage in the scriptures is to be understood, as it is understood in the world, from the expressions of the elders. Puruṣottama says that people make golden images after knowing the form from the earthen or wooden images. That is why mundane illustrations like that of a pot and the clay are found in the Vedas. So only human beings and not the Vedas are dependent. ⁸⁵

83. Tathā ca bījaśaktir eva sarvavṛkṣe prasaratīty Omkārasya yā paramātmavācakatā saiva sarvasmin vedatarau prasṛtā.

A.B.P.I.i.10.p.150.

84. Tathā ca parokṣeṇa svasya yathā jāmadagnyāvagetis tathā parokṣeṇāpi tasya prapañcasyāvagatih. A.B.P.I.iii.28.p.427.

85. A.B.P.I.i.4.pp.136-137.

The connection of words with individual objects is the question not only with the Vedas but even with ordinary words, which have their worldly usage. That the objects are infinite does not pose any problem for Puruṣottama, who says that all the objects in the world are non-different from God.

It will thus be seen that the Śuddhādvaitins not only differ from Śaṅkara, but even from Rāmānuja. They accept the form but are inclined to believe in the relation of words with individual objects. They agree with Rāmānuja in his view that words express God, but while for Rāmānuja, all the words ultimately express God, in the system of Vallabha, all the words primarily express God and there is no scope left for indication. They admit the sphoṭa but not as explained by grammarians. The sphoṭa is not revealed by the letters (Varnābhivyaṅgya) but is explained as "Sphutati vāg anena" by which the speech becomes manifest. And finally they believe in an entirely different world of the Vedas. This world is supramundane and hence the authority of the Vedas can never be questioned, even if they express what may appear to be absolutely wrong and absurd ideas like 'Fire is cold' (Vahnir anuṣṇah). That the Vedas are alaukika is enough to seal the lips of any sceptic, who would find out a bundle of

contradictions in the Vedic literature. It is a novel and yet very strong argument of Vallabha and his followers.

Puruṣottama accepts the expressive capacity of all the three, letters, words and sentences. He says that among themselves they bear the relation of principal and subordinate. Thus in a word, the letters are subordinate to the word, and in a sentence the words are subordinate to the sentence. Puruṣottama explains the expressiveness (Vācakatva) as the possession of the beginningless capacity favourable to the connotation of a certain meaning, which is understood from it. As this connotation by capacity is accepted as eternal, there is nothing to bar the eternal nature of expressiveness.⁸⁶ Grammarians believe that śakti is the very nature of the word and is the same as vācakatva. Puruṣottama however understands śakti as the capacity to reveal the meaning and not as vācakatva.⁸⁷ Śaṅketa is explain^{ed} by him as the divine regulation of śakti so as to

86. Vācakatvam cārphapratītijanamēnukūlānādiśaktinattvam
bodhyam. Evam ca śaktyā bodhakatvasya utpattikatvenābhi-
-pratitvān na tośya nityatve kim api bādhakam. Pr. p. 88.

87. Vestustas tu sādhu tvāpare paryāyā anādivācakatvarūpā
arthabodhāvīrbhāvakaśaktir atiriktaiva. Pr. p. 88.
At another place Puruṣottama explains śakti as:
Padapadārthayor nityasambandharūpā. T. Sn. Ab. V. 153. p. 130.

reveal only a particular meaning of a particular word uttered at a particular place, and time.⁸⁸ Śakti is three-fold i.e. it has three vṛttis: (1) Primary or mukhya, (2) Indication or gaunī and (3) implication or tātparya.

The first is the expressed sense. It is threefold;

conventional e.g. maṇḍapa, etymological e.g. pācaka and etymologico-conventional e.g. pañkaja. The second is that which indicates by a possible connection. It is classified into two: (1) Prayojana lakṣaṇā, when some sense is conveyed indirectly with a certain purpose, e.g. Gaṅgāyān Ghosaḥ.

(2) Gaunī lakṣaṇā, when the idea of resemblance is meant in a sentence, e.g. Gaur vāhikā.⁸⁹ Implication is the utterance of a sentence for conveying a certain purport.⁹⁰

Puruṣottama like some rhetoricians, does not accept suggestion or vyañjanā as a separate vṛtti, but includes it in the tātparya.⁹¹

88. Etad deśakālavibhedenāsmābhir uccāryamāno'yaṁ śabda
imam evārtham bodhayatu na tv anyam itīśvarakṛtaniyama-
-rūpaḥ śakti-saṅkoca eva saṅketapadenocyate. Pr. p. 88.

89. Pr. p. 93.

90. Tātparyam ca tatpratītiicchayā uccāritatvam. Pr. p. 94.

91. Pr. p. 95. ff.

Purusottama does not agree with the Mīmāṃsā doctrine that śabda is pravartaka. In the Suddhādvaita, it is God who urges people for action. Puruṣottama uses the method of reductio ad absurdum and argues that if we believe that the words are pravartaka, all would be engaged in the activity, as enjoined in the Vedas but this is not the case. So their pravṛtti or otherwise depends upon the desire of God and not the Vedas.⁹²

Vallabha explains the smṛtis as:

Rsīṇām pūrvacaritesmaranam smṛtir ucyate.⁹³

Puruṣottama accepts it as his definition of the smṛtis in his Prasthānaratnākara.⁹⁴ Experience, says Puruṣottama, is the root of memory. It may arise owing to the practices of ancient sages, or by worldly dealings, or from the śāstric works on policy or from the Vedas. Out of all these, only the last can serve as the means of valid knowledge. But the validity of the smṛtis as a pramāṇa is not on a par with the Vedas. Puruṣottama says that just as a mirror reflects an object, the smṛtis expound the

92.Pr.p.101.

93.T.Sn.V.33.

94.Pr.p.103.

teaching of the Vedas, but just as in the case of reflection there is a fundamental distinction between the object and its image, as seen in a mirror, similarly the prāmānya of the smrtis is dependent upon the knowledge of the Vedas. The smrtis thus have the purpose of enlarging and strengthening the Vedas and not of replacing them.⁹⁵

Purāṇas are understood by Vallabha as being Vedadharmā-tideśa, i.e. the extension of Vedic teaching.⁹⁶ It may be interesting to note that the purāṇas are considered in the Suddhādvaita as more important than the smrtis.⁹⁷ The Purāṇas are of the nature of explanation and expansion of the Vedas (Vedopabrahmanarūpa). The Purāṇas describes the sport of the highest Lord and are thus equally authoritative like the Vedas, the only difference between the two being that the Purāṇas are dependent upon a particular kalpa to which they belong, while the Vedas are independent of such

95. T.Sn.Ab.V.46.p.38.Cf.also p.39.where Purusottama says:

Smrtirūpapramāṇasya svarūpam janyam na tū vedavat nityam.

96.T.Sn.P.V.48.p

97." Śrutismrtī ubhe netre purāṇam hrdayam smrtam"

quoted by Vallabha in T.Sn.P.V.49.

considerations.⁹⁸

Puruṣottama is not inclined to accept the other pramāṇas, which are accepted by other systems of thought. Upamāna need not be taken as a separate pramāṇa, for the knowledge of resemblance is obtained by our sense-organs like the eye with the help of the memory of the similarity that has been experienced before.⁹⁹ The *yogya-anupalabdhī* which is advanced by the *Maiyāyikas*, as an argument to prove the *abhāva* has not been admitted by Puruṣottama. We can not say that something is known by non-apprehension, just as we know it with our own eyes.¹⁰⁰ The *Mīmāṃsakas* accept the *arthāpatti* as a separate pramāṇa, as illustrated by the passage, '*Jīvan devadattaḥ grhe nāsti*', which means that he is out. It is classified by *Pārthasārathimīśra* into two, *śrutārthāpatti* and *dr̥ṣṭārthāpatti*. Puruṣottama says that the *Arthāpatti* of both these types is just auxiliary to the *śabda* and *pratyakṣa* respectively. Prin. S. N. Dasgupta says: 'Puruṣottama also

98. *Purāṇam Vedavad eva bhagavanniśvāsarūpaṃ tattatkalpīya-
-bhuvenadrumātmakasya bhagavato līlāṃ pratipādayac
chivādirūpasya mātmyam parabrahmaṇa eva vadati....tena
tattatkalpātmakakālādhīnam eva tadbalaṃ na tu tannira-
-pekṣam iti.* T. Sn. Ab. V. 55. p. 54.

99. Pr. p. 148.

100. *Cakṣuṣāvagataḥ itivānupalabdhyaṅavagata iti pratyayā-
-bhāvat.* Pr. p. 121.

admits arthāpatti or implication as separate pramāṇa, in the manner of Pārthasārathimīśra'¹⁰¹ It is difficult for me to understand how he has arrived at such a conclusion, when actually Puruṣottama says : 'Evam dvividhāpīyam arthāpattir yathāyatham pratyakṣaśabdayor anugrahikā. Pratyakṣādipramitārthe jñānadārdhyahetutvāt. Natu pramāṇāntaram. Tadgemakasya balīyaso' bhāvād iti.' ¹⁰² Dasgupta has based the whole section on the pramāṇas in his chapter 'The philosophy of Vellebha' Ch. XXXI. upon the Pramāṇaprakaraṇa of the Prasthā-^{ha}-ratnākara. That is why I found it difficult to understand how the conclusion is arrived at by Dasgupta.

Aitiḥya or tradition is explained as a particular statement, the authorship of which is unknown. ¹⁰³ It is illustrated by 'there is Yakṣa in this tree.' It is no pramāṇa because it is not decisive. It is included in the śabda. Sambhava, which is like understanding the number hundred in the number thousand, is included in the śabda. Lokaprasāda is included in pratyakṣa, cestā in anumāna, lipi in śabda and pratibhā, which is illustrated by 'my brother is to come to-morrow' is no pramāṇa.

101. S.N. Dasgupta. History of Indian Philosophy. Vol. IV. p. 345.

102. Pr. p. 152.

103. Aviditakartrkah śabdaviśeṣaḥ. Pr. p. 153.

It will thus be seen that only three pramāṇas, Pratyakṣa, anumāna and śabda are accepted in the Śuddhādvaita. Out of these three, the first two are useful in the ordinary worldly dealings, while in the spiritual matters only verbal testimony is to be taken as authoritative.¹⁰⁴ Puruṣottama says that the validity of the pramāṇas depends upon the quality of sattva present in them.¹⁰⁵ This quality of sattva can be acquired even by Yoga, but as the Yoga itself depends upon the Vedas, it is better to accept the Vedas as the highest pramāṇa. Perception and inference depend upon persons like us, who are affected by avidyā or ignorance and so they are definitely weaker than śabda.¹⁰⁶ Vallabha defines tarka as 'Tarko nāma svotpreksitē yuktih.'¹⁰⁷ Puruṣottama gives a very interesting argument, when he says that as the world is full of diversity, it is very easy to find out suitable

104. Purvoktāny eva vyavahāre pramāṇāni. Paramārthe tu śabda eveti siddham. Pr. p. 153.

105. Sarvāny eva pramāṇāni sattvam eva kathamāna, Upejīvanti..... Pr. p. 34.

106. Pr. p. 104.

107. A. B. II. ii. 21. p. 568.

examples for both the argumentators and so it is difficult to give a particular reasoning for a particular point.¹⁰⁸

Puruṣottama does not seem to have any definite view regarding the spontaneity and self-validity of knowledge. While the followers of Mīmāṃsā, Kevalādvaita and Viśiṣṭādvaita believe in the self-validity of knowledge, Puruṣottama says that there are cases where knowledge should be regarded as depending upon accessory influences of memory and the like, hence it should not be regarded as self-valid always.¹⁰⁹ For the scriptures of course, he believes in their self-validity, as pointed ^{out} above.

(IV).

Brahman-attributes.

Our world with all its wide variety, has always been a big question mark for the thinkers. We wish to know what is at the root of this world, what makes human beings laugh and weep on this big stage of the world and what drives the Sun and the Moon and Stars from the East to the West. Speculations of philosophers have always been pointedly turned towards the investigation of the esse of the universe. Again it has not been mere curiosity of an arm-chair

108. Lokasya vaicidryenobhayor vādinor drṣṭāntasaulabhye

ekatarayuktiniyāmakasya hetor abhāvāc ca-A.B.P.II.i.11.
p.569.

109. Pr.p.155.

thinker, but coupled with this urge of knowledge is an equally strong, nay even a stronger, urge to find out the way of happiness and bliss for the human beings, who are rotting here and there in the dust and din of the humdrum mortal world. Systems have been propounded after systems, thinkers have followed thinkers, philosophers and religious teachers have preached one after another; all with the sole aim of finding out the truth and weal behind the worldly woe. What is the Supreme Spirit? The Upaniṣads say that it is Brahman; the systems of the Vedānta, each claiming to be the rightful successor of those ancient works, have retained the same name, but each of them has its own conception of that Supreme; whether it has attributes, how it is related to the world and to us and how we can attain to it.

It has often been alleged that Indian Philosophers, who have accepted the śabdapramāṇa as the highest authority, have never cared to prove logically the existence of Brahman but have accepted it from the Upaniṣads. While for Śaṅkara it may not be true, but it is correct statement for Vallabha and his followers. Vallabha not only refuses to accept tarka, but even condemns those who follow it. The Naiyāyikas, especially Udayanācārya has given so many arguments to prove the existence of Brahman. Rāmānuja in his Śrībhāṣya has refuted such arguments as have been advanced before him. Puruṣottama with his strictly logical

mind, gives a studied refutation of all these arguments and tries to prove that Brahman is the Aupanishada Puruṣa, which can be known only from the Upaniṣads and not by any other means.¹¹⁰

Brahman thus can not be said to be an object of our worldly dealings. It is beyond all our senses, beyond all our thoughts. It is Sarvavyahārātīta. But if it is beyond the reach of our senses, how can we approach it? What again about the incarnations of God, which, as stated in the Purāṇas, are seen by the people? To this the 'Suddhādvaitin replies that even if it is beyond the vyahāra, and is thus not an object of any pramāṇa, it becomes an object of the Vedas, because of its own desire.¹¹¹ So far as the incarnations are concerned Puruṣottama says that Avatāra means the descent of God from the Vaikuṇṭha to the world.¹¹² These various incarnations of God are like the different parts played by an actor, who may be seen on the stage as a king or as a minister at his own desire.¹¹³

110. A.B.P.I.i.2.pp.70-81.

111. Tatas ca pramāṇabalenāviśayaḥ svecchayā viśayaś cetyuktaṁ.

A.B.I.i.4.p.134.

112. Avatāro nāma vaikuṇṭhasthānād ihāgananaṁ. T.S.Ab.V.73.p.121.

113. Yathā naṭe rājāyam aśvo'yam tathā sādharāṇo matsyo'yam
varāho'yam manusyo'yam iti teṣāṁ buddhijanakety arthaḥ.

T.S.Ab.V.71.p.120.

How is it that Brahman is beyond our ordinary means of proof? The reason is that Brahman has no form, that can be an object of our visual perception. It is like the empty space without clouds. Our eyes, which can comprehend only that which is endowed with form, goes far and wide in the sky but grasps^s nothing. It is only the fathomless blue, that is seen by us. Similar is the case with Brahman, which is too subtle for our senses and too far for our ordinary functions of mind and body.¹¹⁴ Thus Brahman, which is not in any way an object of our bodily and mental efforts, can be an object on account of its own sweet will, which can make itself seen or unseen, heard or unheard, known or unknown in whatever form it wishes and at whatever ~~stands~~ time it desires. When it thus wishes to be seen, it is the very profundity of Brahman that helps the mundane sense-faculties in its apprehension.¹¹⁵

Brahman, which is formless, is an abode of contradictory qualities, according to the 'Suddhādvaita. From the scriptures which are the only authority for knowing Brahman, we find that it is variously described as full of attributes and yet devoid of them. If an attempt is to be made to reconcile

114. Cf. T. S. Ab. V. 75.

115. *Evam sati nām sarve lokarṣṭyaiva paśyantv iti yadeccchā tadā brahmano gambhīrataiva lokarṣṭyanaugrāhikā bhavati.*

those conflicting passages, we shall have to believe that Brahman is possessed of contradictory attributes. Vallabha and his followers believe that Brahman is capable of becoming everything (sarvabhavanāsamārtha). Hence for one, who accepts the Brahman as stated in the scriptures, there is no conflict nor any shadow of conflict. It is, as Puruṣottama points out, the nature of the thing (vastuśvabhāva) and how can the essential nature of anything be called in to question?¹¹⁶ We can not counter what is, and the possession, of the contradictory attributes by Brahman, is. Even if we find something quite wrong and self contradictory in the śrutis like, 'the fire is cold', we should believe that it is correct, because Brahman can be both fire and cold. Similarly Brahman can be both formless and formed, without hands and feet it can run and catch, without ears it can hear, and without eyes it can see.¹¹⁷ The contradictory attributes of Brahman can be made out even on the logical grounds. The earth, as we see, is the resting place of the objects, which are by their

116. A.B.P. III. ii. 21. p. 923.

117. Tathā ca bhagvataḥ sarvarūpatvena vahnirūpatvād anuṣṇa-
tvarūpatvāc cānuṣṇatvavahnitvayor aikādhikaranyāc
chivatvādinām apy aikādhikaranyāt vahnir anuṣṇaḥ param
brahma brahma-viṣṇuśivākāraṁ anākāraṁ ity aviruddham.

very nature against each other. Thus for instance a snake and a rat, both of them live on earth. Again we may enter or exit or rest and all these are called actions. We may be awake or may be experiencing dreams, but the resort of both these is our buddhi. Similarly Brahman, which is the Almighty basis of everything, the principal substratum of all that works or is worked upon in the universe, is decidedly the abode of contradictory attributes.¹¹⁸ This possession of contradictory attributes, says Puruṣottama, is found in Brahman more; it is less and less in its effects just as a lotus leaf gets thinner and thinner and is pointed at the end.¹¹⁹ Thus even the effects have the viruddhadharmāśrayatva, what to talk of Brahman?

The teachers of the Suddhādvaita have to say something even for those, who do not accept the Viruddhadharmāśrayatva, just on the ground of the essential nature of Brahman.

118. Brahma Viruddhadharmāśrayam. Vivakṣitasarvādhāratvāt. Sahajaviruddhasarpa-mūṣakādyādhārabhūmivat. Peraspara-viruddhaniskramanātva-praveśanātvaśrayakarmatvāt. Jāgrdādyādhārabuddhivac ca. T.S.Ab.V.71.p.119.

119. Yathā hi kamalam mūle bhūyaḥ sad agra bhāge anīyas tiṣṭhatī tathā viruddhadharmāśrayatvam api bhagavati. Bhūyaḥ sat kāryeṣu hrasad atīviprakīrṣṭe kārye'tyalpam bhavati. T.S.Ab.V.71.p.119.

Brahman is different from the world and so the negative descriptions of Brahman are for showing how our mundane attributes can not be applied to it. Thus Brahman is said to be described as endowed not with the ordinary attributes of our world but with the supramundane attributes, stated in the scriptures.¹²⁰ This is proved by the scriptures themselves because the negative descriptions are followed by the positive ones. This is just like a statement, 'he is not a sinner but is meritorious.'¹²¹ This kind of reasoning is however for only those, who do not agree to the viruddhadharmāśrayatva on the basis of the vastusvabhāva alone; otherwise the principal tenet of the Suddhādvaita is of Brahman possessed of contradictory attributes.¹²²

The question of the attributes of Brahman has assumed very much importance in Indian Philosophical Systems. The

120. Tathā ca jagadvailakṣaṇyabodhanena tatprakāraḥ dharmā
niśidhyante na tu tatsadrśāḥ svarūpadharmā api.

A.B.P.III.ii.22.p.924.

121. Asthūlādisrutir na yēvad dharmāniśedhikā. Kiñcin
niśidhye tadanyesattāyā bodhakatvāt. Yād evam tad evam.
Ma pāpāḥ puṇyavān ayam ityēdivākyavat. S.S.p.238.

122. Ato ye vastusvabhāvato viruddhadharmāśrayatvam na
manvate tān praty evam laukikāleukikavibhāgarūpayā
yuktyā nirṇayah. A.B.P.III.ii.22.p.925.

Upanisads, which are the expressions of various thinkers about the Supreme Principle of our life and of our world, show two different trends of thought, both of which are mutually conflicting. While the religious urge of a man would require a God, who is full of all virtues and devoid of all the evil, the reasoning of a man tends to admit of a God, nay not a God but a principle, which is beyond us and beyond all that belongs to us. How can Brahman be bound by the so-called virtues or vices of our fleeting life and changing world? If we accept Brahman as basically different from the world of limitations in which we live and die, we should also be prepared to concede that it can not be possessed of the ~~finite~~ qualities, which are of the limited world and which are thus limited themselves. Thus the bold declarations of Yājñavalkya in the Brhadāranyakopaniṣad¹²³ led to the extreme position of the Buddhists, who would call their principle nothing else but śūnya, which brought their theory dangerously near to nihilism if not nihilism itself. Śaṅkara, as a master of strictest logic cannot in any case refuse to accept this. If the reality is to exclude the *eternae* and if it is to be eternal, then the Real, rather than that which is not non-real,

123. Cf. Brhadāranyakopaniṣad: II.iii.6, III.ix, 26, IV.ii.4, IV.iv.22, IV.v.15.

cannot be understood as fettered by our own chains. Brahman can not flow in the limited channels; the only thing which we can say about it is that it is pure being, though as a category there may not be much difference between pure being and non-being. Śaṅkara certainly believes in a personal God, but that Īśvara is at a lower level. All the virtues and powers of that God are evaporated in the white heat of the pure being, when we rise from the lower to the higher realm of Truth. The teachers who followed Śaṅkara, could easily see that however logical this position might be, here religion is divorced from philosophy. However ardent a devotee may be, however sincere he may be, he would not like to worship a God, who does not exist in the highest sense. Mere flight of high soaring intellect would not be sufficient for religion, which requires some slice of imagination and emotion. Thus Rāmānuja and the Vaiṣṇava teachers who followed him violently attacked Śaṅkara as a buddhist in disguise. Rāmānuja says that Brahman is possessed of all the attributes, which are good and is devoid of all the qualities, which are bad. Vallabha cannot accept this for obvious reasons. If we believe that God is different from the world, he must not have the attributes

of the world. Vallabha can neither accept the position of Śaṅkara, whom he thinks to be the real villain of the Vedānta, because Vallabha believes in the path of devotion as the only and the easiest way of salvation. Hence we have the highest Lord of the 'Suddhādvaita, as possessed of supremundane attributes, leaving out the limited worldly qualities. Brahman can thus become even a bundle of contradictory attributes, because all the attributes are superworldly as the term contradictory, which is the word of our world, loses all its force. Really what Vallabha intends to say is that Brahman is endowed with all the attributes, though they may appear to be contradictory to us, because of its essential nature of being beyond our imagination and intellect. The foregoing analysis will show that the positions taken by Śaṅkara and Vallabha are not far removed from each other, though attempts have been made to show that they are poles apart. The only difference between the two is that while Śaṅkara refuses to adore his God with worldly clothes, Vallabha goes one step forward and adores Him with the clothes, which are not worldly. That Vallabha calls Brahman nirguṇa is an unmistakable proof for it, because nirguṇatva means prākṛtaguṇa-rāhitya.

It should be noted that according to Purusottama one who is possessed of the knowledge of the qualitless Brahman, is one ^{who} has been away from the worldly qualities owing to the grace of God. ¹²⁴

What again is the relation between Brahman and its attributes? The problem does not arise for Sankara, who does not believe in the qualified Brahman. On the other hand he thinks that absolute oneness or Advaita can not tolerate the difference even within itself, as would be the case if we accept Brahman as possessed of qualities. Brahman according to Rāmānuja, is Viśiṣṭa or qualified by the sentient and the non-sentient, both of which form the body of Brahman which is the soul. Here ofcourse Rāmānuja is not so very clear or exact. He says that Brahman is one even though it is qualified, just as the body and the soul together make one man. But this would make his Brahman a composite whole, because if we are to believe in the transformation of the cit and the acit in to the gross form from its subtle state, Brahman remaining the same,

124. Yaś tu bhagavadanugraheṇa prākṛtaguṇarahiṇo' bhūt
sa nirguṇabrahma vidyāvaṇ ity ucyate. A.B.P.IV.iii.14.

it would naturally imply that the cit and the acit are the ~~extraneous~~^{ex} qualities attached to Brahman and do not belong to its essential nature as Rāmānuja wants it to be. Puruṣottama rightly points out that if we are to believe in oneness, that One cannot include within itself the qualities, which do not form part and parcel of its essential nature.¹²⁵ The greatest difficulty with Rāmānuja is that, he leaves the relation of Brahman and cit-acit partially unexplained, skips over the problem by giving the body-soul analogy which is not quite satisfactory and clings to the term Advaita, even though at times the Dvaita is not removed.¹²⁶ Vallabha's position, as explained by Puruṣottama, is an attempt to solve this difficulty, while retaining Brahman as possessed of attributes. Vallabha can not agree to any distinction within Brahman; it cannot be a composite whole and so we must accept ekarūpatā in the essential nature of Brahman as the scriptures always pointedly teach of Brahman as 'one without a second'.¹²⁷ Puruṣottama says

125. Ātmapadasya kevalātmavācitvena viśeṣanāntarasāṅgrahā-kṣamatvāt. A.B.P.I.i.3.p.98.

126. Cf. 'An eternal relation between them whether essential or accidental will be an inexplicable mystery.'

Radhakrishnan. Indian Philosophy Vol.II.p.713-714.

127. Cf. A.B.P.III.ii.11.p. 902.

that a substance and its quality have the inseparable relation between them and it is because of this inseparable relation between the two that there is non-difference.¹²⁸ Again the attributes of Brahman are not accidental but essential and Brahman is thus both the knower and the knowledge, the existent and the existence, the blissful and the bliss. The relation between the two is thus of Tādātmya, which is explained as 'Bhedeśahisnur abhedah.' Just as sunlight is an attribute of the Sun and is also the essential nature of the Sun, so is the case with Brahman and its attributes.¹²⁹ It will thus be seen that Vallabha steers clear between the two positions of Sāṅkara and Rāmānuja. He accepts the attributes of Brahman and as attributes, they must be different from the substance. But then they are inseparable and essential, not accidental or extraneous. They thus belong to the very nature of Brahman. Hence the difficulties, which are found in the theory of Rāmānuja are avoided.

The question also arises whether Brahman should be

128. Dharmadherminos cāvinābhāvena sthitatvād abhedah.

A.B.P.I.iv.2.p.481. See also 'Sā ca sampad (i.e. abheda as bhedaviruddhasampad) bhāvarūpatve sati svāśrayāvinābhū-tatvam tad vibhāvavartamānatvam iti yēvat. A.B.P.III.ii.28. p.935.

129. Yathā sūryaprakāśayos tādātmyarūpasya bhedaviruddha-sampado'bhedasya kalpanā evam brahmatoddharmayor api.

A.B.P.III.ii.28.pp.935-936.

endowed with a body. Puruṣottama after Vallabha rejects the idea outright because the alī, creator, Brahman cannot be said to have any limitation of its own that would require a body. So in the original form there can be no śarīra.¹³⁰

(V).

Brahman-the essential form.

For the sake of a clear understanding of the 'Sūdhādvaita, Brahman is to be understood as having three forms, the essential form, the causal form and the effect-form.¹³¹ The essential form of God is threefold viz. kriyātmaka, jñānātmaka, and ubhayātmaka. The first is described in the former part of the Vedic literature. (i.e. pūrvakāṇḍa) and the second, in the latter part i.e. the uttarakāṇḍa or the Upaniṣads. In the Gītā and the Bhāgavata, Brahman is qualified by both action and knowledge, and is showed to be the object of devotion. Here the Akṣara is to be included in the Uttarakāṇḍa and Karma in the Pūrvakāṇḍa. Time (Kāla) which is of the essential

130. Tatpānyānapēkṣatayā sarvakartur brahmanah kā vānupapa-
-tīh syād yena svasyāpi śarīram kalpayet. Ato mūlarūpe
nāsty eva śarīram. A.B.P.I.i.19.p. 227.

131. Cf. T. S. V. 85. also Pr. p. 164.

nature of the interior sat, cit and ānanda (existence, consciousness and bliss) and the svabhāva or nature, which is not described in the scriptures as an object of production, are to be included in the essential form of Brahman.

When God desires to be many, the aspect of bliss is slightly suppressed, because of the rise of the quality of sattva in the interior.¹³² He thus becomes gaṇitānanda. This is called Aksara, the form, which God assumes, when he becomes both prakṛti and puruṣa. In the Aksara are said to remain Billions of eggs of all sorts. That is what the Bhāgavate Purāṇa calls Aksara as the cause of all the causes.¹³³ This Aksara is said to be resting at the feet of the Lord and is thus called the ⁱtail of the Blissful.¹³⁴ It is again the resting place of God, his āśhāra, his place of resort. Thus it stands for the vyēpivaikunṭha. The difference between Aksara and Puruṣottama is that the Highest Lord only desires for sport and is not entangled in it; the Aksara on the other hand is entangled in it and with the slight suppression of the aspect of bliss by means of the quality of sattva,

132. T. Sn. V. 99.

133. Ted āhur akṣaram brahma sarvakāraṇakāraṇam. Bhāgavate-
-purāṇa. III. xi. 41.

134. Brahma pucchaṃ pratisthā. Teittirīya-upaniṣad. II. 5.

it can be called the chief jīva.¹³⁵ Puruṣottama, the Highest Lord is again said in the śrūtis and the smṛtis to be higher than both kṣara and Akṣara.¹³⁶ The Highest Lord is thus the controller of Akṣara. This Akṣara^{is} also ānandamaya. As pointed by our author the incarnations of the Puruṣa are blissful and so we must accept the Akṣara also as Ānandamaya, because it is the avatārin of the Puruṣa, which is its avatāra. The difference between the Highest Lord and Akṣara is that of conditions or states and not of entities.¹³⁷ Even if we believe that the Akṣara is Ādhāra and Brahman is Ādheya, there is no harm in believing both as one on the ground of

135. Tathā, ca Puruṣottamas tū līlayā icchām karoti na tu tayā vyāpriyate, ity atirohitānandam. Akṣaram tu tayā vyāpṛtam saṁ mūlabhūtena sattvena tirohitānandam mukhya-jīvapada-vācyatām dhatte. T. Sn. Ab. V. 98 p. 79.

136. Cf. Kṣaram pradhānam amṛtākṣaram haraḥ. Śvetāśvetara. U. I. 10 ... Akṣarat parato paraḥ. Muṇḍaka. Upaniṣad. II. i. 2. Dvāv imau puruṣau loke kṣaraś cākṣara eva ca.

.....
 Uttamaḥ puruṣas tv anyeḥ paramātmety udāhṛtaḥ.

Bhagavad Gītā. XV. 16-17. etc.

137. Gītāyām dvadāśe 'evam satatayuktā ye bhaktās tvām paryupāsate, ye cāpy akṣaram avyaktam teṣāṁ ke yoga-vittamāḥ' iti prāśnena taduttareṇa cākṣarapuruṣottama-yor aikyam avasthābhede-na bhinnatvam ca bodhitam.

A. B. P. I. ii. 23. p. 341.

the Viruddhadharmāśrayatva of God. ¹³⁸

Aksara is obtained by the followers of the path of knowledge, while the Highest Lord can be realised only by the grace of God, combined with sincere devotion and ardent love. This Aksara can however be understood as paying way to the paraṇṛpti, because it produces the highest knowledge by destroying nescience. The destruction of nescience leads to the manifestation of the aspect of bliss, which may finally lead a devotee to the essential nature of the Highest Lord. It is thus antecedent to the paraṇṛpti. ¹³⁹

Thus the scriptural passages teaching knowledge are connected with the Aksara. Thus the Aksara is the form assumed by God for the emancipation of the souls following the path of knowledge. ¹⁴⁰

Aksara is a novel conception introduced by Vallabha in the systems of Vedāntic thought. Dr. P. M. Modi in his 'Aksara-a forgotten chapter in the History of Indian Philosophy' has shown how the conception of Aksara, besides that of the Supreme Principle has often been met

138. T. Sn. Ab. V. 99. p. 81.

139. ~~T. Sn. Ab. V. 99. p. 81.~~ A. B. P. III. iii. 33. pp. 1084-1085.

140. T. Sn. Ab. V. 99. p. 79.

with in the Upaniṣads and the Gītā. The concept of Aksara however lost its existence in the works of Gaṇḍapāda and Saṃkara and was not revived by the later Ācāryas until Vallabha, the last Ācārya in Indian Philosophy. He gave a peculiar position to it in the frame work of his theory of Pure Monism. The present writer does not think it proper to discuss the concept of Aksara, as explained in the Upaniṣads and Gītā, because it is not within the scope of this study. It is however difficult to assert dogmatically as to what exactly has been the meaning of the word, because the Upaniṣads contain speculations of various philosophers belonging to various places and ages while the Gītā appears to give more or less a synthetic exposition of the different theories, that were current in those days. It may be possible to understand the Aksara as the immutable principle thus showing the trend of abstraction and negation in the description of the Absolute. But so far as Vallabha is concerned, his idea of the Aksara is neither of abstraction nor of negation. It is the mukhya-jīva, or the first product, if the word can be used, and contains within itself crores of eggs for future creation. Vallabha however uses the term found in the Upaniṣads and

the Gita for a particular purpose. The Upaniṣads, especially the older ones, generally teach the path of knowledge, while the later~~are~~ and minor Upaniṣads and the Purāṇas teach of devotion. Vallabha who laid the greatest stress on devotion thought that the Highest Lord could be obtained not by knowledge alone, but by sincere devotion and ardent love of a devotee, favoured by the grace of God. What then about those who follow the path of knowledge or action, as taught in the Śāstras? The term Akṣara, found in the Gītā and the Upaniṣad⁵ was understood and explained by Vallabha as the fruit, obtained by those who follow the path of knowledge. Akṣara is again inferior to the Highest Lord, and thus the superiority of the path of devotion is established. It is possible that Vallabha might have been influenced by Śaṅkara, who also maintained a division of the personal God and the impersonal Brahman; though it should be admitted that there is no parity between the two cases except that there is a division, and that one of the two is higher than the other. The distinction between the personal God and the impersonal Brahman has no place in the theory of Vallabha. Thus whatever may have been the connotation of the term Akṣara in the older works, it has

a peculiar significance of its own in the philosophy of Vallabha.

Time (kāla), action(karma) and nature(svabhāva) are said to be the different forms of Akṣara. Kāla is manifested with the slight revelation of the aspect of existence (sat), having all the aspects of existence, sentiency and bliss inside.¹⁴¹ It is thus an essential form of the capacity of action, because action is the capacity of the aspect of sat. Hence the other two aspects of sentiency and bliss are suppressed.¹⁴² It can also be described as always moving, the cause of all, or the support of all.¹⁴³ As it is the cause of all, it is a cause of worldly dealings like 'soon' or 'late' and being the support, it causes the dealings of past and future.¹⁴⁴ Its first work is to disturb the equilibrium of the guṇas.¹⁴⁵ In the

141. Antahsaccidānando vyavahāre īśatsattvāmsena prakāṣaḥ kālaḥ. Pr. p. 166.

142. Kālaḥ puruṣottamasya kriyāśaktirūpaḥ. Cestārūpatvāt. ... Kriyā ca sadamśaśaktirīditi yukteś cidānandatiro-
bhāvaḥ. T. Sn. Ab. V. 105-106. p. 84.

143. Nityagatve sati sakalāśrayaḥ sakalodbhavo vā kālaḥ. Pr. p. 166.

144. Tena sakalodbhavatvāc cirekṣiprādivyahārahetutvam sakalāśrayatvād atītānagatādivyavahārahetutvam ca darśitem. T. Sn. Ab. V. 105-106. p. 84.

145. Etasya prathamam kēryam guṇakṣobhaḥ. Pr. p. 166.

Tattvadīpanibandha, the dāvine form of time is stated to be Akṣara, the material form is the Sun and the spiritual form is the division into aeons, years and months.¹⁴⁶ In the Prasthānakāra however Puruṣottama says that the material form is the Sun and other luminaries, the spiritual form is the atoms and the Highest Lord is the divine form.¹⁴⁷ The time taken by the solar wheel in covering the atomic space is the time-atom which is too subtle.¹⁴⁸

Karma, like kāla, is not a distinct category but only a different form of the Akṣara. It is the universal action which is capable of being manifested by diverse individual actions, depending upon that which is enjoined or that which is proscribed.¹⁴⁹ Like kāla, it is also connected with the aspect of sat, while cit and ānanda are suppressed.¹⁵⁰ The difference however between kāla and karma is quite clear.

146. T.Sn.V.109.p.85.

147. Pr.p.166.

148. Tetra yēvatā kālēne sūryarathacakram paramānumātram deśam vyāpnoti sa kālaḥ paramānuh. Pr.p.166.

149. Vidhiniśedhaprakāreṇa laukikakriyābhāḥ pradeśato' bhi-vyāñjanayogyā kriyā. Pr.p.168. See also: Vihitanisiddhaprakāraḥ kriyābhigyañgyā kriyā karmeti tallakṣaṇam siddhyati. T.Sn.Ab.V.112.p.87.

150. T.Sn.V.112.p.86-87.

Kāla is manifested of itself, while karma is manifested in the form of injunctions and prohibitions by human beings.¹⁵¹ Again it is not eternally manifested like the kāla, but subsists only upto the rise of fruit.¹⁵² Karma is universal and is thus not different with different individuals. As it can be manifested in various ways, it can give happiness and miseries to different individuals simultaneously.¹⁵³ It is not necessary to accept the Adrṣṭa, apūrva and such terms as denoting separate categories. They denote only the aspects of karma.

Svabhāva or nature is explained as that which produces transformation.¹⁵⁵ It is inferred from the transformation, which is its effect.¹⁵⁶ Puruṣottama says that when we see a certain cause producing a particular effect only, we shall have to accept the desire of God as the hetu for it. It may be possible to say that the desire of God is the svabhāva

151. Kālaḥ svata eva prakāṣaḥ, ayam tu puruṣair vidhinisedha-prakāreṇa prakatīkriyate. T. Sn. P. V. 110. p. 85.

152. Phalabhogānantaram karmānāśasamaranāt tathā. T. Sn. Ab. V. 110. p. 85.

Also see: Etasya cābhivyaktyanantaram phalasaṁāpanāva-dhi prakāṣyam phalabhogajanakakriyāyāḥ kramena tirobhāvaḥ. Pr. p. 169.

153. T. Sn. Ab. V. 111. p. 86.

154. T. Sn. Ab. V. 111. p. 86; Pr. p. 169.

155. Parināmahetutvam tallakṣaṇam. Pr. p. 169.

156. Parināmena anumeyah. Pr. p. 169.

but it is better to accept it as a separate category, which

is manifested in the form of the desire of God.¹⁵⁷ Thus

it is not manifested in the form of sat, cit and ānanda.

Puruṣottama also points out that so far as the worldly

dealings are concerned, kāla has nothing to do with anything

either sentient or otherwise. Karma is useful only as connected

with the sentient, where as svabhāva is connected with both

the sentient and the non-sentient.¹⁵⁸ It has thus everything

as its basis. (Sarvavastuṣv āśritah.) All these four, Aksara,

kāla, karma, and svabhāva are one with Brahman and are therefore

neither effects nor causes.¹⁵⁹ That is why they are included

in the essential form of God.

157. Dugdhamṛtsūtrādīkam cādhighatāpatādirūpeṇaiva parīṇamati

netareṇa rūpeṇa. Tetra tādṛśī bhagavadicchaiva hetuḥ. ...

Tathā ca saiva parīṇamahetubhūtā icchā svabhāva iti

vaktum śakyam yady api, tathāpi t 'Kālam karma svabhāvaṃ

ca māyeśo māyayā svayā, Ātman yadrecchayā prāptam vibubhū-

-sur upādade' iti vākye upādānagocaratayā kālavād bhīma-

tayā ca nirdeśāt necchā svabhāvaḥ kintu icchākāreṇa

prakato bhavati buddhir iva vijñānerūpeṇa. T. Sn. Ab. V. 113.

p. 87.

158. Kālah... nirādhāra eva vyavahāropayogī karma...

cetanādhāram eva vyavahāropayogi, tathāśvabhāvaḥ...

cetanācetanavastvadhāram (Rūpaṃ). T. Sn. Ab. V. 113. p. 87.

159. T. Sn. V. 114. p. 88.

It will not be out of place here to note the conception of Antaryāmin, as taught by the exponents of Pure Monism. God is said to enter the heart of an individual, in the form of a swan, together with the individual soul. This form is called the Antaryāmin or the inner controller. Just as there are many individual souls, there are also many Antaryāmins.¹⁶⁰ One may point out the anomaly in believing in so many Antaryāmins. Vallabha says that the difference is not even in the individual souls and so there is no question regarding the Antaryāmins.¹⁶¹ Vallabha states the distinction among the Antaryāmin, Akṣara and Kṛṣṇa is just as between the charioteer the warrior and one who is in the warrior. Puruṣottama explains that the Antaryāmin rules over the individual souls like a charioteer, who controls the horses. Akṣara again controls the Antaryāmin, just as a warrior directs a charioteer; and Kṛṣṇa rules over Akṣara even as the Antaryāmin of a warrior rules over him.¹⁶² Thus though the Antaryāmin belongs to the essential form of Brahman, because of its entrance in the effects with the individual souls, it is to be included in

160. Yathā jīvanām nānātvam tathāntaryāminām api. Ekasmin

hrdaye hanṣarūpenābhaya-preveśāt. T.S.P.V.28.p.70.

161. Bhedas tu jīve'pi nāstīti na kāpī anupapattiḥ.

T.S.P.V.28.p.70.

162. T.Sa.Ab.V.121.p.95.

the causal form and not the essential form.¹⁶³

The concept of Antaryāmin is not new to the Vedānta. Rāmānuja for instance accepts it as one of the modes of God. According to Rāmānuja, Īśvara appears in five different modes, one of which is the Antaryāmin, in which mode he dwells in the heart and is to be seen by Yogins and accompanies the individual soul even when they go to heaven or hell.¹⁶⁴ The Antaryāmin is, for all practical purposes, a connecting link between the individual soul on the one hand and God on the other. If we believe in the devotion as the only means of liberation, it is necessary also to admit God, who can be worshipped and hence who is different from us. In that case the Antaryāmin would, so to say, serve as something like a bridge between the two.

(VI).

Brahman-the causal form.

The causal form of God is manifested in 28 categories. They are as follows:-

- (1- 3) Sattva, Rajas, and Tamas,
- (4) Puruṣa, //
- (5) Prakṛti,

163. Antaryāminām svarūpabhūtātve'pi jīvena saha kārye praveśāt... kāraṇakotāḥ eva niveśaḥ. Pr. pp. 164-165.

164. Cf. Bhandarkar. Vaiṣṇavism, Śaivism etc. p. 75.

- (6) Mahat,
- (7) Ahaṅkāra,
- (8-12) Tanmātras,
- (13-17) Bhūtas,
- (18-22) Karmendriyas,
- (23-27) Jñāhendriyas, and
- (28) Manas.

Puruṣottama says that all these 28 categories are not separate entities as such, but have God as their essence. We shall presently see how and where the advocates of Pure Monism differ from the Sāṅkhya theorists, but the basic distinction between the two is that while the followers of Sāṅkhya believe all these as separate entities, this is not the case with the Suddhādvaitins, for whom the term tattva is to be understood as tat-tva or bhagavat-tva.¹⁶⁵ What is meant by these 28 categories is that the causality of God is manifest in 28 ways.¹⁶⁶ The Suddhādvaitins explain all these tattvas on the strength of the Gītā and the Bhāgavata-III, as expressly

165. Bhagavato bhāvo bhagavattvam. Bhagavataḥ sarvān prati yā sāmānyakāraṇatā sā... yatas teṣāṃ tathātven tasmāt tēni tattvāni na tu sāṅkhyāntaravat prthakpadārthatvena tattvāni. T.Su.Ab.V.87, p. 71.

166. Bhagavato yā kāraṇatā sā loke' stāvimsatidhā prakāśyati yāvat. Pr. p. 169.

stated by Puruṣottama.¹⁶⁷

Sattva is of the nature of pleasure and illumination, is non-obstructive to pleasure and causes attachment to pleasure and knowledge in human beings.¹⁶⁸ Rajas is of the nature of passions, produces desires and associations, and causes attachment to actions.¹⁶⁹ Tamas stupefies all the embodied beings and is created by the concealing power, it produces tendency to carelessness, laziness and sleep.¹⁷⁰

Puruṣottama says that we can not accept the theory of the Sāṅkhya that these qualities are moving by themselves, because we shall then be confronted with the contingency of rejecting God. Again the Sāṅkhyatheory is that these qualities produce each other and coalesce with each other. This, says Puruṣottama, would be tantamount to an incoherent admixture of their respective natures. Nor again should the

167. Atah param gītām tritīyaskandham cāśritya teṣām lakṣaṇā-
-ny ucyante. Pr. pp. 169-170.

168. Sukhānāvarakatve prakāśakatve sukhātmatve ca sati
sukhāśaktyā jñānāśaktyā ca dehino dehādyāśaktijanakam
sattvam. Pr. p. 170.

169. Rāgātmakam vā trṣṇāśaṅgādijanakam vā karmāśaktyā dehino
nitarām dehādyāśaktijanakam vā rajah. Pr. p. 170.

170. Āvaranāśaktijanyam sarvadehinohekam pramādālasyañidrā-
bhir dehino dehādyāśaktijanakam tamah. Pr. p. 170.

rajas be admitted as is done by the followers of Kapila, to be of the nature of miseries, for that would run counter to its explanation as being of the nature of passion. Barring these points of difference, Puruṣottama is prepared to accept other points, made out by the Sāṅkhya.¹⁷¹

God, says Puruṣottama, is without guṇas but he produces these three guṇas. This can be understood on the analogy of cotton and a thread. There is no thread in the cotton, but the cotton assumes the state of a thread. Similarly the Highest Lord, who is himself nirguṇa, creates them at his will. 172

Puruṣa, says Puruṣottama, is the Ātman. The term Ātman is explained as derived from the root 'at' to pervade, to envelope. So Ātman is that which envelopes everything, the body, the senses and everything for the sake of others.¹⁷³

171. Cf. Pr. p. 170. For the Sāṅkhya view see:

Prītyeprītiviśādātmakāḥ prakāśapravṛttinīyamārthāḥ,
Anyonyābhībhavāśrayajenanamithunavṛttayaś ca guṇāḥ.
Sattvam leghu prakāśakam iṣṭam upastambhakam calem ca
Guru varanākam eva tumah^{rajaḥ} pradiṭṭapavaś cārthatō vṛttiḥ.
Iśvarekṛsna's Sāṅkhyekārikās, 12-13.

172. Pr. p. 172.

173. Dehendriyāśāṅkam sarvam parārtham atati vyāpnoty
adhitasthethi ātmā. Pr.p.173.

Purusottama explains puruṣa in three ways. (a) He is beginning-less and devoid of qualities; is the controller of prakṛti and is known as an object of the notion 'I'. (b) He is self-luminous. (c) Even though he is not affected by the qualities^{ies} and faults of the world, he is associated with it.¹⁷⁴ The self-luminosity of the Puruṣa or the Ātman can be proved by our experience of happiness or absence of miseries, when we are enjoying deep dreamless sleep. He is thus kevala and the qualifications such as kartṛtva are due to its non-discrimination from the Prakṛti and the like, on account of the desire of the Lord, favourable to creation. This can be explained on the analogy of the redness of the Sun, which is seen in a red mirror. That is why it is capable of liberation (Muktiyogyatva), because if the bondage is understood as natural, the scriptures teaching of salvation would be useless.

According to the Sūdhādvaitya, Puruṣa is one and not many, and there is no difference between Puruṣa and Īśvara,

174. Teṣu anāditve sati nirguṇatve sati prakṛtiniyāmakatve saty ahamvittivedyatvam ity ekam laukikam. Svayam-

-prakāśatvan ity aparaṃ svarūpalakṣaṇam. Viśvagataguna-dosaśambandhābhāve' pi saṃyog sansargavattvam iti tṛtīyam muktyupayogi. Pr. p. 173.

on the ground of the sentiency in the essential nature of both.¹⁷⁵ The individual soul or jīva is different from the Puruṣa. Having sentiency as its essence, the jīva may be regarded as of the same type as the Puruṣa or as a part of Puruṣa.¹⁷⁶ So the Mūla Puruṣa can be established on the strength of the jīvātman, which is the sākṣin or the witness in the deep sleep.

Prakṛti is called Pradhāna or the main form, which God has produced as the material of the world.¹⁷⁷ It can be described in six ways, so as to show the six qualities which God has bestowed upon it. It is triguṇā or having the three qualities in a state of equidispotion. Just as Brahman has sat, cit and ānanda as its attributes and also has its essence, similarly the three qualities of sattva, rajas and tamas are not only the attributes but the very essence of the Pradhāna. This, says Puruṣottama, is the difference of Pure Monism from the theories of Képils. The Pradhāna is

175. Cidrūpatvena puruṣeśvarayor availakṣanyāt ... Puruṣas tv ēka eva. Puruṣeśvarayor na vailakṣanyam anvapi tadā-nyakalpānāpārthā. Pr.p.176.

176. Jīvas tu puruṣatattvād bhinna eva.... Cidrūpatvena tatsajātīyah puruṣasyaivāṃśo vā. Pr.180.

177. Bhagavatā jagadupādānatvena nirmitam mukhyam bhagavad-rūpam. Pr.p.185.

again avyakta and becomes abhivyakta or manifest by means of time and the like. It is eternal(nitya) and has the nature of existence and non-existence.(sadasadātmaka) It is described as 'aviśeṣa' because the worldly beings are not able to discriminate it and is also called 'viśeṣavat', as it shows all the specifications. Puruṣottama says that in other systems the relation between Prakṛti and Puruṣa is that of the master and his servant, but in the 'Suddhādvaita' it is of contact also because the productive contact of the two is admitted.¹⁷⁸ There is no harm in regarding both Prakṛti and Puruṣa as possessed of form, because even the Highest Lord may be said to have a form on the strength of the theory of Viruddha-dharmāśrayatva.

Mahat is produced from the qualities, which are disturbed. It is not different from the sūtra, but one with it. Sūtra is connected with the power of action and mahat with that of knowledge. So one and the same entity is called both mahat and Sūtra, in as much as it can be viewed from the point of

178. Prakṛtipuruṣayoś ca svasvāmibhāve eva sambandho'

nyatra. Prakṛte tu vīryādhānasya vivakṣitatvāt samyogo'

pi. Pr.p.136.

view of either knowledge or action.¹⁷⁹ Mahat can be explained in three ways ,from the spiritual, the divine and the material points of view. The first refers to its essential nature, the second to its meditation in the form in which it is well-known among Gods, and the last is for explaining it to the people. The first explanation can again be given as threefold, as sāttvika, rājasa and tāmasa. From the sāttvika point of view it can be explained as immutable and capable of manifesting the world, which is its substratum.¹⁸⁰ From the rājasa point of view it can be described as the shoot of the world.¹⁸¹ From the tāmasa point of view it is described as capable of destroying very powerful tamas.¹⁸² From the ādhidaivika or the celestial point of view it can be stated to be of the nature of pure sattva, which is the place of the manifestation of

179. Sūtreṃ sūcanāt kriyāśaktimāṃ prathamā vikārah. Tato mahān jñānaśaktimān. Sa ca sūtreṇa samyuktaḥ samyagmiśritaḥ. Tataḥ prthaṇ na kintv ekaṃ eva vācyaṃ. Jñānakriyāśaktibhyāṃ dvēdhocyate. Pr. p. 187.

180. Tatra kūṭasthatve sati svādhāre viśvavyāñjakaṭvam iti sāttvikam svarūpalakṣaṇam. Pr. p. 187.

181. Jagadaṅkuratvam. Pr. p. 187.

182. Atisamarthatamaṇāśakaṭvam. Pr. p. 187.

Vāsudeva, so that it can be meditated upon in that form. From the material or the ādhibhautika point of view, it explained as the citṣa, having the unchanging objectless knowledge as its mode.¹⁸³ That ~~is~~ ^{it} without an object, differentiates it from the buddhi, which is always related to an object. The followers of the Sāṅkhya on the other hand take the buddhi and the citṣa as synonymous.

Ahaṅkāra or the ego is produced from the mahat. It is described as endowed with the qualities of tamas, rajas and sattva, which respectively produce the tanmātras, the indriyas and the manas.¹⁸⁴ From the celestial point of view it is said to be an abode of Saṅkarsaṇa. On the material side it can be stated to be the agent, the means and the effect corresponding to the qualities of sattva, rajas and tamas respectively.¹⁸⁵ One, who is the substantive of the ego which is then an attribute, is endowed with quiet and terrible stupefaction.¹⁸⁶

183. Ādhibhautikam cittatvam iti lakṣaṇam. Cittatvam ca nirviṣayasarvavikārarāhitajñānavṛttikatyaṁ. Pr. p. 188.

184. Pr. p. 188.

185. Bhautikalakṣaṇaṁ tu kartrkaraṇakāryatvam. Pr. p. 189.

186. Dharmipurahsaram tu śāntaghoravimūḍhatvam iti bhautikam svarūpalakṣaṇam. Pr. p. 189.

One, who has no ego, is not stupefied and so the devotee, whose mind is fixed upon God, is different from one who has 'sāntaghoravimūḍhatva.

Prāṇa and Buddhi are just different forms of ahaṅkāra. They should not be regarded as separate categories. Prāṇa gives power to all the senses.¹⁸⁷ This is why its attributes are ojas, which is the power of the senses, sahas, which is the power of the Manas, and bala, which means physical strength. Prāṇa is atomic, but on account of its capacity, it can be fivefold. Thus it can pervade the whole body. The five forms are, Prāṇa, Apāna, Vyāna, Udāna and Samāna.¹⁸⁸

Buddhi is to be inferred from its effect, which is the knowledge of a particular object.¹⁸⁹ Puruṣottama's explanation of buddhi is given above.

Tanmātras are defined by Puruṣottama as subtle states of the elements.¹⁹⁰ The elements are possessed of the qualities

187. Prāṇalakṣaṇam tu sarvendriyabaladātrtvam. T. Sn. Ab. V. 97. p. 78. Also see Pr. p. 189.

188. Cf. T. Sn. Ab. V. 97. p. 78.

189. Viśiṣṭajñānalakṣaṇakāryānumeyā. T. Sn. Ab. V. 97. p. 78.

190. Sā ca bhūtasūkṣmāvasthā. Pr. p. 189.

like the sound, which is non-manifest.¹⁹¹ They are five, sound, touch, form, taste and smell. They can be grasped only by the yogins, while people like us can comprehend them only when they are specific. Here the Sāṅkhya theory is accepted by the 'Suddhādvaita.

'Śabda is explained as having the attribute of being comprehended by our ears. It is the tanmātra of space and can be said to be the sign of inference of something having been seen by a seer.¹⁹² The last is explained rather ingeniously. If a man standing outside the house says that the elephant has gone, then householder, who is in the house, infers that the man out of the house has seen the elephant. The sound, which is in the effects and which is consequently qualified, is an attribute of all the five elements and not just of the space, as made out by the followers of the Nyāya system. Puruṣottama gives a very good argument for this. When a gun is fired, the sound has its effect upon the skin and the heart also of the hearer.¹⁹³ Puruṣottama also refuses to admit with the Bhāṭṭa school of Mīmāṃsā that śabda is a

191. Nirviśeṣaśabdādigunavād bhūtatvam. Pr. p-189.

192. Pr. p. 189.

193. Pr. p. 191.

substance having its measure, and which is liable to contraction and expansion. According to him Śabda is a *guṇa* and not a *dravya*. Similarly touch or *sparsa* is the *tanmātra* of *vāyu* and is comprehended by the skin.¹⁹⁴ When in the effects, it is the quality of four elements. So it can also be described as an attribute of what is pervaded by the sound or what pervades the form.¹⁹⁵ *Rūpa* or form is the *tanmātra* of light and can be grasped by our eyes. It can also be described as having the form, similar to the form of a substance or always found as affixed to the substance or occupying the same space as that of a substance.¹⁹⁶ *Puruṣottama*, it is interesting to note, accepts *citra* as a separate colour.¹⁹⁷ *Rasa* or taste in the *tanmātra* of water and is grasped by our tongue; and *gandha* or smell is the *tanmātra* of the earth and is grasped by our nose. *Puruṣottama* also discusses the various divisions of all these.

Bhutas or the primordial elements are generally characterised as being endowed by manifested sound and the

194.Pr.p.192.

195.Pr.p.192.

196.Pr.p.196.

197.Citram apy atiriktam rūpam.Pr.p.196.

like. They are five.¹⁹⁸ Ākāśa is defined in three ways. It gives the worldly space, is an object of the dealings of within and without, and is the substratum of the prāṇa, sense-faculties and the internal organ.¹⁹⁹ Puruṣottama does not accept that ākāśa has any form, nor that the blue colour seen above, is an attribute of the sky.²⁰⁰ Its manifest quality is sound. Vāyu is formless, it moves and pervades, carries objects, sound and smell and gives strength to all the sense-faculties.²⁰¹ Its manifest quality is touch; and the sound follows from its cause (Ākāśa). Tejas is explained as capable of enlightening, cooking and digesting, heating that which is cold, eating up and drying.²⁰² Its special quality is form, while the qualities of sound and touch follow in it from their causes. Water is capable of

198. Tatrākāśādipañcakēnyatamatvam saviśoṣaśabdādimattvam
vā sāmānyalakṣaṇam. Pr. p. 202.

199. Pr. pp. 202-203.

200. Nākāśe rūpam. Upari nīlam paśyate ākāśam paśyāmīty eva
pratyāt. Nīlam nabhaḥ paśyāmīty atrāpi na guṇitvena
nabhaso bhānam. Guṇatvena nīlasattve mānābhāvāt. Pr. p. 207.

201. Pr. p. 209.

202. Pr. p. 209.

wetting, sticking, satisfying, living, expanding, flowing, removing the heat, and remaining in a mass.²⁰³ Its specific quality is taste; sound, touch and form follow in it from their causes. The earth is that which has form and which holds the whole world.²⁰⁴ Its specific quality is smell, while other qualities follow.

Indriyas are described as being produced of the taijasa ahankāre and as means of action or knowledge.²⁰⁵ They can be said to be capable of enlightening about the self through their fruit, while they are connected with the body.²⁰⁶ They are twofold, faculties of action and those of sensation. Puruṣottama does not admit that they are transitory or that they are themselves objects of our senses. The indriyas are different from their places in our body and are thus suprasensuous. They are atomic in measure and are always superintended by their respective deities, without which they are capable of doing nothing. The five organs of action are speech, hands, panis, feet and anus; while those of knowledge are ears, skin, nose, eyes, and

203. Pr. p. 210.

204. Pr. p. 211.

205. Taijasaḥ ankāropādeyatve sati jñānakriyāyatarakarāṇam indriyam. Pr. p. 214.

206. Dehasamyuktatve sati svaphelanātmajñāpakatvam vā.

Pr. p. 214.

tongue. Puruṣottama explains them completely, enumerating the Superintending deities and describing their scope and action.²⁰⁷

Manas is capable of both action and knowledge. It is of the nature of conation and non-conation.²⁰⁸ Its explanation from the celestial point of view is given as the place of the manifestation of Aniruddha. From the material point of view it is stated to be slowly meditated upon by the yogins. While dealing with perception, ^PPuruṣottama says that it can be regarded as both an indriya and not an indriya. In the ^Pprameya^Pprakarane of the Prasthānaratnākara he says that it is not an indriya.²⁰⁹ Its place is the heart.

Puruṣottama is not prepared to accept the Prāgebhāva (Negation antecedent to production) or dhvansa (destruction) as separate categories. It is not different from the state of the cause, the kāraṇāvasthā, and an avasthā can not be experienced as an entity different from the entity, of which it is a condition.²¹⁰ Puruṣottama further points out that when a man does not see the special state of the cause ,

207. Pr. pp. 215-217.

208. Tasya ca saṃkalpavikalpātmakatvam svarūpalakṣaṇam.
Pr. p. 217.

209. Idam ca nendriyam. Pr. p. 217.

210. Avasthā ca svarūpātirekeṇa nānubhūyate. T. Sn. Ab. V. 117.
p. 89.

favourable to production, he does not think that he is seeing the *prāgabhāva* of a particular effect.²¹¹ Again the *prāgabhāva* does nothing in the production of an effect.²¹² Similar is the case with the *dhvanśa* also, which is not distinct from the essential nature of the instrumental or the material cause.²¹³

Puruṣottama says that other categories, accepted by other systems, need not be separately enumerated. Thus for instance, number, measure, distinction, non-difference, desire, efforts, happiness, miseries, all these can be stated to be existing or otherwise only in so far as they are related to the *tattvas*, which have been dealt with. *Sāmānya* or generality is co-eval with the *tattvas*, while *samyoga* is included in the *sparsa*. In fact the *sāmānya* etc. do not exist at all, so far as the causal form of God is concerned. They can be

211. Na hi ghaṭajananābhukūlām kāraṇāvasthām apaśyateḥ.

kaśyāpi iha ghaṭo bhaviṣyati, idāṁ atra ghaṭapṛāgabhāva
iti buddhir udeṭi. T. Sn. Ab. V. 117. p. 90.

212. Tathā cāśādhāraṇakāraṇatvenābhyaupagamyamānasya tasya
vyāpārābhāvāt kāraṇatā nāṅgīkartum śakyā. T. Sn. Ab. V. 117.
p. 90.

213. Ubhayathāpi nimittopēdānānyotarasvarūpātirikto
dhvemsō na nirūpayitum śakyah. Tadatiriktasyādarśanāt.

T. Sn. Ab. V. 117. p. 91.

admitted only in the effect-form.²¹⁴

The foregoing explanation of the causal form of God, as accepted by the Śuddhādvaita, bears an interesting comparison with the position accepted by the followers of Sāṅkhya. In the very beginning of this section, we have pointed ^{out} that the fundamental difference between the Sāṅkhya on the one hand and the Śuddhādvaita on the other is that while the former upholds the dualistic doctrine by considering all these as separate entities, the latter believes all these categories to be just forms of one Supreme God. All these 25 categories of the Sāṅkhya have been admitted with the ~~addition~~ ^{idea} of the sattva, rajas and tamas, which though given a prominent place by the Sāṅkhya, are according to it not tattvas but qualities or guṇas. It may thus appear that in the Śuddhādvaita we have a Vedāntic superstructure raised upon the principal entities of the Sāṅkhya. The primary source of this lies in the Bhāgavata Purāṇa, where there is clearly noticeable a deliberate attempt to put the Sāṅkhya wine in a monistic bottle. Attempts to harmonise the dualistic theories with those of monism are found in the Gītā also. The Sāṅkhya philosophy with all

214. Vestutas tu sāmānyāder abhāva eva... Tasmān naiyāyikādyupagatatapadārthanām śrutipurāṇavirodhe laukikayuktivyuktatve ca kāryakotāv eva niveśe iti bhāvah.

that is admitted in it, has no place in the absolutism of Śaṅkara, but it has crept into the theories advocated by Rāmānuja and the succeeding Vaiṣṇava Ācāryas in one or another form. The Sāṅkhya theories were slowly and slowly almost reshaped so as to suit even a monist like Vallabha. The share of the Bhāgavatapurāṇa in this process seems to be very much, but as we are not definite about its date, it can not be properly appreciated.

Another important point is that while explaining these categories, there are given the ādhidaivika explanations referring to Śaṅkaraṇa and Aniruddha. The root of this lies in the Caturvyūha theory, as promulgated by the earlier Pāñcarātra. This theory has however been criticised by the author of the Vedānta-sūtras. Rāmānuja not only accepts the theory but even interprets the Brahmasūtras so ingeniously as to get the theory sanctioned by the author of the Brahmasūtras. Vallabha while commenting upon the Sūtras rejects the theory and agrees with Śaṅkara in his interpretation. Here however we find that if the theory of the vyūhas is also brought in harmony with monism, the Buddhādvaita has no objection against it, though it is not expressly stated or referred to. Here also the Bhāgavata-Purāṇa seems to have played a very important part, in so shaping it so as to suit Monism.

(VII).

Creation.

Puruṣottama in his Prasthānaratnākara and Anubhāsyaprakāśa²¹⁵ gives the process of creation, following the Bhāgavata. II. Brahman first assumes the forms of knowledge, joy, time, desire, action, Māyā, and Prakṛti. Kāla or time is of the nature of the power of action, while desire is the thought of the Lord expressed in "May I be many and produce".²¹⁶ This is twofold. The first has the nature of differentiation, while the second is of the nature of raising and degrading.²¹⁷

Considering the first Puruṣottama says that the attributes of sat, cit and ānanda, which are of the nature of action, knowledge and bliss, not connected with kāla, are mutually differentiated and while in that process they differentiate their substantive also; thus making Brahman endowed with action, knowledge and bliss. Thus the Highest Lord, who is trirūpa, becomes possessed of form (sākāra). Even though thus differentiated, owing to his desire to remain non-differentiated, God remains one whole.

215. Cf. Pr. pp. 159ff. Also A.B.P. II. iv. 22. pp. 810-813.

216. Bahu syām prajāyeya. Chāndogya. VI. ii. 3, Taittirīya II. 6.

217. Dvitiyaś tūtkarṣāpakarṣarūpaḥ. Pr. p. 161.

That is who the effect form is inferior and God with all these three forms is called complete or Pūrṇa. The power of the aspect of existence (Sat) is the Māyā, which is of the nature of action, and that of the aspect of sentiency is the Māyā, which deludes.²¹⁸ The Māyā, which is instrumental in the production of the world, belongs to the aspect of bliss. Māyā is thus related to all the forms of God and is therefore comprehensive of everything.²¹⁹ It thus gives the form to everything, that comes out of the original nature.²²⁰ It can thus be accepted as of the nature of place, time and objects (Deśakālavasturūpā). At times it may be said to produce even the desire of the Lord. It does not however mean that the original creatorship is devolved upon it.²²¹

Coming to the second, Puruṣottama says that all these aspects have that of bliss as the Highest, while the other two viz. that of sat and cit are inferior to it and are

218. Śaktis tu sadamśasya kriyārūpā cidamśasye vyāmohikā māyā.

Pr.p.160.

219. Sañcāyakarūpā .Pr.p.160.

220. Tato mūlarūpe nirgate akṣaramśabhūtasya tatra praveśas

tadā tasmins tāni ākṛtim sampādayati. Pr.p.160.

221. Na tu tāvatā mūlakartṛtvam. Pr.p.161.

produced as serving it. Then are created knowledge and action, which are the attributes of cit and sat, as powers of the Highest Lord. Then the aspect of bliss is endowed with knowledge and action. When the attribute of the aspect of cit viz. knowledge goes away from the cit, the power of the cit, viz. the deluding Māyā, deludes it. The cit aspect, even though of the nature of understanding, is deluded by it, because of the absence of knowledge, which is its attribute, and because of the separation of the aspect of bliss from it. The cit is related to māyā, ~~which is of the nature of~~ with the understanding that it will be joined with the ānanda through this relation. Being thus not at ease, it ^{remains} ~~remains~~ dependent upon the sūtrātman, which is of the nature of the tenfold prāṇas. It is thus called jīva, because of its efforts to hold the prāṇas.²²² Similar is the position of the aspect of existence, which becomes inert, because of the absence of the power of action. Later on by virtue of activities, which are the parts of the original action, it is manifested in the form of the body and the like. When that activity or the attributes of that activity are concealed, it is also concealed; when however it is manifested, the terminology like ghata and the like

222. Teda prāṇadhāranāprayatnavattvā jīva ity ucyate. Pr. p. 161.

comes to the Jīva, the Lord and the Buddhi, and so when the manifestation is concealed, that terminology produces the understanding of destruction. Similar is the case with the cit, which is manifested and concealed by the knowledge, which is a part of the power of knowledge. The aspect of bliss is to be understood in much the same way. Thus by twofold desire, the inert objects which are manifestations of the sat aspect and which are binding upon the individual souls; the individual souls, which are manifestations of the cit and which are bound; and the antaryāmins, which rule over them and which are the manifestations of the Ānanda, - all these are produced on the analogy of sparks from fire.

The whole analysis of creation as given by Puruṣottama, has been taken down by us ~~type~~ here completely, except some minor omissions. It is interesting to note that the concept of Māyā is accepted by the 'Suddhādvaita, though its seems to be different from that of 'Sāṃkara. Māyā is the miraculous power of God, but it is delusive also with regards to its connection with the aspect of cit and in 'the making of' the jīvas. This vyāmoḥikā Māyā has a very

important part to play. This vyāmohikā Māyā, it is important to note, is the same as avidyā in the Śuddhādvaita.²²³

(VIII).

Brahman-the effect-form.

The effect form of God, is endless. Even then it can be classified into two, the samastī and the vyastī in so far as we view it either collectively or individually.²²⁴ The collective form is of the nature of the Brahmāṇḍa, while the individual one is made up of the individual souls and the inanimate objects. The Antaryāmin is not included in the effect form, because it has no ego of the body (Dehābhī-māna), while the individual soul is so included because it is possessed of that ego.

The individual soul, even though belonging to the effect form and endowed with the bodily consciousness is eternal and is not therefore produced, like an ordinary transitory objects. That the individual soul is eternal

223. Teda cidamśasya śaktir vyāmohikā māyā avidyēti yāvat.
Pr. p. 161. See also: Prof. G. H. Bhatt's article 'The concept of Māyā in the Śuddhādvaita Vedānta'. Indika, The Indian Historical Research Institute, Silver Jubilee Commemoration Volume, Bombay. 1953.

224. Cf. T. Sn. Ab. V. 118, p. 92.

and does not vanish with the destruction of the body, is proved on the strength of a very curious but interesting argument of Puruṣottama, who points out that even a newly born child will be hungry and will try to suck its mother. This can be explained, says Puruṣottama, only on the ground of that child, remembering its experiences in the previous life. This shows that the jīva that was in the previous body has now come over to that of the newly born child.²²⁵ As it is eternal, it can not be said to be produced, for that which has a beginning must have an end and if we believe in the production of the Jīvas, we should admit its destruction also and that would run counter to the eternal nature of the jīvas, that has been scrupulously maintained in all the scriptures. The analogy, that is used, is that of the emanation of sparks from fire and this emanation can not be called production.²²⁶ In his

225. Jātemātrasya bālasya kṣudhātāḥ stanapānādaḥ pravṛtti-
-derśanāt. Tasyāś ca pūrvānubhūtakṣunnivṛttikāraṇabhūtā-
-nubhavejanyasmṛtimentarenānnapapattyā tasyātmanah
pūrvāpārejanmīyaśarīrāvacchinnaśyaikyā siddhe tena
cānāditve'nādibhāvatvena ca dhvamsāpratīyogitve
nityatvasya siddhatvat. T.S.Ab.V.53, p.92.

226. Yato visphuliṅgavad uccaraṇam notpattih. Nāmarūpasamban-
-dhābhāvat. A.B.P.II.iii.17.p.704.

famous kārīkā on creation Vallabha says that those which are transcendent are produced, with regard to those that are eternal but limited there is contact, while for the eternal and the unlimited there is manifestation.²²⁷ While explaining this kārīkā, Puruṣottama says that production is the association of the objects due to the externalization; contact is due to the action of coming in; while manifestation is caused by desire. This being the case, when there is manifestation or contact, the essential nature and the qualities of the cause do not undergo any fundamental change or modification and hence the samāgama is not utpatti.²²⁸ The writers on the 'Suddhādevita, especially Puruṣottama, have made deliberate attempts to show that the spark-fire analogy can not and should not mean production.

What is the relation of this individual soul to Brahman? On the strength of the scriptures, the Gītā,

227. Anitya janamaṇ nitye paricchinne samāgamaḥ,
Nityāparicchinnaṇaṇ prākāṭyaṇ ceti sā tridhā.

A.B.II.iii.31. p. 679.

228. Janamaṇ bahirbhāvaheṭukaḥ viśayaśamsargaḥ, samāgamaḥ
āgamaṇakriyāheṭukaḥ saḥ, prākāṭyaṇ icchāheṭukaḥ sa.....
Tathā cātra vibhāgāḥ jāte bahirbhāve tadānīm sva-rūpa-
-dharmayoṛ anyathābhāva-bhāvāt tasya notpattirūpātā.

S.S. pp. 170-171.

and the Sūtras, the individual soul is said to be an anśa of Brahman. What exactly is the connotation of this term in connection with the individual soul, as related to Brahman? The word Anśa is used for a part (Avayava), a son, a piece (Khaṇḍa), a part of something which is specific (Viśiṣṭavastvekaśa), a portion from the whole mass (Kṣeyekaśa) or even a wife.²²⁹ Similarly the term pāda which is found in the śrutis, stands for a part or a portion. So we may accept any of these senses and there will be nothing wrong. Even then however we should accept that meaning, which is properly suitable to the illustrations of sparks and fire and a spider and its web. Thinking in this way, we should understand the term anśa to mean a piece or a part, but having the essential nature of the whole unchanged.²³⁰ That is why the individual soul is called an ābhāsa or an appearance of Brahman; just as a Brahmin who is devoid of good conduct, but who bears the

229. Puruṣottama quotes the passage: Ardho vā eṣa ātmano yat patnīh. Here he says that ardha means aṁśa.²²⁹

A.B.P.II.iii.53.p.767.

230. Tathā sati khaṇḍāvayavādirūpās tannityatvādibodhaka-
-śrutyānurodhāt evikṛtasvarūpā evaṁśāśiddhyati.

A.B.P.II.iii.53.¶.767.

sacred thread, is a Brahmin only in appearance. ²³¹

The question naturally arises as to how can non-dualism be explained, when we believe in the *amśatva* of individual souls. The individual souls, which are the manifestation of the *cit* aspects and which are *amśas* of Brahman, can be called one with Brahman, as a part can not be different from the whole. A spark, which is an *amśa* of fire, can not be non-fire. But then is not a part different from the whole? Can we say that a part as such is absolutely one with the whole?

The question does not arise for Śaṅkara, nor even for Rāmānuja. Śaṅkara with his staunch belief in absolute identity has said that the individual souls are also appearances, imagined by our ignorance. If we have to believe that 'I am Brahman', that 'I' must be wrong and must be Brahman. But then this would lead to the destruction of the individual souls as such and surely nobody would attempt to realize that Supreme, by the realization of which he will destroy himself. ²³² Rāmānuja accepts qualified Monism and so the differences between the individual souls on the one hand and Brahman on the other does not worry him much.

231. Yathā'nēcārī brāhmaṇo brāhmaṇābhāṣaḥ, sūtradhāra katve'
pi brāhmaṇyākhyāḥ evatāyās tatas tirohitatvāt, tathā,
jīvo'pi. A.B.P. II:iii. 50. p. 760.

232. Na hy ātmanāśaḥ puruṣārthaḥ. A.B.I. iii. 15. p. 399.

Madhva would in fact want difference and try to disprove identity. Bhāskara and Nimbārka admit both oneness and difference, but while the latter leans heavily towards the fundamental nature of difference, the former tries to explain it on the strength of upādhis.

Puruṣottama makes a thorough analysis of the problem, that faces him. The Ācārya, whose theories he is expounding, says just that an aṁśa is not different from the aṁśin, but this is not enough. If we want to promulgate the path of devotion, we must maintain the individuality of the individual souls and the aṁśa, if its aṁśatva is not imagined, can in no case be ~~be~~ absolutely identical with the aṁśin. Puruṣottama therefore says that they must accept the theory of Bheda-bheda, while leaning towards abheda and explaining the Bheda as owing to desire. That is why, while referring to Bhāskara, Puruṣottama says that he admits both aṁśatva and bhinnābhinnatva.²³³ This he says is the relationship of tādātmya and herein the difference owes its existence to the desire of the Highest Lord and is thus adventitious.

233. Tatra aṁśatvam tu yuktam bhinnābhinnatvam ca. Śrautavāt.

A.B.P.II.iii.53. p.763. See also: Tathā caivam tādātmye
eva vyāsasya tātparyam na nityabhede nāpy abhede iti.

S.S.p.175.

It is interesting to note that Puruṣottama calls Rāmānuja a believer in difference.²³⁴ There is no tāttvībheda in the Śuddhādvaita, where the jīvatva is adventitious.²³⁵

This however raises another problem. That which is adventitious and not natural, can not be called eternal. In his efforts to bring the theory of amśatva as near to abheda as possible, Puruṣottama calls jīva bhāva as adventitious, but then how can the individuality of the jīvas be eternally maintained if it is not natural? We should here bear in mind that in the Śuddhādvaita, the highest emancipation is the Sāyujya, where a devotee enjoys with God. It may be said that the individual soul might have attained the Brahmabhāva, but even then the distinction does and should persist. Again Vallabha argues actually that the destruction of the soul can not be desired by anyone; So there is a deliberate effort on the part of the propounders of the Śuddhādvaita to retain that individuality. Again, it is maintained that the jīvatva is only because of the embodied ego (Dehābhimāna) and we may say that when that

234. Atrā tādātmyam anāṅgīkurvatām tāttvikabheda vādinām
Rāmānuja madhvanaiyēyikā dīnām nānāmatāni. S.S.p.150.

235. Jīva bhāvasya āgantukatva kathanena tāttviko bhedo
vāritah. S.S.p.155.

is destroyed, the jīvabhāva, which is adventitious, is also destroyed. What then about eternity and individuality? This contingency appears to arise for all those, who try to retain the individuality of the souls, call them nitya and yet try to adhere to Monism. It does not arise for two philosophers only, Śaṅkara and Maḍh^hyā, both of whom take uncompromising attitudes^s, the former cutting the Gordian Knot by saying that all the distinctions are false, and the latter flatly rejecting all thought of Monism.

Further, what about the souls in the world? Are they one or many? If we believe in only one soul, i.e. Ekātma^vāda, then the eternal individual souls would pose a problem. If on the other hand we agree to the existence of different individual souls, we must believe in the multiplicity of the souls i.e. Nānātma^vāda. If a jīva is believed to be an anśa of Brahman, there is bound to be the conclusion of the anśin, being a composite whole, rather than one complete whole. Puruṣottama here takes a compromising attitude^d and says that from the point of view of the individual souls, we should admit multiplicity, while from the stand point of Brahman there is oneness.²³⁶

236. Evaṃ jīvānām anśatve jīvasvarūpavicāreṇa nānātma^vādo
bhagavatsvarūpavicāreṇa ca ekātma^vādaḥ. A.B.P. II. iii. 53.
p. 767.

There is no agreement among Indian Philosophers regarding the measure of the Individual soul. The followers of the Nyāya believe in the jīvas to be omnipresent, but they accept the multiplicity of the souls. The Jains accept the jīvas as having the measure of the bodies, which is the residence of those jīvas. Śaṅkara thinks that the jīva is actually not existing on the highest level, and so it may be called vibhu in reality. All the other exponents of the Vedānta accept the jīva to be atomic. Puruṣottama ridicules the theory of vyāpakātmavēda by pointing out that if all the jīvas are omnipresent, all would be joined with all the bodies and if one body eats a mango all would enjoy it, because there is no limitation or regulation. So many times one feels that there is nothing at one's feet but the head is aching, similarly there will be an experience of happiness in the body of Devadatta, while simultaneously there may be a feeling of pain in the body of Yaṅṇadatta.²³⁷ So many other arguments are also advanced by Puruṣottama. The jīva again can not be said to have the dehāparimāṇa, because that would lead to the transiency of the jīvas and run counter to their eternity.²³⁸ The materialists believing in the

237. T.S.Ab.V.53.p.92.

238. Madhyamāparimāṇatve anityatāpatteḥ. T.S.Ab.V.53.p.92.

luminosity of sentiency as being a result of the
conglomeration of the atoms of the primordial elements.

This is also not acceptable, since in that case consciousness
would remain in a dead body also.²³⁹ The jīvas then should
be admitted as atomic in measure. How then to explain the
pervasion of the whole body by the consciousness, which is
atomic? This can be explained on the ground of the capacity
of the caitanya to pervade the whole body just like a piece
of sandal-wood or it may be called its quality of spread-
-ing just like that of smell, which spreads here and there
leaving its original source.²⁴⁰

One would naturally ask~~d~~ as to how to explain the
scriptural passages, that often teach of the pervasion of
the soul, if we are to accept it as atomic. Here the
followers of the Suddhādvaita state that this can be
explained on the ground of the Bhagavattva of the souls.

239. Jñānam yasya dharmah sa puñjo bāhyaś cen mrtāśarīre
pi jñānam upalabhyeta. T.S.Ab.V.55-56, p.97.

240. Sarvaśarīragatacaitanyopalambhas tu sāmartyaḥ vā
guṇāḍ veti sādhitam. A.B.P.II.iii.28, p.721.

When the aspect of bliss, which is concealed from the individual souls, is manifested, then the soul attains those attributes, which are connected with the aspects of bliss and there is viruddhadharmāśrayatva, as of the Highest Lord. Thus even though the souls may be atomic, they may be great and pervading on account of the possession of the contradictory attributes. Thus the vyāpakatva of the soul who has obtained the realization of Brahman, can be explained. The vyāpakatva is thus of the nature of Brahmatva and not jīvatva.²⁴¹ The jīva, as a jīva, is atomic and as Brahman it is pervasive.

Being a part of Brahman, the jīva is sentient, and the sentiency is not only an attribute but also the essential nature of the individual soul; just as the attributes of Brahman also constitute its very nature. Puruṣottama gives a very good argument when he says that which is produced by one is one's quality; that which is

241. Tasya brahmabhāvam prāptasya jīvasya bhagavattvena
vyāpakatvaśrutir yujyate. Na tu jīvatvena rūpeṇa....

Ānandāśābhiyakteu brahmabhāve sati tasya tadviruddha-
dharmādhāratvam bhavaty aśeṣe tatra brahmakotayeh
paricchedo vyāpakatvam ca pratīyerann iti. A.B.P. II. III

one's quality is inseparable from the one, of which it is a quality; finally that which is inseparable from one is one's essential nature.²⁴² As the sentiency is an attribute of the individual soul, it follows as a corollary that it is also its essential nature. Similarly the activity of an individual soul also comes from Brahman. The individual soul is an agent on account of the relationship of *tādātmya*, which it bears with Brahman. Thus the activity is of Brahman and it appears to be in the *jīva*.²⁴³

Here comes perhaps the most crucial problem of all the systems of the world. If the individual souls are agents themselves and if the activity of these *jīvas* is to come from Brahman, and also if everything is in and through God, what about the unhappiness experienced by the *jīvas*? The contingency, that arises for Brahman, is that the Highest Lord, who is said to be so merciful and kind, so good and benign, is partial to some who are made happy and cruel to

242. *Yo yajjanakah sa tadgunako yo yadgunakah sa tadavānābhūtaḥ, yo yadavānābhūtaḥ sa tadātmakeḥ*. A.B.P.II.iii.18/.

p. 706.

243. *Brahmagataṃ eva kartṛtvam brahmetādātmyād eva jīve bhāsate*. A.B.P.II.iii.41.p.748.

those who are miserable. The human beings in this wide world are daily falling and bleeding upon the thorns of life. Who is responsible for this? The theory of the enjoyment of the fruits of one's own actions and that of the transmigration of souls are formulated as a reply to this, but we shall have to admit in that case that the Highest Lord is dependent upon the actions of an individual. Why should the omnipotent God depend upon the actions and create human beings according to the same? The doctrine of the freedom of will may be and has been admitted in the Śuddhādvaita. God is like a father, who puts all the necessary material before a child and informs him about the good or bad points connected with them, but it is the child who acts and not the father, who is consequently not responsible for the defaults of the young one.²⁴⁴ This however is no solution of the problem, because even if we admit the freedom of will, what about the creator who has created people, some happy, healthy, wealthy and wise, others equally miserable, weak, poor and foolish. The contention of God being dependent upon the actions can not be agreed to by the Śuddhādvaita, which believes in the omnipotence of

244. Ato guṇadoṣa-kathanapūrvakam bālecchānusārisāmagrisampā-
-dake pitari yathā na doṣaḥ kintu bālasvabhāve tathā
brahmaṇy api na doṣaḥ kintu jīva eva. A.B.P. II. iii. 42.

God, who is and must be independent. The karma again being jada or inert must be regulated by someone.²⁴⁵ Why then not believe in God as the giver of fruits, as He is the source of activity? And if that is accepted, as it is actually accepted, what about the contingency of partiality and cruelty? Vallabha tries to solve the difficulty by pointing out that the creation is of and in the self. God does not create anything new or different from Him; He just manifests himself as the jīvas and so even though the makers of miseries, he ^{is} neither partial nor cruel.²⁴⁶ Everything is one with him. The Brahmasūtra II.i.34. says that God creates in accordance with the actions of an individual. This sūtra is only for explaining the opponent.²⁴⁷ Viṭṭhaleśa has another explanation to offer. He says that God desires to sport and sports naturally require some differences and distinctions. There is nothing wrong therefore if we believe

245. Atah karmaniyāmaka īśvaro'ṅgikārya eva. T.S. Ab.V.76.p.128

246. T.S.V.76.p.128.

247. Pūrvam tadananyatvādi sūtraiḥ sarvasya brahmātmakatvam.

jīvasyāpi brahmātmakatvam ca pratipādayan yadatra

sāpekṣatvam hetūkaroti tena jñāyate vādibodhanāyedaṁ

iti. A.B.P. II.i.34.p.602.

the miseries also to be the līlā of God.²⁴⁸ Puruṣottama combines the two views in to one and says that even though God may give fruit with regard to the karma of individuals, He does not become dependent, because He desires to do in that way. While thus following his desire, he can not be said to be cruel or partial, because He is everything. The karma also is an attribute ~~also~~ of Brahman and that is how it is accepted as devoid of beginning. Sometimes God may not care for karma, because He is independent.²⁴⁹

The explanations of Vallabha and his son and the interpretation of the two views as given by Puruṣottama should be given a due place among all those explanations

248. The view of Viṭṭhaleśa is suggested by his explanation of Brahmasūtra II.ii.742 in which he explains the word prayatna as 'Bhagavatkr̥tāḥ kr̥tārtham udyamah.' For further explanation see A.B.P.II.iii.743p.750.

249. Tenatredam siddham. Phaladāne bhagavān jīvakṛtapraya-
-tnasāpekṣo'pi na svātantryādūhīyate. Tathaivālocita-
-tvāt. Ālocanēnusāreṇa viśiddham phalam jīvebhyo
dadad api na vaiṣamyādidoṣabhāg bhavati. Sarvarūpatvāt.
karmaṇām apy anāditvam bhagaveddharmatvāt. Kvachin
maryādām bhīṣaty api. Svatantratvāt. A.B.P.II.iii.42.

which have so far been given. The contention of Viṭṭhaleśa may appear even strange on the face of it. Why should the jīvas suffer for the sport of God? Such a God will not be different from the boys, who throw stones in ponds for joy and kill the frogs. Hence the arguments based on the līlā of God must have the solid backing of the argument based on the oneness or Ātmasrṣti, if we are to use the terminology of the Śuddhādvaita. But the explanation on the ground of Ātmasrṣti requires one's vision cultivated for this, and is in fact a negation of the miseries rather than an explanation of them.

The world is regarded in the Śuddhādvaita as a manifestation of the aspect of sat of God. The Vedānta can not accept the theory of Kaṇāda that the world is produced from the conglomeration of atoms, or from the prakṛti as advocated by the Sāṃkhya. Puruṣottama repudiates both these views thoroughly in his Srṣtibhedavāda.²⁵⁰ However the problem for the Śuddhādvaita is, whether the world should be accepted as unreal. The whole world with its wide variety of things, both great and small has been a very great problem for the philosophers. It is always fleeting and changing. Can it be called real at all? Again if we are to accept that everything is Brahman, can we

250. Cf. Srṣtibhedavāda. Vādāvalī. pp. 82-95.

equate Brahman with the floating, changing, mass of things, which are not satisfactory, not eternal, and not even joyful? Can we believe that this world, which we see around us, is a real transformation of real Brahman?

Śaṅkara says that the world is mithyā or unreal. The reality of the empirical world can not be maintained in the ultimate analysis and so Śaṅkara distinguishes between the Vyāvahārika satya or the exoteric truth and the ^Pāramārthika satya or the esoteric truth. Here however it is necessary for us to understand what exactly is meant by Śaṅkara, when he says that the world is mithyā. The world, as it is, is in any case more real than the chimeræ and can not thus be rejected outright as sheer illusion. It can not thus be compared with mirage, or dreams or phantoms of experience. The Prātibhāsika is different from the Vyāvahārika; but just as the Prātibhāsika is negated in the Vyāvahārika, in which we know that all that we have dreamt or seen or thought is wrong, even so we can go one step further and say that the Vyāvahārika is just an appearance, when we go to a still higher level of the Pāramārthika ^{satya} ~~satya~~. While we are dreaming, we do not think that what we experience is false; we know that only when we arise from our dream and find ourselves

in the waking state. By the parity of reasoning we can say that the waking worldly state can also be falsified, when we rise still higher due to the dawning light of true knowledge. The reality and otherwise of the world are thus relative. When Śaṅkara says that the world is mithyā, it is so only from the point of view of the highest reality, which the world is surely not.

The unreality of the world, with everything that it includes, matter, souls, personal God, and all—even if ~~it~~ may be maintained on the highest level, is a big blow to the religious mind and how so ever great may be the conclusions of this devastating reasoning, a man, especially a man of religion, does not like it. What would be the position then if the whole world is regarded as a phantom of imagination, even if such an understanding may be a misunderstanding or misinterpretation? The Vaiṣṇava teachers who followed Śaṅkara launched a violent tirade against him, and Śaṅkara was called 'Buddhist in disguise' (Pracchanna-bauddha) and a 'False-speaker' (Mithyāvādin).²⁵¹ Rāmānuja

251. Nāgārjuna distinguishes between two satyas. Cf.

Dve satye samupāśritya buddhānām / dharmadeśanā,
 Lokasamgr̥tisatyam ca satyam ca paramārthataḥ.
 Mūlamādhyamika^{ka}śāstra. XXIV.8. quoted in 'Gaudapāda' by
 T. M. P. Mahadevan. p. 206. fn. 70. Even Śūnya of Buddhism is
 void only in the ultimate analysis.

and Madhva, Bhāskara and Nimbārka—all who followed Śaṅkara said that the world is real and explained the relation of the world and Brahman in their own ways. The world, according to Rāmānuja, is the gross/acit which is the effect of the subtle acit. This subtle acit, together with the subtle cit, forms the body of Brahman and thus there is qualified monism. Even if we may not enter into a discussion of the relation of the subtle acit and Brahman, we should at least admit that the rudiments of the world are in Brahman. If then the empirical world is ugly, bad and dull, the rudiments should be subtly ugly and subtly bad. Can they then be connected with Brahman? If we think that the subtle acit does not contain all this, what can be the source of everything despicable and dissatisfactory in the world, which is the gross form of that very subtle acit? Any way the reality of the world, when looked upon in the context of the Advaita, even though that Advaita may be qualified, remains an unsolved problem.

Vallabha and his followers say that the world is not false. It can not be equated with the illusory appearances, because it is the manifestation of the aspect of sat of

Brahman; and is thus its effect. As the cause is real, the effect, which is the revelation of its aspects of being, can not be called unreal. The *prapañca* is thus *satya* and not *mithyā*. The question now is as to how can the world be called real. What Vallabha and his followers mean by the reality of the world is the reality of the essential form of the world (*Brahmarūpeṇa satyatva*). We may agree that the world, which is just the manifestation of Brahman, is real in its essence, which is Brahman; but as Dr. P. T. Raju puts it, 'the relation between the essence of the world and the Brahman is not the problem. The problem is about the relation between the world as we experience it and the Brahman.'²⁵² Thus if Brahman is the norm of reality, can we say that the world, in which we live, is also real?

The answer to this is found in the distinction that has been made out by the followers of Pure Monism, between *Jagat* or *Prapañca* on the one hand and the *Samsāra* on the other. This distinction has not been maintained by the predecessors of Vallabha and therefore it is a novel theory for the Vedānta. The world has Brahman as its material cause and *māyā* as an instrument; the *samsāra* on the other

252. Dr. P. T. Raju. *Idealistic thought of India*. p. 169.

hand has no material cause and avidyā or nescience is instrumental for its appearance.²⁵³ The samsāra is not produced. It is 'ucyate' and not 'jāyate'.²⁵⁴ The Samsāra is of the nature of pride and consciousness of possession (ahantāmatātmake) and is thus destroyed by knowledge. It is the Samsāra which ends, when one is liberated, and not the world, which may be merged at the will of God. In the 'Suddhādvaita the terms māyā and avidyā are not synonymous, as is the case with the system of Śaṅkara. On the strength of the Bhāgavata passage,²⁵⁵ Puruṣottama says that the avidyā is an effect of the māyā. Avidyā is thus not without a beginning and being one of the twelve śaktis of the Lord, it has no power over God.²⁵⁶ Knowledge puts an end to the avidyā and consequently samsāra, but not the prapañca.²⁵⁷

253. Tathā hi prapañcasya brahmopādānakatvam māyākaraṇakatvam, samsārasya nirupādānakatvam avidyākaraṇakatvam iti kāraṇabhedād bhedah. T.S.Ab.V.23.p.60.

254. T.S.P.V.23.

255. Vidyāvidye mama tanū viddhy uddhava śarīrinām,
Mokṣabandhakarī ādye māyayā me vinirmite. Bhāgavata.
XI.xi.3.

256. T.S.Ab.V.25.p.65.

257. Jñānasya sakāryāvidyānāśakatvam mocanam ca, anyathaiva avidyāyā ahantāmatātmake samsārabījatvāt samsārasyāvidyākatvakathanena sakāraṇasya tasyaiva jñānanāśyātvakathanena ca samyag siddham. T.S.Ab.V.81.p.139.

It should also be borne in mind that avidyā is just removed by vidyā, it is not destroyed. An effect is completely destroyed only when the inhering cause is destroyed. Knowledge can not destroy the māyā which causes avidyā. Avidyā therefore exists in the māyā in a subtle form.²⁵⁸ Puruṣottama gives an illustration by pointing out that the state of sleep, which is removed by wakefulness, remains in the buddhi, as its mode and pervades the internal organ.

Avidyā and vidyā have five divisions, each, and they are called parvans. The five parvans of the avidyā are the ignorance of the essential nature and the superimposition of the body, the senses, the prāṇa and the internal organ.²⁵⁹ Avidyā, says Puruṣottama, can be understood either collectively or individually. It is thus samastirūpā or vyastirūpā, just as we can understand the forest as one, while the trees are many. The samastirūpā is one of the powers of the Highest Lord, The vyastirūpā is connected with the individual souls.²⁶⁰

There is no question of superimposition with reference to

258. Kāryasya sarvathā nēśo hi samayāyināśāt. Prakṛte ca vidyāyāḥ sāttvikītena svajanakamāyānāśakatvābhāvāt māyāsattvāt tatra sūkṣmarūpeṇāvidyāyāḥ sattu tasya upamardo eva na tu nāśah. T. S. Ab. V. 33-34. p. 74.

259. T. S. V. 32.

260. Evam sati samastirūpeṇa vauṇam itived aikyam. Vyastirūpeṇa vṛkṣā itivenā nānātvam. Tatra samastirūpā bhagavacchaktir vyastirūpā jīvanām iti siddhyati. T. S. Ab. V. 32. p. 73.

the avidyā, which is produced from the māyā before creation, because the adhyāśas come afterwards. Māyā produces mahat, which again creates the ego. Both these are of the nature of the internal organ and so the first is the antahkaranādhyāśa. Prāṇa is just another form of the ego and there is the prāṇādhyāśa. This ^{is} followed by the superimposition of the body and the senses. The dehādhyāśa leads to a complete forgetting of the essential nature (svarūpe-vismaraṇa). This is the ignorance of the nature, which is the same as wrong knowledge. Thus the original nescience leads to the bondage of the dehādhyāśa and the superimposition of the attributes of the body, which in its turn produces the cycle of births and deaths. This is saṃsāra. ²⁶¹

It will thus be seen that the distinction between the jagat and the saṃsāra depends upon the distinction between the points of view from which we look at the cosmos. If we take it to be just of the essential nature of Brahman, it is the prepañca which exists; if it is understood as a heterogeneous mass of things separated from one another and also from Brahman, there is ignorance and saṃsāra. Thus it is the difference which is sublated and not the essential nature. When we are in need

261. *Evam ca mūlāvidyākṛto dehādhyāśādibandhas tena kṛto yo janmamaranādīpareṃparājanako dehādīdharmādhyāśaḥ sa saṃsāra iti phalaṭi .T.S.Ab.V.32.p.74.*

of much of gold we use all the ornaments of gold in our possession and we take them to be gold and not bracelets and rings different from the gold. The distinctions^s are removed and we have gold alone. Even so here also we have the prapañca, which is not false.²⁶² The distinctions are thus due only to the egoism and the things, as they are viewed by the ordinary people in the world, are brought about only by speech.²⁶³ The saṃsāra is thus a delusion of the individual soul, due to which he sees things, which do not exist and does not see what exists in the prapañca, which is of the nature of Brahman. Puruṣottama gives even a syllogism to prove the reality of the prapañca. Just as the dream world requires the world, which is more real to precede it, even so our vyāvahārika prapañca follows the prapañca, which is relatively more real. The reason given for the premise is the māyikatva or the 'māyikatveṇa abhimatatva'.²⁶⁴

262. Yathā bahusuvāṇāpekṣāyām tatkāryāṇi kṛtākakūṇḍalaghata-
śarāvādīny ānīyaitāveḍ idam suvarṇam iti suvarṇatvenaiva-
tāni grhyante na tu kṛtākādīrūpeṇa iti vikalpabuddher
eva bādho na tu svarūpasyāpīti tādṛśabhānānurodhena api
na mithyātvaṃ prapañcasya siddhyati. T.S.Ab.V.91.p.158.

263. Tena lokapratīyamānarūpeṇa padārthānām vācārāmbhana-
-mātratvaṃ eva. T.S.Ab.V.92.p.159.

264. Vyāvahārikāḥ prapañcāḥ svāpekṣayotkṛtāsattākeprapañce-
pūrvakāḥ. Māyikatvenābhimatatvān māyikatvād vā. Svapnādi-
prapañcavet. S.S.p.351. See also Śrītibhedavāda, vādāvalī,
p.104.

That is why it is said that a Brahmvādin never sees anything bad in the world, because for him everything is of the nature of Brahman.²⁶⁵

The foregoing discussion regarding the distinction between the jagat and the saṁsāra, eloquently speaks of the exact position that the Śuddhādvaita has taken regarding the world. The world can not be accepted as real, as has been done by Rāmānuja; nor can it be regarded as unreal as taught by Śaṅkara. Vallabha therefore tries to make a compromise by stating the reality of the world in its essential nature and distinguishing it from the saṁsāra, which is illusory and unreal. When Puruṣottama postulates another prapañca, which is relatively more real, it may appear that the difference between the Śuddhādvaita and the Kevalādvaita is more of emphasis than of substance. It is interesting to note here that the five pārvans of the avidyā are, ignorance of the real nature and the adhyāsas, both of which are maintained by Śaṅkara. Puruṣottama's opponent appears to be correct in pointing out that in the Śuddhādvaita, the ultimate reality of the world is accepted as of the nature of Brahman, after rejecting the same from the point of view of the world, while in Śaṅkara's system there is the rejection of just the

265. T.S.Ab. V.79.p.133.

ultimate reality of the world as such.²⁶⁶ Can it be said that Vallabha admits the theories of Śaṅkara for all practical purposes and raises a theistic structure upon them, instead of the absolutistic one constructed by Śaṅkara?

(IX).

Theory of causation-Abheda.

After dealing with important points regarding Brahman and the world, together with the individual souls, we shall now turn to the theory of causation as promulgated in the 'Suddhādvaita. The theory of causation assumes primary importance in Indian systems of philosophy because here the thinkers try to show how the world as an effect can be explained from the principle, that they have accepted. While the followers of the Sāṅkhya believe the Prakṛti to be the cause of the universe together with the Puruṣa, who just 'looks' at it, the Vaiśeṣikas are of the opinion that the gross forms of the world are all derived from the

266. Brahmavāde hy advaitārtham jagato jagadrūpeṇa pāramārthika
-satyatām nānāyuktisrutisūtrādibhir nirākṛtya tais
tasya brahmarūpeṇa pāramārthikasatyatā pratipādyā...

Māyāvāde tu jagataḥ pāramārthikasatyatvanirākarāṇa -
mātreṇa... T.S.Ab.V.82.p.140.

conglomeration of the atoms, which constitute the original cause. All the branches of the Vedānta agree that the ultimate cause, the uncaused cause of the world is Brahman, and all except Madhva admit that Brahman is both the material and efficient cause of the world.

The followers of the Sāṅkhya are refuted by saying that the Prakṛti is inert and thus cannot produce the world.²⁶⁷ Puruṣottama says against the Vaiśeṣikas that in the Vedic as well as Purāṇic literature we find that the gross cause gives rise to the subtle effects and not vice versa. This is found in the world also, for the mass of threads, which is gross gives rise to the piece of cloth, cotton which is a mass causes the thin threads.²⁶⁸ We can not therefore admit that the cause is subtle and is thus the atoms. The Buddhistic theory of creation, of that which exists from that which does not exist, is also vehemently rejected. The Buddhists contend that it is from the seed, which is destroyed, that a sprout is caused. Here also

267. A.B.II.ii.1-10.

268. Śraute paurāṇe ca darśane sthūlād eva kāraṇāt sūkṣma -
sya kāryasya vibhāgenādāv utpatteḥ. A.B.P.II.ii.12.

Puruṣottama points out that it is only the gross form of the seed, which is destroyed and not its subtle form which definitely exists.²⁶⁹ The world thus is not *asataḥ sattā-rūpa*, and must have Brahman as its cause.

While the other systems of the Vedānta say that Brahman is the material cause or the *upādāna* of the world, the Śuddhādvaita prefers the term *samavāyikāraṇa* or the inhering cause. Brahman has three aspects, being, sentiency and bliss; and these aspects are found inherent in the inert worldly objects, the individual souls and the Antaryāmins. Thus there is inherence of *sat*, *cit* and *ānanda*. That which is inhered in the other is seen as the latter's essential characteristic, just as a pot shows the essential characteristics of the clay. The whole world, whatever may be the internal differences and distinctions, reveals one common characteristic of being or existence; and we can say that there is inherence or *anvaya* of *sat* in the world.²⁷⁰ As *sat* is of the essential nature of

269. *Evāñ ca āṅkurādāv api bījasthūlānśasyaivopamardo na tu sūkṣmānśasya. Tadantasta eva sūkṣmānśānām āṅkurībhāvāt.* A.B.P.II.iii.26.p.651.

270. *Yo hi yadanvitaḥ sa svasmins tadviṣayām pratītim ādhatte yathā ghaṭādiḥ pṛthivyādipratītim. Tathātra sarvaṁ astītyādipratītijanakatvāt sadādyanvitam.*

A.B.P.I.i.3.p.83.

Brahman, as is the case with cit and ānanda, Brahman is the samavāyikāraṇa or the inhering cause of everything. The Anvaya or samanvaya is the inherence of that, which is neither adventitious nor super-imposed, and that is why the name and form or the illusory experiences are not to be understood as inhered.²⁷¹ That is why the samavāya of the Śuddhādvaita is different from the inseparable conjunction which is called samavāya by the Vaiśeṣikas.

The word Prakṛti stands for the essential nature of the thing and Brahman can just be called Prakṛti in this way; which therefore means the samavāyikāraṇa.²⁷² When we see an earthen pot, we know that it is made of clay and thus all the earthen pots can be known as having the clay as their essential inhering cause, similarly when we decide the aspect of being in one substance, it is known as inhering in all the existing substances and so Brahman, which has sat as its

271. Anāropitānāgantukarūpenānuvṛttir eva samavāyah.

A.B.P.I.i.3.p.90.

272. Prakṛtiśabdaś ca svarūpe rūḍhaḥ mṛtprakṛtir ghataḥ, kārpāsaprakṛtiḥ paṭaḥ ityādiprayogadarśanāt samavāyikāraṇam abhidhatte. A.B.P.I.iv.23.p.530. Puruṣottama further says that the term Prakṛti also stands for the efficient cause, on etymological grounds: Prakṛtā kṛtir yena. A.B.P.I.iv.23.p.530.

aspect, is established as the inhering cause.²⁷³ The term prakṛti thus should not necessarily mean the Pradhāna of the Sāṅkhya because the Pradhāna is not a samavāyin.

It is quite natural that a question will arise as to why the word upādāna, which is used by other systems of the Vedānta, is not found here, while the term samavāya is used instead of it. Puruṣottama says that the word upādāna, which means the material cause, expresses, that which is enveloped by the actions of the agents and which is consequently limited by the same.²⁷⁴ The upādāna is only a specific state of the samavāyīn. It is that aspect of the earth alone, which in the form of a lump of clay or threads, limited and worked upon in the process of production, that can be called the material cause or the upādāna for the production of a jar or a piece of cloth. So only the

273. Yathā hyeksmīn mṛtpinde mṛdvikāratvanīścayottaram
 sarvasmīn tatsajātīye tathā jñānāṃ mṛttikāyām tat-
 -samavāyitvajñānam tādṛśaikadeśapratyakṣād eva bhavati...
 tathā prakṛte'py ekatra sammayatve nīścite sarveṣu
 tatsajātīyeṣu sadvikāratvajñānāt sati sarvasamavāyi-
 tvajñānam tādṛśapratyakṣād eva bhavatīti sati samavāyi-
 tvasiddhiḥ. A.B.P.I. iv. 23. p. 531.

274. Loke upādānapadena kartrīkriyayā vyāptasya pericchinna-
 -syaiivābhidhānadarśanāt. A.B.P.I. i. 3. p. 118.

Highest Lord who is not changed or worked upon is the samavāyin of the world by just one of his aspects.²⁷⁵ The reason thus for the preference of the term samavāyin to the term upādāna lies in the adherence of the thinkers of Pure Monism in the avikṛtapariṇāmavāda, as different from the generally accepted parināmavāda or vivartavāda.

Upādāna, says Puruṣottama, is twofold, parināmin and vivarta. The first is defined as the transformation of the Upādāna, the transformation having an equal degree of existence.²⁷⁶ The vivarta on the other hand is the transformation, which has not an equal degree of existence with the upādāna.²⁷⁷ The parināma can further be understood as either vikṛta or involving change or modification, or avikṛta, i.e. that which does ^{not} involve any such change. The former is illustrated in the manufacture of a pot from the clay, while the shaping of different ornaments of Gold is an example of the latter. In our ordinary affairs of the world,

275. Upādānam tu samavāyina evāvasthāviśeṣaḥ. Paricchānnasya
karṭṛkriyayā vyāptasyaiva mrtpiṇḍasūtrādirūpasya
prṛthivyambāsyaiva ghaṭapatādyupādānatvaḥ saṁśanāt...
Ata eva bhagavān avikṛta eva jagata ekāṁśena samavāyī.

Pr.p.31.

276. Parināmaś ca upādānasamasattako'nyathābhāvaḥ. Pr.p.31.

277. Upādānasya viśamasattako'nyathābhāvo vivartaḥ.

Pr.p.32.

the efficient and the instrumental causes are different from the material cause. Pūruṣottama does not think it necessary to believe in the asamavāyikāraṇa, which is explained by the vaiśeṣikas to be the conjunction of the different constituents like the threads in the production of a piece of cloth. It may be included in the kāraṇasāmagri.

The followers of the Śuddhādvaita admit the avikṛta-pariṇāma-vāda in which the cause, even though transformed into the effects, retains its essential nature and does not undergo any basic or substantial modification. When milk is transformed into curds, it can not be used as milk and becomes curds only. We can not prepare tea with it. When however ornaments are made of gold, we can use all of them as gold and the gold remains gold even though the distinction between the golden ornaments and gold is of the different shape and different names. They are not different substances. ²⁷⁸

The avikṛtapariṇāma-vāda of Vallabha cannot be understood properly without the āvirbhāva-tirobhāva-vāda, which is one of the most important theories of the Śuddhādvaita.

278. tathā bahusuvāṇāṅkāśāyāṁ kṛtākakūṇḍalakalāśabhrāṅgāre-
divyaktyanādaṛas tathā... Etenākārādibhedakṛte eva tat-
-tallaukikavaidikavyavahārabhedo na vastubhedakṛtaḥ.

A.B.P.I.iv.23.p.535.

In fact Puruṣottama explains causality itself as the basis of the power of manifestation.²⁷⁹ The āvirbhava and tirobhāva can be explained as manifestation and concealment respectively. The āvirbhāva can be understood as the power of the cause, which reveals outside the latent effect, which already exists in the cause; the tirobhāva is that capacity which conceals the effect which exists outside.²⁸⁰ The terms may be understood simply also as āvirbhavana and tirobhavana thus meaning just manifestation and concealment.²⁸¹ Viṭṭhaleśa in his Vidvan-
-maṇḍana explains āvirbhāva as being fit to be an object of experience²⁸² and tirobhāva as being not fit to be an object of experience.²⁸³ Both āvirbhāva and tirobhāva are powers of the lord. Puruṣottama also discusses as to whether any such powers or powers are necessary in the cause. When a certain effect is produced from a certain cause or a particular set

279. Kāraṇatvam cāvirbhāvakaśaktyādhāratvam. Pr. p. 26,

280. Āviḥ prakāṣaṁ bhāvayati upādānantahsthaṁ kāryaṁ bahiḥ prakāṣaṁ karoti yā nimittagatā upādānagatā ca śaktiḥ sā āvirbhāvaśabdavācya. Evam tīraḥ aprakāṣaṁ bhāvayati bahiḥsthaṁ kāryaṁ upādānantah sthāpayati yā śaktir nāśaka-gatā sā tirobhāvaśabdavācya. Āvirbhāvatirobhāvavāda.

Vādāvalī. p. 191.

281. Āvirbhāvatirobhāvavāda. Vādāvalī. p. 191.

282. Anubhava viśaya tvayogyatā. V. M. p. 86.

283. Tada viśaya tvayogyatā. V. M. p. 85. See also the explanation in S. S. and Pr. p. 26. ff.

of causes, we should accept the power of that cause or causes to produce that particular effect. This power can not be understood as the nature or the essence of the cause, for neither the nature (svabhāva) nor the essence (svarūpa) can be avoided and so if we were to understand the productive capacity as either of them, we must admit the production of a piece of cloth from the threads, which are torn to tatters or that of a sprout from a seed which is burnt. We should thus accept the power of production as different from the essential nature of the cause and also as liable to obstruction or destruction by an external element.²⁸⁴ Those powers of production and its opposite can be respectively called āvirbhāva and tirobhāva. The whole process of causation has to be explained in terms of these two powers with which the Highest Lord is endowed. Even the six modifications of becoming (Bhāva^avikāras) as stated by Vātsyāyana in Nirukta²⁸⁵ can be understood in connection with these two. 'Is being produced' (jāyate) is related to revelation alone, so also 'is' (asti) is so related because of the ~~the~~ inherence of the aspect of being. 'Is being transformed', 'grows' and 'waness' (Viparinamate, vardhate and apakṣīyate) are connected with both

284. T. Sn. Ab. V. 140. p. 113. Also Cf. Āvirbhāvatirobhāvavāda.

Vādāvalī. p. 185. ff.

285. Nirukta. I. 2.

manifestation and concealment, while 'is being destroyed'²⁸⁶
(naśyati) is connected with concealment alone.

The effect thus is only a manifestation of the cause, or in other words, the effect is just a manifested state of the cause. This being the case, there is essentially non-difference between the cause and the effect.²⁸⁷ As everything is caused by Brahman, everything is Brahman. Brahman is revealed in the world by its aspect of sat, in the individual souls by its aspect of cit and in the Antaryāmins by its aspect of ānanda. That is why Brahman is described as devoid of any dualism, either with those who are of the same type or with those who are not of the same type or with those who are in it.²⁸⁸ The individual souls, which are sentient and eternal, have a similarity ~~in~~ nature ~~nature~~ with Brahman and are thus sa-jātiya. The sa-jātiyadvaita is illustrated by Puruṣottama as existing in the two different bulls. The inanimate objects are vi-jātiya because of inertia and transiency; and the difference would be just like that between a pot and a piece of cloth. The Antaryāmins are svagata, because all the aspects of sat, cit and ānanda are manifested in them but they are

286. S.S. pp. 350-351.

287. A.B.P.I. iv. 23. p. 534.

288. Sa-jātiyavi-jātiyasvagatadvaitavərjitaṃ. T.S.v. 60. p. 113.

limited and are capable only of limited and defined action; the illustration given here is that of the flowers and the tree.²⁸⁹ Brahman has none of these distinctions, as it is inherent in all the three by its various aspects.

Causation, says Puruṣottama, can be understood on two grounds, anvaya and vyatireka. They may be explained as meaning the invariable existence of the cause when the effect exists, and the invariable absence of the effect in the absence of the cause, thus implying a relation of invariable concomitance between the cause and the effect. Anvaya may also be taken to mean the inherence of the aspects of the cause in the effect and vyatireka may be understood as the existence of the cause over and above the effect.²⁹⁰ While the first explanation of the terms and the second explanation of anvaya leads to the theory of identity, the second explanation of vyatireka is important from another point of view. It shows that in the system of Vallabha God is not wholly transformed into the world and even though it is revealed variously by its aspects

289. T. S. Ab. V. 60. p. 113.

290. Kāraṇatāgrāhakau cānvayaḥvyatirekau. Tau ca dvividhau. Svasvavyāpyetarayāvatkāraṇasattve yatsattve'vaśyam yatsattvam anvayaḥ. Yādabhāve'vaśyam yādabhāvo vyatirekaḥ... Anvayanam anvayaḥ.... Kāryeṇa saha tadavayavādirūpeṇā-vasthānam. Viśeṣeṇātirecanam vyatirekaḥ. Kāryātirekenā-vasthānam. Pr. p. 52.

it remains over and above the world. God is thus in the world and yet transcends the same. This is meant by *vystireka, i/e. viśeṣeṇa atirecena.*

How can non-difference or identity be explained in the 'Suddhādvaita? We have seen that in the 'Suddhādvaita, Brahman inheres in the effects, or is revealed in the effects and the effects are only condition of the cause. Essentially therefore the effect is one with the cause, just as the golden ornaments are one with gold. Brahman is transformed in the effects without undergoing any change or modification. All this can be accepted. But even then there are two important points, which requires explanation. As we have seen above the problem before a philosopher is not merely to show the essential identity of the world with Brahman, but to explain the world as it is seen and experienced by us in its relation to Brahman. Secondly, even in accepting the essential identity and in accepting the difference only of name and form, that name and form which is surely a change or modification, if admitted as real and not *mithyā*, should be explained in the light of the monistic doctrine, that has been propounded.

As we have discussed in the previous section about the jagat vis-a-vis the *samsāra*, jagat is real only as a manifestation

of Brahman and not as the world, which is separated and different from Brahman. In that case the reality, of the jagat as jagat, can not be admitted. Puruṣottama says the same thing when he points out that the various forms, as seen in the world, are only for the worldly dealings. So the reality of the world can not be maintained in the limited and defined form, in which it exists, but from the point of view of reality the world is non-existent.²⁹¹ The illustrations which are given by Puruṣottama to prove the abheda, are still more pointed. The form of a pot may be different from that of clay, but it does not mean that the pot as a substance is distinct from the clay. A man who is sleeping or standing or sitting or walking may have different postures, but the man remains the same.²⁹² We may thus consider the distinctions as immaterial, but are they real? While refuting the dualistic theories, Puruṣottama says that they are

291. Teṣāṃ rūpāṇāṃ vyavahāramātrārthatvād ity artāhaḥ. Etena
 siddhānte pratiniyatarūpeṇa jagataḥ satyatvābhāvo, na
 tu satyatvena rūpeṇa jagadabhāva iti bodhitam. A.B.P.I.iv.23.
 p.536.

292. Yo vikāraḥ prthubudhnodarādīḥ sa vācārambheṇa vācika-
 kriyātmako na tu kāraṇād vyaktibhedāpādakaḥ. Yathā supte
 utthite upaviṣṭe ca puruṣe' vyavavinyāsabhedo' to nāma-
 -dheyam ūmīttikakriyāyāḥ padārthasvarūpabhedānāpādaka-
 -tvāt nāmaiva. Tathā cētra kāraṇāvasthātmaneivaika rūpya-
 -sya vivakṣitatvād vyaktibhedānādāra eva.

only due to the ego and are unreal.²⁹³ The distinctions even between things like a pot and a piece of cloth are only mundane and hence unreal.²⁹⁴ Rāmānuja attacks the theory of Ātmasvarūpa-parināmanavāda on the same ground of distinctions. If we believe in both the enjoyer and the objects of enjoyment as the transformations of the essential nature of God, how can there be distinction between them? Puruṣottama replies by restating his theory of Pure Monism on the scriptural grounds and says that the svabhāva-vibhāga is seen even in the world on account of the disintegration of powers. (Śaktiviśleṣa) This is like a tree, in which the leaves, flowers, fruits and roots-everything is mutually different, but all of them have the unity with the seed so far as their nature (svabhāva) is concerned.²⁹⁵ We have however seen that the distinctions are only due to the ego and are therefore unreal. Is this the same as Vivartavāda? When Śaṅkara says that the world is unreal, he rejects the reality of the world, as we see it. If that is vivartavāda, it may appear that it is accepted by the propounders of the Buddhādvaita also. Puruṣottama in fact admits this and says that from the point of

293. Abhimānamātram eva bhedo na tu vāstavaḥ. T.S.Ab.V.92.p.159.

294. Chetapatesthale tu vyāvahārikopādānakṛto bheda ity

evāstavaḥ. T.S.Ab.V.92.p.158.

295. A.B.P.II.i.13.p.573.

view of the world he accepts vivartavāda, while from the point of view of Brahman he believes in Parināmavāda.²⁹⁶

Admitting that there is Parināmavāda from the point of view of Brahman, what about the vikāras? We may say that the vikāras or modifications are unreal, but if we want to maintain the reality of the world, even in its essential form, we must admit at least one kind of change. The jagat is the effect form of Brahman, in which only one of the three aspects is revealed and the other two are concealed. Similarly the individual souls are an effect, with two aspects revealed and only one concealed. Thus there remains a subtle distinction between the cause and the effect, that is between the cause with all the aspects fully manifested and the cause with the manifestation of one or two aspects. Thus a change in the state of the cause can not be refused on any ground. The opponent of Puruṣottama correctly points out that even in the Avikṛtaparināmavāda, the change of the avasthā (pūrvāvasthā-anyathābhāvarūpa-vikāra) remains.

Puruṣottama says that the change in the state of the cause is not equal to the change in the substance and therefore there

296. *Evam ca antarāsṛṣṭim prati vivartopādēnatvam ātmasṛṣṭim prati parināmyupādēnatvam brahmaṇa iti niścayaḥ.*

is no harm in admitting it.²⁹⁷ At another place when the theory of Bhāskara is severely criticised by Vācaspati Miśra, Puruṣottama defends Bhāskara by pointing out that the difference between the two ornaments of gold, is due to the difference between their respective conditions. Thus that, which is conditioned, is different as well as non-different from that which conditions, according as we look to them from the point of view of the different conditions or of the oneness of the substance. Thus non-difference does not necessarily mean oneness, and the bheda can be admitted together with the abheda.²⁹⁸ Thus the unity of the cause and the effect is tolerant of the difference and this is Tādātmya.²⁹⁹ The bheda which is thus accepted is due to the desire of God.³⁰⁰ The powers of āvirbhāva and tirobhāva should also be understood on the basis of the

297. Tathā ca dadhidugdhanyāyena svarūpasya gandhādiguṇānām cānyathābhāva evātrāgrāhyavikāratvenābhipreyaṭe, na tu saṅkhyānyathābhāvo'pi tathātveneti kāryaśrutyanurodhādāṅgīkriyate. A.B.P.I.iv.23.p.539.

298. A.B.P.I.i.3.pp.92-95. See also Bhedaābheda svarūpanirṇaya. Vādāvalī.

299. Bhedaśhiṣṇur abhedaś tādātmyam. S.S.p.149.

300. Bhedaśhiṣṇutā ca bahu syām prajāyeya itīcchāyām tad-vyāpārebhūtaśaktivibhāgena. Pr.p.29.

desire of God.³⁰¹ That is why Puruṣottama says that in the Śuddhādvaita the samavāya is not different from tādātmya and the samavāyikāraṇa is that cause, the effect of which is produced depending upon the cause in the relationship of tādātmya.³⁰² Thus we may say that the Śuddha-advaita is the same as Aicchika-bheda-abheda.

(X).

Sādhanaś and Phala.

At the very outset it is necessary to make one point clear, so far as this section is concerned. In the beginning of this chapter we have shown that Puruṣottama's contribution to the Śuddhādvaita is mainly on the philosophical side of the system. Though Puruṣottama has commented upon and independently written certain tracts dealing with the practical side of the system, such as the belief in devotion as the highest means of liberation, or the divisions of puṣṭi, pravāha and maryādā,

301. Evam saty asmin kale'smin deśe idam kāryam evam bhavaty itīcchāviśeṣyatvam āvirbhāvah, tadā tetra tathā tan mā bhavaty itīcchāviśeṣyatvam tirobhāvah. S.S. pp. 115-116.

302. Tetra tādātmyasambandhena yadāśrayam kāryam bhavati tat samavāyikāraṇam. Pr.p. 27. also: Ato na samavāyas tādātmya-tiriktah. Pr.p. 29. also: Yedyapi siddhānte samavāyo nātirike-tes tathāpi tādātmyasyaiva nāmāntaram tad. T.S. Ab.V. 27. pp. 68-69.

or the desirability of renunciation, etc., If however one wants to get a complete picture of these teachings, one should read the works of Gokulanātha and Harirāya rather than those of Puruṣottama. In this section therefore, we have not treated the topics of sādhanas and phala fully, but we have tried to give only those points which deserve special notice in our study of Puruṣottama.

Mokṣa according to the abstract speculations of the idealists of some of the Upaniṣads and according to Śaṅkara is the liberation from all the evils and miseries of the world. That the world is a venue of woe has been accepted by almost all the religious teachers and philosophers. Hence emancipation is definitely devoid of miseries. But is it full of joy also? Happiness and misery are relative terms and so, as argued by the absolutists like Śaṅkara, if we accept happiness or joy in the liberated state, the unhappiness will also be admitted from the backdoor. Hence mokṣa should be understood as total absence of miseries (Atyanta-duḥkha-abhāva). Naturally this could not appeal to the people at large. It is not enough that liberation is just an absence of unhappiness. This is only a negative aspect. There must be something positive also, so as to give

solace to the suffering mortals. Puruṣottama rejects the idea of relativity and says that there is full bliss and bliss alone in the state of mokṣa. Brahman is ānandamaya because of the ānandaprācurya. When we say that the sun is full of light or that the summer days are full of heat or that the monsoon nights are completely dark, the opposites of light, heat and darkness are respectively sublated by perceptual experience and cannot be understood as existing even in a minimum degree.³⁰³ Brahman is thus full of bliss and there is not an iota of its opposite in it. Even so liberation is also full of joy and not mere negation of miseries.

Can God be obtained? If ^{we} just argue that the attainment of anything can be accomplished only when that thing is different from one who obtains it, and that the relationship between the limited jīva and unlimited God is that of oneness, who is to be obtained by whom? That is why Śaṅkara says that mokṣa cannot be obtained, it is.³⁰⁴

303. Loke'pi pracuraṣṭaṁ prakāśaṁ savitā prabhūtesantāpo nidā-
-gha-divaso'nāhakarāmayī varṣāvibhavarī bahudhano
vaiśravaṇa ityēdivēkyāśravaṇa pratiyoginām tamaḥśaitya-
prakāśedāridryāṇāṁ pratyakṣato bādhena tatra tadālpa-
-tvaśaṅkāyāṁ anudayāt. A.B.P.I.i.12.p.198.

304. Cf. Śaṅkara-bhāṣya.I.i.4, II.i.14.

This however is not the position, that can be accepted by the followers of the Śuddhādvaita. If God is not to be obtained, nothing is to be done for it, then what is the use of all the talk of devotion and discipline? Puruṣottama says that the attainment is possible owing to the āvirbhāva-tirobhāva, depending upon the will of God. As regards the oneness or non-difference between the two, it is the individual soul, who is one with Brahman and not vice versa; and so the non-difference does not come in the way of prāpti.³⁰⁵

The attainment of the Highest Lord means the Sarvātma-bhāva or the Brahmabhāva with the realization of the presence of Brahman everywhere. It is explained by Puruṣottama as the flashing of Brahman preceeded by the revelation of the attributes of Brahman.³⁰⁶ The highest kind of liberation however is the sāyujya, which is the result of the Puṣṭi-bhakti. Puruṣottama gives an etymological explanation of sāyujya as conjunction.³⁰⁷ It is

305. Ananyatvam tu suvarṇaśakalanyāyena brahmaṇaḥ sakāśāṁ jīvasya na tu jīvasya sakāśād brahmaṇaḥ iti tasyāpi prāptipratibandhakatvābhāvāt. A.B.P.I.i.11.pp.178-179.

306. Brahmabhāvaś ca svesmin brahmadharmāvirbhāvapūrvaka-brahmasphurtirūpa eva. A.B.P.I.i.29.p.263.

307. Saha yunaktīti sayuk, tadbhāvaḥ sāyujyam iti yogah.

T.S.Ab.V.13.p.48.

the eternal enjoyment in the company of Kṛṣṇa.

God, according to the Śuddhādvaita, is not only Sādhya-rūpa but even Sādhana-rūpa; even the means for his realization are of the essential nature of God. They are also the aspects of God. Puruṣottama says this on the strength of the Puruṣasūkta and the explanation of it in the second book of the Bhāgavata.³⁰⁸

The Upāsanās, given in the latter part of the Vedic literature, are not for the purification of the mind, as has been made out by Śaṅkara and his followers. These meditations on the other hand, inform us of the greatness of God and thus pave the way for devotion.³⁰⁹ Once the Brahmaneness (Brahmatva) is established there is not much of distinction between knowledge and meditation, because either of them is brought about by experience and both require a common mental faculty. The difference may however be found out by pointing out that meditations

308. T. Sr. Ab. V. 3. p. 5.

309. Udgīthēdisūryādyupāsanāyā tattatprekṛaṇoktam
phalam tena tenopāsyena dīyate. Teṣāṃ ca pratīkatve-
na tatkr̥taphaladānān mūlarūpamāhātmyam eva prati-
pāditam bhavati. Jñāte ca māhātmye tatra bhaktiḥ.

T. S. Ab. V. 12. p. 45.

require the superimposition of the attributes of one upon something else. Even if we accept it, the superimposition is always of the attributes of the superior upon the inferior and not vice versa. The attributes of the cause are superimposed upon the effect. Once this is conceded, even though knowledge and meditation may be distinguished with regard to their forms, it should be accepted that both lead to the same result. There is thus no difference between the two in their capacity to produce the result. ³¹⁰

As regards the three paths of action, knowledge and devotion, the Śuddhādvaita position is that of maintaining the superiority of devotion to the other two. Vallabha and his followers have given many arguments in their support. The path of knowledge leads to the *saṁyama* mukti, while that of devotion to the *nirguṇa* mokṣa. Knowledge, says Puruṣottama, presupposes the existence of the quality of *saṁyama* in the seeker of salvation and so the liberation that results cannot be without it; the *nirguṇa* mukti can result only by means of *bhakti*. ³¹¹

After Vallabha, Puruṣottama enters into the discussion of the term *Bhakti*. The base (*prakṛti*) and the affix (*Pratyaya*)

310. A. B. P. I. i. 20. p. 232.

311. T. S. Ab. V. 14. p. 51.

express the sense when combined; out of these two, the affix is principal. Here the affix, which is capable of connoting the general meaning of the root, mainly expresses the devotional action (bhajanekriyā), when joined with the root bhaj. That action is of the nature of service or sevā. The term sevā, as found in usages like strīsevā, auśadhasevā, etc. has a conventional meaning of a specific bodily activity preceded by either constancy or continuity. As this would imply some unhappiness due to the strain, that the body undergoes, it can not be called a puruṣārtha, for which one should try. Service should therefore be preceded by love. Thus the principal connotation of the affix is 'love' and the bodily efforts which are subordinate, are meant by the base. So the combination of the base and the affix means premasevā.³¹²

Love or sneha is explained as a specific attribute of the self or the mind, and is not a desire, or knowledge or efforts.³¹³ Bhakti is a rasa and this love to the object of devotion should not be understood as ordinary erotic sentiment, which is just an appearance of the love to God and is thus far inferior to it. That is why Puruṣottama after

312. T. Sn. Ab. V. 92. p. 75.

313. Snehaḥ cātmano manaso vā yogyo dharmaviśeṣaḥ. S. S. p. 7.

Vallabha takes pains to teach sense-control as an essential prerequisite of a seeker of God.³¹⁴

A very important contribution, that the Śuddhādvaita has made to Indian religious thought, is the Puṣṭimārga. The distinction between the Puṣṭi and the Maryādā has been given in detail by almost all the scholars of the Śuddhādvaita including Puruṣottama.³¹⁵ The Puṣṭimārga depends solely upon the Grace of the Lord.³¹⁶ The Grace of the Lord (Anugraha) is a separate attribute. It is not just the desire to give fruit, nor the desire or effort to ward off the miseries of others. It does not mean knowledge either. It paves the way to the desire of the Lord to give fruit or His acceptance, and is the cause of devotion.³¹⁷

(XI).

Conclusion.

We have in the foregoing pages discussed the important tenets of the Śuddhādvaita, as expounded by Puruṣottama following Vallabha and Viṭṭhaleśa. While the system, as

314. T. Sn. Ab. V. 238. pp. 184-186.

315. See Puṣṭi-pravāha-maryādā, with various commentaries.

316. Poṣaṇam tadānugraheḥ. Bhāgavata. II. x. 4.

317. Tasmāt svīkāraphale dītsā prayojakam kṛpāparaparyāyam dharmāntaram eva... Sā ca bhaktyupadeśasyeva bhakter api kēraṇam. Puruṣottama's commentary on the Puṣṭi-pravāha-maryādā. V. 2.

explained by Puruṣottama is not and cannot be different from that taught by Vallabha, there is a clear difference in the approach of the two. As we have already stated, Vallabha's laconic style and interpretative method left very much to be understood and assumed. A clear exposition of the *Suddhādvaita* was badly needed and it was supplied by Puruṣottama. Puruṣottama however gives not just an exposition, but an analysis and a comparative study, thus arriving at some very important conclusions, which we have attempted to present in this chapter.

For understanding these conclusions better, we should see the whole course that Indian Philosophy has taken in the course of centuries. While the Upaniṣads gave various thoughts in various ways, the trend of abstraction and negation was taken up by the Buddhist idealists, who taught the *Vijñānavāda* and the *Sūnyavāda*. Śaṅkarācārya gave a positive shape to that trend by postulating the pure being and advocating the unreality of the world in its ultimate sense. Śaṅkara was the master of strictest logic and so attributed all the relationship to *Māyā*; he frankly admits that it is all inexplicable. Even though Śaṅkara has vehemently denounced the Buddhist theories,

he has equally vehemently repudiated the dualism of the Sāṅkhya or the atomic pluralism of the Vaiśeṣika. For him Monism can not be compromised in any way with dualism or pluralism. This however gave a severe blow to all that was emotional and religious, for religion wants heart more than head. Again the political enslavement of the Hindus required something, upon which they could fall back and from which they could get solace. This led to the reinforcement of the cult of devotion, which was already popularised by a host of Ālvārs. Attempts were made to bring in this popular element into the Vedānta. This however wanted a clear recognition of the reality, the ultimate reality of the dual, the devotee and God. People were unable to stand the devastating doctrine of the falsity of the world. Monism had to be compromised with dualism. Rāmānuja qualified it, Medhva accepted dualism alone, Bhāskara and Nimbārka ~~then~~ tried to combine the two. Rāmānuja and Nimbārka lean more towards dualism. Vallabha was convinced that the teaching of the Upaniṣads and the Brahmasūtras is definitely of Monism; but he was an equally ardent devotee and Vaiṣṇava. He thereupon promulgated the theory of Pure Monism and retained the individuality of the

jīvas and the reality of the world. How can this be possible? Puruṣottama's analysis leads him to the theory of Tādātmya. He finds that if the reality of the world, even as a revelation of one of the aspects of God, is to be retained, the bheda will have to be tolerated. Abheda is here not the outright rejection of the bheda; it allows the aicchika bheda. The Tādātmya ^are~~l~~ation subsists between Brahman and its dharma, Brahman and the jīvas, Brahman and the world. This is where Puruṣottama ²ar~~r~~ives. Puruṣottama is credited with this exposition by no less an authority than Giridhara. 318

Viewed in the light of the above remarks, it will be clear that the Śuddhādvaita has tried to teach Monism without sacrificing the interest of the cult of bhakti. It is more advaitic than the systems of Rāmānuja, Bhāskara, or Nimbārka, and is more positive, if not dualistic, than that of Śaṅkara. The Śuddhādvaita should therefore be called 'Positive Idealism'.

318. Bhedābheda pratītiḥ tu madhyamānām prakīrtitā,
 Ato ^{hi} madhyamaḥ pakṣaḥ Śuddhādvaitānurodhetā.
 Bodhāya bahusandarbhe Gosvāmapuruṣottamāiḥ,
 Śrīmadēcāryacarāṇair yatre kuṭrāpi darśitā.
 Śuddhādvaitamārtanda. V. 34-36. Appendix. ~~to~~ 'Śuddhādvaita-
 siddhānta pradīpa. p. 226.

CHAPTER.VI.

" EVALUATION "

(I).

Introductory.

We have seen in the foregoing chapters the contents of Purusottama's works, his dialectics and interpretations and his exposition of the Suddhādvaita, which has been explained in his voluminous commentaries and more than a score of independent works. The work of an author can however best be appreciated, if we try to understand him and the ideas that he put forth in relation to the time and tradition to which he belonged. We have already seen in the first chapter that Purusottama was born, when India witnessed feuds and strifes from all the quarters. Though India was a dreamland of gold in the eyes of foreigners, there was no political stability and the strong regime of the Moghuls was defied from various quarters. A dark age was looming large over the head of Indians, forboding the grim picture of petty strifes of small principalities. The conditions were almost on the verge of being chaotic. Fear and distrust took the place of peace and stability and

inspite of the glory of wealth, there was utter poverty of prosperity and welfare. The Hindu society remained a hetegogenous mess of a variety of people having a variety of beliefs. There were too many religious beliefs and Hinduism was manifold and yet getting more and more conservative. There were many thinkers, scholars, authors and saints, all struggling to do something and the common man was led to and frc by the conflicting views, which he could not and therefore did not care to understand. It was this age which produced Purusottama.

We have to study the aims and achievements of this great scholar, who wrote and discussed and taught throughout the large span of his life. How was he looked upon by his own people? What did he think about them? How could he influence them? What did he contribute to the Sampradāya? What can possibly be his place in the history of the Sampradāya in particular and of Indian thought in general? All these questions remain to be answered. We have tried in the following pages to give an evaluation from this point of view. We have at our disposal no factual history of the

Sampradāya, how it was moulded and how it suffered the ups and downs in its chequered career of about five hundred years. We have to depend upon the references in his works, the references which are rare and at times not conclusive either. We have also at our disposal some hear-says and traditions.

(II).

Purusottama and the Sampradāya.

While we have no means to know the relations of Purusottama with other Goswāmīs of his time, there is every reason to believe that his relations with at least some of them appear to be anything but cordial. Certain charges were levelled against him, we do not know by whom nor do we know whether they were levelled in his own time or after his death, though the later seems to be more probable. This great scholar is said to have been jeered at as 'Vedapaśu' by his contemporaries. Further a more serious charge against him is that with all his efforts to explain the principles of the Śuddhādvaita, Purusottama is said to have advocated

the 'Apasiddhāntas' or wrong theories.¹

There are three hearsays which go against him. We have referred to all of them while dealing with Puruṣottama's life. It is said that Puruṣottama brought the image of Bālakṛṣṇa to Surat, hiding it in the locks of his hair. The other two have something to do with his relations with Harirāya. One is that of Harirāya's ordering him to take off the footwear from the feet of Śrīnāthajī and the other is that of the explanation of one passage in the Subodhinī to Puruṣottama by an old lady, who just heard the explanation given by Harirāya.

The first of these ^{or}hearsays is nothing but a myth, because the idol of Bālakṛṣṇa was brought to Surat by Vrajerāya, who came to possess the same as a result of the distribution of the images. We have detailed the whole incident in chapter II above. The fact however that such a fiction has been woven round the name of Puruṣottama shows that attempts were made in the Saṃpradāya to portray him in not a very good light. The attempts appear to have been made deliberately

1. Avatārevādāvalī. Hindi. Intro. p.6.

because it is difficult to find out any basis for the currency of such a tradition. The two hearsays relating Puruṣottama's inferiority to Harirāya were current among the followers of the latter. The historicity of both the stories is seriously questionable. The impression that we get of Puruṣottama from his works ~~is~~ is that he was not only a very great scholar, but also very exact and fastidious. How is it possible that he might have committed such a breach of discipline, when he was himself so very particular about everything? Even if we admit that Puruṣottama was a young enthusiast, when he went to the temple of Śrīnāthaji and hence he might have done this, the second story is still more unacceptable, looking to the deep and penetrating in-sight that his works show. It is too much to assume that Puruṣottama could understand ~~the~~ the meaning of a passage from one who heard it from Harirāya. On the other hand it is very likely that both these stories have been made out by the followers of Harirāya to prove the superiority of their old teacher over this young man. Was there some sort of rivalry between these two great ~~men~~ of the system? Harirāya was much older than Puruṣottama and it is not likely that he might have

considered this youth as his rival. If at all there was a rivalry, it probably existed in the minds of the followers of Harirāya. But there surely was a difference in the thoughts and treatment of these two and both have played their parts differently in the history of the Sampradāya.

Harirāya can best be compared with Gokulanātha and Viṭṭhaleśa. He was a devotee and his mission was to explain the path of devotion to the masses. His works are mainly short tracts and most of them are on the Subodhinī. He taught more of Kṛṣṇa and his Līlā, Puṣṭi and Māyādā rather than Brahman and its attributes or the theory of causation. Puruṣottama on the other hand discussed and debated the principles of the Suddhādvaita philosophy. He was a scholar par excellence and he considered it his duty to explain the theories taught by Vallabha by argumentation and analysis. The works of Harirāya do not reveal the scholarship, that is seen in the works of Puruṣottama. Puruṣottama on his part appears to lack that emotion and spiritual experience of a devotee. Though he was sincere in his devotion, the emotional side of a devotee was burnt in the white heat of his

intellectual feats. Harirāya was a mystic, a follower of the Prameya Mārga, while Puruṣottama was rational and leaning towards the Pramāṇa Mārga. Is it likely that the followers of Harirāya, who did not find that brilliance of erudition in their own teacher, thought it proper to circulate such stories which would glorify Harirāya at the cost of Puruṣotta^{ma}~~ra~~?

And what did Puruṣottama himself think of the Sampradāya as it was before him? Puruṣottama was bold enough to assert that the Sampradāya was Nivṛtta. It was due to the grace of Lord Balakṛṣṇa who inspired his mind that he could know the meaning of Anubhāsyā. ² The ^{verse} ~~works~~ at the end of the Anubhāsyā-Prakāśa clearly shows that while Vallabha and after him Viṭṭhaleśa wrote certain works, their followers did not care~~d~~ to understand them much less to explain them. Vallabha preach-
-ed his theories but he called himself Vallabha Dīkṣita and not Vallabha-Ācārya. Viṭṭhaleśa was mainly responsible for the establishment of the Śuddhādvaita as a system. While he completed the works, which his father left incomplete, and wrote

2. Kṛīḍan śrī Bālakṛṣṇaḥ paramakarunayā manmanah prerayitvā,
Dhāsyārtham yo' tigūḍham prakāṣitam akarot sampradāya

Nivṛtte.

Concluding V.1.A.B.P.p.1441.

some independent works also, he did not devote his time so much to the writing of works, as to the propagation and systematisation of the Śuddhādvaita as a Samprayadāya, which could open its doors even to the ignorant masses. The worship of the idol of God came to be a full-fledged affair.

Even Viṭṭhaleśa in his works gave much more importance to the practical rather than the theoretical side. He was followed by Gokulanātha, Kalyāṇaraya, Harirāya, and many others who taught, talked and wrote of the līlā of the Lord. It was the age of intense intellectual activity in India and scores of scholars came out to support and demolish various theories. Puruṣottama could see that whatever might have been the effect of the Sāmpṛadāyic teaching on the masses, it was necessary to face the scholars on equal ground; if at all the Śuddhādvaita as a system wanted to survive. Puruṣottama could further see that many important points were left ~~at~~ obscure by Vallabha and that blissful obscurity was kept intact by his descendants. The task before Puruṣottama was thus not only to comment upon the works of Vallabha and Viṭṭhaleśa but also to explain, analyse and find out the exact significance of many of the theories taught by Vallabha,

with a comparative study of the theories of others. The greatest contribution of Puruṣottama to the Sampradāya is this: He explained the doctrines and what is more he put the whole system on a dialectical basis, so that the opponents could be met on their ^w~~own~~ grounds. In doing so he had to be an argumen~~tator~~ and could not afford to go on talking about the hal~~ls~~ of Heaven. Even while commenting upon the sixteen~~th~~ tracts, Puruṣottama has this very approach and this perhaps earned for him the honorific title of 'Vedapaśu', because naturally none would have liked the bold statement 'Sampradāye nivṛtte'. The charge of Puruṣottama's having taught the apasiddhāntas is very serious indeed, but curiously none has said what apasiddhānta has been taught by him and how. We have in the preceding chapter given in detail the Śuddhādvaita doctrines as expounded by Puruṣottama and we have found that Puruṣottama arrives at the belief in Tādātmya: 'Bhedasahisṇur abhedah.' as the teaching of Vallabha. But this is a natural corollary to which any student of Vallabha would be driven and there is nothing wrong in it. Or is it that it is all miraculous and one should not even try to understand it? Puruṣottama never refutes Vallabha or

Vitthaleśa, he never goes against them at any point while writing; not only so but he defends them even though at times he appears to be defending what can not be defended.

We have referred above in Chapter V. to the statement of Giridhara, who says that the understanding of pure monism is the best, while the Bhedābheda is understood by the madhyama. Puruṣottama has mainly taught the Madhyama Pakṣa, while it has been shown at places by Vallabha.³ Can this be taken as a clue to the said charge of apasiddhānta? Any way there is no apasiddhānta in what Puruṣottama has taught. If Vallabha's philosophical teaching is to be understood from the point of view of reason, the Śuddha-advaita is nothing more, nor anything less than Tādātmya.

Puruṣottama very often does not subscribe to the traditional line adopted by his predecessors. Thus for instance he is the only writer in the Sampradāya who pays homage to Gopīnātha, the elder son of Vallabha.⁴ He calls him the Vallabha-Pratinidhi. The relation between Vitthaleśa and

3. Śuddhādvaita Mārtanda. V. 34-36. Appendix to Śuddhādvaita-siddhāntapradīpa. p. 226.

4. A.B.P. Intro. V. 5. p. 1.

Gopīnātha was fairly cordial but after the death of Gopīnātha, there was some quarrel between his wife and Viṭṭhaleśa. As a result of this, perhaps, and also because Gopīnātha did not enjoy a long life so as to be able to do something for the system, he was completely forgotten by the scholars of the Sampradāya. Any way, Puruṣottama thought it to be sheer in-justice and thus he mentioned him even before Viṭṭhaleśa. Curiously enough this has led to a traditional belief in the Sampradāya that Gopīnātha was reborn as Puruṣottama.⁵

Puruṣottama again is completely conservative in his outlook like a typical Brahmin author of mediaeval days. He does not like that even the Śūtras and women should be given freedom to get knowledge as much as a member of the three higher classes. After Viṭṭhaleśa there was a tendency among the teachers of the Sampradāya to appeal to the lower strata of ignorant masses and to explain to them the Bhāgavata, the Mahābhārata and such other works. Puruṣottama tries to put a check on this and says that

5. Cf. Puṣṭimārgaṇaṁ pañcāśo varṣa. Part. II. p. 2.

the Śūdras and women may be allowed to study these works but only those portions which do not treat of Brahman. He discusses the whole point and argues out why they should not be allowed to do so.⁶

A very important point, which should be noted in this connection, is that Puruṣottama was very careful in emphasising a high moral standard for the people. Puruṣottama has discussed the whole question of Indriya-nigraha very forcefully and at length in his Āvaranabhaṅga.⁷ Puruṣottama was also unhappy at the way in which foreign language and dress were wholeheartedly welcomed by his own people. He called them fools.⁸ Puruṣottama had thus something of a reformer in him and he tried hard to point out that laxity of morals should never be tolerated in any case.

6. A.B.P.pp.442-444.

7. T.Sn.Ab.V.238.pp.184-186.

8. Etena ye mūrkhā anāpady api mlecchādiveśabhāṣādikam
rocayante svīkurvanti ca te'pi tatheti bodhyam.

T.Sn.Ab.p.163.

To remove the ignorance of his own people and to refute the charges against the Sampradāya, Puruṣottama goes to the extent of discussing even the practice of the Brahmasambandha and the prose passage connected with it. He explains the Brahmasambandha as "Brahmasambandho nāma sarvasmin bhagavatsvāmikatvarūpaḥ sambandhaḥ; tasya karanam nāma bhagavatā ācāryān prati gadyenokto ya ātmasamarpana-prekārah; tadrītyā bhagavati svātmasahitasvīyasarvapaḍārthā-nām bhagavati tathātvavijñāpanam. 'Sa vai naiva reme' iti śruteḥ, 'krīḍārtham ātmana idam trijagatkṛtam te svāmyam tu tatra kudhiyo para īśa kuryar' ity ādivākyaḥ ca, vestutaḥ sarvasya bhagavadīyatve'pi 'sa vai naiva' ityādi śrutyā ramanārtham dvitīyanirmāṇādiśrāvanāt tenāpāditā yā tattatpadārthe jīvasya svatvasvīyatvābhināpiḥ tatparityā-gena teṣu bhagavadīyatvasya vijñāpanam ūti yāvat."⁹ While discussing the prose passage, Puruṣottama knows that he is not maintaining the secrecy of the Sampradāya. He is apologetic for this. He says : "Yat punaḥ prācīnair atra

9. Puruṣottama's Vivaraṇa on Siddhāntarahasya. p. 39.

kim api noktam tatraitadgopyatvam eva bījam. Mayā tu yad
 idam uktaṁ tad bahirmukhemukhadhvansārtham eveti na tad-
 -virodho doṣāya. Yady api maduktau mārgarahasyaprakāśanā-
 -parādha āyāti, tathāpi prākāśanasyānyenaiva kṛtatvena-
 -tadarthasandehavāraṇasyaiva matkṛtitayā svotkarsaprakāśanā-
 -rjhatvābhāvāt bhagavān śrīmadācāryacaranāś ca madaparādhem
 kṣemanth¹⁰ iti dik."

Puruṣottama treats all his predecessors with due
 respects. This is particularly noticeable in his commentaries
 on the sixteen tracts, where he refers to the diversity of
 interpretations given by the earlier writers of the
 Sampradāya. It is important to note that in these cases
 Puruṣottama does not refute those who have given different
 interpretations. He just refers to them and then he appears
 to give his own view with some hesitation. A typical
 example of this is found in his commentary on the
 Bhaktivardhinī, when he says that he was inspired by the
 Lord to explain in that way. He says : "Prāñcas tu kecid-
 imam bhānam āsaktilakṣaṇatvenāhuh. Anye punar Vyasa-

lakṣaṇatvena. Artham ca svasvarītyā tam~~ā~~ tam āhuḥ. Mama tu bhagavān evaṃ preritavān iti mayaiṃ vākyākhyātam. Gr̥h̥atyaga evācāryāṇāṃ āśayasya sphuṭatvād iti.¹¹"

To wind up the whole discussion we may again bræefly indicate Puruṣottama's contribution to the Śuddhādvaita. Firstly Puruṣottama has for the first time analysed and explained those principles of the Śuddhādvaita, which have so far been neglected by his predecessors. Secondly Puruṣottama for the first time put the Śuddhādvaita System on a dialecti-
-cal basis, on a par with other systems of the Vedānta and outside the Vedānta. Thirdly Puruṣottama tried to raise the moral standard of the people.

(III).

Puruṣottama's influence on the Sampṛadāya.

Puruṣottama's voluminous works, commentaries and indepen-
-dent tracts, opened the eyes of latter scholars of the system. They considered it therefore their duty to focus their attention on the principal works of the Śuddhādvaita, Anubhāṣya, Tattvadīpanibandha and to a lesser extent the Vidvanmandana. They saw that these works should no longer be

11. Puruṣottama's commentary on Bhaktivardhini. p. 40.

neglected and efforts were made to study them and to explain them by writing commentaries on them. This is surely an achievement for Puruṣottama, because none of his predecessors explained those works and they were content with commenting upon the sixteen tracts and some parts of the Subodhinī alone. The deep and penetrating insight found in the works of Puruṣottama however shows that he set a very high standard of scholarship, which could not be achieved by the scholars who followed him. Those commentators followed the voluminous works of Puruṣottama and many of them appear to have given nothing more than simple short explanations, abridged and culled from the ^Pṛakāśa or Suvarṇasūtra or Āvaranabhāṅga.

Out of the successors of Puruṣottama, Gopasvara can be called the most outstanding writer and scholar in the Sampradāya. Even his father Gokulotsava, who was born in V.S. 1815, was a very good scholar and was called Vidvat-śiromaṇi and Vāk-cāturi-dhurīṇa. We have seen that Puruṣottama gave his property to another Puruṣottama, son of Muralīdhara. This Puruṣottama's son Govardhanesā also died sonless. His wife Mahārāṇīvahuḥjī adopted Gokulotsava

in V.S.1850. Gokulotsava is said to have written some comentaries. Shri C.H. Shastri gave me a list of some of the works written by him. They are : (1) Saundaryapadyatīkā, (2) Vivekadhairyaśrayatīkā, (3) Saṁnyāsanirṇayatīkā, (4) Siddhānta-rahasyatīkā and (5) Śṛṅgāraraśamandanatīkā. It is said that Gokulotsava was a very good speaker.

Gopeśvara, born in V.S.1835, was the eldest son of Gokulotsava. On account of Gokulotsava's adoption to the pontifical chair in Surat, Gopeśvara could acquire all the works, that were in possession of Puruṣottama. It was a literary heritage and Gopeśvara took the greatest advantage of it. Shri. C.H. Shastri could find out a list of his works, in his own handwriting. His works as stated in the list are as follows:-

- (1) Vedanavārthitīkā,
- (2) Brhadāraṇyaka-brāhmaṇadvaya-tīkā,
- (3) Chāndogyānuvāk-vyākhyā,
- (4) Ātmabodhopaniṣat-tīkā,
- (5) Śloko...with commentary (Some letters are missing here in the list, found by C.H. Shastri),
- (6) Sadyuktimaṇi,
- (7) Bhaktimārtanda,
- (8) Fourth Adhyāya of the Adhikaraṇamālā,

- (9) Ātmavāda,
- (10) Parivṛdhāṣṭakāṭikā,
- (11) Svapnadarśanaṭikā,
- (12) Sub-commentary on the commentary of the Vivaraṇa-
-kārikās, on 'Kathā imāste...',
- (13) Bhaktiretna,
- (14) Bhaktiretnaṭikā,
- (15) Raśmi,
- (16) Pañcapadī,
and
- (17) Jaiminisūtravṛtti.

Raśmi is a voluminous sub-commentary on the Bhāṣya-
-prakāśa of Puruṣottama. Shri M.T. Telivala says about it
thus: "The author of Raśmi thoroughly explains not only
the Bhāṣyaparakāśa of Śrī Puruṣottamajī but even supplies
the want, which was felt by the readers of Prakāśa.

Prakāśakāra took for granted that readers^{or} of Aṇubhāṣya,
understood the literal sense of the Aṇubhāṣya and hence
we rarely find him explaining the literal text of the
Aṇubhāṣya. For this reason, the author of Raśmi in all
places where he finds that Śrī Puruṣottamajī has not
explained the Aṇubhāṣya, tries to give the literal meaning

of all the passages of the Anubhāṣya." ¹² Gopeśvara was called "yogī" and 'sarvavettā', while Puruṣottama was called 'Paṇḍita Purandarepārī!' and 'Daśa-Śāganta-vāṇijayā!'. A comparison between Puruṣottama and Gopeśvara need not be attempted, but it must be said that Gopeśvara was recognised by the Sampre-dāya as a sincere devotee, besides being recognised as a great scholar, while Puruṣottama was appreciated only as a scholar.

It will be a point of interest to compare the Bhakti-mārtanda of Gopeśvara with the Prasthānaratnākara of Puruṣottama. Like the Prasthānaratnākara, it also contains four chapters on Premāṇa, Prameya, Sādhana and Phala. But there is an important point of difference. Puruṣottama's aim is to explain the theories of the Śuddhādvaita, whereas Gopeśvara sets out to explain the Bhakti, as he himself says in the beginning. ¹³ Thus he begins not with an explanation of the theory of knowledge or the means of proof, but with a

12. A.B. with P.&R. III. i. Intro. p. 10.

13. Vedādisarvasāstrārthabhūtām brahmiṣṭhadurlabhām,

Bhaktim vakṣye yethāśāstram prabhubhir viśadīkṛtām.

Bhaktimārtanda. Intro. V. 5. p. 1.

question as to how Bhakti can be understood as the meaning of all the Śāstras. Similarly the Prameyaprakaraṇa is also written with the express purpose of explaining Bhakti.¹⁴ The Sādhanaaprakaraṇa is to show that Bhakti is the main Sādhana, and the fruit obtained by means of it is explained in the last chapter. Gopeśvara discusses other topics also, e.g. the concept of akṣara,¹⁵ that of Abheda,¹⁶ etc, but one will find that these discussions are subordinated to the discussion on Bhakti. Again many of them are bodily found in the works of Puruṣottama. A typical example of this is Puruṣottama's defence of Bhāskara against Vācaspati in the Anubhāsyaprakāśa. The whole passage is almost quoted in the Bhaktimārtanda.¹⁷

Thus we find that in his works Gopeśvara discusses more about Bhakti, Puṣṭi, Līlā and all that than Puruṣottama. If Puruṣottama can be compared with Vallabha, Gopeśvara should be

14. Atha bhaktiśabdārtham nirṇetum prameyaprakaraṇam
ārabhyate. Bhaktimārtanda. p. 70.

15. Bhaktimārtanda. p. 109. ff.

16. Bhaktimārtanda. p. 116. ff.

17. Cf. Bhaktimārtanda. p. 205. ff. and A. B. P. pp. 93-95.

compared with Vitthaleśa. Even in the colophons one may note that while Puruṣottama generally refers to Vallabha, Gopeśvara, refers to Vitthaleśa.¹⁸

We have noted above how Cokulotsava came to Surat, after being adopted by Mahārānīvahujī, wife of Govardhaneśa. His descendants were also good scholars and sincere devotees. Surat thus remains a seat of learning. Just now the Badamandir in Surat is adored by His Holiness Shri. Vrajaratna-lalji Maharaj, who was born in V.S. 1952. He is a very good scholar himself and a sincere devotee. Due to his efforts the Akhila Bharatiya Shri Balakrishna Shuddhadvaita Mahasabha was established in Surat in V.S. 1882. Many works of the Sampradāya have been published by the said association. The Mahasabha is also conducting examinations on the Śuddhādvaita. One Shuddhadvaita Vaishnava school has been established in Madras in V.S. 2002. There is also a Vallabha-Vedānta prize, bearing his name in the Gujarat University.

(IV).

Puruṣottama's place in Indian Philosophy.

The late Pandit Gattulalji of Bombay is said to have

18. See. Colophons. in A.B. with P. & R.

compared Puruṣottama with the famous Jain scholar Hemacandra, described as Kalikālasarvajña, and with Sāyana Mādhava. He called Puruṣottama a 'Sarvatantrasvatantṛa! The title of Sarvatantrasvatantṛa, though so much in vogue among ancient scholars, has not often been understood exactly as regards the meaning, it conveys. Sarvatantrah may mean one who knows all the Tantras. 'Sarvāṇi tantrāṇi adhīṣe veda vā.' Together with this is added 'Sva-tantra' which shows that such a scholar is not only a very good student of all the systems, but is an independent thinker himself. Thus he has both the scholar-ship and originality of thinking.

Hemacandra, perhaps the greatest Jain scholar, who ever wrote in Sanskrit and Prakrit, was not just a philosopher or teacher of Jainism. He was a poet, grammarian, rhetorician, historian, writer of a work on prosody, and what not. Puruṣottama also was a profound scholar of all the branches of Sanskrit literature and philosophy. We have seen that he refers to many works and systems and has so many things of his own to say regarding them. One may perhaps feel that Puruṣottama, though a prolific writer, has written everything by way of

explaining the 'Suddhādvaita theories and practices, while for Hemachandra it may be said that he has written on all the branches of literature independently.

Puruṣottama should be compared with great commentators like Vācaspati Miśra, Sudarśana Bhaṭṭa, and Jayatīrtha. All these scholars were authors of standard commentaries on the Bhāṣyas of their respective masters. Even among these, the figure of Vācaspati Miśra stands aloof. He can really be called Sarvatantrasvatantra, because he has written scholarly and authentic commentaries on almost all the orthodox systems of Indian Philosophy. He has written Nyāyakanikā, Tattvasamīkṣā, Tattvabindu, Nyāyavērttikatātparyatīkā, Sāṅkhya-tattvakaumudī, Tattvaśārādī and Bhāmaṇi. Thus he wrote on all the systems of Indian Philosophy except the Vaiśeṣika. It is noteworthy that Vācaspati, though a follower of Śaṅkara, shows himself an independent thinker, owing allegiance to no single system in a dogged manner. Puruṣottama is surely an independent thinker (Svatantra), and has passed his own comments on the concepts of other systems also, but he is a follower of the Suddhādvaita, from the first to the last.

Curiously however there is one common point between the two. Just as Puruṣottama was charged with having taught the Apasiddhānta, even Vācaspati was taken to task by some for saying something against the Bhāṣya of Śaṅkara. Amalānanda gives a spirited defence of Vācaspati, when he says :
 "Tasmād Vācaspatimatam Bhāṣyaviruddham iti kaiścid ayuktaṃ uktaṃ. Kiñ ca -

Agnītatvabhṛāntatādṛśād arakṣat parameśvaram,
 Etad bhāṣyārthatattvārtho vācaspatir agādhadhiḥ." 19

Puruṣottama's task however as a commentator of Vallabha was more difficult than that of Vācaspati, Sudarśana, or Jayatīrtha. Śaṅkara, Rāmāṇja and Madhva were clear and exact, while Vallabha was not at all clear, at times very obscure. The difficulty of Puruṣottama thus lay in the terse laconic style of Vallabha. Hence whereas Vācaspati and others were concerned with advancing the arguments for the positions, accepted by their respective Ācāryas, Puruṣottama had to explain the theories of Vallabha, analyse them and then indulge in argumentation.

19. Kelpateru on Brahmasūtras. I. ii. 22, quoted by D. K. Shastri in 'Aitiḥāsika Śaṅśodhana.' p. 122.

The real contribution of Puruṣottama to Indian Philosophy is his work for the Sampṛadāya. He could see that it was an age of Chaos, in which the system of Vallabha could flourish~~ed~~ only if it was properly explained and argued out. Otherwise it would go down in the eyes of scholars. Puruṣottama did what was needed. His name will be remembered in the History of Indian Thought as the strongest and greatest exponent of the Śuddhādvaita, which was hitherto not understood and was therefore mis-understood and neglected. If one wants to study the system of Vallabha, one should read the works not ^{only} of Vallabha and his son, but one should also read with them the commentaries of Puruṣottama, besides his independent works. It is really a misfortune that a scholar like Puruṣottama should have been jeered at and called 'Veda-paśu' by those for whom he wrote and debated and argued.

The best appreciation of Puruṣottama was made by Prof. M. C. Shastri, who founded an association called 'Śrī Puruṣottama Mandala' in Bombay in 1925 A.D. Every week end Prof. Shastri came from Poona to Bombay and delivered Lectures on the works of Vallabha and Puruṣottama. It is interesting to note that in 1926 A.D. the members of the said association

expressed their feeling of gratitude to the Learned Professor by presenting him an address and a Gold Medal in the Madhavbag, Bombay.

The present writer has seen a copy of the picture of Puruṣottama and is prepared to endorse readily what Shri. N.D.Mehta has said about him. Shri Mehta who happened to see one such copy remarks that his forehead is brimming with profound thoughts and his large eyes appear to accept the objections of the opponents with an open mind. The pointed tip of his nose shows his ability to refute those objections with subtle arguments, and his chin shows the strength of his firm determination.²⁰

At the end of this study, I would like to quote two traditional verses regarding Puruṣottama:

- (1) Śrīmadvallabhadīkṣītāhvayaharer vandyānvaye saṁpāmas
Tatkārūṇyasudhābhīṣekavikasatsaubhāgyabhūmodayah,
Dṛpyaddurmedavādividvadbhaduṣkūṭoktikumbhasthālī-
Sadyobhañjenakelikesaripatih Pītāmbarasya ātmajah.

20. Cf. N.D.Mehta. Hinda Tattvajñāna Itihāsa. Vol. II. p. 260.

(2) Nēśīd ena samah samastanigamasmrtyāditattvārthavid

Vektā cāpratimāḥ sadāḥsu viduṣāṃ adyēpi bhūmau budhaḥ,

Yah sarvaṃ naivalakṣapādyakamitapraudhāprabandhaṃ vyadhāt

Sa Śrīmān Puruṣottamaḥ Vijayatāṃ Ācāryacūdāmaṇiḥ.

-(0) X X X (0)-


" APPENDIX " .No.I."

Horoscope of Purusottama.

॥ श्री ॥

संवत् १७३४ शकः १५७९ भाद्रपद शुक्ल
१० चतुर्वार १८/४ परं ११ तिथौ प्राकट्य
उत्तराशाढा न. दृष्टी ३६/३६ अतिगंजयोग
ध. कन्यासंक्रांति गतांक्षा ६ दृष्ट दृष्टि ३३/०.
गो. क्षीपीताम्बारजीगृहे क्षीपुर्बोत्तमजी जन्म.

अथ जन्म.



"APPENDIX.No.II."

Release executed by Gaigābetījī, Jānakīvahuji and Vrajabhūṣaṇa.
(From Venuṇāda Vol. I. No. 3)

શ્રીસૈવત ૧૭૩૭ વર્ષે પ્રથમ આસો સુદ ૩ વાર રવેલી શ્રી શામલસુત વીજરાજ જોગ લા. શ્રી બેટી શ્રી ગંગાબેટીજ તથા શ્રી જાનકીવહુજ તથા શ્રી વ્રજભૂષણ જત સેવા ૨ બેચ તથા શ્રી પાદકાજી સેવા માટે વેવાજદ હતો તે અમો અમારા કુળની રીત સમજ છીએ, તેની વિગત જે શ્રી બાલકૃષ્ણજી સેવા એ હમો આપી તથા શ્રી પાદકાજી ૧ એકે એક શ્રી આચારજી સેવા શ્રી ગંગાબેટીજ પાસે આ રંગા રહે ત્યાં સુધી શ્રી ગંગાબેટી પાસે રહે પછી શ્રી પાદકાજી ૧ એકે એક શ્રી આચારજી આપીએ, તથા દ્વરકાનાથજી અમારા છે તે અમો પાસે રહે, તે એવું એણી રીતે સમજાવું છું. અમારે કશી વાતનો વિવાદ નથી. હવેરામદાવા બીજાં આજદીન પહેલું એ વિવાદ માટે લખું તથા કાગળપત્ર મોરો મોરી જે પાસેથી નીકલે તે રદ છે. આજ દીન સુધી કશી વાતનું લેવું દેવું નહીં.

૧. અત્ર	મતુ	૧ લગ	સાખ
બેટી- ગંગાબેટીજ મતુ		૧. અતર સાખ શ્રી કલ્યાણરાયજી સુત	
જાનકીવહુજ મતુ		શ્રી હરીરાયજી	
મતુ ઉપર લખું તે સહી.		૧. સુંદરદાસ વેણીલાલ ઘણી હજુર	
૧ લા. શ્રી વ્રજભૂષણ ઉપર		લા. વનમાલીદાસ.	
લખું સહી.		૧. ગાંધી હરીદાસ તલજાદાસ સાખ	
		૧. રામસન સુત લિઠૂલ સાખ	
		૧. ભગવાનજી જનબી સાખ ઘણીએ	
		હજુર	
		૧. કલ્યાણદાસ મોરારજી સાખ	
		ઉપર લખ્યા પ્રમાણે કરી છે.	
		૧. સા. સ. ઉદેસિંગ જગજીવનદાસ.	

" APPENDIX No. III. "

Gift-Deed of Purusottama. (From Vēṇṇāda Vol. I. No. 3)

॥ श्री हरिर्जयति ॥

संवत् ३७८३ वर्षे द्वितीयायाद सुदी ३० गुरौ
दिने गुंसाइ पुरुषोत्तमजी मुरलीधरजीसुत विदुल्लेखाजीके
पौत्र योग्य निश्चितं गुंसाइ पुरुषोत्तमजी पीतांबरजीसुत
यदुपतिजीके पौत्र यत् में अपनी आरोच्यतामें अपनी
इच्छातें जो वस्तु मेरी हुती सो दीनी इसको, ताकी विगत
श्रीबालकृष्णजी तथा श्रीप्राजेश्वरजी तथा ओर हाकुरजी हैं
को तथा श्रीगुंसाइजीकी पादुका तथा चरणारविंद तथा
हाकुरके आभरणपात्र तथा हुयेजी साजसज्जकाली तथा
याकिंचित् वस्तु जो हे सो सब में सुरति मध्ये दियो,
यामें काहुको सर संबंध नही.

३. अत्र सतं
निश्चितं पुरुषोत्तमजी
पीतांबरजीसुत यदुपतिजीके
पौत्र. में अपन हुताश्वको
उपर लिख्यो सो सही."

तत्र साक्षिणः

१. निश्चितं श्रीवल्लभजी
श्रीविदुल्लेखाजीसुत
उपरको लिख्यो सही.

१. निश्चितं श्रीवल्लभात्मज
मुरलीधरजी. उपर
लिख्यो सही.

३. अत्र साक्षी श्रीकल्याण-
दायजीसुत श्रीप्रजपालजी.

there are many other witnesses also.

" A P P E N D I X.No.IV."

Description and colophons of the manuscript of Rāmāyana,
deposited in the Chunilal Gandhi Vidyabhavan, Surat."

The Manuscript is written on old
handmade country paper in Devanāgarī
characters. All the काण्डs have separate
pagination.

काण्डs I and II :- 346 folios. In the
colophons upto सर्ग 12, the name given to the
काण्ड is वाल्मीकाण्ड or आदिकाण्ड. Thereafter
we have अयोध्याकाण्ड.

Begins: ॥ श्री गणेशाय नमः ॥ ॥ ॐ नमो
शङ्खपते वासुदेवाय ॥ ॥ श्री रामाय नमः ॥ ॥ जयाते
बधुवंद्रातिन्मकः कौद्रान्या हृदयमन्दसो नमः ॥ द्वा-
वदसासिधमकारी दाद्वानथी पुण्डरीकाक्षुः ॥ नमस्तनसै
मुनीन्द्राय श्रीयुगाय तपावलिने ॥ सर्वज्ञासाधिवान्माय
वाल्मीकिमुनये नमः ॥ etc.

Ends: इत्यार्षे रामायणे अयोध्याकाण्डांतर-
पार्त्तिसि सवतकाण्डे संहितासप्तषष्ठो नाम सर्गः ॥
॥ ३७६ ॥ ॥ इदं पुत्राणमायुष्यं ब्राह्मं च विजयावहं ॥
..... य इमं श्रावयेत् पुत्रसंख्या आहू पर्वणि पर्वणि ॥
पितृणां शुभया तृप्तिर्जायते नात्र संशयः ॥ ॥ ६३ ॥
॥ श्रीरामाय नमः ॥ ॥ श्री ॥ ॥ ६३ ॥ ॥ ६३ ॥

॥ संवत् १७८६ चैत्र शुद्ध २ सोमो निर्वर्तितसिद्धं ॥
॥ शुद्धसम्बन्धु ॥ ॥ कल्याणसम्बन्धु ॥ ॥ श्री ॥

काण्ड III :- 131 folios.

Begins: श्रीगणेशाय नमः ॥ ॥ जयति
मृगुपंक्षातिभक्तः प्रथमकविर्दिग्गजवरः स्वामीजीकिः ॥
मृदुलान्धितपदसिद्धं कृतसिद्ध नामायणं येन ॥ १ ॥
etc.

Ends: इत्यार्षे नामायणे आरूप्यककांडे
पंचाविंशो नाम सर्गः ॥ ॥ ८१ ॥ नामायणसम्बन्धु-
कांडे ॥ नामाय नमः ॥ ॥ श्री ॥ ॥ श्री ॥ ॥ ६९ ॥
॥ श्रीरस्तु ॥ ॥ कल्याणसम्बन्धु ॥ ॥ ६९ ॥ ॥ श्री ॥
॥ शुद्धसम्बन्धु ॥ ॥ श्री ॥ ॥ संवत् ॥ ॥ १७८६ ॥ ॥ वैशाख ॥
॥ शुद्ध २ सोमो निर्वर्तितसिद्धं ॥ ॥

काण्ड IV :- 144 folios.

Begins: ॥ ॥ ७३० नमः श्रीनामचंद्राय ॥
॥ श्री गुरुभ्यो नमः ॥ ॥ लो तु दृष्ट्वा महात्मारौ etc.

Ends: इत्यार्षे नामायणे किष्किंधाकांडे
चतुर्विंशतिनामकां संहितायां श्रीवाल्मीकीये उद्योगे
हस्तसतः सागरत्रयसो नाम सर्गः ॥ ॥ ६५ ॥
॥ संपूर्णसिद्धं किष्किंधाकांडे नामायणं ॥ ॥ शुद्धसम्बन्धु ॥
॥ कल्याणसम्बन्धु ॥ ॥ द्विधसम्बन्धु सर्वजगतः पर-
हितानीरताः सर्वंतु भूतगण ॥ दोषा त्रयांतु
नादां सर्वत्र जगः सुखीभवतु ॥

॥ श्री वासवंगाय नमः ॥ ॥ संवत् १७८६ वर्ष
 ज्येष्ठ शुदि ७ बुद्धे ग्रंथ समाप्तः ॥
 ॥ हनुमान्तये नमः ॥ ॥ श्री वास ॥ ॥ श्री ॥ ॥ छ ॥

काण्ड १ :- २४१ folios.

Beginn: ॥ श्री गणेशाय नमः ॥ ॥ श्री वासाय
 नमः ॥ जितं शगवता तेन हविषा लोकधात्रिणा ॥
 अजेन विश्वरूपेण निर्गुणेन गुणात्मना ॥ १ ॥
 जयति बहुधातिशयः etc.

Ends: इत्यार्षे वासायणे पान्सीके सुंदर-
 कांडे अंकापर्वणि अंकोपरोधो नाम सर्गः ॥ ३
 ॥ १३० ॥ ॥ समाप्तं सुंदरं .

काण्ड १ :- २२५ folios. Different
 handwriting.

Beginn: ॥ ॐ नमः श्री वासाय नमः ॥
 ॥ जयति बहुधातिशयः etc.

Ends: इत्यार्षे श्री वासायणे पान्सीकीये
 सुंदरकांडे वासराज्यवर्णनो नाम सर्गः ॥ १०३ ॥
 ॥ छ ॥ ॥ शुभं भवतु ॥ ॥ संवत् १७८६ वर्ष
 श्रावणमासे कृष्णपक्षे २ सोमवासरे लिखित-
 सिद्धं ॥ ॥ कन्याणमस्तु ॥ ॥ छ ॥ ॥ छ ॥ ॥ श्री ॥

काण्ड VII :- It is unfortunately incomplete. It has 132 folios, and ends abruptly. The text is damaged. Folios have stuck to one another. Handwriting is still different.

Begins: तिष्ठकः . . . अथवाक्य-
 द्विजपदः अ वागसीकः । मृदुन निरपद . . . etc.
 Ends: Abruptly.

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